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Middle East
No. 62

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Secret

Correspondence regarding

ADEN COLONY

AND

ADEN PROTECTORATE

CLOSED UNTIL 1971

1936—1940

(In continuation of Middle East No. 59; continued by Middle East No. 65.)

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Printed for the use of the Colonial Office.

Middle East
No. 62

Secret

Correspondence regarding

ADEN COLONY

AND

ADEN PROTECTORATE

1936—1940

(*In continuation of Middle East No. 59 ;*
continued by Middle East No. 65.)

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NOTE:—A copy of A. Beeby Thompson and Partners' Report on Eastern Aden Protectorate (Hadhramaut) Water Problems is printed as Eastern No. 176.

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING ADEN COLONY AND ADEN PROTECTORATE

1936—1940

1. ROAD FUND

78105/37 [No. 8]. No. 1.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13th September, 1937.)

(No. 227.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 1st September, 1937.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram No. 70 of the 26th August, 1937*, on the subject of road policy in the Aden Protectorate, I have the honour to submit herewith, in quadruplicate, a preliminary application for assistance from the Colonial Development Fund†.

2. The object of this application is to provide for the topographical survey on which alone can be based the accurate estimates for the comprehensive scheme of road construction, which it is intended shall form the subject of a further application to the Colonial Development Fund. The reasons which have led me to the conclusion that such an application is justified are set out in the following paragraphs.

3. The Aden Protectorate has not hitherto enjoyed the improved methods of transport which the advent of the automobile has introduced to nearly all other parts of Arabia. To this day, the only alternative to the aeroplane is, in most districts, the camel. The physical conformation of the Protectorate, rather than the indolence or indifference of its inhabitants, is responsible for this perpetuation of primitive conditions. Wide unbroken plains, such as those which unite, rather than divide, Iraq and Syria are not to be found within its borders, nor has the enterprise of the roadbuilder to contend merely with the comparatively adaptable contours of northern Arabia. To the pioneer, the terrain of the Protectorate opposes two redoubtable obstacles: first, the shifting sands of the coastal plain, which are for the most part impassable for any form of wheeled traffic, and secondly, the rugged and inhospitable mountain ranges which rise behind them, and through which, as in the time of Job, the torrent beds provide the only passage. It is this two-fold barrier that separates Aden from the fertile plateaux which lie between 5,000 and 8,000 feet above sea level and extend roughly the length of the Protectorate, and also from the territory of the Yemen.

In a few cases, motor transport has been introduced, but over tracks which are generally nothing more than boulder-strewn torrent beds. In only one case (to which I made reference in my telegram No. 56 of 19th August‡) has scientific road construction ever been undertaken; namely, the zig-zag track originally constructed by the Army at the time of the Boundary Commission in the early years of the century to lift the road from the Wadi Hartaba to the Dhala' plateau. This has recently been reconditioned, but must still in places be classed as dangerous for motor traffic.

4. I am of opinion that three main advantages would result from adequate road construction in the Protectorate: in the first place political security would be enhanced; secondly, trade between the Western Aden Protectorate and the Eastern Aden Protectorate, and between Aden and the Yemen would be stimulated; and thirdly, a market would be found for the agricultural produce of the plateaux; and their population, who, at present, exist in indigence and squalor, would have some prospect of rising to a more comfortable and useful plane of life.

* 78105/37 [No. 5]: not printed. † Not printed. ‡ 78105/37 [No. 4]: not printed.

5. As regards the first advantage, by the construction of roads large tracts of country would be brought effectively and permanently within the orbit of security and stability. Considerable areas of the Protectorate, though nominally under British suzerainty, are still a prey to internecine strife, which renders any kind of economic or social progress out of the question. There are, unhappily, indications that in parts of the territory, owing to the indiscriminate diffusion of weapons of precision, which has disastrously facilitated the prosecution of murderous vendettas, the social and economic condition of the people has deteriorated rather than improved during recent decades. I regard it as one of the first duties of the Protecting Power to protect the inhabitants of the territory from the effect of these feuds, for until security is established nothing can be established. To this end, I feel that a good road system is a most important step. Not only will it promote that personal contact between officers of Government and the people—not in the office but in the village—which is so essential to the maintenance of mutually useful relations, but it will also introduce into regions which have hitherto been closed to them those unofficial but none the less potent influences for peace which commerce normally exerts. If oil is discovered in the Protectorate, this argument will, of course, apply with even greater cogency.

6. As regards the second advantage, there is no doubt that the opening of adequate roads between Aden and the Yemen is much to be desired. It is at present possible to make the journey by three routes, but only with great difficulty, and in dry weather, before the rains render sections of the roads practically impassable. I regard the establishment of reliable communications with those parts of the Yemen which are adjacent to the Protectorate as being of great importance, because there is no doubt that good roads will attract to the port of Aden much of the commerce which is at present diverted to Mocha (Yemen) and other minor ports. They should also foster that spirit of *bon voisinage* between the two territories which it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to promote. In this connexion it may be of interest to state that the news that a road was in contemplation which would link Aden with the plateaux, even though the physical obstacles of a precipice 3,000 feet high would prevent its actually being carried across the uplands, was received with the greatest interest and satisfaction in Beidha, the principal city of one of the richest areas of the Yemen.

7. As regards the third advantage, namely, that a market would be furnished for agricultural products, it must be remembered that over the whole of the Aden Protectorate, a territory approximately 110,000 square miles in extent, agriculture is the sole occupation and means of livelihood of the inhabitants. That being so, it is all the more regrettable that their standard of cultivation is so low and the deficiency of communications so paralyzing that, at a time when the importance of Aden as a shipping and fuelling port is steadily increasing, practically none of the port's vegetable or grain supplies have come from the Protectorate; so that at present about 30 lakhs of rupees are spent annually on the import into Aden by sea of fresh vegetables and grain from foreign countries. There seems little doubt that the fertile plains and mountain terraces, which at present nourish nothing but grain, a few wild fig trees, sour apricots and under-sized grapes, could bear far larger and marketable crops. So far as the strictly agricultural side of the question is concerned, I propose to address you separately in due course; but clearly the provision of adequate communications is essential if producer and market are to be connected to their mutual advantage. Once this connexion is established a market should be created within the Protectorate for products manufactured in the United Kingdom.

8. Such are the reasons which lead me to believe that a progressive road policy would both promote security and prosperity within the Protectorate and would also open up new markets for external commerce. In order to put this policy into effect, I consider that the construction of four main roads should be undertaken. These roads are indicated on the enclosed map* and are numbered in order of importance. I append the following notes in regard to each:—

(1) *Aden–Ta'iz.*—This route, which for about 70 miles of its length runs through the Protectorate, at present provides the only communication between Aden and Ta'iz, which is one of the most important coffee-bearing districts in the Yemen. From Ta'iz the motor road proceeds to Hodeida on the Red Sea coast, via Mocha of coffee fame, or via Haiss and Zabid and Beit al Faqih. The Yemeni Governor-General of the Ta'iz province has repeatedly requested this administration to put the Protectorate section of this road into a proper state of repair. The construction of the existing road is due almost entirely to the Sultan of Lahej through whose territory a portion of it runs. I consider that this road should remain the main arterial route between the two countries,

* Not reproduced.

but that it should be made passable, as far as practicable, in all weathers. To this end, the easing of gradients in many places and the construction of at least one bridge is desirable.

(2) *Aden–Shuqra–Lodar–Shibam.*—Shuqra is the capital of the Fadhli Sultan and is situated on the coast about 70 miles east of Aden. It is already possible to reach it by car, but in the vicinity of the Wadis Bana and Hassan the going is extremely rough. Beyond Shuqra the road runs inland towards the mountains. A recent inspection of the route has shown that, while a short stretch of less than 20 miles presents certain obstacles to wheeled traffic, once the Jaheil plateau is attained the terrain presents no difficulties, and Lodar, the capital of the 'Audhali Sultan, can be reached with ease.

From Lodar it would be possible to extend the route to Yeshbum, Nisab and Shabwa, and thence to the Hadhramaut. From Yeshbum a branch road could also descend the Gheil Habban to the coast where it would connect with the rapidly expanding system of motor-tracks of which the mileage is already 350 miles. This road would thus become the main connexion between the east and west sections of the Protectorate. It would also, via Yeshbum, afford access to the Empty Quarter.

I am glad to say that the Fadhli Sultan is already engaged on the construction of the first section from Shuqra to the Jaheil plateau, and as an encouragement to his initiative I have provided him with a supply of tools and with technical advice.

(3) *Aden–Dhala'.*—Dhala', which lies about 90 miles north of Aden, is the capital of the Amiri Sultan, one of the most progressive Rulers of the Protectorate.

The existing track runs for some miles along a torrent bed of which the conformation is constantly changing and always difficult. If possible, the road should be rendered independent of the vagaries of nature. If this can be done, there seems no doubt that a prosperous agricultural trade can be established between Dhala' and Aden.

(4) *Aden–Mufalis.*—This route also provides a supplementary route to the Yemen, from which it would no doubt attract considerable custom. An additional advantage is that it facilitates rapid communication with the littoral between Aden and the western frontier of the Protectorate, which for strategic reasons is desirable.

Once the main trunk roads are established, I do not doubt that local enterprise will supplement them with an extensive system of "feeder" roads, particularly on the uplands where conditions are favourable.

9. I now come to the type of road which is to be constructed. The modern automobile has shown itself capable of overcoming obstacles which would have arrested its less robust predecessors: and it is no longer necessary to provide a metalled surface to ensure reasonably comfortable travel. I do not therefore propose, except in one instance to which I refer below, to provide more than a good "piste", masonry culverts, and, where necessary, simple bridges. Over much, perhaps over most, of the proposed routes it would be possible to follow the immemorial camel tracks: in some places all that will be called for will be the clearing and draining of the existing route. In certain localities, however, it will be necessary radically to re-align the track so as to provide gradients and corners which can be negotiated by wheeled traffic.

The exception to which I referred above is the stretch of road 16 miles in length between Shiekh Othman and Lahej. Besides joining Lahej with Aden, this road forms the first section of two of the proposed routes. As the ground is sandy and the road already carries a very considerable traffic, I consider that a "mix-in-place" asphalt road should, if practicable, be put down.

10. I come finally to the question of the maintenance of the roads once they are constructed. By the first proviso to section 1 (2) of the Colonial Development Act, 1929, the use of forced labour is prohibited; nor should I as a matter of principle put forward any proposal for the imposition of even a modified *corvée* such as is in force in the Yemen. Fortunately, local practice provides an alternative, since it is customary for road tolls to be levied on every camel load of merchandise which passes through any Ruler's territory. In order to protect the camel trade and the interests of camel owners generally it is proposed that motor fares and freight charges should be fixed at a higher rate than the current camel fares and freight charges. This system has been successfully introduced in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, and I propose that it should be adopted and regularized in regard to the new roads, and that an adequate portion of the toll charges should be set aside for the purpose of upkeep of the roads, which would in future be a first charge upon all such dues. The fund so created would be administered by a board on which all the Rulers concerned as well as Government would be represented.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

(C46866)

78105/37 [No. 13] Extract. No. 2.

MR. D. J. WARDLEY (TREASURY)

to

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE).

EXTRACT.

22nd October, 1937.

* * * * * * *

There is one further point which gives us some misgiving. If we start surveying, and still more if we start building, roads in the Aden Protectorate, what effect will it have on the Italians? I see that two of the roads go to the Yemen. Will they not regard the roads as military roads? May they not regard their construction as affording a pretext for violating the Rome Understanding? There have already been ominous signs that they are on the look out for any activities of ours in the Protectorate that would afford such a pretext.

* * * * * * *

2. PROTECTORATE LEVIES

78047/36 [No. 1]. No. 3.

AIR MINISTRY

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

SIR, Air Ministry, W.C.2, 7th January, 1936.

With further reference to your letter of the 17th October, 1935*, and Air Ministry letter of the 2nd November, 1935†, numbered as above, I am directed to inform you that the final estimate of the cost of the Aden Protectorate Levies during the financial year 1936 is £19,050 net.

The above figure includes the sum of £1,950 in respect of the addition to the Levies of one British officer (i.e., arising from the employment of one officer in connexion with anti-gas measures) and 31 natives. The figure of £1,360 for extra expenditure given in Air Ministry letter of the 13th November, 1935‡, related only to the additional native personnel. In this connexion attention is drawn to the probable excess of £1,000 on the original estimate for 1935, as shown in the attached statement.

Pending the receipt of further information from the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Aden, it is not possible to furnish details of the additional sum of £1,950 and, as it is understood that particulars of the estimated cost of the force in 1936 are urgently required, an interim statement is enclosed which shows details of the provision for the normal establishment. A further statement showing the final distribution of the total estimate of £19,050 will be forwarded as early as possible.

I am, &c.,

W. G. STEVENS.

* 78015/35 [No. 2]: not printed. † 78015/35 [No. 6]: not printed.
‡ 78047/35 [No. 21]: not printed.

Enclosure in No. 3.

ADEN PROTECTORATE LEVIES—DETAILS OF ESTIMATE FOR 1936.

	1936.	1935.	*Increase.*	*Decrease.*	*Explanation of major variations.*
	£	£	£	£	
A. Normal Establishment (a)—					
1. Pay and allowances of personnel.	7,690	7,470	220	—	Additional allowances, service gratuities, and increments of pay.
2. Rations	1,675	1,750	—	75	
3. Clothing and equipment	735	750	—	15	
4. Fuel, light, water, barrack services, etc.	1,125	965	160	—	Additional allowances to Major Grimwood on arrival of wife in Aden.
5. Animals, forage, saddlery, veterinary services, etc.	2,023	1,935	88	—	
6. Arms and ammunition ..	905	600	305	—	Provides for new Vickers gun and range-finder.
7. Medical services	400	430	—	30	
8. Transportation services ..	590	540	50	—	
9. Works Services	1,532	2,310	—	778	Decrease occurs as 1935 estimate included provision for new single quarters for 14 sweepers. 1936 estimate includes approximately half the cost of married quarter for British Warrant Officer held over from 1935.
10. Miscellaneous, i.e., training grant, general stores, telephones, etc.	215	220	—	5	
11. Payment to War Office for non-effective charges of loaned Army personnel.	250	250	—	—	
	17,140	17,220	823	903	
Deduct— Appropriations-in-aid	40	170	Add— 130	—	Receipts for clothing issues under clothing allowance system will be credited to Heading 3 in accordance with normal R.A.F. practice. Hitherto such credits have been given to A.-in-A.
	17,100	17,050	953	903	
B. Provision for increase of 1 British officer and 31 natives.	1,950	1,000(b)	950	—	
£	19,050	18,050	1,903	903	

Net increase .. £1,000.

(a) British Officers 3
British Warrant Officer 1
Arab Officers 6
Arab Other Ranks 192

(b) Expenditure on account of the emergency during 1935 not provided for in original estimate.

78047/36 [No. 13]. No. 4.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

(Sent 8 p.m., 10th March, 1936.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 23. With reference to your despatch of the 2nd October secret No. 301*, the proposed scheme for the increase of the Levies has been approved. The reorganization necessary can be commenced as from the 1st April next. A separate despatch† is being sent concerning the recommendation made in the last paragraph of your despatch referred to above that the whole defence problem, including the strength and duties of the armed police, should be reconsidered.

* No. 47 in Middle East No. 57. † No. 5.

78047/36 [No. 19].

No. 5.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

(Secret.)

Downing Street, 11th May, 1936.

SIR,

With reference to my telegram No. 23 of the 10th of March*, in which I conveyed to you approval for the increase in the strength of the Aden Protectorate Levies, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have had under review the recommendation made in the last paragraph of your secret despatch No. 301 of the 2nd of October, 1935†, that the problem of defence as a whole at Aden (including the question of the strength and duties of the armed police) in the changed circumstances which have arisen since the Defence Scheme was last under review should receive further consideration.

2. The present position is that as a result of the emergency arising from the Italo-Abyssinian dispute there has been a large increase in Imperial forces at Aden and that these forces must be regarded as providing adequately for the defence requirements of Aden for the moment. Nevertheless, since the presence of these additional forces is only a temporary measure, His Majesty's Government considered that the permanent increase in the Aden Protectorate Levies which you had recommended should be proceeded with, and authority for this was conveyed to you in my telegram under reference.

3. For the time being His Majesty's Government consider that this increase in the Aden Protectorate Levies must suffice, especially as so long as the present emergency lasts and the outcome of the present abnormal conditions remains uncertain, it is difficult to give satisfactory consideration to the question of the permanent defence forces required for the Aden area. His Majesty's Government are therefore of the opinion that consideration of the future defence requirements of Aden must be deferred until the permanent increase in the Levies has been completed and the situation arising out of the present emergency has become clarified. When these conditions are fulfilled you should put forward a revised Defence Scheme which can be drawn up in the light of the more stable situation which would then exist.

I have, &c.,

J. H. THOMAS.

3. POLICY IN THE HADHRAMAUT

78018/36 [No. 1].

No. 6.

THE ACTING RESIDENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5th October, 1936.)

[*Answered by No. 9.*]

(No. 457.)

(Confidential.)

The Residency, Aden, 22nd September, 1936.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to Sir Bernard Reilly's despatch No. 94 of 17th April, 1935‡, concerning Hadhramaut policy and to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's reply thereto of 9th September, 1935§.

2. Owing to the ill-health of the late Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and his continued absence in India, Sir Bernard Reilly was unable to pursue this subject further until after the death of the late Sultan and the election of his successor, His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib.

* No. 4. † No. 47 in Middle East No. 57. ‡ No. 72 in Middle East No. 57.
§ No. 75 in Middle East No. 57.

3. I now enclose a copy of a letter which Sir Bernard Reilly directed me, as Political Secretary, to address to His Highness on the subject of the future policy of the Hadhramaut and the re-arming and training of the " regular " forces of His Highness.

4. His Highness has now accepted the terms laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter and has agreed to assistance being given to the Kathiri Sultan provided that the condition laid down in paragraph 4 is fulfilled by His Majesty's Government. He has also agreed that this assistance should take the form of raising and training Tribal guards and has promised to do all he can to expedite the completion of the road between Tarim and Shihr.

5. As regards the loan of a British Officer to re-organize and train his " regular " forces, His Highness candidly expressed his fear that such an appointment might be regarded with suspicion by his subjects and indicated his reluctance, on this account, to agree to this proposal as he had only just succeeded to the chieftainship. Sir Bernard Reilly did not wish to press His Highness but he hopes, as do I myself, that this fear may, in due course, be proved to be groundless and that, when His Highness has established his position as ruler, he may be pursuaded to consent to a British Officer being lent.

His Highness had no objection, however, to a British Officer visiting Mukalla periodically to inspect the forces. His Highness desires a Muslim Officer, and preferably an Arab, to undertake the task of reorganization and training and, as no trained Arab Officer is available in Aden, is endeavouring to obtain the services of one of the Hadhrami Officers who are serving in His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad's forces. Failing this, it is possible that His Highness may enlist the help of His Majesty's Government in procuring an Officer from the Iraqi Army.

6. I now wish to put forward my proposals for re-arming the " regulars " of His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla whose numbers, according to his predecessor, may be taken as being about 300, which re-arming His Highness has agreed should be at his own expense. I propose that the assistance given to His Highness shall be on the same scale as that given to His Highness the Sultan of Lahej (reference Sir Bernard Reilly's despatch No. 101 of 18th April, 1934*). I therefore recommend that the sanction of His Majesty's Government be accorded to His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla for the purchase of 300 short Lee Enfield rifles and 100,000 rounds of Mark VII ammunition and that arrangements may be made to deliver the same as soon as possible.

The Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Aden, whom I have consulted supports my recommendation, and is of opinion that there is no military danger involved.

7. As regards recent supplies given to His Highness's predecessor and recently promised to His Highness himself, Sir Bernard Reilly sanctioned in March, 1934, the grant to the late Sultan of 200 long Lee Enfield rifles (1914 pattern, Residency old stock) and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, both rifles and ammunition being given half free and half on payment and gave a promise that he would recommend to His Majesty's Government that the rifles were exchanged for the short pattern under certain conditions to which, as mentioned in paragraph 4 of this despatch, His Highness has now agreed.

These long Lee Enfield rifles are, however, very old and mostly unserviceable, neither is there any ammunition available for them in Residency stock. They would, therefore, be of little use to this Residency were they returned by His Highness, and would only take up valuable space in an already congested arsenal, and I propose to allow His Highness to retain these arms, subject to the approval of Sir Bernard Reilly.

As His Highness stated that he was short of armament other than Lee Enfield armament and requested to be supplied with some, I have told him that he may have the following Le Gras armament which was sanctioned two years ago by Sir Bernard Reilly for his predecessor and never drawn:—

Rifles.	*Ammunition.*
100 (to replace 200 M.H. rifles for which ammunition is no longer supplied.)	15,000 (free)
167 (to replace the same number of nondescript rifles.)	10,000 (payment)

I have also promised His Highness some more Le Gras ammunition on payment if he desires it. I still await His Highness's reply.

8. As regards the political and other advantages to be derived from the re-arming, reorganization and training of the regular forces of His Highness, and the degree of control to be maintained over them by this Residency, I wish to refer you to paragraph 6

* 37950/34 [No. 1]: not printed.

of Sir Bernard Reilly's despatch of 17th April, 1935*. With the succession of a new ruler over Qu'aiti territory who has yet to establish himself and gain the confidence of his subjects, I am of opinion that the considerations which led Sir Bernard Reilly to recommend the policy as outlined by him in his despatch and to recommend also the assistance of His Majesty's Government in bringing it about are greatly increased at the present time. I have already referred to the consent of His Highness to a British Officer inspecting his forces and their arms from time to time and, as in the case of His Highness the Sultan of Lahej, the State of Mukalla is so ably managed and so well controlled, in comparison with the more uncivilized districts of the Aden Protectorate, that I am satisfied that His Highness will take steps to keep a careful check of the arms issued to his regulars and irregulars and that there is little danger of their being sold or otherwise disposed of within or without Qu'aiti territory.

9. Now that His Highness has agreed to the proposal to raise and train Tribal Guards in Kathiri territory, I shall discuss this question with the Kathiri Sultan during a flying visit to the Hadhramaut which the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Aden, and myself intend to take this week-end, and a further despatch will be sent to you on this subject in due course.

10. It is probable that His Highness will make a request to be permitted to possess two Vickers guns. Should he do so, the request will receive my recommendation and the support of the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Aden. But I shall address you later on this subject.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir Bernard Reilly whom you will probably wish to consult before he returns to Aden.

I have, &c.,
M. C. LAKE,
Acting Resident, &c.

Enclosure in No. 6.

(No. 1163.)

AFTER COMPLIMENTS, The Residency, Aden, 27th April, 1936.

In confirmation of Your Highness's conversation with the Resident with regard to the re-arming, reorganization and training of Your Highness's regular army, I have been directed to give Your Highness in writing an outline of the proposals submitted a year ago by the Resident to His Majesty's Government who have approved of them generally. It was the Resident's intention to discuss these proposals with the late Sultan 'Umar, but unfortunately the latter's continued ill-health and finally his death prevented this, and the matter had to be left in abeyance until Your Highness visited the Resident a few days ago.

2. Sultan 'Umar was constantly requesting the Resident for assistance in re-arming, reorganizing and training his regular soldiers but the Resident was loath to give such assistance until he had some guarantee that such re-arming and training would be put to proper use, and that the arms would be carefully looked after and maintained under a system of registration and as the property of the State.

3. The Resident also wishes that any assistance given to Your Highness in respect of Your Highness's regular forces should be dependent on some practical assistance given to the Kathiris by this Residency and Your Highness acting in co-operation. Such assistance would, it is hoped, fulfil the two main desiderata of the Kathiris, namely the establishment of peace and security in the Hadhramaut valley and better means of communication with the sea, and thereby with the countries in which wealthy Kathiris have important interests, such as Singapore and Java. Your Highness will readily realize that the fulfilment of these two objects will also considerably benefit the Qu'aiti Government.

4. Such assistance to the Kathiris would be given without prejudice to our good relations with Your Highness's Government at Mukalla, and His Majesty's Government's treaty with the Sultanate of Mukalla which is the basis of their policy in the Hadhramaut will be maintained as it is at present; and I hope that nothing will be done to disturb the good relations of this Residency with Your Highness's State.

5. As Your Highness is aware, the Lahej Trained Forces have recently been re-armed with modern weapons with British assistance, but at the Sultan's expense, and have been reorganized and trained by the Officer Commanding, Aden Protectorate Levies, who also performs the duties of Inspector-General, while in outlying districts from Lahej such as in Haushabi and Amiri territories, and at Shuqra, local tribal guards have been formed and partially trained, but are armed with an inferior weapon to that of the Lahej

* No. 72 in Middle East No. 57.

Trained Forces. These tribal guards are under the supervision of a Political Officer from Aden. The Resident has in mind a scheme for Your Highness's forces similar to that for the Lahej forces, and at the same time a scheme for tribal guards for the Kathiri territory.

6. Subject to the giving by Your Highness of a guarantee such as is mentioned in paragraph 2 and to Your Highness's agreeing to co-operate in assisting the Kathiris as set forth in paragraph 3, the Resident is willing to recommend that His Majesty's Government should assist Your Highness in re-arming at your own expense your regular forces with a modern weapon, and in reorganizing and training these same forces. As regards the latter, I understand that Your Highness would prefer for the present not to be lent the services of a British Officer, but of an Arab Officer, but that Your Highness would welcome the periodical visit of a British Officer to inspect the progress made in the reorganization and training of Your Highness's forces and to give Your Highness advice. I shall be glad to have Your Highness's confirmation on these points.

7. As regards the assistance to be given to the Kathiris, this would consist in the organization of tribal guards armed with an inferior weapon, and the completion of the motor road between Tarim and Shihr which has taken so long to construct, but I understand from what Your Highness told the Resident that you expect all difficulties in connexion with the road to be overcome and the completion to be fulfilled in two or three months.

8. I shall be grateful to have confirmation of Your Highness's acquiescence to the Resident's scheme as set forth in this letter, and Your Highness's comments on the points raised, as soon as convenient to Your Highness.

Greetings.

M. C. LAKE,
Political Secretary.

To His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

78018/36 [No. 2].

No. 7.

COLONIAL OFFICE
to
AIR MINISTRY.

[*Answered by No. 8.*]

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 9th November, 1936.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to refer to the letter from this Department of the 13th of September, 1935*, enclosing a copy of a despatch† to the Acting Resident at Aden regarding the policy to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in the Hadhramaut, and to transmit to you, to be laid before the Air Council, a copy of a despatch‡ and enclosure from the Acting Resident submitting detailed proposals.

2. These proposals with the exception noted below, follow in general the policy already approved, and I am to enquire whether the Air Council see any objection to them.

3. With regard to paragraph 5 of the despatch, while Mr. Ormsby Gore appreciates the difficulties referred to by Lieutenant-Colonel Lake he feels that it would be of great advantage to His Majesty's Government to ensure the presence in the Sultan's territories of a British officer through whom touch may be maintained with Aden. Moreover if no such officer is appointed His Majesty's Government may expose themselves under the proposed scheme to the criticism that they are supplying arms to the Sultan without adequate security for their proper use. Mr. Ormsby Gore proposes, therefore, to ask the Resident to consider further the possibility of arranging by further representations for the Sultan to accept a British officer to reorganize and train his forces at the outset. He is disposed to think that the acceptance of a British officer in this instance would pave the way for the acceptance later of a British adviser if, as seems not unlikely, the need for such an officer is felt in the future.

I am, &c.,
H. R. COWELL.

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* 78108/35 [No. 13]: not printed. † No. 75 in Middle East No. 57. ‡ No. 6.

78018/36 [No. 5]. No. 8.

AIR MINISTRY

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Secret.)

SIR, Air Ministry, W.C.2, 4th December, 1936.

With reference to Colonial Office letter dated 9th November, 1936*, regarding the policy to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in the Hadhramaut, I am commanded by the Air Council to acquaint you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore, that they concur generally in the proposals outlined in the despatch† and enclosure from the Acting Resident at Aden.

2. With regard to paragraph 5 of the despatch the Council likewise appreciate the difficulties referred to by Lieutenant-Colonel Lake. There is no doubt, however, that the presence of a British Officer in the Sultan's territories, who could maintain a liaison with Aden, would be of great advantage to His Majesty's Government, but, while they agree that the Resident should be asked to consider the possibility of arranging, by further representations, for the Sultan to accept a British officer to reorganize his forces, they are of opinion that a greater measure of success could be obtained in this direction if His Highness was not unduly pressed in the matter.

3. The Council would, however, strongly deprecate the appointment of an officer from the Iraqi Army and suggest that for the moment a certain amount of delay in the supply of the equipment asked for would strengthen further representations which could be made in the not too distant future.

I am, &c.,

J. M. SPAIGHT.

78018/36 [No. 6]. No. 9.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

(Sent 7.30 p.m., 24th December, 1936.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 10.*]

No. 125. Your confidential despatch No. 457 of 22nd September†. I agree generally with proposals. I am doubtful however as to advisability of waiving appointment of British Officer to reorganize Shihr and Mukalla forces. Without such an officer there is risk of criticism that arms are being supplied to Sultan without any security as to use to which they will be put. Also employment of British officer would create useful link with Aden Government and would pave way for appointment of British advisers on other matters if such appointments are considered desirable in future. I recognize however that best hope of success in dealing with Sultan may be obtained by avoiding too much pressure upon him, and I leave to your discretion decision as to best method of handling matter. His Majesty's Government are however in any case definitely opposed to appointment of officer from Iraqi Army.

Crown Agents after enquiry from War Office state that supply of 300 short Lee Enfield rifles and 100,000 rounds of Mark VII ammunition will necessitate new manufacture. Supply would be on usual repayment terms and cost would depend on usual factors such as trade cost, method of packing, etc. Current vocabulary rates which afford guide to probable cost are rifles £7 each, ammunition £4 11*s.* 6*d.* per 1,000 rounds. Please inform me whether order is to be placed. I am not in position to say how long it would take to carry out order but it seems probable that it would be a considerable time. In any event you may like to consider whether some delay in supplying equipment would not help with further representations which might be made for loan of British officer.

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*No. 7. † No. 6.

78018/37 [No. 1]. No. 10.

THE RESIDENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.40 p.m., 1st January, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 14.*]

1st January. My telegram No. 99* and your telegram No. 125†.

Paragraph 1. Ingrams' report on the political position at Mukalla as follows.

(1) Sultan like his predecessor desires the reorganization of his army with our help and accepts conditions outlined in my despatch No. 94 of 17th April, 1935‡, excepting that he prefers British Indian to European officer as less likely to rouse local prejudice.

(2) He is genuinely interested in material progress and social amelioration of his State and proposes several useful and practicable schemes for which he seeks loan from His Majesty's Government.

(3) He is anxious to secure the succession for his son Awadth in contravention of the will of his grandfather Sultan Awadhth which has hitherto governed the succession and by which the son of the late Sultan should inherit. Present Prime Minister and his family encourage these aims and particularly (3). They aim at the complete domination of a well meaning but weak Sultan and monopoly of power in the State.

Ingrams' enquiries tend to confirm the general opinion that they have close contact with the Italians and may be subsidized by them. If there were clear evidence that the Minister is working against us in the interests of a foreign power I could insist on his dismissal in view of the Protectorate Treaty but this is not at present forthcoming and the Treaty gives the Aden Residency no right to interfere directly in internal administration.

Paragraph 2. Sultan wishes shortly to go to India ostensibly to bring his family to Mukalla and to leave the Prime Minister or latter's father as his representative during his absence. I propose to tell him that in view of reports received I have not sufficient confidence in the present Prime Minister to agree to this and that his visit to India must be therefore contingent on his changing his election or consenting to the residence of a British Political officer at Mukalla during his absence to ensure that his treaty obligations are observed.

Paragraph 3. Ingrams strongly advocates installation of British adviser at Mukalla either permanently or for considerable period and thinks that the Sultan might be brought to accept this if his wishes under (1) and (2) in first paragraph are met. He considers that under the present conditions no encouragement should be given to (3) and that the Sultan should be disabused of the idea that the present Minister can secure it for him. With regard to (1) scheme for the reorganization of the army has been approved by His Majesty's Government and a suitable Indian ex-officer of the Indian Army and Yemen Infantry personally known to Lake and acceptable to the Sultan has been found, and I am therefore not in favour of pressing the Sultan further at present about British military officer.

Paragraph 4. In view of apparent development of foreign intrigue in the Hadramaut and of the desire generally expressed to Ingrams for more active British [(?) action] to ensure internal tranquillity and peaceful progress Quaiti and Kathiri States I am now disposed to favour proposal in third paragraph, and Ingrams would be suitable and very willing to fill the post. In that case I should require another political officer to replace him at Aden. Please inform me whether I may sound the Sultan on these lines and particularly whether H.M.G. would (1) in that case entertain proposal for loan of about 3 lakhs of rupees subject to their approval of scheme contemplated (2) expect Sultan to pay for adviser or pay him themselves. With regard to (1) I advise loan on the understanding that adviser will be able to see that money is properly spent. (2) depends on importance that H.M.G. attach to promotion of our influence in this area.

Paragraph 5. Pending your consideration of 3rd and 4th paragraphs may I have your immediate approval to action suggested in second paragraph?

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* 78180/36 S. [No. 9]: not printed. † No. 9. ‡ No. 72 in Middle East No. 57.

78018/37 [No. 7]. No. 11.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

SECRETARY, COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 8th January, 1937.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to transmit to you a memorandum on the subject of British policy in the Aden Protectorate, and to request that, if you see no objection, the memorandum may be placed as an additional item on the agenda for the meeting of the Standing Official Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East, which it has been suggested should be held at a suitable date after the 18th January, for consideration of the memorandum already communicated to you regarding Kamaran Island.

I am, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

Enclosure in No. 11.

MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH POLICY IN THE ADEN PROTECTORATE.

1. At their meeting on the 21st August, 1935, the Standing official Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East considered proposals for increasing the authority of the Sultan of Mukalla, and for improving the relations between the Quaiti and Kathiri tribes.

2. At their meeting on the 14th December, 1936, the Sub-Committee made recommendations for establishing British authority more effectively in the Hadramaut up to the boundary claimed by His Majesty's Government, especially in view of the possibility that applications for oil prospecting licences in that area might be received.

3. The Resident at Aden has now addressed to the Secretary of State two telegrams, in which (*a*) he submits proposals for extending British influence in the Sultanate of Mukalla, and (*b*) he makes suggestions for establishing British authority in the remoter parts of the Hadramaut. Copies of these telegrams and of the Colonial Office telegrams to which they refer are appended to this memorandum.

4. The question of the immediate action to be taken in view of the Sultan's contemplated temporary absence has been the subject of separate correspondence with the Departments concerned: and this memorandum only deals with the more permanent aspects of the situation described by the Resident.

5. Our treaties with previous Sultans of Mukalla, other than those providing for the suppression of the slave trade, only bind the Sultan not to dispose of any part of his territories to a foreign power, and to conform to the wishes of the British Government in all matters relating to his dealings with the neighbouring chiefs and with foreign powers. In return the Sultan receives an annual subsidy of $360, which is still being paid to the present Sultan.

6. It appears that the Sultan is anxious to obtain a loan for development purposes, and the moment seems opportune for an attempt to induce him to enter into a new treaty under which the British Government, through the Resident at Aden, would be given more definite powers of control.

7. It is generally agreed that the time is not ripe for the establishment of any form of direct administration in the Protectorate, and that the proper policy is to continue to work through the local Rulers, over whom our influence should be gradually extended.

8. It is suggested that the Sultan might be pressed to enter into a treaty on the lines of the treaties concluded in the past with certain Rulers in the Malay States, on which our administration of those States depends. In brief, such a treaty would provide that the Sultan would receive and provide a suitable residence for a British officer, to be called Resident or Adviser, whose advice must be asked and acted upon in all matters other than those touching Muhammadan religion and custom.

9. It is unlikely that the Sultan would enter into such an engagement except for some material consideration; and it is proposed therefore that his entering into such a treaty should be made a condition of the grant of a loan on favourable terms.

10. This loan might be advanced direct by the British Government, or as an alternative it might be advanced by the Government of the new Colony of Aden. (It may be stated that similar advances by the Straits Settlements Government to Malay States are common.) The Aden Government could raise the money, if necessary, by loan from the Crown Agents for the Colonies; but it would be necessary that the Treasury should undertake to make good any loss which the Aden Government might incur in respect of the loan, and should, if necessary, authorise provision on the vote for Middle East Services for any nett charges in respect of interest which the Aden Government had to bear. (We are under an obligation not to throw on the new Colony any burden in respect of military and political charges in the Protectorate.)

11. It is suggested that the salary of the Adviser should be borne by His Majesty's Government, but that the Sultan should be required to provide a suitable residence and office accommodation.

12. The appointment of such an Adviser will involve the creation of an additional post of Political Officer in the Protectorate service. In any event, and whether the Sultan agrees to receive a permanent adviser or not, it is clear from the Resident's telegrams that it will be essential for some years to maintain an additional Political Officer for service in the Hadramaut; and application to the Treasury for approval of such an appointment has accordingly been made.

13. On the question of the assistance to be given towards the training of the Sultan's Forces, it is suggested that approval of the employment of a British Indian officer may be given.

Colonial Office,
January, 1937.

Appendix.

To Aden telegram No. 125, 24th December, 1936. (No. 9.)
To Aden telegram No. 128, 30th December, 1936. (78177/36 [No. 3]: not printed.)
From Aden telegram, 1st January, 1937. (No. 10.)
From Aden telegram No. 2, 2nd January, 1937. (78177/37 [No. 4]: not printed.)

78018/37 [No. 13]. No. 12.

INDIA OFFICE

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

(Secret.)

SIR, India Office, S.W.1, 11th January, 1937.

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to your letter of the 5th January*, concerning the Sultanate of Mukalla, and in reply to state for the information of Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore that the Marquess of Zetland concurs in the proposal to approve the action suggested in paragraph 2 of the telegram dated 1st January, 1937†, from the Resident at Aden.

Lord Zetland notes that it will probably be desirable for the general questions raised in the Resident's telegram to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Standing Official Sub-Committee for questions concerning the Middle East, and he will await the memorandum which is to be prepared for circulation.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Foreign Office, Treasury, Air Ministry, War Office and Admiralty.

I am, &c.,

J. C. WALTON.

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* 78018/37 [No. 3]: not printed. † No. 10.

78018/37 [No. 19].

No. 13.

THE RESIDENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3rd February, 1937.)

(No. 17.)

(Confidential.)

SIR, The Residency, Aden, 20th January, 1937.

I have the honour to forward for your information, a copy of a Memorandum by Mr. W. H. Ingrams, First Political Officer, on the present political situation in the Hadhramaut.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Resident, etc.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Confidential.)

MEMORANDUM BY MR. W. H. INGRAMS, O.B.E., ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE HADHRAMAUT.

The purpose of this Memorandum is to give a short appreciation of the political situation in the Hadhramaut as I have found it during my recent visit. I do not propose to do this at any great length for I have described the society of the country fully in my report, and I was interested to find with increased contacts on this occasion that as far as I have been able to check it the information given therein is substantially much more accurate than I should have supposed was possible.

I should like, however, to emphasize a point which, though it is perhaps implicit in my previous report, is not sufficiently emphasized, and that is that it is entirely wrong to look at the Hadhramaut with any preconceived ideas obtained from a knowledge of the western part of the Protectorate.

The more intimate becomes my knowledge of that country the more I am struck with its very considerable differences. I have been at some pains to analyze the reasons for these marked differences of culture which are to be found among all classes of the population. There are differences even in externals, matters of dress, arms, dwellings and so on, but the differences in the character of the people are even more pronounced.

Fundamentally I think these differences amongst what may be called the upper or more civilized classes of the population are due to culture. Even in such a civilized area as Lahej there is practically speaking no trace of culture to be found and even the most civilized members of that society are barely educated. But in the Hadhramaut there is an old and deep rooted civilization, mediaeval it is true, but giving a polish to the conversation and general life of the inhabitants which is quite absent among the western tribes. Libraries are not uncommon and many houses contain books not only on religion but on history, poetry and philosophy. This is a fundamental difference of old standing. Another ever spreading difference is in the knowledge in the towns and the interest in modern affairs and world politics, an interest largely stimulated by constant emigration to other countries and by the constant return of migrants to their own homeland. Newspapers come to every town and though they are not many in number, each one passes through many hands. There are now several wireless sets, listened to not by one or two people but sometimes by twenty or thirty. The news thus heard is spread. It is also to be emphasized that with the continued influx of migrants who have made money abroad there is, even amongst the tribes in the wadis, a great impetus towards a desire for settled conditions.

While differences of this nature are well marked in the society of all the towns, the differences between the Beduins living in the steppes and those of the Protectorate are of another nature: they are not nearly so far advanced for they have had almost no contact with western influences and are practically speaking unvisited. They are thus completely ignorant of the British Government except perhaps as a vague unreality.

In Mukalla and Shihr there is, as in Aden and Lahej, very little culture in the sense in which the inhabitants of the big towns of the interior have it, but there is the same

interest in world affairs and the people are of course much more progressive than those of other small ports in the Protectorate. Amongst the upper classes of society throughout the country female society is much more civilized. It is uneducated and ignorant but has an innate refinement which results in a standard of living which must be classed as civilized.

In the course of my stay in Mukalla I got to know His Highness the Sultan fairly well and I found him a man of education, full of good intentions and most loyal in his support of the British connexion. Physically he is a phenomenon. Lack of exercise has had a deplorable effect on his figure and to his physical condition are no doubt due certain weaknesses in his mental equipment. His memory is poor and he has no strength of will. He has some of the obstinacy due to weakness but it is commonly said that the last man who has seen the Sultan is the most powerful for it takes little to make him change his mind on many issues. He seems on the whole a fairly gentle sort of character though I believe he might be capable of cruelties, but his interests are much more in matters of development and improvement than in the futilities of Arab politics. I should say the governing passion of his life was his devotion to his most uninteresting son 'Awadh. There is a change in his voice when he speaks to him, and though he does not speak of him very much his rather restrained utterances on the subject show how proud he is of him, and in their restraint give one the impression that his son is to him one of those more sacred subjects which one rarely mentions. His love of his son seems to me of the somewhat unreasoning maternal description for, to put it bluntly, the boy is no more than an animated mass of meat. He is disgustingly fat and while he is perfectly amiable he has nothing whatever to say for himself and it is difficult to see how anybody could really love him—he is in other words a complete poop.

I should not think that the father will live very long. I do not know what his actual age is, but he looks a decrepit sixty. I do not think that the general idea is that he has long to live and it has been said to me that he has Death written on his face. I should not imagine either that an Insurance Company would find 'Awadh a good life, particularly if he continues to live in the present way, eating as he does and without taking a quarter of a mile of exercise a day. The doctor tells me that when they were in Egypt he was seen by specialists who warned him and his father that he must take exercise and eat less or the consequences would be serious. Examination of his stools showed that his trouble was undigested food.

'Awadh is in some ways the key to the present difficult political situation in the Hadhramaut. Very early on in my stay I discovered that new enlistments into the Mukalla army were being made in his name. This fact could only have one interpretation, namely, that it was desired to make him the Heir Apparent. It has been a puzzle to me why the unfortunate Salim bin Ahmed, the Wazir of the late Sultan, should have been put in prison and subjected to every kind of indignity to such an extent that I believe also his life is in danger. Salim Ahmed was a thoroughly bad Wazir but probably not worse in his peculations than any ordinary Arabian Prime Minister, but after all what he did, he did with the approval of his master, the late Sultan 'Umar, and there was no particular point in treating him in such a way as would give him, as it has given him, the sympathies of those who formerly detested him. But one possible motive for his treatment becomes clear when it is seen that the desire of the Sultan is for his son to succeed him, for if Salim Ahmed went back to India he would be in a position to intrigue with the other claimants to the throne, the sons of the late Sultan who in view of Sultan 'Awadh's will are perhaps the more rightful claimants.

If I had any doubts on this question they were removed when I went to Shihr, for one night—and many truths and confidences are spoken late in Ramadhan nights—Ahmed bin Nasir, one of the two ministers, sounded me as to whether I thought it was possible that the British Government would recognize 'Awadh as the Heir Apparent.

With the mention of Ahmed Nasir it becomes necessary to bring into the story Seiyid Hamid bin Bubekr al Mihdhar, the Prime Minister. Seiyid Hamid is a young man of thirty or so, well-read for an Arab in poetry, history, religion and such like graces, and with two years of the Al Azhar and the political environment of Egypt behind him. He is pleasant to speak to and it may be that it is only his protruding teeth that give one the idea that he is foxy, though personally when I met his much less polished but much more astute father, Seiyid Bubekr, I felt that foxiness was a family trait. Seiyid Hamid was previously married to Sultan Saleh's sister who has now died, so there is a strong bond between them on that account. There is another for the reason that Sultan Saleh being a good and religious minded man has a penchant for Seiyids, particularly those who have kept in close contact with him during his long wait for the throne of his fathers. Yet another stronger link may be soon forged for there is a proposal afoot that he should marry Sultan Saleh's daughter. This is not the exact

line of politics that Hamid and the Mahdhar would have wished for they desired to marry her to a son of Seiyid Abdurrehman bin Sheikh al Kaf, as will appear later in this narrative.

Ahmed Nasir is a soldier and a Yafa'i, one of the tallest Arabs I have ever seen. We measured ourselves together and I found that with my boots on I could only give him an inch, so he must be just over six feet tall. He struck me facially as having an ideal face to play the part of Mephistopheles and I was interested when a Turk in Seiyun, who did not know him, said that he could see on his face that he was meant for Gehennum. He has had twelve wives but has no children and has willed all his property to the Mahadhar. He has however managed to get himself well connected for Sultan 'Awadh was made to divorce the wife he had, who has not yet brought his child to birth, and to marry, I think, a niece of Ahmed Nasir, at any rate a fairly close relation. Ahmed Nasir is uneducated and almost illiterate. Until the Sultan came he was no more than a private soldier on eight dollars a month, but he leaped in one night to the position he now holds. His official salary is 100 dollars a month but he had already made a considerable fortune in house property and is said by his enemies, but I have not taken the trouble to investigate it, to owe a good deal of his success to usury.

The Mahadhar and Ahmed Nasir owe their position to the fact that they have promised Sultan Saleh to use all their influence to make 'Awadh the next Sultan. Their power is derived from this and practically speaking whatever they say goes. I believe I have given a slight check to their progress but they were rapidly on their way to having their own nominees in all the provincial Governments and in all the principal jobs in the country. 'Awadh himself is never out of the sight of one of the Mahadhar and it is the particular job of 'Ali, Hamid's brother, to stay with him continually. It is literally true that the Sultan was practically isolated from all other contacts and though I have been responsible for some changes in this direction, I cannot feel that I have achieved anything very substantial. It has got to be realized that the Qu'aiti State is at the moment in the hands of the Mahadhar.

As regards the Kathiri State, when Sultan Saleh was settled down he sent for the Kaf family to see him at Mukalla. They had long been friends and had corresponded during the years in which he lived in India. They, like everyone else, had great hopes of vast improvements on his accession and they still, like everyone else, are fully convinced of the essential goodness of the Sultan. I need not here go deep into the various interviews they had. My information is perfectly sound and what I heard in Seiyun and Tarim has been amply confirmed in its important details by what I had heard in Mukalla and other places from Seiyid Hamid, from the Sultan and from other sources. Negotiation broke down and the Kafs went away disappointed because the Sultan changed his mind whenever the Mahadhar learnt of his discussion, but the Mahadhar made an offer to the Kafs, and I have absolutely no reason to doubt the truth of what Seiyid Bubekr has told me on the subject, for, for one thing Seiyid Hamid had spent much of a Ramadhan night trying to persuade me to use my influence to bring one of the Kafs down as a Wazir to the Sultan. There is no need to enlarge upon the story very much but Seiyid Hamid offered the Kafs a share in the country if they would bring the Kathiri Sultan as their joint servant (which the Kafs could very well do) and provide Rs.300,000 for immediate necessities—I rather believe for fostering certain good schemes of the Sultan to keep him amused. Hamid also wanted Seiyid Abdurrehman to bring his son from Singapore to marry Saleh's daughter. Seiyid Hamid told Seiyid Bubekr that between them they would keep Sultan Saleh completely in their power and that they could do what they liked with 'Awadh. Seiyid Bubekr refused to have anything to do with politics and the whole family retired to the wadi.

The failure of this demarche on the part of Hamid has upset the Italians, and the Italian Consul has interviewed Seiyid Hamid al Bar on the subject to see whether anything could be done to bring the Kafs into the scheme. Mention of the Italians makes it necessary for me to say that further investigation throughout the Hadhramaut has confirmed everything that I have written about the Mihadhar connexion with them. It might perhaps be supposed that the fact that the Mahadhar were working with the Italians could not have a great deal of effect if the Italians attempted to enter the country or to establish any much closer contact, but apart from the fact that with the whole organization of the place in Mihdhari and with growing steps being taken for the elimination of Yafa'is and others who are not in favour of the Mahdhar schemes, there are quite a number of other signs that the Italians would not find it very difficult from an internal point of view to establish themselves in the country. One would imagine that with their record in Abyssinia and, if it were known, their record in Northern Africa, they would not be likely to be very popular, and it was not until I had had several weeks of hints being made to me that I realized that there were sections, and not inconsiderable sections, of the population which would welcome them.

One of the most curious phenomena about the Italian threat is that though many people know a little about it and some people know quite a lot, very few are in the least anxious to speak about it with other people listening. For some reason or other they are afraid. Many of them want to talk but what they say is largely given in hints or in absolute privacy at night. I noticed this in Mukalla. I noticed it again in Tarim, in Seiyun, in Shibam and Hureidha. During the latter part of my time in Mukalla when I had confirmed by enquiries the information contained in my reports on the subject, I rather abstained from making further enquiries amongst other people, and from then on and throughout my time in the country, waited until I was spoken to. Some of the conversations were rather curious. Perhaps the most straightforward came from 'Ali bin Habreish the paramount chief of the Hamumis, who came with some of his followers to interview me privately in Tarim. The gist of his talk was: " I do not want the Qu'aiti Government, they have wronged me, and the Qu'aitis think we are just wild Beduins to be treated like animals. They are preventing us making our living by carrying goods from the coast to the interior for we cannot enter Shihr. I do not want the Kathiri Government for the Kathiri Sultan has not the strength to help me. I do not want the English Government for I know nothing of them beyond the fact that they are friends of the Qu'aitis and would help him against me and have done nothing for me. I have heard of a new Government called Injerams which is wanting peace in the Hadhramaut. Will you give me protection so that I may have a port of my own in our own country to the east of Shihr and that we may earn our living? If you will not I must go to the Italians or the Saudie."

Time and time again people said to me " Will the British Government come and give us peace in this country? We will surrender our arms if we may be given peace and justice. If the British Government won't do it then perhaps the Italians or the Saudis will."

One man talking of Beduins disturbances said " The Saudis and the Italians are bad but (with expressive gestures) the Italians hang robbers and the Saudis cut off their hands. I wish they would come and do it here."

When Philby went through the Hadhramaut he broke down barriers on the road which the 'Awamir had made and they made no attempt to remonstrate with him or to show resistance. It has had a terrific effect for everyone says that when asked they say they did nothing because he came from Ibn Saud, and Ibn Saud mutilates the people who interfere with the roads.

Late one night in Shibam when we had discussed many matters and I was preparing to go, Sultan 'Ali bin Salah after silence said, in an offhand way and after asking my secrecy, " By the way what should I do with Italian spies who come down from the Yemen?" Without appearing unduly excited I said, " Oh, do many come?" His reply was, " Not many, but many more will."

In Hureidha, Seiyid Bubekr al'Attas in the early hours of the morning pleaded with much earnestness that I should stay longer in the Hadhramaut for strange things would happen, the context of the conversation left me very little doubt as to what he meant but he was unwilling to say any more. Everywhere outside Mukalla I was begged to stay in the Hadhramaut, not only for this reason but because I think they really believed I could give them peace, very often there was the suggestion that if you do not stay something else must happen. All this feeling is a kind of strong under-current which is not immediately apparent on the surface.

Personally I never anticipated such a wide anxiety for me to remain in the country. When I passed through Seiyun for the first time and halted in the market place, I was talking to people in the crowds and an old man came up and said to me " Is it true that Ingrams is coming?" I was told that literally people had been hanging on for me to come. I went to visit the 'Awamir, the bad people who had killed four Kathiris from Dhufan on the road. As I arrived at a spot about half a mile from the Sheikh's house and could get the car no further, I sent a boy ahead to ask the Sheikh to come and meet me. I had barely walked half the distance when an old man and the other Sheikhs with a crowd of followers came out to meet me and started off the conversation by saying they would surrender their arms if I would come and rule them.

As I was passing Diar Buqri, a post of the Nahd on the way to Hureidha, the people came out and said that they did not like the British Government because it left them to rapacious Sultans but they would prefer to have the Italians or the Saudis. I explained my peace-making mission and that the Government was now interested in the peace of the country and next day, on my way back, they called in and taking me to the top of a high house pointed out the country and said if I would come and rule it they would give me the house next door (an equally tall one) to live in.

These are only small examples. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole of the influential part of the Hadhramaut detests the Mahadhar and Ahmed Nasir and is half afraid and half welcoming something behind them.

I now turn to a brief account of the specific matters I have dealt with in the Hadhramaut. I had no difficulty at all in getting Sultan Saleh's agreement to such matters as salary of his instructor and to steps being taken to ensure Qu'aiti-Kathiri co-operation. He gave me as requested a letter to Sultan 'Ali bin Salah at Shibam to go with me to Seiyun to make the necessary arrangements with Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur. He was continually asking my advice and help on progressive services. A list* of the matters on which he wanted assistance is attached. He was surprised but impressed when I informed him of the Mahadhar activities with the Italians, and later on during our conversations asked me to engage for him a confidential clerk from India to look after such matters and gave me details of a possible candidate. He was willing to agree to any suitable arrangements for passports for Kathiri subjects being made but unwilling to allot any Customs revenue, even extra revenue, to the Kathiris. He was relieved that I was not in favour of a revision of the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement, though I rather understood that it was in that respect only that he had had any qualms about it. Incidentally it should be noted that the translation of the treaty given in Aitchison's Treaties is not accurate for it makes no mention of Customs duties.

I went to Tarim feeling confident that I had made good progress and anticipating no difficulty whatever in persuading the Kathiris to adopt the proposals made for their assistance. I thought it would be honest to tell them at once that I saw no hope of their achieving their wishes over revision of the treaty and a share of the Customs revenue which I knew to be a desire very close to their hearts. I discovered that the real objection to the treaty was not in its actual provisions but in the fact that it reflected adversely on their prestige. The Kathiri dynasty is ancient and its Sultans cannot bear to be put in a position of subordination to a mushroom growth like the Qu'aitis whom they look upon simply as common soldiers. Sultan 'Ali has always been a friend of mine, but I found I had even more influence with him when he discovered that I knew the history of his tribe and his country and something of his pedigree and of the life of his ancestor, Bedr Bu Tuweirak, whose chain armour and shield, the former with his name on, he showed me. I had some difficulty in getting him to put by ambitions on these treaty points for the moment, but the real difficulty in persuading him to adopt the Tribal Guards scheme was to get him to believe that the British Government really wanted to take an interest in the peace and good order of the Hadhramaut. He and all those associated with him said that the Government had never shown any interest in the country before, that occasionally short visits had been made when " Salaam aleikum " and " Fiamanillah " had been about the only conversation that there was, and nobody would believe that the British Government really was prepared to come in and support them. However I managed to induce them to believe it in the end and the arrangements were agreed to.

Qu'aiti-Kathiri co-operation was still more difficult, for while they all believed in the good intentions of Sultan Saleh, they were convinced that nothing would be done as long as Hamid and Ahmed Nasir were there, and they said again that it would only work if the British Government stood behind it. I said again that the British Government was behind it and finally and rather dubiously they took my word for it.

There is no doubt that they much prefer the British Government to any other if only it would step in and do something in the country—this I must repeat was a constant theme. Seiyid Bubekr al Kaf said on one occasion " that the British Government played about with the Hadhramaut like a woman with a lover. She wants an affair but is afraid of being put in the family way."

Finally having got some agreement on these points I broached the subject of truces and was glad to be told that the one person who could help me most was the man that Sultan Saleh had mentioned to me, Salim bin Ja'far, who had also to do with the Treaty of Aden, as the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement is called in the Hadhramaut. I went to Al 'Uqda to see him and there again I met with the same story of difficulties on account of the Mahadhar and on account of the reluctance of the British Government to do anything, but finally I enlisted his help and went to Shibam where Sultan 'Ali bin Salah welcomed the letter from the Sultan and my proposals. He told me what I had heard before in Mukalla and Seiyun, that he was in a difficult position as the Mahadhar were trying to make his job untenable, but was grateful to me for having got the Sultan to bring him into Hadhramaut peace arrangements. I had discussed the Sei'ar with

* Not printed.

the Sultan and got his authority to make some sort of arrangements with 'Ali bin Salah to strengthen British influence with them in order to keep them more safely in the British sphere. He welcomed these proposals and also promised to lend his influence in getting a landing ground constructed at Shabwa. I had also spoken to the Sultan and arranged with him for the establishment in the near future of a Qu'aiti post at Husn al 'Abr.

After visiting Hureidha I returned to Seiyun picking up 'Ali bin Salah, Salim bin Ja'fer and one or two other notables. The Sultan threw a large dinner party and we had a most interesting and most profitable peace conference in the atmosphere of a new enthusiasm. Three meetings resulted in the accompanying document* which, as they said, required the consent of Sultan Saleh and his signature. One of the most interesting features of these discussions was that when they were concluded and the draft initialled, they turned the discussion to what announcement should be made, and I reflected that the Hadhramaut had nothing to learn from Geneva and European Chancelleries in matters like this. I attach a copy* of the " press announcement " which, as there are no newspapers in Seiyun, was published by being read to a small meeting in the Sultan's country house and then sent to the towns and tribes. When this had been achieved news came of the Risib incident and until the aeroplane came the place was in a ferment of suppressed excitement as to whether the Government would do anything. Messages came from several quarters, from the Kathiri, from the 'Awamir and from Bin 'Abdats, relating that only if something was done to deal with the offenders would the peace arrangements be successful. I secured Sultan Saleh's signature to the document in Mukalla.

The people concerned desire that the British Government should express their support of this proposal and issue some " propaganda " with it. If this is done and if " just one bomb goes off on a mountain in the Hadhramaut " people believe that peace will be ensured for the moment, but amongst the last things that were said to me was that I must impress on the Government the necessity for entering into the affairs of the Hadhramaut with a firm policy.

78018/37 [No. 22]. No. 14.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

(Sent 8 p.m., 11th February, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 16.*]

No. 29. Your telegram of 1st January† Mukalla. My telegram No. 7 of 13th January‡. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider loan of about three lakhs to Sultan for approved works of development in consideration of his signing new treaty on lines of those concluded with certain Malay Rulers by which he would bind himself to receive British Resident Adviser and to act on his advice on all matters except those concerning Muhammedan religion and custom. Salary of Adviser would be met by His Majesty's Government if this is necessary to secure agreement but I should like your views as to possibility of recovering in whole or part from Sultan. In any case Sultan would be required to provide suitable residence. I shall be glad if you will approach the Sultan and let me know whether he would be prepared to accept an arrangement of this nature, but final offer should not be made pending consideration of question of provision of funds.

Paragraph 2. Please report fully by despatch and in your report indicate (1) what would be the position in Kathiri territory under such an arrangement (2) what you would recommend as to rate of interest for loan and terms of repayment and whether you consider it necessary or desirable to ask for specific security, e.g., a charge on the Sultan's revenues.

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* Not printed. † No. 10. ‡ 78018/37 [No. 14]: not printed.

78018/37 [No. 45].

No. 15.

SIR BERNARD REILLY (RESIDENT)

to

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Received 31st March, 1937.)

MY DEAR COWELL, The Residency, Aden, 17th March, 1937.

Will you please refer to your semi-official letter of 23rd February* regarding the succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla.

This question was the subject of considerable discussion in 1923 shortly after the accession of the late Sultan and General Scott's despatch No. 67 of 16th May, 1923†, deals with it at length and paragraphs 10, 14 and 16, in particular, deal with the custom of succession.

I enclose a copy of the agreement to which reference is made in paragraph 12 of the despatch.

As regards the policy which His Majesty's Government should adopt towards the succession which the Government has not recognised, the agreement is a private one and I consider that the only action that the Resident, on behalf of the Government, should take, would be to use his influence to persuade both parties to abide by the agreement.

The late Sultan's son, Muhammad, who is living at present in Hyderabad, wrote to me last April expressing his fears that the present Sultan would try to secure the succession for his son 'Awadh, and in reply I told him that I saw no reason to suppose that the present Sultan wishes to depart from the agreement. I did not at that time anticipate that he would do so.

Since then and since your letter was received, I have had a letter from the Sultan, who is now in Hyderabad attending the Nizam's Jubilee celebrations, informing me that the late Sultan's son, Muhammad, is proposing, at the instigation of certain people whom he does not specify, to visit Mukalla during the Sultan's absence in India, and asking me to take steps to prevent this as he, the Sultan, anticipates that Muhammad will try to stir up trouble and intrigue against him. I enclose a copy of my reply to the Sultan for your information which expresses in more detail my views as to the policy His Majesty's Government should adopt towards the succession.

Yours, &c.,

B. R. REILLY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SULTAN OMAR BIN AWAD SHAMSHEER NAWAZ JUNG BAHADUR AND SULTAN SALEH BIN GHALIB SAIF NAWAZ JUNG BAHADUR EXECUTED AT HYDERABAD DECCAN ON THE 24TH JUNE, 1922.

1. Owing to the death of Sultan Ghalib bin Awad Janbaz Jung Bahadur, the Sultan of Mokalla, Sultan Omar bin Awad Alkaity, Shamseer Nawaz Jung Bahadur has succeeded the late Sultan Ghalib in accordance with the Will executed by Sultan Awad bin Omer Alkaity, Sultan Nawaz Jung Bahadur on the 1st Shaaban 1316 Hijri. Sultan Saleh bin Ghalib Saif Nawaz Jung Bahadur will succeed Sultan Omar in accordance with the abovesaid will of the late Sultan Awad bin Omer. It is further settled and arranged between ourselves according to the same will that the eldest son of Sultan Omer bin Awad Shamseer Nawaz Jung Bahadur (the present Sultan of Mokalla) shall take the place of Sultan Saleh bin Ghalib and the eldest son of the latter shall succeed the eldest son of Sultan Omar and so on.

2. Now that Sultan Omar has succeeded to the State of Mokalla and Sultan Saleh bin Ghalib is to be his successor the status of the latter shall therefore be that of Heir apparent and every successor to the State shall in his turn be recognised as the Heir Apparent of his predecessor. Sultan Omar bin Awad binds himself to act according to the above stipulation as also the will of the late Sultan Awad. Anything done by him contrary to these documents shall not be acceptable. Each and every Sultan who succeeds in rotation to the State of Mokalla shall act according to these two documents.

* 78018/37 [No. 33]: not printed. † 26526/23: not printed.

3. Sultan Omar and Sultan Saleh parties to this Agreement, with a view to the up-keep of the status of the coming generations do hereby agree that it shall be incumbent on them and on their successors to grant an allowance of 100 (one hundred) dollars a month to all of their male descendants for educational and pocket expenses, whether they live in Arabia or in India. This agreement will be given effect to by Sultan Omar to begin with and his successors Sultan Saleh, the eldest son of Omar and the eldest son of Saleh shall one after the other act accordingly so long as this State is in existence. In case any of the Sultans acts contrary to this stipulation then those who are entitled to the allowance shall have recourse to the Government of India and compel the Sultan to pay them their allowances.

OMAR BIN AWAD,

SALEH BIN GHALIB SAIF NAWAZ JUNG.

Witness—

ABDULLA BIN MOHSIN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

(Private and Confidential.)

DEAR FRIEND, The Residency, Aden, 13th March, 1937.

I have received Your Highness's letter of 4th March informing me that the late Sultan 'Umar's son, Muhammad, is proposing to go to Mukalla.

I regret that this is a matter in which I cannot interfere as Muhammad is at liberty to go to Mukalla if he so wishes.

I wish to refer Your Highness to the Succession Agreement of June 1922, to which you yourself were a party together with the late Sultan 'Umar. By the terms of this agreement, which, as far as I know, is still in force, the will of Sultan 'Awadh bin 'Umar, which lays down the law of succession, was confirmed and agreement was actually reached between you and Sultan 'Umar as regards the recognition of the latter's son, Muhammad, as heir apparent on the death of his father.

Further, I wish to point out to Your Highness that, under the will also of Sultan 'Awadh, the son of the late Sultan 'Umar has been specifically mentioned as being the successor of Your Highness, and, as such, is supervisor of revenue and property in Qu'aiti territory and should, properly speaking, reside in Shihr.

In these circumstances, Your Highness cannot very well object to Muhammad bin 'Umar going to Mukalla. In fact, by the terms of the will under reference, the latter should act for Your Highness in your absence from the State.

These family disputes are a cause of disunion in the Qu'aiti State and tend to hinder its progress at a time when Your Highness, with the assistance of His Majesty's Government, is making great headway towards this end.

My advice, therefore, to Your Highness is to look upon Muhammad bin 'Umar as a friend and not as an enemy, to admit him to Your Highness's counsels and, above all, to abide honourably by the terms of the will and agreement, as such documents are binding on the parties between whom they were drawn up.

If Your Highness accepts this advice in the spirit in which it is given, it is all for the good that Muhammad bin 'Umar should spend some time in Mukalla, as, if, as I hope, he is to take a part in the Government of Your Highness's territory, it is essential that he should spend some time in Mukalla to gain experience, and not reside permanently in India.

Yours &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Resident.

His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib al Qu'aiti,
Saif Gulshan, 1st Lancers,
Hyderabad, Deccan.

78018/37 [No. 47].

No. 16.

THE RESIDENT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(No. 139.) (Received 12th April, 1937.)
(Confidential.)

SIR, The Residency, Aden, 31st March, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 29 of 11th February, 1937*, and to inform you that His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla, who is now in India, was informed in writing that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider the grant to him of a loan of about three lakhs of rupees (Rs.3,00,000) for approved working development in consideration that he signs a new treaty by which he would bind himself to receive a British Resident Adviser and to act on his advice on all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and custom. He was further informed that a recommendation would be made to His Majesty's Government that the salary of the Adviser should be equally divisible between the Government and himself, and asked to state whether he would be prepared to accept an arrangement of this nature.

2. A reply has now been received from His Highness in which he refers to the loyal services rendered by his ancestors to Government in the past and also during the Great War, and states that he too, in his turn, will continue to be loyal to Government and render them such service as they may require of him.

3. As regards the loan of money, His Highness states that he requires it from Government for no other purpose than to assist him in carrying out certain schemes for the material progress and social amelioration of his State and people, and points out that the loan of four lakhs (Rs.4,00,000) granted by Government to his late father Sultan Sir Ghalib bin Awadh in 1917 was unconditional. He further states that he was offered a loan of five lakhs in India on interest at 5 per cent, but looking to the very friendly relations existing between himself and the Aden Residency, he thought it was advisable for him to apply to Government for the loan.

4. He adds that he has instituted a fund called the "Improvement Trust" and that he hopes to derive sufficient income from this fund to enable him to carry out the schemes necessary for the amelioration of his State and people. In the circumstances he states that he does not now require the loan and that should he be in need of money in the future he will arrange to obtain it either in Mukalla or in India.

5. As regards the appointment of a minister, His Highness states that he has secured the services of a competent and experienced Indian official, who is at present in the service of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.

6. It is evident from the Sultan's reply that he is not willing to conclude a new treaty of the nature suggested or to bind himself to accept the guidance of a British resident adviser. He probably feels that to do so would involve a surrender of his independence in his internal affairs that would lower his position in the eyes of his subjects, of his neighbours and of his relatives and friends in India, where the tendency of the Rulers of Native States is to free themselves from the tutelage of British Political Officers and to diminish the authority of those who are resident in their territories. The commencement of a more active policy in the eastern part of the Aden Protectorate and the intervention of a Political Officer from Aden in internal tribal affairs in the Hadhramaut Valley have been welcomed by the majority of the local inhabitants as promising the inauguration of a new period of better government and greater security, but they have at the same time roused suspicion in some quarters that the British authorities are aiming at something approaching annexation, and during my recent visit to India I found that a report had appeared in the Indian press that an endeavour was being made to usurp the authority of the Sultan of Mukalla. His Highness wrote to me on this subject informing me that a rumour was current in India that the British Government were desirous of taking possession of parts of the Protectorate including the Hadhramaut and Mukalla. He added he was sure that these rumours were entirely false, and that he had willingly agreed that a British Political Officer should stay at Mukalla to watch foreign affairs during his absence. He assured me that his officials,

* No. 14.

army and subjects would never have any kind of connexion with any Power other than the British Government, with whom he would always maintain his loyal co-operation, and he suggested that the rumours to which he had referred should be contradicted as they might create a bad impression among the Arabs about both His Majesty's Government and himself. I replied that he might rest assured that there was no foundation for the rumour, which was probably due to the increased contact that has become possible in recent years between Aden, Mukalla and the Hadhramaut owing to the establishment of landing grounds by the Royal Air Force. I said that the reason for the presence of a Political Officer in the Hadhramaut at the present time was the one that he had mentioned in his letter, and I added that the position was partly influenced by his desire to strengthen his military forces, to improve social welfare in his country and to promote various material improvements for which he desired a loan from His Majesty's Government, and that at the same time there was a demand for help in establishing greater security in the interior of the country. I said that I was anxious that the British authorities should comply with these requests as far as possible, and this involved a closer interest and greater contact with Aden. I said, however, that the aim of His Majesty's Government was not to undermine or in any way lessen, but on the contrary to strengthen, his authority and that of the Kathiri Sultan in their respective territories, and to observe the treaties which bound those countries to each other and to the British Government. I thanked him for his assurances of loyalty to the British Government of which, I said, I have never been in any doubt, and I promised to consider what steps could be taken to contradict the false rumours that had been spread about.

7. I consider it important that the development of our policy in the eastern part of the Protectorate should follow certain principles:

(*a*) It should be based on existing treaties, which are the only legal foundation for our position in the country.

(*b*) It should aim at maintaining and increasing the authority of the Treaty Chiefs, that is, of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans.

(*c*) It should endeavour so to guide them that the exercise of their authority will facilitate the material development of their territories and the economic and social welfare of their peoples.

(*d*) It should encourage them to rely for advice and assistance upon the British Government, and so to exclude any temptation to turn for help to other Powers.

(*e*) In order to attain these objects its first endeavour must be to secure the confidence of the Rulers and of their subjects, and to establish such a degree of reliance and respect for British Political representatives that their advice will be freely sought rather than accepted under pressure.

It must be remembered that direct intervention in the affairs of this area is a novelty. Until very recently little interest was shown by the British Government in these Sultanates beyond a desire to exclude foreign influence, and until the advent of the Royal Air Force closer contact with any places except the coastal towns was so difficult as to be almost impossible for the very small political staff that was formerly maintained at Aden. Arabs are by nature conservative, cautious and suspicious, and although there is undoubtedly a very real demand for progress in Mukalla and the Hadhramaut and a much greater degree of enlightenment there than in other parts of the Protectorate, I nevertheless consider that a change in our policy must not be pursued too rapidly or in such a way that it may alarm the susceptibilities of the inhabitants or of their Rulers, or give a handle to hostile foreign propaganda.

8. For these reasons I recommend that the Sultan of Mukalla should not now be pressed for the conclusion of a new treaty which is obviously distasteful to him, nor that he should be forced to accept a resident British adviser against his will. Mr. Ingrams has in a short time gained an influence and a personal ascendency in the Hadhramaut Valley that have enabled him to exercise decisive control over its affairs without the assumption of any official status beyond that of a Political Officer of the Aden Residency. He has done so by the exercise of tact and by the cultivation of friendly personal relations that were obviously genuine, and has so established such a feeling of confidence that his advice has been spontaneously sought and accepted. In my opinion he should pursue the same methods at Mukalla, where the existence of foreign influence and local prejudices and intrigues will make his task more difficult, but should not make it impossible. If he does so it is quite possible that he may bring the Sultan to a frame of mind in which his apprehensions will be allayed and he will willingly consent to accept an Adviser and to follow his guidance whether bound to do so by treaty or not. It is unfortunate that the Sultan will not at present accept the conditions laid down by His Majesty's Government for the grant of a loan, without the help of which any considerable material improvements in the Mukalla State cannot be undertaken; but in

my opinion it will be wise to exercise patience in this matter, and to look forward to a time (which I hope will not be distant) when the Sultan will feel sufficient confidence in the Aden Government and its local representative to accept their advice in financial matters on such conditions that His Majesty's Government may then consider sufficient.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Resident, etc.

78018/37 [No. 52A]. No. 17.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 4.22 p.m., 17th April, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 11. 17th April. Sultan Muhammad Umar son of the late Sultan of Shihr and Mokalla and heir apparent in accordance with the present family agreement has arrived in Aden and unknown to me or the Sultan of Shihr and Mokalla has arranged to sail for England in the Italian [? ship] Victoria leaving Aden 19th April. He has not reserved accommodation in London but has told me that he hopes to stay in the Grosvenor with the Sultan.

Though his outward reason for the visit is the Coronation, I believe that the main object is to lay before you his claim to succeed to Sultanate after the death of the present ruler. I am sending by the next mail a despatch dealing with the question of succession.

Shall be grateful if you can assist regarding accommodation and two seats to view the Coronation procession.

78018/37 [No. 49]. No. 18.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 26th April, 1937.)

(Confidential (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 14th April, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with my confidential despatch No. 139 dated 31st March, 1937*, and to inform you that I have now received a letter from Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur, the Kathiri Sultan, requesting me to convey to His Majesty's Government his desire for the appointment of Mr. W. N. Ingrams, O.B.E., First Political Officer as an Adviser to his Sultanate. I enclose a copy of the Sultan's letter for your information.

2. As you are aware, Mr. Ingrams is at present at Mukalla on special duty during the temporary absence from his State of the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

3. If Mr. Ingrams remains on special duty in the eastern part of the Protectorate after the return of the Sultan of Mukalla, as proposed in my telegram No. 2 of 2nd January, 1937†, he would be able to undertake the position of Adviser to the Kathiri Sultan as part of his duties, and I therefore recommend that the Sultan's request be granted.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

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* No. 16. † 78018/37 [No. 6]: not printed.

Enclosure in No. 18.

A/C. Seiyun, 6th Muharram, 1356.—18th March, 1937.

We inform you that the services rendered by the friend of Hadhramaut, Mr. Ingrams to our native country, made us liable not to forget that great kindness. In view of his sound suggestions or counsels, we now request you kindly to assist us by communicating to His Majesty's Government our desire to keep him as an Adviser or Counsellor of our Sultanate so that we may be enlightened by his sound ideas. We shall provide him with suitable dwelling house as our country can afford.

Please accept our compliments.

SULTAN ALI BIN MANSUR, KATHIRI SULTAN.

Lieut. Colonel M. C. Lake, C.M.G.,
Political Secretary, Aden.

78018/37 [No. 53]. No. 19.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3rd May, 1937.)

[*Answered by No. 25.*]

(Confidential.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 21st April, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to my confidential despatch No. 139 dated 31st March, 1937*, and to state that His Highness the Sultan of Mukalla passed through Aden on 14th April on his way from India to Europe and was joined here by his son Sultan Awadh bin Salih. He was in Aden for only a few hours, and had not time for much discussion during his call on me. I, however, mentioned the subject of a British Adviser at Mukalla and said that I regretted that the proposals made to him by His Majesty's Government were unacceptable to him. He replied that there had been a misunderstanding and that he had now explained his views to Mr. Ingrams, who had met him on board his ship on arrival. Mr. Ingrams subsequently reported what passed between them, and I attach a copy of his note on their conversation.

2. Although the Sultan is unwilling to accept a permanent British Adviser in order to promote the reforms in his State that he professes to favour, it appears that he has another object, to attain which he is prepared to submit himself and his State to British tutelage. His principal desire seems to be to break the conditions of his grandfather's will (under which he himself has succeeded to the Sultanate) and to deprive his predecessor's son of his inheritance in order to secure his succession for his own son Awadh. In entertaining this aim he is following the example of other modern Arab rulers, such as King Ibn Sa'ūd, the King of the Yemen and the Sultan of Lahej, each of whom has secured the recognition of his eldest son as his heir, instead of leaving the succession to be decided, in traditional Arab fashion, by election after his death. It remains to be seen whether the wishes of these rulers will be fulfilled when they die. In the cases of the Yemen and Lahej it is generally expected that their arrangements for the succession will be disputed and very probably altered. In Mukalla the Qu'aiti State is of comparatively recent origin and has not the usual tradition of elective rulership. The succession has hitherto been regulated by the will of Sultan Awadh bin 'Umar, who died in 1910, and who disposed of the inheritance of his State as though it were a private family property. He made his will on his own initiative, and it has never received any formal British approval or guarantee. Members of the family have from time to time been advised by the Aden Residency to abide by its terms in order to avoid family quarrels, but His Majesty's Government are in no way committed to ensuring that Sultan Awadh's regulation of the succession will be permanent, and they are free to acquiesce in a change in previous practice if they consider that it will be beneficial.

3. With regard to personalities in the Qu'aiti family there is not much to choose. Its members have never been particularly distinguished for intelligence, and inter-marriage for several generations with Indians has produced an unpromising type of Arab-Indian hybrid. Even in this family the Sultan's son Awadh is remarkable for his mental

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* No. 16.

and physical flabbiness, but he is amiable and amenable to advice, and may become a suitable figurehead, if that is what is desired. His cousin Muhammad son of the late Sultan 'Umar, and heir to the Sultanate under the will, is a young man of about 21, brought up entirely in India, probably more intelligent than Awadh, but possessing no real interest in the Arabian possessions of his family and having only a slight knowledge of Arabic.

4. Apart from personalities, there is a good deal to be said in favour of a revision of the system of succession. A continual alternation of power between two branches of the family which, with each successive generation, become more divergent and mutually antagonistic must inevitably be injurious to the interests of the State. Each ruler, knowing that his immediate successor will be a member of the rival branch, will endeavour to make as much as he can out of the State revenues to bequeath it to his own children, or alternatively he will try to alter the succession as the present Sultan is endeavouring to do. I think that eventually intervention by His Majesty's Government in favour of one or other branch of the family will become unavoidable in the interest of greater continuity and stability in the affairs of the State, and it is arguable that the time is now ripe for this change.

5. The promulgation of Sultan Awadh's will was an arbitrary personal act of the Ruler not sanctioned by custom, by the assent of the people of the State or by the explicit approval of the Protecting Power.

I am informed by Sultan Salih that it has already been set aside on legal grounds in so far as it concerns private property in India, and I think it is within the competence of the present Ruler to revise or to abrogate it as a political measure in so far as it concerns the succession to the Sultanate. There would be no need for His Majesty's Government to give formal approval to this change any more than they did to the change made a few years ago in the Lahej succession, and they could continue, as in the case of Lahej, to reserve their decision until the death of the ruling Sultan. Unlike Lahej, however, Mukalla has no body of persons possessing a recognized traditional right to choose a new Ruler, and Sultan Salih therefore realizes that the change that he desires to make has little chance of being effective unless he can obtain the approval and support of His Majesty's Government. If these are given to him no serious opposition is probable within the State, but strong protests will doubtless be made by the disinherited heir and his branch of the family, unless they can be propitiated by pecuniary compensation.

Their demands in this respect are likely to be very large, and it will probably be necessary for His Majesty's Government to support the Sultan in refusing to grant more than a reasonable amount, which he should be bound to give.

6. In return for the support of His Majesty's Government in his designs Sultan Salih appears to be willing to accept a permanent British Adviser and even to sign a treaty on the lines recently proposed to him. He is personally on excellent terms with Mr. Ingrams, whose work in the Hadhramaut he appreciates; and, even without a formal treaty, he seems to be willing to give him a very free hand in the management of his State. A treaty would however bind his successors as well as himself, and would place the Qu'aiti State under effective and permanent British control, which would doubtless be of great benefit to its people, although it would inevitably expose His Majesty's Government to a charge of interfering with the liberty of an Arab State and of encroaching on Arab independence. The fact that this interference will be welcomed by the population and probably approved by Arab opinion in Aden will not prevent critics of His Majesty's Government at home and abroad from making this charge, and the step may also cause uneasiness among other Chiefs in the Protectorate and possibly some alarm at San'ā.

7. The advantages to the people of that part of the Protectorate and to British interests in it would, nevertheless, be so great that I recommend that full consideration be given to Sultan Salih's proposals. If they are acceptable to you, I suggest that he be told that he should address me officially on the subject, giving his reasons for wishing to abrogate his grandfather's will and explaining what he desires to substitute for it. I consider that here he would be well advised to propose that each Ruler should in future have the right to nominate his own successor, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, rather than that he should attempt to introduce the principle of primogeniture which is foreign to Arab custom. These proposals, when received from the Sultan, would be submitted through me to you, and, if you concur, I would advise their acceptance on the understanding that His Highness will make adequate provision to compensate the dispossessed heir and will agree to accept such conditions as His Majesty's Government think necessary to ensure the future tranquillity and well-being of his State.

These conditions could be previously arranged with the Sultan, and would probably take the form of the treaty already proposed or of an agreement of a similar nature.

8. Sultan Salih is now on his way to Europe, and is anxious to discuss his plans at the Colonial Office. I therefore submit these suggestions immediately for your consideration.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 19.

NOTE BY MR. W. H. INGRAMS, O.B.E., FIRST POLITICAL OFFICER, OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF SHIHR AND MUKALLA ON THE 14TH APRIL, 1937.

I went on board the s.s. *Strathnaver* yesterday to meet His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib. After greetings and profuse thanks for the services I had been able to render to his State, Sultan Salih proceeded at once to the question of the presence on board of Muhammad bin 'Umar, son of the late Sultan. He said he had been disturbed by the letter of advice which he had received from the Residency regarding Muhammad's intended visit to Mukalla and he sincerely hoped that the Governor would not encourage Muhammad's proposal to go there, especially during his absence. It was certain, he said, that the boy, who was harmless himself but had with him an unscrupulous lawyer who was simply endeavouring to get money out of him, would be led into intrigues and be the cause of accentuating any existing differences of party that there are in Mukalla.

He told me frankly that he hoped that it would be possible for 'Awadh to become his heir. The will of his grandfather, he said, was an impossible document and except in so far as actual succession was concerned had never been carried into effect, and, even as far as succession was concerned special agreements had been made. He told me that, as I knew, he was anxious for the development and improvement of his State but that there was absolutely no encouragement to such development if the succession was not secured to his descendants. He said " of course if Government is not willing to recognize my son then I shall be left to do as my predecessors have done and make as much out of the country as I can while I am Sultan."

He asked me what I thought the chances were of getting his son recognized. I replied that of course I was in no position to give him any sort of assurance as to what attitude Government would take in the matter. I said I imagined that if they felt called upon to make a decision their decision would be influenced by what would be the greatest good for the country and its people, and that I had no doubt that it was generally recognized that what had hitherto happened, namely that the Sultans had despoiled the country to fill their own pockets, was undesirable.

I then said that I thought it was unfortunate that he had recently declined the offer to be provided with an Adviser, an arrangement which would no doubt assist considerably in the development and improvement of the country. The Sultan said that the proposal for an Adviser had looked as if the Adviser would be the Sultan and he would be a nonentity, and that he was afraid of some strange officer coming who would relegate him entirely to the background. I then asked him if he thought that I had in any way in the course of our dealings shown any tendency to treat him in that way. He said that I certainly had not and after again saying how grateful he was for various things I had done, said he would be very happy if I could be his Adviser. He had failed to find the new Prime Minister he had wanted to get in India and would be very pleased if I did the work as he had seen the results of what I had done with the tribes. He assured me that he would have no hesitation in accepting the Adviser proposal if his own wishes in regard to the succession could be met.

I then said that if it turned out that Government were willing to consider the matter I felt they would probably require fair provision to be made for Muhammad 'Umar, and he then said that he would leave that entirely to me and that he would agree to any reasonable proposal that I made. I tried to get some idea of what he would consider reasonable and he, or Khan Bahadur 'Ali Baakza who was speaking for him in a good deal of the conversation, first suggested an allowance to be paid from the State. I said I thought it would probably be better if a Trust were formed for him but I had not given much consideration to the matter and there might be a good many factors to be taken into account. He repeated that he would leave that entirely to me, whether it should be a trust or a lump sum or property. He then asked me if I would explain the whole matter to Government and endeavour to secure for him a satisfactory solution. I said that a satisfactory solution would no doubt be the one that was of greatest benefit to the

country as well, as, taking his interests as well as those of Muhammad 'Umar into account, I thought I could undertake to do that, particularly as there was probably no clash between his best interests and those of Government, but that I could not commit Government in any way. He entirely understood this.

I have dealt with the question of succession in the Mukalla state in my Report on the Hadhramaut, page 78 et seq. As long as there is no advice or control in the internal affairs of the State there is just one possible advantage in the present arrangements for succession at Mukalla and that is that the death of one Sultan usually means a clear sweep of the old gang and a brief respite for the population before the new lot of oppressors get busy. It is a very debatable point whether there is any real advantage in this at all. There is certainly less than in the system of election which pertains elsewhere in the Protectorate for that does mean that to some extent the people choose their own oppressor.

As I had pointed out in my Report, Sultan 'Awadh, the grandfather of the present Sultan, treated his possessions in Arabia on exactly the same footing as those in India, namely as private estates. It is only very recently that a conception has grown up of State property as opposed to the personal property of the reigning Sultan.

As regards his Indian estates Sultan Salih says that the will of his grandfather has been set aside in virtue of the law of primogeniture, and he considers that on these grounds the will should be set aside as regards Mukalla, but it seems to me that this is not a very sure foundation on which to base the case, for one thing primogeniture has, I believe, never been acknowledged among Arabs as giving a bona fide right to succession and for another it seems to me entirely wrong that a country should be treated as private property.

I think really that there is very little doubt that in fact it is more likely to be advantageous to secure the succession from father to son rather than to allow it to be the cause of spoilation of a State by a Sultan during his lifetime and disruptive disputes at his death. The problem is of course no new one and several Arab States have of late attempted to solve it on the ordinary western lines.

As far as the will is concerned Government have never committed themselves to any particular line of action by recognizing it nor have they in any way guaranteed it either when Sultan 'Awadh produced it to the Resident or on any subsequent occasion. On the other hand when the question has been raised advice has generally been given to the effect that agreements regarding the succession should be observed. Recognition has been given to the Sultans who have succeeded Sultan 'Awadh according to the will but the opinion has been expressed that recognition did not imply recognition of the will but was merely concerned in securing the payment of stipend to the accepted Chief.

There is, of course, no court which has the jurisdiction to enforce or vary the will and the fact that the will has been set aside with regard to the Hyderabad estates has no bearing on the succession in the Hadhramaut. One may suppose, therefore, that there is in fact nothing to prevent any Sultan from setting aside the will and nominating his own successor, particularly if he can be sure that the Yafa'is in the country would support his nominee and there would not be such an upheaval that would render Government's intervention essential.

Any intervention that was made over succession would in present circumstances, therefore, have to be purely political and would take into consideration the public interest and expediency generally. I imagine it is quite possible that circumstances such as these have risen in other protected Sultanates in the Empire, though the only case of which I have any particular knowledge is that of Muscat and Zanzibar separated by Lord Canning's award in 1861 on the report of the then Resident and the Chaplain of Aden who were appointed as Commissioners to investigate the questions at issue between two of the sons of Seyyid Sa'id. Brigadier Coghlan had occasion in the course of his enquiries to examine the right of Seyyid Sa'id to dispose of his African possessions by will on the ground that several of them were his by conquest and that it was chiefly owing to his administration that the whole was consolidated into one dominion. Brigadier Coghlan considered that it was very questionable whether on such grounds he could fairly be held to have possessed the power to dispose of them either by will or otherwise to his sons or anyone else. The cases are not exactly parallel but Sultan Salih's predecessors did acquire their Sultanate in the Hadhramaut mainly by conquest and it may not be altogether irrelevant to point out that they were established there as undisputed rulers largely owing to British assistance, vide pages 32 and 33 of my Report.

There are of course a good many precedents for the provision of dispossessed Sultans or would be Sultans and I imagine a fair solution of Muhammad's material claims—and it is unlikely that he is greatly interested in anything more than the material aspect of the question—would not be difficult to find. The ideal would probably be that

he should have the Hyderabad estates and that the elder branch should retain the succession in Arabia, but I do not know what the value of the Hyderabad estates is nor do I suppose that Sultan Salih would be willing to go as far as that.

The Colonial Office have in mind that the treaty they propose should be on the lines of those concluded with certain Malay rulers, and the only Malay treaty I have been able to find in the Secretariat which has a clause on these lines is that with the Chiefs of Perak, in which Article VI provides " that the Sultans receive and provide a suitable residence for a British officer to be called Resident who shall be accredited to his court and whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay religion and custom." It will be noted in Hertzlet's Treaties that that treaty and several others make provision for succession. The same volume of Hertzlet also contains the Zanzibar Protectorate Treaty which includes the following article: " Colonel C. B. Euan-Smith further guarantees to His Highness Seyyid 'Ali on behalf of Her Majesty's Government the right of nominating his own successor to the throne subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government," and a provision somewhat on these lines would no doubt satisfy Sultan Salih.

78018/37 [No. 55]. No. 20.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10th May, 1937.)

[*Answered by No. 25.*]

(Confidential.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 27th April, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to my despatch of 21st April, 1937*, regarding the Mukalla succession, and to enclose a copy of a letter which I have since received from Sultan Muhammad bin 'Umar.

2. Before sailing for England, Sultan Muhammad bin 'Umar had a long interview with Mr. W. H. Ingrams, O.B.E., First Political Officer, from which Mr. Ingrams formed the opinion that Sultan Muhammad would be ready to renounce all claims to succession if he were adequately compensated.

3. He suggested that Mr. Ingrams should negotiate on his behalf, and Mr. Ingrams considers that a monthly allowance from the Mukalla Government and a fixed income from the Hyderabad or Bombay estates might satisfy Sultan Muhammad.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY.

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 20.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, Aden, 17th April, 1937.

I am grateful to Your Excellency for granting me an interview and writing to the Colonial Secretary for my reception in London.

The only object of my visit to Aden was to meet you and to place my thoughts regarding Mukalla before you. As Your Excellency were very busy I could not speak to Your Excellency about the matters which I consider of prime importance to me and my family.

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* No. 19.

On the demise of my late father His Highness Sultan 'Umar bin Awadh the question of succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla automatically opened up. Such a question is determined by one of the following methods:—

(*a*) Succession by the eldest son of the late Sultan to the Sultanate.

(*b*) Succession by special family custom.

According to rule (*a*) I am entitled as the eldest son of the late Sultan 'Umar bin Awadh. But as there is special family custom the rule referred above will not operate. The special family custom as laid down by the will of the common ancestor and ratified by the agreement of Sultan 'Umar and Sultan Salih and consecrated by the practice since then is that the succession to the Sultanate will continue in the two lines of Sultan 'Umar and Sultan Salih. And if Sultan Salih becomes the ruler the eldest son of the Sultan 'Umar will become the heir-apparent and Prince of Mukalla and vice-versa. In view of the special custom, the succession to the Sultanate will be governed by the family custom in contravention to the ordinary rule of succession.

It is not open for any member of the family to go against the established custom. If any body challenges the custom and desires to take law into his hand—then there are only two alternatives open for the aggrieved party—either to redress the wrong by his own independent acts or to appeal to the Supreme Government.

I think Your Excellency will bear me out when I say that it will not be right for any Sultan under the protection and suzerainty of His Majesty's Government to redress the wrong by his independent acts—unless permitted to do so.

Hence the only other alternative for the aggrieved party is to appeal to His Majesty's Government through the proper channel.

I believe when such an appeal is made, His Majesty's representative in exercising his judgment will take into account the following things:—

1. The devotion and friendship of the person appealing to His Majesty the King of England.
2. The popular feeling of the country which will be entrusted to his care.
3. The capacity of the person to manage the affairs of the State.

I request Your Excellency to apply each of the above tests to my case and satisfy.

I assure Your Excellency that you will find me second to none in the friendship and devotion to the Crown of England. I am confident that if the will of the people will be ascertained—notwithstanding certain things that have been done by Sultan Salih—I will have the unanimous support of my people for the recognition of my claim to be the heir apparent and prince of Mukalla. I am quite prepared to assert with confidence that I possess those qualities of head and heart which an Arab Sultan requires.

I respectfully but with all the emphasis that I command, appeal to Your Excellency as the representative of His Majesty's Government to support my cause which is just and righteous. I am entitled by law, equity, and justice to be declared heir apparent of Mukalla and to receive the customary allowance of the Princeship.

I have not the slightest doubt that Your Excellency who has always shown regard to Arab family custom and who has earned his good name by devotedly following principles of justice and equity will ever hesitate to support my cause which is just and righteous. But as I have not received any definite answer in this matter of great importance to me I approach Your Excellency with this appeal.

I trust Your Excellency will graciously favour me with a reply to this appeal for which I shall ever feel grateful.

I have for the time postponed my visit, as advised by Your Excellency, to my dear country—Mukalla.

With profound regards,

Yours, &c.,

MUHAMMAD BIN 'UMAR.

The Governor,
Aden.

78018/37 [Nos. 56-57].

No. 21.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

1. FOREIGN OFFICE.
2. AIR MINISTRY.

[*Answered by No. 26.*]

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 17th May, 1937.

In continuation of the letter from this Department of the 6th of May* regarding the affairs of the State of Mukalla, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to transmit to you, to be laid before [Mr. Secretary Eden] [the Air Council] the accompanying copies of two further despatches† and enclosures from the Governor of Aden concerning the question of the succession to the Sultanate. I am also to enclose a copy of the 1922 Agreement‡ which at present regulates the succession, together with a copy of Mr. Ingram's recent Report§ on the Hadhramaut, Chapter X of which is of particular interest in this connexion.

2. It appears that the Sultan, in return for the support of His Majesty's Government in his designs for the succession, might be willing to accept a British Adviser on conditions similar to those discussed in connexion with the proposals for a loan dealt with in the previous correspondence. In view of the advantages likely to result from the acceptance by the Sultan of a British Adviser, Mr. Ormsby Gore is inclined to favour a proposal that the Governor should be authorized to invite the Sultan to submit formal representations as to the succession, and to assure him that His Majesty's Government are likely to give sympathetic consideration to his proposals provided that they can be satisfied that adequate compensation will be offered to the dispossessed heir, and that the Sultan will conclude a Treaty on the lines recently proposed to him to ensure the future tranquillity of the State.

3. Subject to the concurrence of [Mr. Secretary Eden] [the Air Council] and of the other interested Departments, Mr. Ormsby Gore would be prepared, if opportunity arises, to speak in this sense to the Sultan during his stay in this country, and in order that this may be possible, I am to request the favour of an early reply to this letter. (It would be understood, if the matter is raised in this country, that the Sultan should defer his formal proposals for presentation through the Governor after his return.)

4. A similar letter is being addressed to the [Air Ministry] [Foreign Office] and copies are being sent to the India Office and Treasury.

I am, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

78018/37 [No. 61].

No. 22.

AKBAR ALI KHAN

to

COLONIAL OFFICE

[*Answered by No. 24.*]

138, St. James' Court, Buckingham Gate, S.W.1,

DEAR SIR, 18th May, 1937.

With reference to your office letter dated 14th May, 1937‖, an official letter signed by Sultan Mohamad Bin Omer Alkaity, is submitted herewith.

I shall be grateful if you would spare a few moments of your busy time to enable me to elucidate some of the points referred to in the letter.

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* 78018/37 [Nos. 50 and 51]: not printed. † Nos. 19 and 20. ‡Enclosure 1 in No. 15.
§ Colonial No. 123. ‖ 78018/37 [No. 58]: not printed.

I wish to make it plain here that I am not approaching you in my professional capacity as a lawyer but as a friend and Counsellor of the late Sultan Omer of Shihr and Mokalla, the interests of whose family are dear to my heart, and I believe, perfectly safe in your hands.

Yours, &c.,

AKBAR ALI KHAN.

Enclosure in No. 22.

138, Duke's House, St. James's Court, S.W.1,

18th May, 1937.

SIR,

I beg to submit the following for favour of your sympathetic consideration:

His Majesty's Government is doubtless aware of the fact that my grandfather, Sultan Awad, had executed a will, dated 1st Shaban 1316 Hijri, as regards the future successions to the Sultanate of Shihr and Mokalla, wherein it was laid down that his first son, Sultan Ghalib should succeed him and be succeeded, in turn, by Sultan Omer, the younger brother of Sultan Ghalib. Sultan Omer, it was further stipulated, should be succeeded by Sultan Ghalib's eldest son, Sultan Saleh, and the latter by Sultan Omer's eldest son Sultan Mohamad (the undersigned). The Sultanate of Shihr and Mokalla was thus made to rotate alternately between the two branches of Sultan Awad's sons, thus linking up the interests of the entire family with the well-being and prosperity of Hadramut and enhancing its devotion and loyalty to the British Crown.

Another advantage that Sultan Awad had contemplated in not restricting the line of succession to any one branch of the family was that the proposed arrangement threw open the Sultanate of Shihr and Mokalla to a wider circle of eligible candidates, in case of absence of heirs or the utter incapacity of a particular one to shoulder the responsibilities of his office. Moreover, it was calculated to introduce a healthy spirit of emulation and enterprise in the two branches of the family while inducing both to pool their resources and efforts for the benefit of their common heritage.

Sultan Awad's will, apart from its merits, has built up a tradition, which has the sanction of continued observance to the present day and is regarded by the people of Hadramut as sacrosanct and binding on both the branches of the family.

His Majesty's Government, as the paramount power, though not technically bound by the will itself, has, by virtue of its own well-established and wholesome principle of respecting local traditions, been recognizing successions accordingly. Sultan Omer was recognized after Sultan Ghalib and Sultan Saleh after Sultan Omer.

When Sultan Omer succeeded Sultan Ghalib, a fresh agreement, dated 24th June 1922, was executed and signed both by Sultan Omer and Sultan Saleh, confirming and reiterating the original will of their common ancestor, wherein Sultan Omer recognized Sultan Saleh as his Heir-Apparent and Sultan Saleh in turn solemnly pledged himself to recognize and declare Sultan Omer's eldest son (the undersigned) as his Heir-Apparent and successor. Needless to add that the agreement was duly submitted to the British Authorities at Aden for information and ratification.

Now that my cousin Sultan Saleh has, by the grace of God and in accordance with Sultan Awad's will and the subsequent agreement between him and my late father, been recognized Sultan of Shihr and Mokalla, he is expected, by the terms of the same agreement, to intimate to His Majesty's Government my name as his Heir-Apparent and successor and secure formal recognition. So far as I am aware, His Highness has not yet fulfilled this part of the agreement. Nor am I receiving the monthly allowance due to the Heir-Apparent. On the contrary, rumours are current that His Highness is contemplating to break family tradition and his own solemn pledge. Yet I persist in the hope that the rumours are baseless and am perfectly confident that my interests are safe in the trustworthy hands of His Britannic Majesty's benign Government, towards whom my devotion and loyalty is unquestionable.

The object of this respectful representation is to enlist the sympathy and patronage of His Majesty's Government in my cause and to solicit their kind and benevolent assurance regarding my position as Heir-Apparent and successor to the Sultanate of Mokalla.

I further beg that His Majesty's Government may be pleased to direct my cousin, His Highness Sultan Saleh, to pay my monthly allowance regularly and clear off the arrears of the last fifteen months.

Assuring His Majesty's Government of my unfailing devotion and loyalty,

I beg, &c.,

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY.

Permanent Address:
Shamsheer Bhaugh, Nampalli,
Hyderabad,
Deccan, India.

To:
The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies,
His Britannic Majesty's Government,
Downing Street, London.

78018/37 [No. 60]. No. 23.

NOTE FOR THE USE OF HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF MUKALLA AT HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 21ST MAY, 1937.

1. Though coming primarily for the Coronation, I am happy to have this opportunity to tell you, Sir, something of a matter which is very close to my heart, something which is all important to me and my State—namely, the succession of my son to the Sultanate in due course. This matter calls for immediate settlement, if for no other reason than to put an end to the unrest and intrigue which is hindering all progress and indeed stability in the State. I ask for your personal interest in this matter.

2. Briefly the position is that my grandfather, the founder of the State, made a will—which is not valid in accordance with Mohammeden law—enjoining alternate succession as between the elder and younger branches of the family. All the other terms were never fulfilled. As the eldest son's son, I was coerced into accepting an irregular procedure as to the succession under the threat that my uncle would call in the armed assistance of a neighbouring tribe to support his claim; and then everything might be lost to the Quaiti family for all time. The invaders would remain. If, in acquiescing in my uncle's succession, I acted unwisely, I only did so in the interests of my people to avoid civil war. The point now at issue is between my own son, the rightful future ruler, and my uncle's son, who, incidentally, happens to be not the son of a married wife.

3. Speaking as a Mohammeden, sufficiently well versed in the Shariat law, I maintain that the first Sultan had no power or right to lay down the succession *for posterity*. He can dispose of his property and maybe, name his immediate successor. That is all. Again, if this right is vested in a certain Sultan it must no less be vested in succeeding Sultans. This is the right that I now claim. I naturally wish to nominate my own eldest son, who has been working in the State and has recently had the advice of Mr. Ingram who has reported on him most favourably.

4. In practice in Arabia, as in all Mohammedan countries, the law of primogeniture is generally adopted. King Feisal was succeeded by his son; the heir apparent to Ibn Saud is his eldest son; the Iman Yahia has named his eldest son as his successor; In Egypt the succession is automatic. There is no tribal law or custom in Mokalla to alter or set aside this generally accepted principle of primogeniture. My son should not be called upon to forfeit his birthright.

5. However, this aspect of the case, and the political consequences arising out of the conflicting claims to the succession, are now being set out formally in a memorial to be presented. To assist me in this matter I have invoked the aid of a trusted friend, Sir Geoffrey Archer, (see letter attached*). He has agreed to propose and sponsor my case. The formal issues therefore I leave in his hands.

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* Not printed.

6. I just wish to say in conclusion:—

(1) Until my son is formally declared to be my successor and the law of primogeniture is recognized as a rule, there can be no peace or prosperity within my borders. Nothing else will stop the " Fitna " and the uncertainty created by rumour.

(2) Each successive ruler, in the future as in the past, will have to extract money from the State to support his heir living outside.

(3) There can be no continuity of administration. Each ruler will undo the work of his predecessor.

(4) The present position is intolerable and utterly unfair to the Shahris over whom I rule.

That briefly is my case.

78018/37 [No. 63]. No. 24.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

AKBAR ALI KHAN.

SIR, Downing Street, 24th May, 1937.

I am desired by Sir John Maffey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th May*, enclosing an official letter signed by Sultan Mohamad bin Omer.

The Secretary of State is in communication with the Governor of Aden on the subject of Sultan Mohamad's letter. Until the observations of the Governor are received, Sir John Maffey is not in a position to discuss the matter: and he would suggest that you should not postpone your departure from England.

Yours, &c.,

A. B. COHEN,

Private Secretary.

78018/37 [No. 62]. No. 25.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

[*Answered by No. 39.*]

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 24th May, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch of the 21st April†, regarding the succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla. I have also received your confidential despatch of 27th April‡.

2. This question was raised by the Sultan of Mukalla at an interview on the 21st May, when he left with me the note§, of which I enclose a copy.

3. I told the Sultan that I would give careful consideration to his representations in consultation with you; that I hoped that he would see his way to accept a British Adviser; and that I should be anxious that any arrangements about the succession would be of such a nature that subsequent trouble need not be anticipated.

4. I suggest that, if you see no objection, you should encourage the Sultan, on his return to Aden, to submit definite proposals, under which

(*a*) he would accept a British Adviser, and sign a treaty under which he would bind himself and his successors to act on his advice on all matters except those of Mohammedan religion and custom; and

(*b*) he would offer suitable compensation to the dispossessed heir.

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* No. 22. † No. 19. ‡ No. 20. § No. 23.

If his proposals are satisfactory, His Majesty's Government would agree not to oppose his designs for the settlement of the succession, and not to support in any way the claims of Sultan Muhammad Bin Umar.

5. I enclose for your information a copy of a letter* addressed to the Colonial Office by the last-named. I do not propose that there should be any discussion with him in the matter of the succession until I have your reply to this despatch.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78018/37 [No. 74]. No. 26.

AIR MINISTRY

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

SIR, Air Ministry, W.C.2, 24th May, 1937.

I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to Mr. Cowell's letter 17th instant†, regarding the affairs of the State of Mukalla, and to say that they concur in the course of action proposed therein.

The Air Council feel that their chief interest in the matter is that the settlement reached should be such as to minimize any risk of disorder at Mukalla, in view of the very considerable distance of that place (approximately 450 miles) from Aden.

Copies of this letter are being sent to Foreign Office, India Office and Treasury.

I am, &c.,

CHARLES EVANS.

78018/37 [No. 81]. No. 27.

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

[*Answered by No. 32.*]

DEAR SIR, St. James' Court, S.W.1, 27th May, 1937.

With reference to the Memorial* submitted by me recently to His Majesty's Government on the subject of my succession to the Sultanate or Mukalla, I beg respectfully to add that if His Highness Sultan Saleh has submitted any memorial on the subject, I might be furnished with a copy thereof, so that I may have an opportunity of replying to his arguments, if any.

Similarly, if a copy of my representation is sent to him for explanation and reply, it will not only expedite matters but enable His Majesty's Government to get a good grasp of all aspects of the case, before finally deciding it.

I trust I will be given a hearing before that stage is reached.

Yours, &c.,

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY.

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* Enclosure in No. 22. † No. 21.

78018/37 [No. 75]. No. 28.

MR. K. W. BLAXTER (COLONIAL OFFICE)

to

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR).

(Confidential.)

DEAR REILLY, Downing Street, S.W.1, 31st May, 1937.

With reference to the Secretary of State's confidential despatch of the 24th of May* about the Mukalla succession question, you may be interested to have this short account of what took place when I and my wife took tea with Sultan Mohamad and his party a few days ago.

As was to be expected they raised the succession question. I told Mr. Akbar Ali Khan that the Colonial Office view was that questions relating to the State of Mukalla could only be discussed with the Sultan himself in this country, and that I therefore could not enter into details in the matter. I did, however, say that the Colonial Office thought Sultan Mohamed would be well advised not to stay on in England in anticipation of an early settlement of the question. I pointed out that the whole question had now been referred to you for your further consideration and it seemed probable that some time would elapse before any recommendations could be received. I told them also, in answer to a question, that if they wished to make any further representations they should be made to you, as you at present had the matter under consideration. To an enquiry whether it would not be a good thing for the two sides to be brought together for the purpose of negotiations, I replied that such a course might be advisable at the right moment, but that any such meeting would presumably take place in Aden and not in London.

Sultan Mohamed has been very pressing with invitations to dinner. He has invited the Secretary of State and senior officials of the Office, but these have not been accepted, since it was thought that the Sultan of Mukalla might feel aggrieved. It was agreed, however, that I and my wife might go. We found it extremely difficult to escape without accepting further invitations; we succeeded in doing so, but had to consent rather reluctantly to be photographed by the Sultan's cine-camera!

Abdulla Pasha who is one of the Sultan of Mukalla's party told me that one of the two companions of Sultan Mohamed (I forget which) is on the Government of India's black list, as a political agitator. This may only be gossip, but I record it for what it is worth.

Yours, &c.,

K. W. BLAXTER.

78018/37 [No. 82]. No. 29.

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 32.]

DEAR SIR, St. James' Court, 31st May, 1937.

I am grateful to you for your kind assurance that you will be in a position to discuss the subject-matter of my representation to His Majesty's Government after the Governor of Aden has submitted his observations thereon.

As suggested by you in the letter under reference, I am not postponing my departure from England, as I had at one time intended to, but propose to leave shortly for Mukalla

I request that I might be kept informed of the developments in this case and also apprised of the Governor's observations so that I might be in a position to make a supplementary representation, if any is called for, or come over to England in good time to place my case before His Majesty's Government so that the ends of justice might be met.

As the decision in this case affects me most vitally, I once again request that the solicitations made above, might be granted.

Yours, &c.,

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY.

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* No. 25.

78018/37 [No. 84]. No. 30.

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE)

to

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR).

[Answered by No. 37.]

(Confidential.)

MY DEAR REILLY, Downing Street, S.W.1, 3rd June, 1937.

You will now have received our despatch about the succession in Mukalla.

Although no opportunity has arisen for discussing in detail the terms of the proposed treaty, I gather that the Sultan feels some apprehension that the acceptance of an Adviser will reduce his own powers to insignificance. This is by no means the intention; and I think that if he understood our relations with the Malay Sultans he would realize this.

In all, ten Malay Rulers, within and without the Federation, have accepted Resident Advisers. Some of them have voluntarily entered into treaties of this nature in quite recent years, after long experience of the working of the Adviser system in neighbouring States. There have been very few cases of material disagreement between the Ruler and the Adviser, and the only serious case recently has concerned the succession in the State—a matter which in Mukalla would be settled if the proposed treaty were made.

It should be understood that the advice given to the Ruler in all matters of internal concern is based solely on the Adviser's view of the interests of the State and of the Ruler. It has been our policy to maintain the authority of the Ruler in all such matters. In matters of foreign relations other considerations must necessarily enter; but in this sphere the Sultan is already bound, both by treaty and by the force of circumstances, to follow the advice of the Protecting Power.

It will also be realized that, in the event of foreign exploitation of the oil or other resources of the State, it will be of the greatest advantage to the Sultan to have at his side an experienced Adviser, in close and constant touch with His Majesty's Government. In such circumstances the maintenance of law, order and good government is essential to the avoidance of incidents which might give rise to threats of foreign intervention.

The Sultan should also understand that in the event of serious disagreement between himself and the Adviser, it will be open to him to appeal to the Governor and even to the Secretary of State.

I suggest that you might, if you see fit, open the matter to the Sultan somewhat in this sense. If he should dislike the actual terms used in the Malay treaties, he might still be willing to bind himself to *consult* with the Adviser in all matters; and this would probably have much the same effect, provided that the control over his foreign relations were maintained in express terms.

Yours, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

78018/37 [No. 92]. No. 31.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7th June, 1937.)

[Answered by No. 44.]

(Confidential.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 26th May, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Lake's confidential despatch No. 457 dated 22nd September, 1936*, regarding our policy in the Hadhramaut.

2. The present position with regard to the Mukalla Forces is that a retired Indian Army Officer, Subedar Diwan Ali, was appointed as Instructor in January, 1937, but Mr. Ingrams reported that the position was not satisfactory, partly owing to Subedar Diwan Ali's ignorance of Arabic and mainly to the chaotic condition of the Mukalla Army.

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* No. 6.

I therefore considered it desirable to obtain the opinion and advice of a competent Military Officer and, at my request, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Robinson, D.S.O., Commanding the Aden Protectorate Levies, was authorized by the Air Officer Commanding to proceed to Mukalla, where he spent about a fortnight in examining the position. He has written a report contained in a series of minutes on the proposed reorganization of the Mukalla Army. This report was forwarded to me by Mr. Ingrams with a Memorandum, and I referred these documents, with my comments, to the Air Officer Commanding at Aden for his opinion.

3. I enclose copies of the entire correspondence* as I consider this to be the best means of presenting to you the views expressed by the officers concerned and my own opinion regarding them. I agree entirely that the reorganization of the Mukalla Forces has no chance of real success unless it is closely supervised by a competent British Military Officer. This was my original proposal, which I subsequently modified in deference to the wishes of the Sultan of Mukalla, but I now realize that the appointment of a British Officer is an essential factor in the scheme, and I anticipate that the Sultan's objections to it can now be overcome.

4. As I have stated in my letter of 11th May, 1937, to the Air Officer Commanding, I consider that of the two alternative methods of securing a British Officer proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robinson, the appointment of a Major as Second in Command to the Aden Protectorate Levies is the better one, and I desire strongly to support the recommendations that have been made by the Air Officer Commanding to the Air Ministry on this subject. Air Commodore McClaughry has made it clear that he considers this appointment to be desirable quite independently of the Mukalla problem, but the fact that it would provide the best and easiest method of dealing with the latter is a very strong point in its favour from political point of view. With regard to the Sultan of Mukalla's contribution towards the cost of such an appointment I suggest that, as it is intended that the officer should remain in Mukalla for about six months only, a sum of about £200 would meet the case.

5. This solution would at the same time assist in dealing with the question of the Kathiri Tribal Guards. Two instructors have been appointed for them: Jemadar Muhammad Baksh and Muhammad bin Fadhl Abdali. They are under the general supervision of the Political Officer (the Honourable R. A. B. Hamilton) who deals with Tribal Guards in the western part of the Protectorate. For geographical reasons, however, it is difficult for him to visit them frequently, especially as he has other important duties to perform. I wish therefore to relieve him of responsibility for the Kathiri Tribal Guards which could conveniently be placed under the supervision of the officer dealing with the Mukalla Forces, who, after completing his six months' work at Mukalla, would continue to be Inspecting Officer for both the Mukalla Army and the Kathiri Guards.

6. I hope that these recommendations will meet with your approval, and that the proposed appointment can be sanctioned at an early date.

7. I am addressing you separately regarding armament for the Mukalla Forces.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

78018/37 [No. 85]. No. 32.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

SULTAN MOHAMAD BIN OMER ALKAITY.

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 8th June, 1937.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to acknowledge the receipt of your letters† of the 27th and 31st May regarding the question of the succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla, and to inform you that copies are being sent to the Governor of Aden.

I am, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

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* Not printed. † Nos. 27 and 29.

78018/37 [No. 86]. No. 33.

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE)

to

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR).

MY DEAR REILLY, Downing Street, S.W.1, 8th June, 1937.

After the despatch of my letter of the 3rd June*, I had a visit from Sheikh Ali Baakza, who called to discuss the proposals for a treaty on behalf of the Sultan of Mukalla.

He appeared to be very anxious to secure the support of the Secretary of State for His Highness's designs on the succession, and to overcome his reluctance to the conclusion of a treaty by which he would bind himself to accept a permanent Adviser.

Baakza seemed fully to understand that we had no designs on the integrity of the State or the authority of the Sultan. I assured him, on the contrary, that in the Malay States it was our policy to uphold the authority and dignity of the Sultans. At the same time, in the present international situation, and with the prospect of oil exploration parties, it would clearly be to the advantage of the Sultan to have at hand a British officer of experience with whom he could keep in close touch.

Baakza informed me that he himself favoured the appointment by the Sultan of Mr. Ingrams as Prime Minister. I said that this clearly went much beyond our proposals, but that we should like to hear what you thought of the scheme.

He pressed the importance of the settlement of the succession, and assured me that the Sultan would be willing to offer reasonable compensation to Sultan Mohamad. I told him that, if you assured us that his offer was a reasonable one, I felt confident that the Secretary of State would accept your view. (I did not attempt to follow his argument that, under Mohammedan law, Sultan Mohamad had no *legal* claim.)

It was understood that definite proposals would be made to you by His Highness as soon as he returned to Aden.

Yours, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

78018/37 [No. 98]. No. 34.

THE SULTAN OF MUKALLA

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

MY DEAR FRIEND, 23rd June, 1937.

In accordance with the conversation which took place at the interview you were good enough to grant me, I am sending a Memorial† in quadruplicate dealing with the matter of the succession to my State. I need not emphasize my own feelings in this matter or the supreme importance which I attach to it, as involving questions of the highest moment to my State and people and, I venture to believe, of no less importance to British influence on the Hadramauth Coast of Arabia.

In the preparation of the Memorial, I have enjoyed the advice and assistance of Sir Walter Monckton and Mr. Kenneth Diplock and of Sir Geoffrey Archer who has had long practical experience of administration in the Red Sea Area.

I beg, &c.,

SALEH BIN GHALIB,

Sultan of Shihr Mukalla.

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* No. 30. † Not reprinted.

78018/37 [No. 96]. No. 35.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 26th June, 1937.)

[*Answered by No. 38.*]

(Confidential (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 16th June, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your confidential despatch of the 24th May, 1937*, regarding the succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla, and to state that I shall discuss the matter with His Highness Sultan Salih, on his return to Aden, in the manner that you indicate. I do not yet know the date of his arrival, but I understand that it will be during the month of July.

2. In the meantime Sultan Muhammad bin 'Umar, son of the late Sultan 'Umar and claimant under the Will of Sultan Awadh to the Sultanate of Mukalla, has arrived and is remaining here temporarily to press his case. He has not yet stated it fully but I have no doubt that he will base it not only on the Will of Sultan Awadh but also on the Agreement made between his father, the late Sultan 'Umar, and the present Sultan at Hyderabad in India on 24th June, 1922, to which he has already referred in a recent letter to me. Copies of this Agreement† and of the Will of Sultan Awadh‡ were sent to your predecessor as accompaniments to Major-General Scott's despatch No. 67 dated 16th May, 1923§. For convenience I propose to send you fresh copies of both the documents.

3. It will be seen that the Agreement of 1922, to which the present Sultan appended his signature, is of a very categorical nature, and it will be interesting to see how His Highness proposes to justify his intention to dishonour it. It will be observed that although General Scott recommended on page 4 of his despatch of 16th May, 1923, that the Agreement should be recognized by His Majesty's Government, no recognition was accorded: in the Duke of Devonshire's reply in his despatch of 21st August, 1923||, he limited himself to approving the Resident's proposal to recognize Sultan 'Umar as successor to the late Sultan Ghalib and to continue to him the salute of 11 guns. No reference to the agreement was made in this communication.

4. As I have previously indicated the hands of His Majesty's Government appear to me to be perfectly free in this matter, except in so far as they may consider it politically expedient to press any particular course of action. I shall therefore await Sultan Salih's explanation of his proposals and of his reasons for them, as directed by you.

5. In the meantime I do not propose to enter into a discussion with Sultan Muhammad bin 'Umar as to the rights and wrongs of this dispute, but to limit myself to taking note of any points that he may wish to put forward.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

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* No. 25. † Enclosure 1 in No. 15. ‡ Enclosure 1 in No. 36. § 26526/23: not printed.
|| 39884/23: not printed.

78018/37 [No. 99]. No. 36.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6th July, 1937.)

(Confidential.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 23rd June, 1937.

In continuation of my despatch, confidential (2) dated 16th June, 1937*, I have the honour to forward herewith fresh copies of the Will of Sultan Awadh and of the Agreement of 1922† between the late Sultan 'Umar bin Awad and the present Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

WILL OF SULTAN AWADH.

That on the 1st of the month of Shaban 1316 of the Moslim Era, I, Awadth bin Omar bin Awadth the Ka'yti Sultan Nawaz Jung Shum-Shir el Molk, do hereby say that our late father Omar bin Awadth has bequeathed one-third of his property, estate, bequests, and whatever he possessed in the interior of Arabia such as Hadhramaut, etc., of valleys, counties in the parts of Hadhramaut, cultivated land streams, wells, crafts, tenements, messuages, ready cash, arms, gold, silver, merchandise, servants, credits, receivable debts, and all things to which the name of property or wealth is applied, also one-third of his goods, properties, bequests that are in the direction of Hyderabad and other countries in India, such as credits, receivable debts, ready cash, gold, silver, merchandise, servants, machines, arms of all sorts, and all their materials, tenements, messuages, etc., and in short has made it a permanent will wishing with this deed to please God; that one-third of his properties and rights that are in the direction of India as well as the interior of Arabia or in any direction of the Kingdom and State to cover the expenses of the guarded country of Shabam, Hura, etc., and these countries which his sons have possessed and do possess, also all the necessaries that the establishment in their position require in the way of improving, constructing, preserving, and for checking the spread of evil deeds that may arise against Government, subjects, Chieftainship, etc., or on anything that is advantageous to the Government, Chieftainship and subjects. Also for suppressing riot and opposing invaders, evil-minded persons, raiders, etc., as mentioned in the Will of our late father Umar bin Awadth, dated 1st Rajab 1279 of the Moslim Era, in which he made me and my late two brothers Abdulla and Salih the Rulers, protectors, administrators, and supervisors in the above mentioned one-third and its products. Our late father has granted the power of election, etc., as mentioned to us and those whom we elect as a Chief after us. My aforesaid two brothers Salih and Abdulla have already passed away to the mercy of the Almighty God and I remain solely the Ruler, protector, administrator, and possessor with full discretion in what my late above-mentioned father bequeathed in his will. That I was and am as long as I am breathing the Ruler, protector, administrator, and supervisor, in dealing in all the affairs that depend on the guarded city of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, Shehr, Mukalla, and all their dependencies of ports and cities that are now under my sway. I have granted the order of election, administration, etc., after my death to my son Ghalib bin Awadth bin Umar the Ka'iti during his life-time. I have made him the ruler, administrator, and superior, as aforesaid as well as that which he will occupy and possess after me of lands, countries, etc., and act in my place and do all things that are interesting to him and Government, Chieftainship, and subjects, to incur the necessary expenditure without squandering. He is also allowed to use out of the remainder of (the willed) one-third and its production the necessary expenditure without squandering and thus use out of the income of the countries such as the custom duties, etc., which have connexion with the finance and Government the necessary expenditure that concern the Chieftainship in the way of developing and establishing the countries and cities and for expelling evil-minded persons, invaders, raiders, etc., which may be advantageous and by which disturbances are avoided as above mentioned. I also recommend him to obey me and the commands of the Almighty God and his Prophet

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* No. 35. † Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

upon whom His mercy and Peace be, to do good deeds which be possible, to honour virtuous people, learned men, and Seyyids; to appoint and dismiss servants, and those that are under his Government; to hear complaints, rule the subjects justly, dispense the law which God has sent to His Prophet, His Peace and Mercy be on him upon himself and those whom God has placed under him, to put in force the impartial Mahomedan law, to pass orders, prohibit wicked deeds; and use all possible action in repressing any mischief that may befall the subjects, to consult his brother Omar and all those who are his relatives who are believed to be of good nature upon every subject and subjects that may be interesting to the Chieftainship position, and upon all important affairs. The adviser of every ruler must be his successor in all affairs and that they must assist each other. After the death of the aforesaid Ghalib bin Awadth his successor is his brother Omar bin Awadth bin Omar the Ka'yti who should be the ruler and the successor of the said Ghalib bin Awadth over the aforesaid countries of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, and the others that are in the direction of Hadhramaut; also the ports of Shihr and Mukalla and their dependencies as above mentioned, and after the death of the aforesaid Omar his successor is to be Saleh bin Ghalib who should be the ruler and Chief over the above mentioned countries that are in the direction of Hadhramaut, Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, etc., as well as those in the direction of the coast, such as Mukalla, Shihr, and their dependencies, etc., as above mentioned. After the death of the aforesaid Salih bin Ghalib his successor should be the son of Omar bin Awadth but if he has no son Mahomed bin Ghalib should be the successor and if he has a young son Mahomed bin Ghalib should act in his place and thus the succession should be amongst the sons of Ghalib bin Awadth and Omar bin Awadth and their descendants to generation and lineage. Every ruler who will be elected if he makes his residence at Shihr he should appoint his successor at Mukalla to officiate on his behalf in Government affairs and if he makes Mukalla the place of his residence he should appoint his successor at Shihr to officiate on his behalf in the affairs of Government, if his successor is absent the heir of his successor should act, but if both the successor and his heir are away (the successor or his heir) should appoint any one that the ruler may approve until he returns. In case the ruler be absent on a journey he should appoint in his place his successor to administer the affairs of the Government until he returns, if his successor is also absent he should appoint the heir of his successor but if his successor as well as the heir of his successor are both absent he may appoint any one he may approve until he comes back. As long as Ghalib bin Awadth is a ruler and administrator his successor the aforesaid Omar bin Awadth should be the Chief Official over the goods, properties, their products, the revenues of the countries, etc., in crediting, safeguarding and receiving from any and whatever direction may be and from every person or persons, he also should be under the command of the ruler Ghalib bin Awadth. If Omar bin Awadth becomes the ruler after the aforesaid Ghalib his successor should be the aforesaid Salih bin Ghalib bin Awadth who should be the supervisor receiver and keeper of the properties, etc., above mentioned and concern the chieftainship and Government and in any and whatever direction may be and from any person or persons, he should also be under the command of the aforesaid ruler Awadth bin Omar and thus for every ruler his successor should be the superior receiver and keeper as above mentioned. The supervisor is allowed to appoint and constitute whomever he desires to receive the income keep the goods and their products, to demand, ask and receive from every person or persons whatever is due to the Chieftainship, and dispute, legate, satisfy and defend either personally or by his attorney the recovery of debts from any person or persons whatever may be due by them to the Chieftainship in the way of debts, rights, and deposits. If the successor is absent in the direction of India his heir should act in the interior of Arabia in administering receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of debts that are due to the Chieftainship but if the successor is in the interior of Arabia his heir should act in his place in the direction of India in administering receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of what are due in the way of debts, rights, deposits, etc., to the Chieftainship, dispute, legate and negotiate settlement but if both of them (the successor and his heir) are in one place they should assist each other in the administration and recovery, also the one that is present is to be quite efficient to act in the place of the absent. The successor should be under the orders of the ruler and the heir of the successor should be under him (successor). The ruler may appoint in the city of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, and all the cities that are within the district of Hadhramaut whom he approves either one or more representatives in each of them to administer on his behalf and be under his command. The representative should judge judiciously, reign over the subjects justly, hear complaints, give just orders, prohibit wicked deeds and dispense the law that the Almighty God has sent to His Prophet, may His mercy and peace be on him, and endeavour in improving the affairs of the country and people and to have compassion and pity on those whom God has made him a superior, such as the weak and poor persons and others, to give account to the ruler of the income, outcome, taxes, products and all things that

the ruler appoints him over. If any opposition is shown to the representative or if he disobeys the ruler, does not maintain justice and does wrong and oppresses and does not give any account, tc., the ruler may dismiss him and appoint any one in his place but if the ruler wishes to appoint him in another place and does not want him to act as a representative he may discharge him and appoint any one in his place. The ruler is at liberty to appoint whom he likes and dismiss whom he dislikes from the cities, etc. The ruler has to provide his successors their sons and relatives a competent allowance of food, clothes, riding animals, etc., and to the sons of the sons of his brother Omar bin Awadth the Ka'yti and descendants to generation also the sons of the sons of Ghalib as well as the sons of his sons and descendants to generation a fixed allowance of food, clothes, etc., and to those who live in the ports of Shihr and Mukalla and their dependencies as well as Hadhramaut, Shabam and Hura, and their descendants to generation as the case may be and consider them as his sons. Every ruler that reigns over the port of Shihr, Mukalla, and their dependencies, as well as Shabam, Hadhramaut, etc., should provide all those who are related to our late father Omar bin Awadth and the sons of their sons who are living at Shihr Mukalla, their dependencies, Hadhramaut and Shabam, an allowance as the time and possibility affords, provided that they should be under his command and orders; also, they must obey, comply, submit to him and be his supporters and assistants. If the ruler becomes insane, or is young in age though entitled to Chieftainship the successor should act on behalf until recovery, or until be becomes of age; this is all that should be followed.

I also do hereby say and confirm that I wrote what is above mentioned and that I am at liberty to revoke, annul, or modify all or some of it during my life time, but if I do not revoke, annul, or modify, all that which has been mentioned should remain in force and effective.

I acknowledge all that which this letter comprises and acknowledge the same by own hand.

AWADTH BIN OMAR BIN AWADTH THE KA'YTI
SULTAN NAWAZ JUNG SHAM-SHIR EL MOLK.

Witnesses:—

HOOSAIN BIN HAMED BIN AHMED AL MUHDAR
JABAR BIN ABDULLA AWADTH AL MUSLAH
MOHAMED.

78018/37 [No. 100]. No. 37.

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR)
to
MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Received 7th July, 1937.)

(Confidential.)

MY DEAR COWELL, Governor's Office, Aden, 23rd June, 1937.

Thank you for your letter of 3rd June* about the Mukalla succession and the proposed treaty with the Sultan. I know that he feels that the acceptance of such a treaty will give him the appearance of abdicating his authority and so lower his position in the eyes of his subjects and of his friends in India. It is for this reason that I have favoured the idea of obtaining our object by an informal understanding instead of a formal treaty, but as it is the policy of H.M.G. to press for the treaty I shall do so. It is possible that the Sultan will accept it in return for our connivance at his plan to disinherit the heir whom he has promised the late Sultan to recognize. This aspect of the succession question is very distasteful to me, but I realize that the arrangements made in Sultan Awadh's will are most unsatisfactory and that the retention of the succession in the direct line should be good for the country as well as in our interest.

I shall take up the whole question with the Sultan when he returns to Aden, which will probably be at the end of next month. In the meantime I am planning a visit to Mukalla and the interior of the Hadhramaut, which will give me an opportunity of discussing matters with Ingrams. I intend to leave Aden for Mukalla on 16th July and to be away for about ten days.

Yours, &c.,
B. R. REILLY.

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* No. 30.

78018/37 [No. 101]. No. 38.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Confidential (3).)

SIR, Downing Street, 21st July, 1937.

With reference to your confidential (2) despatch of the 16th of June* regarding the succession to the Sultanate of Mukalla, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter† which I have received from the Sultan of Mukalla, (together with two copies of the formal memorial‡ to which it refers) for consideration in connexion with the definite proposals which I requested you, in my confidential despatch of the 24th May§ to obtain from the Sultan.

2. I shall be grateful if you will inform the Sultan, upon his return from Europe, that I have received his memorial and have in the first instance referred it to you for consideration.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78018/37 [No. 109]. No. 39.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.6 p.m., 13th August, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 40.*]

No. 12. 13th August. Your confidential despatch of the 24th May§. Treaty has been signed by the Sultan of Mukalla as follows:—After preamble referring to his desire of development and His Majesty's Government's desire to uphold and strengthen his dignity and authority:

Article 1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agrees to appoint a Resident Adviser to the Sultan, and Sultan agrees to provide the said Resident Adviser with a suitable house and for welfare of his State to accept his advice in all matters except those concerning Mohammedan religion and custom.

Article 2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognizes the right of the Sultans of Shihr and Mukalla to nominate their successors, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government in each case.

The question of compensation for dispossessing heirs is dealt with in an exchange of notes making provision for such compensation as the State can afford and His Majesty's Government considers reasonable. It is also provided in the notes that Awadh recognized as heir and Sultan confers title of Prince on dispossessed heir and who will be so addressed. These terms appear fully to embody the policy desired by His Majesty's Government and subject to your final approval I have signed the treaty. Treaty as signed and copies of notes will be forwarded to you by mail of 18th August.

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* No. 35. † No. 34. ‡ Not printed. § No. 25.

78018/37 [No. 110]. No. 40.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5 p.m., 19th August, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

Personal. Your telegram No. 12*. I have learnt with much satisfaction of conclusion of treaty with Sultan of Mukalla. I expect to be able to convey approval very shortly after receipt of text of treaty and notes.

78018/37 [No. 120]. No. 41.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1st September, 1937.)

[*Answered by No. 46.*]

(Confidential (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 18th August, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 12 of 13th August*, regarding the conclusion of a Treaty with the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla, and to transmit herewith the original Treaty†, copies of the Notes exchanged between myself and the Sultan, and a letter from myself to the Sultan, the terms of which were taken from Mr. Cowell's semi-official letter of 3rd June‡.

2. In your telegram No. 29 of the 11th February§ you conveyed to me the approval of His Majesty's Government for the conclusion of a Treaty by which the Sultan would bind himself to receive a British Resident Adviser and to act on his advice in all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and customs. In consideration of his signing this Treaty the Sultan was to receive a loan of about three lakhs for approved working development.

3. As I have reported to you in my confidential despatch of the 31st March‖, the Sultan rejected this offer, but at a later date it became evident that although he was not willing to submit to any control of his internal affairs in order to secure the advantages which a loan would have made possible, he was nevertheless probably prepared to do so in order to be able to secure the succession of his son to the Sultanate, and in your confidential despatch of the 24th May¶ you requested that the Sultan should be encouraged to submit definite proposals under which he would accept a British Adviser and sign a Treaty binding himself and his successors to act on his advice in all matters except those of Muhammadan religion and custom.

4. As stated in my telegram No. 12 of the 13th August*, the Treaty that the Sultan has now signed embodies the policy desired by His Majesty's Government; and it further secures the additional advantage of giving to His Majesty's Government the right of approval to each successive heir nominated by the Sultans, and in this respect is similar to the provisions of the Zanzibar Protectorate Treaty of the 14th June, 1890.

5. The word "accept" in Article 1 seemed perhaps a little less peremptory than the "ask" and "act upon" of the Perak Treaty, and in view of the final paragraph of Mr. Cowell's semi-official letter of the 3rd June‡, I consider that this expression is adequate. The words "for the welfare of his State" were inserted with a view of meeting in some degree a request by the Sultan that the expression "for the improvement of his State" should be added after the words "on all matters". As the Sultan's proposal appeared to limit the power sought considerably, and as in fact it subsequently transpired from the Sultan himself that it was intended to do so, I decided that it could not be accepted in the form desired by him, but that there was no objection to the

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* No. 39. † Copy printed as Enclosure 1. ‡ No. 30. § No. 14. ‖ No. 16. ¶ No. 25.

additional words in the position in which they now stand. The Sultan, after some hesitation, agreed to this alteration, and he then assured me that he signed the Treaty willingly. He further sent his Secretary Khan Bahadur Sheikh Ali Ba-Akza to see me the day after the signature to express his apologies for his hesitation, and to say that he was perfectly content with the situation.

6. The Sultan was not particularly anxious to insert in the Treaty provision for the dispossessed heir and for this reason I consented to the arrangement embodied in the Notes which, as you will observe, reserves final approval to His Majesty's Government.

7. The Sultan was subjected to considerable pressure in the shape of anonymous letters and other reproaches from persons who accused him with selling his State to the British, but he eventually brought himself to a sufficient pitch of courage to sign, and I thought it advisable to conclude the matter at once, subject to the final approval and confirmation of His Majesty's Government.

8. The Sultan has requested that the Treaty should not be made public for a month, during which time the opposition will get more used to the idea. I have consented, if and when your approval is given, to issue the enclosed Notice, and the Sultan, in consequence of advice he has been given by Mr. Ingrams, decided also to issue a Notice at the same time indicating that he had made a very good bargain with His Majesty's Government, rather than to leave himself in the undefended position of having gibes made at him by those who have pressed him not to sign. I enclose for your information a copy of the Sultan's proposed Proclamation.

9. As I was authorized in your telegram No. 29 of the 11th February*, I have given the Sultan to understand that the salary of the Adviser will be paid by His Majesty's Government, and I shall shortly address you with regard to the establishment required for the Hadhramaut.

10. I have not as yet received your approval to the proposal in my despatch Confidential 2 of the 14th April† that Mr. Ingrams should be appointed Adviser to the Kathiri Sultan, and I have under consideration at present a proposal that the Kathiri Sultan should also be invited to sign a Treaty of a nature similar to that accepted by the Sultan of Mukalla.

11. Although the Treaty has now been obtained without the promise of a loan, I trust that it will prove possible to grant it, and I propose shortly to address you on this subject also.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY.
Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 41.

TREATY BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF SHIHR AND MUKALLA.

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib al Qu'aiti, Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla, are desirous of strengthening the friendly relations which have long existed between His Majesty's Government and the Qu'aiti Sultans.

AND WHEREAS His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib is desirous of developing and improving his State.

AND WHEREAS His Majesty's Government are desirous of upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of the Sultan.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have named and appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Bernard Rawdon Reilly, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Protectorate of Aden to conclude a treaty for this purpose.

Article 1.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to appoint a Resident Adviser to the Sultan, and the Sultan agrees to provide the said Resident Adviser with a suitable house, and for the welfare of his State to accept his advice in all matters except those concerning Muhammadan religion and custom.

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* No. 14. † No. 18.

Article 2.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the right of the Sultans of Shihr and Mukalla to nominate their successors, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government in each case.

Done at Aden, in duplicate, and in witness thereof the respective parties have set their seals and signatures this thirteenth day of August, 1937.

Seal of the Chief Commissioner, Aden.

For and on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and subject to their confirmation and approval.
B. R. REILLY,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Protectorate of Aden.

Witness:
W. H. INGRAMS.

On his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and successors.
SALEH BIN GHALIB,
Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

Witness:
SHEIKH ALI BA-AKZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 41.

DEAR FRIEND, Aden, 13th August, 1937.

On the occasion of the signing of the new Treaty between myself and His Majesty's Government I have to inform Your Excellency that in accordance with Article 2 thereof I nominate my son Prince Awadh as my successor to the throne of Mukalla and I shall be grateful if the approval of His Majesty's Government may be formally conveyed to me.

2. I take this opportunity of expressing to Your Excellency my undertaking to make such provision for the son of the late Sultan as the revenues of my State can afford and as His Majesty's Government may consider reasonable. Furthermore I intend to confer on Sultan Muhammad bin Umar the title of "Prince" and I trust this action of mine may meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.,
SALEH BIN GHALIB,
Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

His Excellency
Sir Bernard Rawdon Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E.,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the
Protectorate of Aden.

Enclosure 3 in No. 41.

DEAR FRIEND, Government House, Aden, 13th August, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Highness's letter of to-day's date on the occasion of the signing of the new Treaty and I note that Your Highness nominates Prince Awadh as heir-apparent to the Mukalla State. I have much pleasure in conveying to Your Highness the approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to this nomination.

2. I am glad to observe that Your Highness proposes to make such provision for Sultan Muhammad bin Umar as the revenues of Your Highness's State may be able to afford and I shall be glad to be informed of the amount proposed for the approval of His Majesty's Government. I note Your Highness intends to confer the title of "Prince" on Sultan Muhammad bin Umar, and he will be so addressed in official correspondence from this Government.

I am, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor of the Protectorate of Aden.

His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib al Qu'aiti,
Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

Enclosure 4 in No. 41.

DEAR FRIEND, Government House, Aden, 13th August, 1937.

I take this opportunity of conveying to Your Highness in writing my congratulations on the signing of the new Treaty and of expressing my confidence that the new relationship thus established will lead to an era of fruitful collaboration between His Majesty's Government and Your Highness in the promotion of the prosperity of Your Highness's State.

2. I understand that Your Highness has felt some apprehension that the acceptance of an Adviser would reduce your own powers to insignificance. This is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government; and I think that if Your Highness understood the relations of His Majesty's Government with the Malay States you would realize this.

3. In all, ten Malay Rulers, within and without the Federation, have accepted Resident Advisers. Some of them have voluntarily entered into treaties of this nature in quite recent years, after long experience of the working of the Adviser system in neighbouring States. There have been very few cases of material disagreement between the Ruler and the Adviser, and the only serious case recently has concerned the succession in the State—a matter which in Mukalla is settled by the new Treaty.

4. It should be understood that the advice to be given to Your Highness in all matters of internal concern is based solely on Your Highness's Adviser's view of the interests of the State and of Your Highness. It has been the policy of His Majesty's Government to maintain the authority of the Ruler in all such matters. In matters of foreign relations other considerations must necessarily enter; but in this sphere Your Highness is already bound, both by treaty and by force of circumstances, to follow the advice of the Protecting Power.

5. Your Highness should also understand that in the event of serious disagreement between yourself and your Adviser, it will be open to you to appeal to the Governor and even to the Secretary of State, but I feel confident that such disagreement is unlikely to arise.

I am, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor of the Protectorate of Aden.

His Highness Sultan Salih bin Ghalib al Qu'aiti,
Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

Enclosure 5 in No. 41.

NOTICE.

In view of certain rumours having been recently disseminated to the effect that the Qu'aiti Sultanate of Shihr and Mukalla was being annexed, His Excellency the Governor desires it to be categorically stated that this rumour is utterly unfounded and that His Majesty's Government have never entertained any such intention.

On the contrary at the request of His Highness the Sultan, who is extremely desirous of promoting the welfare of his country, His Majesty's Government has agreed to provide the Sultan with the necessary advice and assistance to achieve his desires.

His Excellency desires it to be widely known that the whole policy of His Majesty's Government in the Protectorate is directed towards upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of the Chiefs and the improvement of their territories.

Enclosure 6 in No. 41.

786.

PUBLIC NOTICE.

Now by the grace of God I have returned to my country and people hale and hearty after attending the Coronation ceremonies of His Majesty the King George VI in London.

During my journey and on my return I heard several rumours which are current everywhere that the British Government has taken possession of my State and my authority and dignity will be suffered. These rumours are entirely false and unfounded. I have already brought to the notice of His Excellency the Governor at Aden about these rumours and His Excellency the Governor has already very kindly published the statement totally denying of such intentions of His Majesty's Government and declaring all such rumours false and unfounded and you all can read the same in the Aden Protectorate Gazette dated . . . . .

The British Government has not the least intention to take even an inch of our land and they have also declared to uphold my authority and dignity.

Under the above circumstances I am now desirous that all such false rumours should forthwith be stopped and if any person or persons after this notice are still found spreading such false rumours which are injurious to my State and myself they will be severely dealt with, punished and transported.

Only for the welfare and vast improvements of our State I have asked the services of Mr. Ingrams from the British Government to work under me as my Resident adviser because without an expert British officer the British Government will not give us all sorts of help for the vast improvements of our State as our means are limited. You all know very well that Mr. Ingrams during his short stay in my absence, has done well in establishing the peace, etc., and I hope he will work sincerely in complete co-operation and harmoniously with me in future under me for the improvements of my State.

Now by the grace of God I will give you a very good piece of information and which is this that according to my powers of the Sultan as the Ruling Chief of Mukalla, Shihr and Hadhramaut and also according to our religious orders of Shafaees I have nominated and declared that my son Prince Sultan Awad bin Saleh bin Ghalib Alkaity to be the heir-apparent of Mukalla, Shihr and Hadhramaut now and the Ruling Sultan of all countries under me mentioned above after me and I have also great pleasure to inform you all that our friend the British Government have already accepted my nomination and declaration that Prince Awad becomes the heir-apparent of my State in my life time and the Ruling Sultan after me. It is a matter of great satisfaction that the succession of Mukalla State has been established in the direct line of the late Sultan Awad for ever which will also be a great benefit to my family as well as the State and my subjects.

Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and Hadhramaut.

78018/37 [No. 122].

No. 42.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Answered by No. 45.]

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 16th September, 1937.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to refer to the letter from this Department dated the 28th August* with which was enclosed a telegram† from the Governor of Aden reporting the conclusion of a treaty with the Sultan of Shir and Mukalla, and to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Eden a copy of a despatch‡ from the Governor enclosing the text of the treaty and certain correspondence in connexion therewith. The treaty is enclosed herewith in original.

2. It will be observed from the note of the 13th August, attached to the treaty, and addressed to the Governor by the Sultan, that the latter undertakes to make such provision for Muhammad bin Umar, the son of the late Sultan, as His Majesty's Government may consider reasonable. As to what compensation should be considered reasonable, Mr. Ormsby Gore must rely upon the judgment of the Governor, and he therefore proposes, provided Mr. Eden concurs, to authorize the Governor to consider the definite proposals for compensation to be put forward by the Sultan, and if he thinks fit, to accept them on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

3. Mr. Ormsby Gore proposes also to approve of the issue by the Governor, at such time as he may decide, of a notice in the form submitted with his despatch.

4. Treaties concluded in the past with Chiefs of the Aden Protectorate were ratified by the Viceroy of India: that procedure is no longer applicable, and Mr. Ormsby Gore will be glad to be informed of the steps which, in the opinion of Mr. Eden, should now be taken to effect ratification of the present treaty.

5. A copy of this letter, and its enclosures, is being sent to the Air Ministry.

I am, &c.,

K. W. BLAXTER.

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* 78018/37 [No. 118]: not printed. † No. 39. ‡ No. 41.

78018/37 [No. 128]. No. 43.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.46 p.m., 28th September, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 46.*]

No. 18. 28th September. Mr. Ingrams addressed to me a very urgent telegram yesterday from Mukalla informing me that the Sultan (who leaves for India via Aden tomorrow) desired to proclaim his son heir apparent in order to quieten rumour following the reported publication of such an announcement in the Egyptian press. In reply I have informed Mr. Ingrams that I have no objection provided that the Sultan stated in his proclamation that this was subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I trust my action will be approved, and that formal approval of Treaty may be accorded as soon as possible. Rival claimant to heirship is pressing me for information regarding succession.

78018/37 [No. 130]. No. 44.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 7th October, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your confidential despatch of the 26th May* and to convey my sanction, with the concurrence of the Treasury and the Air Ministry, for the proposal to appoint a Major as Second-in-Command of the Aden Protectorate Levies. I also approve generally the proposals outlined in that despatch.

2. I observe that the cost of the appointment of a second-in-command, which will be chargeable to Head II (*a*), " Protectorate Tribal Levies ", of Subhead I of the Colonial and Middle Eastern Services Vote, is estimated to amount to a maximum of £1,000 in a full year, and that the additional expenditure during the current year will be about £500. I approve your proposal to request a contribution of £200 from the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla towards the initial expenditure consequent upon the appointment in consideration of the services to be rendered to his forces. When received, this contribution will presumably be paid over to the local Air Force authorities, and be accounted for by the Air Ministry, in the claim on the Colonial Office in respect of expenditure on the Protectorate Tribal Levies.

3. I also approve the proposal, put forward in your confidential despatch of the 13th July†, for the re-arming of the Mukalla Regular Army with Short Lee Enfield rifles at the expense of the Sultan, and in this connexion I enclose a copy of a letter‡ from the Crown Agents setting forth the cost of these weapons and the ammunition mentioned in your telegram No. 57 of the 26th August§. Instructions for supply will be passed to the Crown Agents on receipt from you of the specifications requested by them.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE

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* No. 31. † 78018/37 [No. 106]: not printed. ‡ 78018/37 [No. 129]: not printed.
§ 78018/37 [No. 113]: not printed.

78018/37 [No. 133]. No. 45.

FOREIGN OFFICE

to

COLONIAL OFFICE.

SIR, Foreign Office, S.W.1, 19th October, 1937.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to state for the information of Mr. Ormsby Gore that he has had under consideration your letter of the 16th September* on the subject of the Treaty recently concluded with His Highness the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla.

2. Mr. Eden concurs in the proposals set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your letter and in the terms of the Draft Notice which the Governor of Aden proposes to publish, subject to the following observations.

3. In view of the recent complaints made by the Italian Government in regard to the alleged forward policy of His Majesty's Government in the hinterland of the Aden Protectorate, which has formed the subject of recent inter-departmental correspondence, Mr. Eden feels it might be advantageous, subject to the views of Mr. Ormsby Gore, to insert the words " with whom they have been so long in close political relations " after the word " Chiefs " in the penultimate line of the Draft Notice.

4. With regard to paragraph 4 of your letter I am to point out that the Treaty is signed subject to the " confirmation and approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." It has not in the past been the practice of His Majesty's Government to ratify similar Agreements with native Rulers because, for one reason, ratification by a Ruler of his own signature is not required.

5. Mr. Eden understands that the usual practice in the case of Agreements concluded with Rulers of the Malay States is for His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies to notify the Governor of the State that the Agreement in question has been duly confirmed and approved by His Majesty's Government. It seems to Mr. Eden appropriate that a similar procedure should be followed in the present instance, and in similar cases in future.

I am, &c.,

G. W. RENDEL.

78018/37 [No. 134]. No. 46.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 22nd October, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Bernard Reilly's despatch confidential (2) of the 18th August†, and to inform you that the Treaty negotiated with the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on the 13th August, 1937, has been duly confirmed and approved by His Majesty's Government.

2. As regards the Notice which it is proposed that the Governor should issue, I think it desirable, having regard to the criticisms that have been directed against " forward " policy alleged to have been recently adopted by His Majesty's Government that the concluding paragraph should be amplified by some reference to the long-standing character of the relations between Great Britain and the Sultans of the Hadhramaut. This point would be met if the last lines of the draft were amended so as to read:—

" towards upholding and strengthening the authority and dignity of the Chiefs *with whom they have been so long in close political relations*, and towards the improvement of their territories ".

Subject to this amendment, I approve the issue of the Notice at such time as you may think fit. I also concur in the issue of the proposed Proclamation over the Sultan's signature.

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* No. 42. † No. 41.

3. I observe from the Note of the 13th August*, addressed to Sir Bernard Reilly by the Sultan, that the latter undertakes to make such provision for Muhammad bin Umar, the son of the late Sultan, as His Majesty's Government may consider reasonable. The question of the precise amount that may be considered reasonable is one that I am content to leave to your judgment. You are authorized to consider such definite proposals as the Sultan may submit to you on this point; and, if satisfied as to their suitability, to accept them on my behalf.

4. I observe that no specific recommendation has been made for the publication of the Notes attached to the Treaty. I shall be glad to be consulted before any final decision is taken on this question. On the whole, I am disposed, as at present advised, to regard the publication of the Notes as inadvisable.

5. I take this opportunity of approving the action reported in your telegram No. 18 of the 28th of September†.

6. The proposal submitted in Sir Bernard Reilly's confidential despatch of the 24th August‡ for the grant of a loan to the Qu'aiti Government is under consideration and as to this I will address you further in due course.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78018/37 [No. 135]. No. 47.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 4 p.m., 23rd October, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 92. Confidential. Reference your despatch confidential (2) of 18th August§. Mukalla Treaty approved in despatch which should reach you on 31st October. Publication of Governor's Notice should be deferred pending consideration of modification suggested in despatch.

Notes attached to Treaty should not be published.

78018/37 [No. 138]. No. 48.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.9 p.m., 3rd November, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 1618. 3rd November. Addressed to the Government of India repeated to Government of Bombay and Secretary of State for the Colonies. Under the new Treaty now approved by His Majesty's Government Sultan of Shihr and Mokalla may nominate his heir subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government. He has nominated his son and approval given. This dispossesses the late Sultan's son and the Sultan states in telegram received to-day that dispossessed heir Muhammad Bin Umar proposes to leave for Mokalla. Person named born in India and has never been to Mokalla but his presence there would almost certainly lead to serious internal disorder as mercenaries of Yafai Irregulars would join him. It is possible that he would take a Mogul line boat direct to Mokalla where it would be difficult to prevent him landing. If it is practicable it would be greatly appreciated if his departure from India could be prevented on political grounds. In any case it is requested that any visa he holds for Aden or Protectorate be cancelled and if he applies for any other, consideration be given as to whether it gives him opportunity for doubling back.

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* Enclosure 2 in No. 41. † No. 43. ‡ 78276/37 [No. 1]: not printed. § No. 41.

78018/37 [No. 140]. No. 49.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 3 p.m., 10th November, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 96. Confidential. Mukalla treaty. Sultan Mohamed has telegraphed from Shamsheerbag Nampally Hyderabad in terms of my immediately following telegram*. Subject to your concurrence I suggest you inform him that His Majesty's Government regard themselves as under no pledge whatever in regard to succession, that they accept no responsibility for terms of will of Sultan Awadh or of 1922 Agreement, that they recognize reigning Sultan's right to nominate his successor and have approved nomination of Prince Awadh accordingly. In light of more recent developments you may wish to add reference to offers of compensation. Please do so at your discretion. As regards alleged promise by Colonial Office, I should wish you to know that no such promise was given. Sultan Mohamed was merely informed, in reply to letter† referred to in paragraph 5 of my confidential despatch of 24th May‡, that Secretary of State was in communication with Governor on subject of his letter and that, pending receipt of Governor's observations, we were not in a position to discuss matter, and therefore suggested that he should not postpone his departure from England. See also Blaxter's letter to Reilly of 31st May§.

78018/37 [No. 141]. No. 50.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 5 p.m., 10th November, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 97. My immediately preceding telegram‖. Following is text of Sultan Mohamed's telegram:—

Begins.—Newspapers report Sultan Awad son of Sultan Saleh declared heir apparent Shihr Mokalla and my claims for succession to Sultanate based on ancestral will traditions and British pledges totally ignored. Cannot believe reports true. Colonial Office had kindly promised to give me chance of establishing my claim after hearing from Governor of Aden. Wire if I should come over for discussion and elucidation of my view points. Meantime instruct Government Aden to issue communique contradicting false propaganda by interested parties. Pray wire correct position and remove misgivings.—*Ends.*

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* No. 50. † Enclosure in No. 22. ‡ No. 25. § No. 28. ‖ No. 49.

4. SITUATION IN THE HADHRAMAUT

78287/38 [No. 33]. No. 51.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6th June, 1938.)

(Confidential.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 17th May, 1938.

I have the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of a Report dated 11th April, 1938, submitted by Captain B. W. Seager, Frontier Officer, on the present political situation in the Yemen.

2. The Memorandum referred to in paragraph 71 of the Report is under consideration, and a copy of it, with my comments thereon, will be transmitted to you in due course.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 51.

(Confidential.)

San'ā, 11th April, 1938.

I have the honour to report that I left Aden on Wednesday, 16th February last and reached San'ā via Ta'iz and Hodeida, accompanied by Mr. H. G. Jakins of His Majesty's Consular Service who travelled with me in a private capacity, on Sunday, 27th February. Mr. Jakins left the capital for his post at Jibuti on Friday, 4th March, while I finally left the capital for Ta'iz and Aden on Tuesday, 12th April.

2. For the purpose of this Report I have set out my observations on the present political situation in the Yemen and connected matter under sub-heads and I will start off with that of Anglo-Yemeni relations.

(*A*). *Anglo-Yemeni Relations.*

3. It is my opinion, and I regret to say it, that Anglo-Yemeni relations have deteriorated since my last visit here in July/August, 1937. This, I think, can be attributed in main part to His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine. Contributory and allied causes are (*a*) the increasing prestige of the Italians in the Yemen due, in main part, to the tales brought back by Yemeni labourers about the might and power of the Italians in Italian East Africa, (*b*) present Italian activities in the Yemen which aim at the circulation of Fascist propaganda spoon-fed with judicious gifts of money to the leading personalities and officials: and the propaganda falls on soil which the money fertilizes, (*c*) the apparent successes of the Totalitarian or Authoritarian States at the expense of the Democracies; and it is most important to remember that the Yemen is a Totalitarian State *par excellence*, (*d*) the *growing* belief that the might and power of the British Empire is on the wane and (*e*) just the faintest suspicion that we have set in motion a policy in the Aden Protectorate which may be aimed at the penetration of the Yemen in the course of time. If there is a country in the world whose firm belief it is that His Majesty's Government's policy is supernaturally far-sighted, slow-moving and inexorable, that country is the Yemen. It is true that little importance may be attached to (*e*) as there is not much chance of a continuity of a trend of thought in the Yemen after the present Imam's death as the Yemen, no doubt, will then have plenty of more immediate domestic problems to consider.

4. The Yemeni view of our policy in Palestine is easy enough to understand. This country is administered by the descendants of the Prophet, led by the Imam, and it is perhaps true to say that the Zeidis (the ruling class) are the most fanatical Moslems in the world to-day with the possible exception of the Sa'udi Akhwan. The Imam's idea

of a Jew is naturally enough the Jew he sees in the Yemen and the latter is a typical Biblical figure whose misdeeds are set out in the Quran. It follows then that the descendants of the Prophet can think of him only as a menace to the Moslems as he was in the days of the Prophet. The latter kept the Jews down, and his descendants in the Yemen, as is only right and proper in the circumstances, have done similarly to this day. It is therefore inconceivable and beyond human comprehension that Jews of all people can even be *considered* as an independent body: and that His Majesty's Government of all Great Powers in the world should espouse the Jewish cause indicates surely a most sinister change of policy which can only be directed against Islam as a whole.

5. This, I think, portrays Zeidi opinion in this country and represents the Imam's views but he is a practical man and the head of a nation whose aim it has always been to concentrate on domestic affairs within Yemeni borders in the best interests of his people. If he could be allowed to forget about the Palestine question, no person would be better pleased than himself. As it is, Moslem notables all over the world besiege him with requests to intervene, and he has to do his stuff to maintain his prestige. His profound distrust of His Majesty's Government's policy remains, however much he wants to be left alone, and, as far as I can judge, this has caused him to shrink within himself; and momentarily anyhow holds him back from any show of spontaneity or cordiality to His Majesty's Government. Unconsciously too his thoughts have been inclined to the other factors I have set out above which, no doubt, make him think that His Majesty's Government perhaps is not the Power he thought she was. Yet, in spite of himself, and I know this is a contradiction, he is clinging desperately fast to that die-hard tradition of faith in His Majesty's Government which still requires a deal of shaking while his political sense tells him that of the Italian slayers in Libya and the British murderers in Palestine, the latter are the less evil and the better-intentioned.

(*B*). *Italian Activities in the Yemen.*

6. Italy and Italian affairs have sprung into prominence since my visit here last year. International events, the gossip of the Yemeni labourers who travel to and from Italian East Africa and the *de facto* conquest of Abyssinia, have caused the name of Italy to be respected in the Yemen. On my way from Ta'iz to Hodeida through the Yemeni Tihama, on three occasions Mr. Jakins and myself were mistaken for Italians, and we were greeted with the Fascist salute which is the first time I have seen this form of greeting in the Yemen: while the very fact that we were taken for Italians is surprising in itself and indicates to my mind the hold the Italians have on popular imagination in the Yemen.

7. As far as it can be ascertained the Italians have increased their activities in this country since the return from leave of Dr. Dubbiosi last year or since the arrival and departure of the Italian Treaty Mission. There is every reason to believe that their monetary gifts to important Yemeni officials have increased. They appear to confine their efforts to the leading personalities and officials only and in the capital of a Totalitarian State this policy is a simple one as it narrows down the field so very conveniently. The increased Italian activities have fallen on much more fertile soil as their prestige has grown to such an extent that Italy's power is now being taken for granted.

8. Dr. Dubbiosi, as I have reported in previous years, has been the head of Italian political activities in the Yemen and was undoubtedly a very able man much liked by the King and notables. He has spent over ten years in the Yemen and left for good at the end of last month. His successor, Dr. Passera, who states that he has had seven years service in Eritrea (but volunteers nothing about his career previous to this) has arrived and took over his duties shortly before Dubbiosi left. He is a man of about 53 years of age, speaks indifferent French, and looks like a prosperous industrialist or family lawyer. He tells me that he speaks little or no Arabic.

9. Dr. Passera enjoys the assistance of a full time Italian secretary named Mario Ferrari who replaced Signor Kiccuci last year. It emerges clearly that Ferrari has nothing to do with the medical side of the work. This I have ascertained on the authority of Dr. Petrie who has now spent over a year in this town working side by side with his Italian colleagues. It is true that at no time has it been thought that Kiccuci or Ferrari were anything but political secretaries but it is only now that I am in a position to affirm this.

10. Signor Clementi, the head of the firm of Lazzerini in this town is a bit of a mystery figure. It appears that he has not much to do with the business side of the firm which is run by a Spanish Jew named Edmundo Lopez, at one time Lazzerini's agent

at Mocha. Clementi is a surveyor and engineer by trade who has worked in Morocco and Jerusalem where he is said to have designed or built the King David Hotel. Petrie tells me that he recently spent a hundred pounds on photographic material and has photographically surveyed the Menakha (Haraz) road: he spends a lot of time taking photographs all round the country side and has sometimes been accompanied by Dr. Dubbiosi who, to my knowledge, never used to go out on pleasure. Clementi may be amusing himself or indulging in a recreation which might be congenial to a man of his profession: but his recreation is an expensive one. He runs a Ford V-8 van which is owned by the firm but which he rarely used for the commercial side of his work. He has a Swiss wife who speaks perfect English and who is at present in England.

11. The rest of the Italian Colony consists of two doctors, two engineers, a carpenter and a fully trained Italian chemist from Eritrea, who Petrie says, was virtually forced on the Yemeni Administration last year. The Italian Colony has thus increased by two since I was last here.

12. In the absence of any concrete evidence as to the aims and objectives of Italian activities in this country, I can only observe that they continue to try to gain the confidence and friendship of all important personalities in the Yemen and for this purpose appear to have influences at work in most Government departments. I am informed that they have created parties to work on the various candidates to the Imamate and that these parties, working in cells, spend their spare time putting over Fascist propaganda. This might well be the case but at the same time I should like to remark that I do not think their political organization in the Yemen is the perfect and efficient machine it is thought to be in some quarters.

13. It may be interesting to remark that the whole Italian Colony cannot stand the Zeidis at any price. Murmurs reach me from time to time from this Colony that " the time is approaching, Inshallah, when they (the Zeidis) will be taught what is what ".

14. The Italians are extremely well informed of my movements and Petrie tells me that if he wants to know where I spent a particular night in the Yemen on my way up here or if he is in doubt as to my exact whereabouts, a reference to his Italian colleagues is enough to give him the desired particulars.

(C). German Activities in the Yemen.

15. I am not suggesting under this head that the Germans are engaged in political activities in the Yemen. The German " Colony " consists of two German members (shortly to be reinforced by a wife) of the firm of Messrs. Hanson and Sohne of Hamburg. They are: Hermann Dietrich, who opened a branch of the firm here about 6 years ago and Josef Hanson, a nephew of the head of the firm, who is an electrical engineer by profession. Hanson only arrived in the Yemen a few months ago and may take over the management shortly in order to enable Dietrich to get some well earned leave in Germany.

16. I have known Dietrich since 1927 when he opened a branch of the firm in Jedda. He is a wee little man under five feet in height and speaks English, French, Italian and Arabic with considerable fluency. He has always been a talkative little man interested in his commercial ventures only; and normally on uncertain terms of friendship with the Italian Colony. This time I have noticed a difference. He is on the best possible terms with the Italians and his talkativeness, mere idle chatter in the past, has taken a turn towards politics. He appears to have started to take an interest in Aden Protectorate developments, the Yemeni political situation and other subject matters which were taboo between us in the past.

17. I do not suggest that any political significance can be attached to this but I report it for what it may be worth.

(D). Syrian Activities in the Yemen.

18. There are now five Syrians holding official posts under the Yemeni Government led by Mustafa Wasfi Pasha (Chief of the Yemeni General Staff—Regular Army) of Syrian fame. The other four are Hassan Tahsin Pasha (Chief of the Yemeni General Staff—National Defence Army) who has an unbounded admiration for the German Army with whom he fought in Rumánia during the Great War, Muhammad Esseman and Hashim El Husseini, doctors, and Fauzi Mustafa, a nephew of Mustafa Wasfi, who is a teacher in the San'a High School.

19. These Syrians are Nationalists of the first water and resent the presence of foreigners in the Yemeni capital. They let it be known that the modern Syrian is as good, if not better, than any European and that in the circumstances foreigners in the Yemen are not even an unfortunate necessity.

20. But if they do not like foreigners as a whole they have their preferences when it suits them. They are cordially and heartily anti-Italian because they fear they have designs on this country and are keen that His Majesty's Government should start countering Italian propaganda by engaging themselves in British propaganda.

21. It has been reported that the Syrians here are pro-French and are working in their interests but I am tolerably certain that such is not the case.

(E). Turkish Activities in the Yemen.

22. Mustafa Wasfi Pasha, referred to in paragraph 18 above, informed me during my stay in the capital that the Turks were again beginning to interest themselves in the Yemen. He showed me two letters from two Turkish deputies who asked him to report on Italian activities in the Yemen, at the same time suggesting to him that he should propose to the Imam that the latter call in the services of a Turkish Military Mission to train the Yemeni Army. The Pasha remarked that he had shown both letters to the Imam who told him that he proposed to instruct his son, Seif Al Islam Husein, who is proceeding to Ankara shortly, to take up the subject with the Turkish Government. The Imam and Yemenis generally have no love for the Turks and it would be interesting to know what instructions the Imam has sent.

23. Interesting features of the deputies' letters were passages that Turkish and British foreign policy is now one: and that the Turks felt that as late masters of the Yemen, they were best able to help in the common policy of both Governments.

(F). Yemeni Policy vis-à-vis Italy and England.

24. I have said higher up that the Imam's desire is to be left alone to allow him a free hand to attend to his internal affairs which are engrossing enough but he finds that he cannot achieve this ambition. On the other hand he sees that the Italians are now a Great Power on the western littoral of the Red Sea whose policy is to take an unusual interest in the Yemen for a purpose of which he stands in constant dread, while England still continues to interest herself in the Aden Protectorate, but with this difference that in her slow way she is effecting a gradual change which is disquieting. He objects, in the first instance, to the very existence of Italy and England as they are a menace to his peace of mind and to his beloved Yemen.

25. He knows well enough that he cannot do a thing to keep Italy and England out of the Yemen if either of them wishes to come in but he appreciates well that Italy is an immediate danger while England may be a danger at some time in the future.

26. To this purpose he hopes to win through and maintain the independence of the Yemen by a placation of both Powers and it is a policy of placation that he follows. As he fears Italy and distrusts her most she enjoys most of his patronage and enjoys facilities which are not extended to us. This is pleasing to the Italians as it is designed to please them. But placation is not his only policy. He seeks also to play off one Power against the other in the best Sultan Abdul Hamid tradition. He feels that in his joint policy of placation and the creation of international jealousies that he can safely steer the Yemeni craft through shoal water; and that either Power will take good care to placate *him* for fear that a rough riding policy or the lack of a show of the finer political sensibilities may turn him irrevocably towards the other. This last would be anathema to him but he feels secure as he knows that this option is open to him as a last resort.

(G). The Imam.

27. For a man of his age the Imam is a remarkable personality. At an age which must exceed 70 years he gets through the most stupendous amount of work daily. Last week I passed him in the Palace courtyard sitting under an awning with scores of petitioners crowding round him and very nearly sitting on him in their anxiety to get attended to first. His daily life is similar to that of a popular star who is mobbed on leaving Victoria Station. He has less superficial area than that of a London taxi-cab in which to work; but yet he gets through it with no apparent haste or fatigue.

28. As you are aware he was laid up with gout for about three months commencing on the 26th day of Ramadhan last and only a few days ago was confined to his rooms with a pain on his right hip. A few mornings ago he was speaking to Petrie, during one

of his public audiences, about his ailment and suddenly bethought himself of a patent medicine somebody had given him which he wanted to try out. He turned to his Prime Minister who was in attendance and sent him to retrieve it from its hiding place in a remote corner of the Palace. It was eventually found and on inspection proved to be a quack medicine manufactured in India labelled, " Amritdhara ", " Cure All ", " The Panacea ". As the directions for use were in Urdu which no one can read here. Hodeida has been commanded to effect a translation.

29. Dr. Dubbiosi continued to treat the Imam for gout when he got his twinges. Petrie and another Italian doctor were of the opinion some weeks ago that this treatment was not striking at the root cause of the Imam's ill-health from time to time as a microscopic inspection revealed three months' ago that there were unmistakable traces of gonococci infection. Dubbiosi listened to a suggestion of both doctors that the Imam should be treated for this infection in the first instance, but, as the Imam's physician, finally ruled that he would prefer to treat for gout only and there the matter ended.

(H). The Imamic Succession and Domestic Politics in the Yemen.

30. There has been a most important development in the succession since I was here last year. Seif Al Islam Ahmed, the Crown Prince, is now referred to in official documents as Crown Prince, and is so addressed at all times. It would then seem that there is now little doubt that he will succeed his father in the first instance if the will of the people is not too strong for him.

31. He is more than ever feared and hated by every section of the Yemeni community and appears to go right out of his way to antagonize people even further. I will quote an instance of this. During the recent illness of his father he found fault with an important Sharia Court judgment which had been approved of by the Governor-General of the Ta'iz Liwa (Seiyid 'Ali ibn Al Wazir) in whose jurisdiction the Court had sat. He reproved the latter for his handling of the case. The latter replied that he was sorry and that he would be more careful in the future. This did not satisfy the Crown Prince who sent him a telegram recalling him to San'ā to furnish a verbal explanation of his conduct. Seiyid 'Ali then telegraphed to the Imam direct saying that he was about to obey the Crown Prince's command but he would be glad to know to whom he should hand over the Ta'iz Liwa in his absence. This was the first time the Imam had heard of the proceedings. He was furious and minuted Seiyid 'Ali's telegram which he sent direct to his son. Modesty and the sanctity of an official report forbid me to quote the minute verbatim but it was both terse and expressive. On receipt of it the Crown Prince elected to go sick and shortly afterwards left the capital for a holiday at Hajja.

32. I do not propose here to discuss the chances of other candidates for the Imamate as there are a number of them both obscure and prominent; but I must refer to Seif Al Islam Husein in this connexion.

33. Last year this son might have ranked tenth in the running but he has now closed up and is near the top of the list. He has gained a lot of prestige by his long residence abroad while the extreme unpopularity of his eldest brother has caused Yemenis to look for a more worthy son of the Imam to succeed him: one who is pious and a fit person to carry on the great traditions of the Imamate. They have not had far to look. Husein reeks of piety and is thought to be a Zeidi intellectual of no mean order. He might have been completely overlooked but for the suicidal policy followed by the Crown Prince. The latter, incidentally, has worked himself up into a great rage about his brother as on various occasions recently he has been described in European and Egyptian newspapers, as well as over the air, as Yemeni Crown Prince, and appears to have taken steps to remedy this error. The Crown Prince has consequently taken action himself and has caused articles to be inserted in the Egyptian Press laying emphasis on the fact that it is he (Ahmed) who is the Heir Apparent. In addition Ahmed is furious that the Italian Government have given Husein a decoration recently.

34. It should be stated that most of the candidates to the Imamate are out for themselves only. They now appreciate, however, that only by a fluke will anyone but Ahmed succeed in the first instance. If he is a success they may let him be. If not, each of them will make a bid for it. If they see as time goes on that their efforts are meeting with little success a number of them may combine to put Ahmed out of the running and elect Husein instead. I fancy, judging by remarks let drop by Seiyids 'Ali and Abdullah, Governors-General of the Ta'iz and Hodeida districts, that they would not oppose the election of Husein as Imam, and it is these chance remarks that make me think that in order to avoid the catastrophe of Ahmed ways and means may be found to elect somebody less obnoxious even if it means an end to personal ambitions.

35. There is gossip current that the Crown Prince has been flirting with the Italians through Dubbiosi in recent months. This may well be the case but I should prefer to watch further developments before venturing a personal opinion.

36. The internal situation in the Yemen is as unsatisfactory as ever and I do not think it could be very much worse. Hardly a person I meet in any walk of life has a good word to say for the Administration. In fact all condemn it and express sorrow at the sufferings of the mass of the population who are at the mercy of rapacious, unscrupulous and dishonest Governors who make it their business to get rich as quickly as they can. Oppressive taxes are gathered and not a farthing is spent on the amelioration of the lot of any class of the community. The farmers who form over 75 per cent of the population could do with the most elementary assistance in the matter of the digging of wells, the making of irrigation channels and the employment of a few agricultural officers but not even these are vouchsafed them. In answer to my repeated questions as to why nothing is being done to alleviate the distress and improve conditions, I am always answered that the Imam will not sanction the expenditure and there the conversation languishes.

PERSONALITIES.

(I). Seif Al Islam Husein.

37. The Imam, his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, have no clear idea what this Prince is doing in Europe and why he is touring the capitals. He has told his royal father that he is fulfilling engagements made in London and that he must see them through. With this the Yemen has to content itself. He sent them a programme of his movements from time to time but they are not much better off when they have it as he alters it without reference and without informing them when he has done so. The Arabic broadcasts are in fact a godsend as the announcements give them some idea of his whereabouts and immediate plans.

38. Raghib's explanation of the Prince's tour is an unkind one but Husein happens to be his *bete noire*. He says that the latter has suffered with megalomania since childhood and has always begged his father to send him *en mission* abroad. When he went on the 1937 pilgrimage he asked whether he could negotiate a Treaty on his behalf in Sa'ūdi Arabia or in Iraq. Raghib says that when the Imam referred to him about it he hastened to suggest that he was allowed to do no such thing.

39. The Crown Prince's views about his brother's tour I have already referred to elsewhere. In addition he remonstrates with his father when he sends Husein remittances as he is most anxious to make the better acquaintance of his younger brother at the first opportunity. Raghib says that Husein was given before his departure for London and has since had remitted to him a total of £18,000: and that when the Imam has ventured to protest against his extravagance, the Prince has replied that he cannot help it as living is so very expensive abroad and that he has to do the proper thing.

40. I fancy that Husein is trying to remain away from the Yemen as long as he possibly can, and in the interim, is having the time of his life and revelling in his own importance probably for the first and last time in his life. A lot will depend on his behaviour on his return to the capital. If he puts on airs and graces the Crown Prince will see to it that he gets snuffed out in no time.

(J). Seif Al Islam 'Ali.

41. This Prince was released from the San'ā prison last year and now lives in a round tower-like structure made of mud and stone within the Palace precincts. He is still chained and fettered and is under strong guard the whole time. He spends his hours reading and brooding and listening-in to a radio recently presented to him by his father.

42. 'Ali while he is alive is the Crown Prince's implacable enemy and I do not doubt that both would give a lot to see the other dead and buried. 'Ali has a following among the tribesmen in the Zeidi highlands and it is by no means impossible, if he lives, that he will play an important role in the Imamic Succession. For years it has been suggested that he is strongly pro-Italian and this is likely.

43. It may be the policy of his royal father to release him from confinement altogether in the near future with a view to his reconciliation with his eldest brother; but he may fear that a freed 'Ali, and he is an impetuous and fearless young man, may be unable to restrain his desire to get at both himself and/or the Crown Prince and foment trouble in the Zeidi highlands. It is alleged that the Prime Minister was also instrumental in getting 'Ali into prison and the latter may be cherishing a vendetta against him too.

(K). Qadhi Abdullah Al Amri.

44. The Prime Minister does not appear to have lost any of his power and is still the second most important man in this country. He appears to have dropped out of party politics and seems to be working alone though it is not unlikely that he may have an understanding with the Crown Prince. Qadhi Abdullah has struck a new note and is alleged to have given out that he may retire on the death of the present Imam. (I might hazard a guess that he will either have to run for it or made to serve the next Imam). He knows that he is feared by everyone and that his threat to retire may be a pose to ensure a certain continuity of life.

45. When I called on him on my arrival in the capital he was genial and pleasant. Our conversation was uninteresting except that in the course of it he appeared to be intrigued about the reasons governing the length of Husein's stay in England. I could not help him out very much though I could have told him quite a lot about his doings at the Coronation.

(L). Qadhi Muhammad Raghib Bey.

46. The Foreign Minister is going as strong as ever and was restored to the Imam's good books only about four months ago. In foreign affairs he is still the paramount authority and it is clear that he is in high favour at the moment.

47. When I saw him last month he lectured me on international events generally. He lamented British foreign policy remarking that there were a million different ways of settling Anglo-Italian differences without resort to war and the resignation of Cabinet Ministers. I neither commented on this statement nor asked him for the first hundred solutions. He thinks that the great democracies are heading for disaster and are out of date: and that they are in no way equipped to deal with international events of to-day.

48. Raghib still plays a lone hand and is as unpopular as ever with the Yemenis because he is a Turk, because he has such influence with the Imam and finally because he is thought to be playing a most sinister game with the Italians. He is well aware of his unpopularity but he is also full of his own conceit. We had been referring to the situation which may arise following the present Imam's death when he rose from his seat and standing to his full height said: " It is I, this miserable Turk, who may be the only man in the Kingdom permitted to wander unmolested through the streets of San'a while the remaining leading personalities and officials will be cowering in their homes awaiting the daggers of their assassins ". I did not remark that I was not so sanguine and that in all probability he would not have the time to cower.

49. Raghib has succeeded in marrying off his daughter (the divorced wife of the Crown Prince) to the son, a doctor-dentist, of Hassan Tahsin Pasha, mentioned in paragraph 18 above. There have been tremendous celebrations which have just concluded. Raghib's relations with the Crown Prince appear to be on a better footing but I should not like to affirm this. His relations with the Wazirs were quite good until three months ago and now they could not be worse although he has no quarrel with the Governor-General of the Ta'iz Liwa. A few days ago he had an open break with Seiyid Muhammad ibn Al Wazir, late Governor of Dhamar (brother of Seiyid Abdullah ibn Al Wazir, Governor-General of the Hodeida District) and the subject of their quarrel was Seiyid Abdullah. In a corridor of the Palace, Raghib yelled out that Seiyid Abdullah was a " himar " (donkey) and that the latter was not fit to be an " odaji " (room-boy) let alone be trusted with a Governorate. This has caused a stir here and I do not doubt that the Wazirs are mortally offended. They dare not complain to the Imam (who incidentally was told all about it and expressed approval of Raghib's sentiments!) as they know quite well if they add fuel to Raghib's wrath he will get them into trouble. I can sympathize with Raghib. Seiyid Abdullah is a hard case and would try the patience of a saint.

50. Raghib has become a great admirer of Italy and Germany and makes no secret of his admiration for the Italian Prime Minister. I am using considered language when I say that it takes the form of a kind of hero-worship when he gets properly launched on this subject: and with me he usually lets himself go to such an extent that he overlooks the deductions I must be making the whole time. He is so strongly biassed and prejudiced that in friendly discussions about international affairs he talks such arrant nonsense that it is a strain to listen to him. It would be pathetic if it did not come from a Foreign Minister, who has usually had a sound idea of comparative world values, and if he did not, as well, engage in malicious anti-British gossip, when he gets the chance, under the cloak of his indignation at His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine. As you are aware, I have reported separately a sample of his gossip to visitors who call on him on Fridays.

51. Approaching old age, no doubt, has dimmed his perceptions and it is clear that his sense of proportion has gone: senile decay is probably the explanation. He is certainly Italy's most valuable servant in the Yemen at the moment and I really believe that if he lost his retaining fee from them he would still continue to act as their unpaid propagandist.

(M). Seiyid Abdullah ibn Al Wazir.

52. The Governor-General of the Hodeida district is as xenophobe and as fanatical as ever. When I saw him in February last he made one interesting remark. We had both been expressing fervent hopes that there would be a *rapprochement* between England and Italy. He said that if there was to be a *rapprochement* he hoped that Britain would only emerge from it with " honour and with her power and prestige unimpaired ".

53. Seiyid Abdullah's relations with the Crown Prince are as unhappy as ever. About three months ago he laid himself open to a major snub from Ahmed, who was then acting for his father, and got it with a vengeance. The incident is not worth reporting in detail. In brief in his fanatical way he pretended that he had never heard of the existence of the old Turkish calendar (still used extensively in the Yemen in official correspondence and in the Treasury) which Raghib had quoted in a telegram to him. The telegram was an urgent and immediate one but in spite of this he delayed action on it on the grounds that he could not work out the date.

54. His relations with his cousin, Seiyid 'Ali ibn Al Wazir (Governor-General of the Ta'iz Liwa) are good but not cordial. With the Italians his relations are thought to be close but I fancy he is merely keeping in touch with them to guard against eventualities. It is believed that he has strong *attaches* with Ibn Sa'ud. So far as Raghib is concerned his relations, as I have stated higher up, could not be unhappier.

(N). Seiyid 'Ali ibn Al Wazir.

55. The Governor-General of the Ta'iz Liwa is the ablest and cleverest of the Wazir family. He has had some experience of foreigners and lacks the fanaticism of his cousin Abdullah.

56. He has been angling for over two years now for a promise of support from the Aden Government in case he has trouble following the present Imam's death. When I saw him in Ta'iz on 25th February last he said that he wanted to speak to me confidentially on my return journey (this request is now a hardy perennial). I asked him why he could not speak there and then to which he replied: " see what you will see and hear what you will hear in the capital and then we can talk ". What he meant to say was that when I returned to Ta'iz I would have heard about the Crown Prince and his excesses and that I might then be more pre-disposed to listen to his request for future support. I will report again if Seiyid 'Ali has anything of interest to say.

57. Seiyid 'Ali's son, Seiyid Abdullah (Governor of Di-Sifal in the Ta'iz district), who is married to a daughter of the Imam, has been in the capital for some months and has been trying for weeks to get permission to return to Ta'iz. To date this has been refused and there is little doubt that the Crown Prince is responsible for the hold up: this is the kind of pin prick he indulges in and merely serves to embitter the existing relations between himself and the Wazirs.

58. Seiyid 'Ali is reported to be in closer touch with the Italians than his cousin Seiyid Abdullah; but in this respect their policy is probably identical as they no doubt wish to protect themselves against future events.

(O). Seiyid 'Ali Bin Hamud.

59. A mention should be made of this Seiyid as he is a man of influence in the highlands: and a dark horse in the race for the Succession.

60. Until quite recently he has been Governor of Zabid in the Yemeni Tihama and is now Chief Magistrate in his home town at Kaukaban about 30 miles north-east of San'ā.

61. He is a man famed for his learning and for the justness of his dealings with the Zeidi highlander to such an extent, it is alleged, that tribesmen are known to have made the long journey to Zabid for a settlement of their disputes. The Imam distrusts him and keeps him unemployed or appoints him to minor posts. Seiyid 'Ali has no influential following but he might be able to count upon a large following from Zeidi tribes to the north of San'ā.

(P). B.B.C. Arabic Broadcasts.

62. There is a unanimity of opinion in the Yemen about the B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts. All people I have asked, and I hear opinions on all hands, say that it is the clearest and most lucid of all Arabic broadcasts.

63. I estimate that there are at present over 20 radio sets in San'ā owned by the highest officials and personalities only. The import of sets is still prohibited but from time to time the Imam grants permission exceptionally. In the whole of the Yemen there must be now about 30 sets whose entry has been authorized. I do not doubt that sets are also being smuggled into the country: one case has already come to my notice by no other person than by the smuggler himself.

64. An unexpected sequel to the greater use of radio sets in this country is that Yemeni women are reported to be growing discontented with their lot as they are beginning to realize how much better off are their more emancipated sisters in other parts of the world!

(Q). The San'ā Medical Mission and Connected Matter.

65. Since the arrival in San'ā of Dr. Passera things have moved in the San'a General Hospital. Petrie, who has virtually enjoyed a monopoly of the surgery work, has now been told that he must attend to eye cases only (he is an eye specialist as well as a surgeon) while Santaboni, the Italian Surgeon, is to do all the surgery.

66. Petrie, in the past few months, has gained a considerable reputation here as a surgeon and I do not doubt that this has affected Italian *amour propre* with the result that strings have been pulled to clip his wings. Passera appears to be a live wire and is alleged to have given out that within a year all foreigners, but the Italians, should be run out of the Yemen. You may recall that in a memorandum dated November, 1936, in which I raised the question of Petrie's appointment here I ventured an opinion that the Italians would doubtless intrigue against Petrie: perhaps this is the beginning.

67. I have advised Petrie to accept the change without demur as little or nothing can be gained by representations on my part or complaints from him. He is a Yemeni servant for the time being, and must abide by the orders of the local Ministry of Health.

68. There are an abundance of local rumours that the number of the Italian doctors in the Yemen, is to be increased; and that an Italian midwife is shortly to set out for the Yemen. If these rumours have a solid foundation, and I cannot vouch for them yet, it would appear that the Italians are making a bid for a monopoly of the Yemeni Medical Service.

69. Petrie's contract with the Yemeni Government expires in February next. I have made local representations but cannot pin the Yemeni Government down to a statement that they want the Petries to be succeeded either temporarily or permanently in due course. The Imam by nature is loth to commit himself in advance and what with his hesitation and the Italian influences at work to shut out any but Italian doctors it has been extremely difficult for me to know how much pressure to bear without upsetting the Yemeni Government. I have twice asked Raghib to let me know whether the continuation of the appointments is approved in principle to which he has replied that it is months too early to decide.

70. I have shelved the subject temporarily and may take it up with the Imam direct on the day of my farewell audience. I will report again if there are further developments.

Conclusion.

71. As you are aware I have, in a separate memorandum, set out at some length certain views about Arabian affairs generally. It had been my original intention to summarize the proposals contained in that memorandum at the end of this report, but, as I raised certain issues therein which are not relevant to the subject matter of this report, I subsequently changed my mind. In any event the memorandum in question can be read as an enclosure to this report as it refers.

B. W. SEAGER,
Frontier Officer.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

N. D-38



Compiled at W.O. drawn and heliographed at O.S. and printed at W.O. 1940

ALTITUDE TINTS

Feet
Metres

SEA LEVEL

ASIA 1:1,000,000

PROVISIONAL EDITION

ADEN

NOT TO BE

ADEN

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

N. D-38


44°
45°
46°
47°
48°
16°
15°
14°
13°
SANA
Amran
Manaha
Radda
Aden
Little Aden
Crater
Khanfar
Lahej
Shuqra
Mukalla
Qaryat al Qabil
Qaryat al Ghurfa
Qaryat al Ghayl
Qaryat al Hajarayn
Qaryat al Qarn
Qaryat al Hawra
Qaryat al Hamra
Qaryat al Hamra Ash Shihr
Qaryat al Hamra Ash Shihr
Qaryat al Hamra Ash Shihr



Geographical Section, General Staff. No 2555.
Published at the War Office. 1906.
2nd. Edition 1929.

Projection of the International Map

Demarcated line as drawn in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 - - - - - - - ("1905 line").
North-East line agreed to in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 —.—.— ("Violet line").
"Status quo" line laid down for a period of 40 years by the Treaty of San'a between Great Britain and the Yemen in 1934 —..—..—
Boundary between Colony of Aden and Aden Protectorate

Scale 1:1,000,000

Kilometres 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Kilometres

1 Millimetre = 1 Kilometre

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Miles

Scale 1 Inch to 15·78 Miles
or 1·014 Inches to 16 Miles

REFERENCE

Towns of 1st importance (true to scale)	RIYADH
— 2nd	Laila
— 3rd	Kharfa
— 4th	Qutain
Villages 5th	Mubarras
— 6th	Sughra
Ruins, important	Qusaiyat Ali
Names of provinces	CHER
Tribal names	ATAIBA
Regions, Localities	Maqran
Ranges, Mountains and important hills	TUWAIQ
Hills, Peaks, Saddles, Passes, Gorges; Valleys, Prairies, Plateaux, Capes, and Islands	Al Ghadhara
Boundary, International	
Boundary, International not demarcated	
Boundary, Provincial	
Railway, Single track	
Railway, Narrow gauge or light	
Roads suitable for motor traffic in all weather	
Roads suitable for motor traffic in dry weather only	
Tracks or paths	
Explorers route	
Telegraph along roads or tracks	
Telegraph not along roads or tracks	
River, perennial	
River, sometimes dry	
River, unsurveyed	

Falls, Rapids, Fords, Ferries, Dams	
Well or spring, perennial, non-perennial, ruined	
Waterhole	
Cistern, Reservoir, ruined	
Pipe line, water	
Pipe line, oil, with pumping station	
Contours, Principle, auxiliary, approximate	
Heights in metres	1842
Trigonometrical or astronomical point	
Telegraph or telephone office	
Post office	
Post office with telegraph or telephone	
Wireless telegraph station	
Fort	
Christian mission, Mosque, Minaret, or Tomb	
Pagode or Temple	
Sand	
Sand dunes	
Stony area	
Lava	
Mud	
Marsh or swamp, fresh	
Salt lake	
Area liable to inundation	
Cliffs	
Depressions	
Cairn	

COMPILATION DIAGRAM

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



Compiled at W.O., drawn and heliographed at D.S. and printed at W.O. 1940.

Projection of the International Map

Demarcated line as drawn in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 - - - - - - - ("1905 line").
North-East line agreed to in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 —·—·— ("Violet line").
"Status quo" line laid down for a period of 40 years by the Treaty of Sana between great Britain and the Yemen in 1934 ... —··—··—
Boundary between Colony of Aden and Aden Protectorate

Scale 1:1,000,000

Kilometres 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Kilometres

1 Millimetre = 1 Kilometre

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Miles

Scale 1 Inch to 15·78 Miles
or 1·014 Inches to 16 Miles

COMPILATION DIAGRAM

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES

ARABIC GLOSSARY

Ain	Spring	Source
Bani	Tribe	Tribu
Bir	Well	Puits
Chail	Watercourse	Cours d'eau
Hawa, Hawat	Underground source of water	Source d'eau
Jebel	Mountain	Montagne
Ahor	Bay inlet	Baie
Raqb, R	Waterhole, Pass (R)	Point d'eau, Défilés (R)
Qala	Fort	Fort
Qarn	Projecting hill	Mont
	Spring	Source
Qasr	Fort, Castle	Fort, chateau
Wadi	Dry water course	Cours d'eau desséché

ALTITUDE TINTS

5. FRONTIERS OF THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

78075/38 [No. 1]: Enclosure. No. 52.

THE FRONTIERS OF THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

A.—GENERAL.

A memorandum of the 23rd August, 1937*, by Mr. Fone [of the Foreign Office] entitled "The Growth of the Aden Protectorate" describes the growth of British influence in Southern Arabia from 1839 onwards and the circumstances in which the frontier between the western part of the Aden Protectorate and that part of the Ottoman dominions which is now the Yemen came to be demarcated in 1903, 1904 and 1905, and in which the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 9th March, 1914, came to be concluded. The object of the present memorandum is to carry the story down to the present date.

2. The Anglo-Turkish Convention, which came into force with exchange of ratifications on the 3rd June, 1914, but was not published until 1933, and which His Majesty's Government regarded as the consecration of a territorial situation which had existed for many years previously, laid down the following lines as the southern and eastern boundaries of Ottoman territory in Arabia:—

(1) a line (which may for convenience be called the "1905 line") which runs from a point on the Wadi Bana about 100 miles north of Aden to a point on the Red Sea near the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, according to the provisions of Protocols signed in 1903, 1904 and 1905 and ratified by the Convention.

(2) the so-called "Violet line", which runs at an angle of 45° from Lakmat-esh-shub, near Point No. 1 of the 1905 line, as far as latitude 20° N. (in the centre of the great sandy desert called the Rub-al-Khali or "Empty Quarter") where it meets

(3) the so-called "Blue line", which runs due south from a point on the Arabian coast south of Bahrein until it strikes latitude 20° N.

3. The 1905 line was stated in the preamble to the Convention to separate the "Yemen Vilayet from the territory of the nine cantons of Aden" (meaning the nine tribes north and west of Aden which were usually regarded as constituting the Aden Protectorate up till about 1890). But the Violet and Blue lines are only stated to be the "boundary of Ottoman territory", no precise indication of the status of the territory to the south and east of those lines being given.

4. A considerable portion, however, of the Arabian peninsula lying to the south and east of the 1905 Violet and Blue lines was already by 1914 in the possession of tribes and rulers in special treaty relations (usually of a kind which precluded them from having relations with any other Power) with His Majesty's Government or the Government of India. The tribes and rulers in question may be divided into two main groups:—

(*a*) the Arab States of the Persian Gulf;

(*b*) the tribes and rulers of the Aden Protectorate.

5. The Arab States of the Persian Gulf here in question consist of Qatar, the Trucial Sheikhs and Muscat, whose territories have since 1914 and long before that extended continuously along the coast of Arabia from the point on the Persian Gulf where the Blue line meets the sea to Ras (Cape) Dharbat Ali on the Indian ocean (at about longtitude 53° East). Inland their territories extend from the coast to the edge of the Rub-al-Khali, but it cannot be denied that there are large areas east and south of the Blue and Violet lines, corresponding approximately with the Rub-al-Khali, which have never been under the effective control of any of the Persian Gulf States and are to-day under the control of King Ibn Saud (see paragraph 12 below). Particulars of the treaties concluded with these States will be found in Aitchison's Treaties. It should be noted that Muscat, although its external and to some extent its internal affairs are by custom controlled by His Majesty's Government to a considerable extent, is in theory an independent sovereign State, in treaty relations with other countries than the United Kingdom. Otherwise the States are British-protected States by treaty and internationally speaking parts of the British Empire.

* 79174/37 [No. 6]: Enclosure not printed.

6. The following table shows the treaties concluded with the tribes and rulers of the Aden Protectorate, in chronological order:—

No.	*Name.*	*Date.*	*Page No. of Aitchison's Treaties, (Volume XI) 5th (1929) Edition.*
1	Abdali	18. 6.1839	57
2	Sultan of Qishn and Socotra (for Socctra and its dependencies)	23. 4.1886	167
3	Bir Ali Sultan (Revised in 1896) (Wahidi)	30. 4.1888	149
4	Balihaf Sultan (Revised in 1895) (Wahidi)	30. 4.1888	150
5	Irqa (Revised in 1902)	27. 4.1888	110
6	Lower Haura (Revised in 1902) (Dhuyaibi)	28. 4.1888	113
7	Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla (Qu'aiti Sultan)	1. 5.1888	164
8	Lower Aulaqi	2. 6.1888	107
9	Fadhli	4. 8.1888	93
10	Sultan of Qishn and Socotra (for Qishn and the Mahri tribe)	2 .5.1888	169
11	Aqrabi Sheikh	15. 7.1888	100
12	Barhimi (Subeihi)	17. 9.1889	84
13	Atifi (Subeihi)	21. 9.1889	86
14	Balihaf (original Treaty 1888)	15. 3.1895	152
15	Alawi	16. 7.1895	142
16	Lower Yafai	1. 8.1895	119
17	Haushabi	6. 8.1895	138
18	Bir Ali (origiaWl in 1888)	1. 6.1896	154
19	Irqa (original in 1888)	7. 1.1902	111
20	Lower Haura (original in 1888)	7. 4.1902	114
21	Dhubi Sheikh (Upper Yafa')	11. 5.1903	121
22	Mausatta (Upper Yafa')	3. 7.1903	123
23	Maflahi (Upper Yafa')	27. 8.1903	125
24	Hadhrami (Upper Yafa')	26. 9.1903	128
25	Upper Yafai Sultan	21.10.1903	126
26	Shaibi (Upper Yafa')	5.12.1903	130
27	Upper Aulaqi Sheikh	8.12.1903	102
28	Beihan	29.12.1903	116
29	Upper Aulaqi Sultan	18. 3.1904	103
30	Amir of Dhala' (Amiri)	28.11.1904	147
31	Audhali Sultan	19. 9.1914	133
32	Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement	1918	157

7. Of these treaties Nos. 1, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30 concern the so-called " Nine tribes " (or " Cantons " as they are called in the Anglo-Turkish Convention) which constituted the Protectorate up till about 1890. Of the remainder all except Nos. 2, 7, 10 and 32 concern tribes or rulers living further east but within 150 miles or so of Aden, who can be regarded as forming part of the " Aden Protectorate " since 1890 in the narrow sense in which that term was formerly used. Nos. 2, 7, 10, and 32, however, concern the extensive area still further east generally known as the Hadhramaut, which until about 1932 was not usually spoken of as part of the Aden Protectorate, although the treaties with its rulers differed in no respect from the treaties with the tribes and rulers nearer Aden. All these treaties bind the parties concerned, in return for the protection of Great Britain, not to enter into any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any foreign Power except with the knowledge and sanction of His Majesty's Government and to give immediate notice to His Majesty's Government of any attempt at interference by any other Power. The tribes and rulers concerned are accordingly, like the Persian Gulf States, parts of the British Empire from the international point of view.

8. The most important ruler in the eastern area is the Qu'aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla (No. 7), whose territory extends along the coast from the country of the Wahidi (Nos. 3 and 4) and Lower Haura (No. 6) to about longtitude 50° 40′ East, where the territory of the Mahri Sultan of Qishn and Socotra (No. 10) begins. The Mahri territory in its turn extends as far as the confines of the Muscati province of Dhofar at Ras Dharbat Ali*. Inland from the Qu'aiti, and occupying most of the Wadi Hadhramaut

* The boundary between the Aden Protectorate and Muscat is entirely vague and undefined but may for practical purposes be regarded as a straight line joining Ras Dharbat Ali to the junction of the Blue and Violet lines.

(the richest district of Southern Arabia) is the country of the Kathiri Sultans, who by an Agreement concluded in 1918 (No. 32) agreed *inter alia* that:

(1) " The Province of the Hadhramaut* shall be one province, the said province being an appanage of the British Empire under the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla ", the Kathiri territory being, however, autonomous.

(2) The Qu'aiti Treaty of 1888 was binding upon him and all his correspondence with the Aden authorities should be carried on through the Qu'aiti Sultan.

9. From the three preceding paragraphs it will be seen that the territories of the rulers and tribes of the Aden Protectorate with whom treaties have been concluded have since 1914 and long before that extended along the Arabian coast from the point where the 1905 line meets the sea at the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to the Muscat boundary at Ras Dharbat Ali. As regards the extent of these territories inland, it can be said that with the possible exception of Shabwa (see paragraph 20 below) the territories of the tribes and rulers of the western part of the Protectorate (i.e., exclusive of those of the Hadhramaut) extend without question as far as the 1905 line or alternatively as far as the Yemeni frontier as it is to-day (see paragraph 17 below). It is more difficult to obtain precise information as to the northerly range of the Bedouin tribes dependent upon the Qu'aiti, Kathiri and Mahri Sultans. But it is fairly certain that these tribes roam as far northwards as the borders of the Ruba-al-Khali and sometimes as far as and beyond the Violet line. In addition the Mahri range eastwards as far as the territories of tribes dependent on the Muscati province of Dhofar. In general it may be said that apart from Shabwa and the districts in provisional Yemeni occupation the whole of the country south of the Violet line is adequately covered by one or another of the Protectorate treaties.

10. The area of the Aden Protectorate was defined on the 18th March, 1937, in the Aden Protectorate Order in Council, 1937, which states that this area extends to all territories of Arabia which are bounded on the south by the Colony of Aden and the Gulf of Aden, on the west and north by the Kingdoms of the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and on the east by the Sultanate of Muscat. Within this area His Majesty's Government have taken steps in the last year or two to tighten their control over outlying districts, and this has partly been due to a desire to forestall Italian claims and intrigues. In particular His Majesty's Government have arranged with the Q'aiti Sultan for the appointment of a resident British adviser in his territory, while on occasions more vigorous steps than formerly have been taken in other areas, where necessary by air action, to prevent tribal disorders and aggression. Steps have also been taken to negotiate with the tribes of Shabwa, largely as a result of the prominence given to the locality by a visit by Mr. Philby in 1936, a treaty on the lines of treaties with other rulers and tribes of the Protectorate.

B.—THE POSITION WITH REGARD TO SAUDI ARABIA.

11. As a result of the Great War the Ottoman Empire was succeeded in Arabia by various States, of which for practical purposes only two need be considered here. These are Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, one or the other of whose territories extend from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea along the Blue, Violet and 1905 lines. His Majesty's Government have consistently maintained that these States are succession States of the Ottoman Empire and as such bound to accept the frontiers constituted by these lines, i.e., by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. The Saudi Arabian Government do not specifically deny being an Ottoman Succession State, but they are unwilling to accept the Blue and Violet lines and lay claim to large areas to the south and east of these lines.

12. As it happens, the frontier discussions which have been taking place for some years past between His Majesty's Government and King Ibn Saud about the southern and eastern boundaries of his kingdom have indeed revealed the fact that extensive areas to the south and east of the Blue and Violet lines are in fact inhabited, in so far as they can be said to be inhabited at all, by tribes, of which the Murra are the most important, which have for a long time past been under King Ibn Saud's control. His Majesty's Government are accordingly prepared, while insisting that the Blue and Violet lines are meanwhile the legal frontier, to conclude an agreement which would have the effect of shifting the legal frontier considerably further to the south and east, so as, to include, approximately speaking, most of the Rub-al-Khali in Saudi Arabia. The discussions are for the moment at a standstill.

* Politically, the Hadhramaut means the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Territory. Geographically it extends over a larger, but very indefinite area, both east, west and north, usually including the Wahidi on the west and Qishn on the east, while even Van den Berg (Hadhramaut et les Colonies Arabes 1886), a most conservative writer, admits that it extends northwards to the Arabian desert.

C.—THE POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE YEMEN.

13. The frontier discussions with the Yemen have been more acrimonious and more complicated. During the years following the Great War the Aden authorities were constantly pre-occupied by encroachments on the part of the Zeidis of the Yemen into Aden Protectorate territory south of the 1905 and Violet lines at various points between the Red Sea and Beihan-al-Kasab (which is about 150 miles north-east of Aden).

14. In the course of the discussions which followed these encroachments His Majesty's Government consistently maintained the view that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 was binding upon the Yemen and the Imam (now the King) of the Yemen has as consistently refused to agree that his Kingdom is a Succession State or to admit the validity of the Convention. On the contrary, he claimed and still claims that large sections of the Aden Protectorate ought to belong to the Yemen, not only in law but on the ground of the racial affinity of their inhabitants with the Zeidis.

15. His Majesty's Government eventually sent to the Imam, in 1926 and again in November 1929, a draft frontier treaty to which was attached as an appendix a list of tribes which the Imam, by signing the treaty, would acknowledge to be under British protection. This list* was as follows:—

The Abdali Sultan.
The Fadli Sultan.
The Haushabi Sultan.
The Amir of Dhala.
The Aqrabi Sheikh.
The Upper Aulaki Sultan.
The Upper Aulaki Sheikh.
The Lower Aulaki Sultan.
The Audali Sultan.
The Sharif of Behan-al-Qasab.
The Wahidi Sultan of Balahaf.
The Wahidi Sultan of Bir 'Ali.
The Sheikh of Haura.
The Sheikh of Irka.
The Kaiti Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla and through him the Kathiri Sultans.
The (Mahri) Sultan of Kishn and Socotra.

Upper Yafa—
- The Upper Yafa Sultan.
- The Naqibs of Mausatta.
- The Dhubi Sheikh.
- The Hadrami Sheikh.
- The Muflahi Sheikh.
- The Saqladi Sheikh of Sha'ib.

The Lower Yafa Sultan.

Subeihi—
- The 'Atifi Sheikh.
- The Barhimi Sheikh.

16. The Imam, however, rejected this draft and in September, 1931, produced an alternative draft which omitted any list of tribes and contained instead a provision to the effect that " the situation [on the frontier] existing at the date of the conclusion of this treaty shall remain as it was before ". Further negotiations then ensued and a frontier treaty was finally negotiated at Sana'a by Lieutenant Colonel B. R. Reilly, the Resident at Aden, and signed there on the 11th February, 1934. Article 3 of this treaty (which expires after forty years) reads as follows:—

" *Article 3.*

" The settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion, in whatever way may be agreed upon by both high contracting parties in a spirit of friendship and complete concord, free from any dispute or difference, of the negotiations which shall take place between them before the expiry of the period of the present treaty.

" Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this, treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that

* This list corresponds, for all essential purposes, with that in paragraph 6, although the various tribes and rulers are sometimes differently described and spelt. In particular it includes the whole of the tribes and rulers of the Protectorate, not merely those of the " Nine Cantons."

they will prevent, by all means at their disposal, any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier."

17. Although this treaty made no mention of the evacuation by the Imam of the areas of which he was at that time in illegal occupation its signature was in fact made conditional upon the prior evacuation of all territory south of the 1905 and Violet lines (with certain recognized exceptions) of which he was then in occupation and was delayed for nearly a month while the condition was being fulfilled. The phrase " situation . . . on the date of the signature of the treaty ", as used in Article 3, accordingly acquires a special significance. It means the situation existing after the evacuation by the Yemen referred to above—an evacuation which left the Yemen still in occupation of some territory on the British side of the 1905 and Violet lines, but much less than a few years previously. This " situation " was subsequently defined* by His Majesty's Government as follows:—

" Article 3 of the treaty stabilises, pending a final decision, the actual frontier existing on the 11th February, 1934, the date of the signature of the treaty. This is as follows:—

" From approximately Husn Murad to the Wadi Bana it is identical with the old demarcated Anglo-Turkish boundary as shown on official maps of the Aden Protectorate. From the demarcated point on the Wadi Bana, eastwards, it follows tribal boundaries which have never been demarcated in detail on the ground, and which the inaccuracy of existing maps makes it impossible to define precisely on paper, but which are known to the tribes concerned. These are the northern and eastern boundary of the Upper Yafa tribe, excluding Rubeiatein, the boundaries between the Upper Yafa, Lower Yafa and Fadhli tribes and Beidha, the north-western and northern boundary of the Audhali tribe, the western boundary of the Aulaqi tribe, and the western and north-western boundary of Beihan, including the Masabi country. Beyond this point the boundary, as laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 9th March, 1914, respecting the boundaries of Aden and of Ottoman territory in Southern Arabia, is a line running north-eastwards into the Ruba-al-Khali (' the Empty Quarter ') at an angle of 45°."

18. The effect of the treaty was accordingly to fix the frontier for forty years along the 1905 and—in the view of His Majesty's Government—the Violet lines, except that the Imam remained in occupation of a salient jutting into Aden territory between the Wadi Bana and Beihan-al-Kasab and covering the districts of Rubeiatein and Beidha.

19. At the time that this treaty was signed the Imam evinced no interest in the country lying to the north-east of Beihan-al-Kasab and his control did not extend eastwards beyond Harib near the Beihan border. The ownership of the country eastwards from Harib along the northern side of the Violet line was in fact uncertain and so far as His Majesty's Government could then tell might equally well have belonged to King Ibn Saud or the Imam. Shortly afterwards, however, a treaty was signed at Taif on the 21st May, 1934, between King Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen, Article 4 of which laid down the frontier between the two Kingdoms (but in terms that are practically unintelligible) and provided for its eventual demarcation upon the ground. This demarcation took place in 1936 and so far as can be ascertained from a rough map of the demarcation which was subsequently obtained in confidence from Mr. St. John Philby the demarcated frontier runs from the Red Sea Coast in a general easterly direction into the Ruba-al-Khali. In other words, Yemeni territory stretches eastwards indefinitely into the Ruba-al-Khali and may apparently be regarded as marching with the Protectorate along the Violet line for a considerable distance towards the junction of the Violet line with the Blue line. In this connexion it may be mentioned that King Ibn Saud has disclaimed any call upon the allegiance of the Seiar, a tribe dependent on the Quaiti Sultan, who roam over the desert country north-east of Shabwa as far as and often beyond the Violet line.

20. But although in 1934 the Imam showed no interest in the country north-east of Beihan, the Aden authorities equally had then no direct contact with the tribes inhabiting that part of it that lay on their side of the Violet line, i.e., the Ahl Bal Obeid, whose principal centre is Shabwa, about 100 miles north-east of Beihan. To the north of this country again, tribes dependent on the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans roamed northwards as far as the Violet line and even beyond it. In consequence the country of the Ahl Bal Obeid constituted an enclave in the Protectorate not covered by any direct or effective agreement between His Majesty's Government and its inhabitants. Some of the Shabwa tribes were supposed, it was true, to depend upon the Upper Aulaqi Sultan, and therefore to be covered by the treaty between His Majesty's Government and the Upper Aulaqi, but no documentary evidence of this connexion appeared to exist. The

* It should be understood that this is *not* a text agreed with the Government of the Yemen, and has not been published.

Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans also had claims on the Shabwa area in virtue of ancient agreement and so has the Wahidi Sultan of Balihaf. None of these rulers was, however, in occupation of the area or possessed of any real influence there in 1934.

21. This uncertainty had little importance at the time. But in 1936 Mr. Philby paid an unauthorized visit to Shabwa which had the effect of forcing general attention upon the question of frontiers in this part of the world, while in addition it is believed that the country between Beihan and Shabwa is the most likely oil-bearing district in the Aden protectorate. The existence of an area of the Protectorate abutting on the Violet line and not effectively covered by any treaty came as a consequence of these developments to constitute a serious deficiency in the Protectorate system and steps were therefore taken during the present year 1937, to negotiate a treaty with the paramount chief of the principal section (the Ahl Karab) of the Ahl bal Obeid.

22. The provisions of the draft treaty, which is apparently ready for signature, were in general as follows:—

Article I.—There shall be peace between Great Britain and the Ahl Karab and the Ahl Bareik [another tribe who share the town of Shabwa with the Ahl Karab].

Article II.—Certain roads are to be kept open by the tribes.

Article III.—His Majesty's Government, taking into consideration the fact that the whole confederation of the Ahl Bal Obeid lies geographically within the borders of that country to which British Protection is already extended, guarantees against foreign aggression, etc., the whole of their territory, i.e., that between the Hadhramaut, the Upper Aulaqi and the territories of Beihan on and within the Ruba-al-Khali. The Sheikh in return agrees not to enter into correspondence with any foreign Power, etc.

Article IV.—The Sheikh may not dispose of his territory without consent of His Majesty's Government, etc.

Article V.—The Sheikh to receive a subsidy.

23. It seems, however, that news of the proposed agreement with the tribes of Shabwa reached the King of the Yemen and during August and September he made both written and oral protests, the substance of which was generally speaking as follows:—

24. The treaty of Sana'a contains a provision to the effect that the situation in regard to the frontier between the two parties shall be maintained as it existed at the time of signature until such time as a final settlement is reached (which must be within the term of the treaty, i.e., 40 years). In the Yemeni view, this does not merely mean that the actual line of the frontier shall not be changed, but that the status of the tribes and areas on either side of the frontier shall not be changed. The use of the words " in regard to " and the wide scope of the article generally make this clear. Furthermore the treaty was supported* by a list of the nine tribes under the protection of His Majesty's Government, which was communicated to the Government of the Yemen by His Majesty's Government. Shabwa and the tribe of the Ahl Karab are not mentioned in this list. The Yemeni Government therefore regard the action of His Majesty's Government in extending their influence over Shabwa and negotiating an agreement with the Ahl Karab as a breach of the *status quo* provisions of the treaty and an incursion into territory which, on the showing of their own list has not hitherto been under their control. So for that matter are their claims to control over the Seiar and the el Ashqas. If His Majesty's Government claim that there is no question of any fresh extension of their influence because the territory lies to the south of the Violet line, the Yemeni Government can only repeat that they have never recognized the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 and do not do so now. If His Majesty's Government claim that it is the behaviour of Mr. Philby which has rendered measures of control necessary in an area where none were necessary before, the Yemeni Government agree that Mr. Philby's behaviour was unpardonable and justifies His Majesty's Government in being especially vigilant with regard to their own territories: but they cannot see that it justifies them in extending their vigilance to areas not their own. If His Majesty's Government claim that the area is under the influence of the Upper Aulaqi and covered by their treaty with the Upper Aulaqi, the Yemeni Government cannot admit that this is just ground for extending British control to a part of Yemeni territory. Finally, the Yemeni Government claim that in addition to Shabwa, which already belongs by right to the Yemen, there are large areas to the south of the Violet line, including many at present under effective British protection, which ought to belong to the Yemen, not only on legal grounds but by reason of the affinity of their tribes to the Zeidis. They

* This is of course untrue: see paragraph 16 above. The list was not part of the treaty and in any case it was not limited to the original nine tribes.

therefore consider that when a final frontier settlement is reached these areas, which are of no practical value to His Majesty's Government, should in justice be transferred to the Yemen.

D.—THE POSITION WITH REGARD TO ITALY.

25. Meanwhile a further complication had arisen owing to the existence of the so-called Rome Understanding of the 17th February, 1927. This Understanding was the outcome of conversations in Rome between Sir Ronald Graham and Sir Gilbert Clayton on the one side and Cavaliere Gasparini and Signor Juariglia on the other. The agreed record of these conversations which constitutes the Understanding states that the delegates discussed certain questions affecting British and Italian interests in Southern Arabia and the Red Sea and, as a result of their instructions that the policies of the two Governments in these areas should be developed in friendly co-operation but on independent lines, had decided (*inter alia*) that they would maintain close touch with each other in all questions affecting the Red Sea and Southern Arabia.

26. Some light on the intended scope of the conversations, and consequently on the intended meaning of the term " Southern Arabia " may be derived from the fact that they were in their turn the outcome of an earlier conversation between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Signor Mussolini at Leghorn on the 30th September, 1926, of which the record made by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and concurred in by Sir Austen Chamberlain mentioned Arabia only under the heading of " Yemen ", i.e.:—

YEMEN.

Mussolini . . . . " we have given you intimation of the conclusion of the agreement with the Imam . . . . As regards other matters I accept your suggestion of an Anglo-Italian meeting at which the situation in the Arabian peninsula can be studied . . . . ."

Chamberlain: " You understand that everything which may occur on the route to India affects us in a special manner . . . . it was necessary to avoid a conflict between England and Italy under the ' pavillons ' of Assir and Yemen . . . . (I agree that) the general position in Arabia can be considered by us together ".

27. Moreover, although the confidential records of the Rome conversations made by the British representatives contain no specific definition of their scope, these records show that the conversations were in fact exclusively concerned with the position on the Red Sea coast and the adjacent islands, i.e., the relations between King Ibn Saud, the Imam of the Yemen and the Idrissi of Asir, and the status of Kamaran, the Farsan islands, etc., with an occasional mention of the relations between the Iman of the Yemen and the Aden authorities (including the steps to be taken by the latter to secure the evacuation by the Yemen of Protectorate territory) and of the Aqaba-Maan frontier.

28. On the strength of this Understanding, which, notwithstanding its origin as set out in the three immediately preceding paragraphs, they regard as applicable to the whole of " Southern Arabia " in the widest sense of that term, the Italian Government consider the Aden Protectorate Order 1937 and the consolidation of British authority in the remoter districts of the Protectorate to be breaches of an undertaking given by His Majesty's Government not to alter the *status quo* in Southern Arabia. Their argument, which has not, however, been given in writing, appears to be as follows:—

29. The Rome Understanding of 1927 contained an implied undertaking that the *status quo* should be maintained not only on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea but in the whole of Southern Arabia. At the time when the Understanding was reached the Italian Government were under the impression that the Aden Protectorate, although its frontiers might be vague, did not extend at any rate beyond the areas usually shown on the published maps—and indeed shown and described in the majority of official and other publications at the time—as the " Aden Protectorate ", i.e., a small triangle of territory occupying only the south-west corner of what is now known as the Aden Protectorate, and not extending more than about 150 miles to the east of the town of Aden. The Italian Government had no idea that the claims of His Majesty's Government embraced the area known as the Hadhramaut, still less the whole of that part of South-Western Arabia which lies to the south and east of the territories of the Yemen and Saudi Arabia and to the west of Muscat. They had supposed that between these territories there lay vast areas which were either *terra nullius* or else in the occupation of independent Arab tribes not organized into States. They therefore regard the issue of the Aden Protectorate Order 1937 and the recent extension and consolidation of British authority within the area specified therein, as a violation of the *status quo* existing at the time of the conclusion of the Rome Understanding and accepted and crystallized thereby; and in default of satisfactory explanations from His Majesty's Government,

whom they believe to have embarked on these measures as a counter to the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, they may consider themselves absolved from their own obligations under the Rome Understanding.

30. In reply to the argument of His Majesty's Government that (assuming, which is not in fact the case, that the Rome Understanding contains any undertaking to preserve the *status quo* elsewhere than on the Red Sea Coast) both the Order in Council and the recent consolidation of British authority in the northern and eastern areas of the territory in question involve no alteration of the *status quo* since they are entirely consistent

(*a*) with the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 19th March, 1914, laying down the frontier between Turkish territory and British spheres of influence in Southern Arabia, and

(*b*) with the Treaties—dating from long before the Rome Understanding—between His Majesty's Government and the rulers and tribes of the areas concerned,

the Italian Government maintain that they were not aware, when the Rome Understanding was concluded, of the existence either of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 or of the Treaties referred to, and that they cannot therefore be expected to recognize them now as establishing a *status quo* of the implications of which they were in ignorance at the time. Even, however, if the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 were accepted as relevant, there is, according to the Italians, nothing in the text of it, as now published in the fifth edition of Aitchison's Treaties, to warrant the inference that all the territory to the south and east of the Blue and Violet lines established by that convention, must be regarded as British or under British protection. Finally, whether there has been a territorial change or not there has been a political change inconsistent with the maintenance of the spirit of the *status quo* in so far as His Majesty's Government have extended their effective control to areas where it has not been exercised hitherto.

31. The Italian Government have not yet asserted, although it is conceivable that they might do so should the point occur to them, that the surrender by His Majesty's Government to Saudi Arabia or the Yemen of territory south of the Blue or Violet lines or, alternatively, south of the line which constituted the *status quo* in 1927 is a breach of the Rome Understanding.

E.—CONCLUSION.

32. The object of the present memorandum is to describe the more recent stages in the growth of the frontiers of the Aden Protectorate and in particular to afford a background to the recent Italian and Yemeni complaints. The answers which His Majesty's Government might give to the Yemeni and Italian complaints, having regard to this historical background and to the legal interpretation which can properly be placed upon the various international instruments affecting or supposed to affect these frontiers, are discussed in a Foreign Office memorandum of the 1st December, 1937, (circulated to the M.E. (O) Sub-Committee as M.E. (O) 243) which contains much of the material embodied in the present memorandum, but unlike it develops the arguments and conclusions to be deduced from that material, and in a minute of the 1st December, 1937, by Mr. Beckett circulated as an annex to the record of the 54th Meeting of the M.E. (O) Sub-Committee held on the 7th December, 1937.

33. The recommendations of the meeting as regards the Italian complaints were as follows:—

To record the view that in any discussions with Italy the line to be taken by the representatives of His Majesty's Government should be as follows:—

(i) Attention should be drawn to the precise terms of the Rome Understanding of 1927 and to the legal interpretation to be placed upon them: in particular the Understanding does not contain any provision requiring the maintenance of the *status quo* except in regard to the Arabian coast of the Red Sea.

(ii) That, in any case, no provision affecting the *status quo* in Southern Arabia could apply to territory under British protection.

(iii) Any objection by Italy, based on the ground that, at the time of the conclusion of the Understanding, she was unaware of the pre-existent Protectorate Treaties, could not be accepted as valid, in view of the publication of these treaties in official works and for the other reasons indicated in the Foreign Office memorandum.

(iv) With regard to the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1914, which was not mentioned during the Rome conversations in 1927, Italy had only to ask, and full information about this treaty and the position and extent of the Protectorate generally would have been communicated to her.

(v) British rights of protection over the Hadhramaut, based as they are upon treaty engagements half a century old, admit of no challenge.

34. As regards the Yemeni complaints the recommendations of the Sub-Committee were:—

(i) To recommend that His Majesty's Government should, for the present, refrain from continuing negotiations for a direct agreement with the Shabwa Tribes, but that, in the meantime, we should also refrain from giving any definite undertakings to do so to the King of the Yemen.

(ii) That, to gain time, a reasoned reply in conciliatory language should be despatched to the King of the Yemen.

35. Certain miscellaneous information, supplementary to that contained in the Foreign Office memorandum of the 1st December and in the present memorandum is embodied for convenience of record in the following annexes:—

Annex 1. List of References: Treaties, Memoranda and Maps.

Annex 2. Note on the area of the Aden Protectorate as quoted in square miles in various publications.

Annex 3. Mr. Philby's views on the Aden Protectorate, especially as affected by the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915.

Annex 4. Mr. Philby and the official " Handbook on Arabia " issued during the Great War.

Annex 5. The terms " Aden Protectorate " and " the Hadhramaut ".

Annex 6. The Publication of the Protectorate Treaties and the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.
15th December, 1937.

ANNEX 1.

List of References.

(December, 1937.)

Treaties, etc.

" Protectorate " Treaties between His Majesty's Government and the tribes and rulers of the Aden Protectorate (1839–1904): See Aitchison's Treaties, 5th Edition, Volume XI (dated 1929, but actually published in 1933) pages 53 to 170.

Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting the Boundaries of Aden and of Ottoman territory in Southern Arabia, with Protocols 1903, 1904, and 1905; with Maps: London: 9th March: 1914 (10517). Aitchison's Treaties, 5th Edition, Volume XI (dated 1929, but actually published in 1933) pages 42 to 52.

Treaties between His Majesty's Government and the Sultan of Muscat, the Sheikh of Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhs: See Aitchison's Treaties, 5th Edition, Volume XI (dated 1929, but actually published in 1933) pages 239 to 260 and 287 to 319.

Rome Understanding of 1927 (Agreed Record of conversations between Sir Ronald Graham and Sir Gilbert Clayton and Cavalieri Gasparini and Signor Guariglia): Rome: 17th February, 1927 (E. 1369/22/91/1927: in print).

Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation: Sana'a: 11th February, 1934 (Treaty Series No. 34 (1934) in Cd. 4752).

Saudi-Yemeni Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood: Taif: 21st May, 1934 (Eastern (Arabia) Print: 13th August, 1934: Section 1).

Aden Protectorate Order, 1937: 18th March, 1937.

Memoranda, etc.

" Handbook of Arabia ": Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division: Volume I, May, 1916: Volume II, May, 1917 (both issued in 1917).

" Memorandum respecting the Hadhramaut: Its extent and relations with His Majesty's Government ": with Map: Mr. H. Jones, Foreign Office: 11th November, 1932 (E. 5492/5492/91: in print: 14118).

Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Reilly's report on his mission to the Imam of the Yemen to negotiate the Treaty of Sana'a: Aden despatch No. 50 Secret of 28th February, 1934, as amended by Colonial Office letter of 23rd August, 1934: Eastern (Arabia) Print: 26th March, 1934, Section 1, and 24th August, 1934, Section 1.

" Memorandum respecting the Boundaries in Arabia: Anglo-Turkish Arrangements ": with Map: Mr. H. K. Grey, Foreign Office, 30th April, 1934 (E. 723/723/91: in print: 14411).

" A Report on the Social, Economic and Political Condition of the Hadhramaut ": with Map: by Captain W. H. Ingrams: 1936. (Published by His Majesty's Stationery Office: Colonial Office No. 123.)

" The growth of the Aden Protectorate ": Mr. C. H. Fone: 23rd August, 1937, with additional minutes (E. 4967/10/91 (1937)).

Maps.

(See Anglo–Turkish Convention 1914. The maps include four detailed maps of the frontier demarcated in 1903, 1904, 1905 and a map showing the Blue and Violet lines).

" Map showing Tribes and New Boundary of the Aden Protectorate ": 1:633,600: General Staff No. 2124: January, 1906.

Map accompanying " Routes in Arabia ": General Staff, India, 1915.

Aden: International Map 1:1,000,000 January, 1926: with over-printing in colour added in about 1928 to illustrate the Aden-Yemen frontier and Yemeni incursions: General Staff No. 2555A.

Sketch Map of the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (traced from a map with Arabic names received confidentially from Mr. Philby in 1936: E. 2566/1529/25 (1936): No. 41464). No scale.

(See Captain Ingrams' Report on the Hadhramaut 1936 for a map showing the areas of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans).

See also ordinary sheets covering Arabia of 1:1,000,000 International Map, 1:2,000,000, India and Adjacent Countries, and Hunter's Map of Arabia and the Persian Gulf on the scale of 1 inch = 32 miles.

ANNEX 2.

Note on the area of the Aden Protectorate as quoted in square miles in various Publications.

The Italian Government are unfortunately correct when they state that the area of the Aden Protectorate as given by publications like the Colonial Office List has been inconsistent in the past and suggest a great extension of British territory during the last few years. The following illustrations will make this clear.

(N.B. The limits indicated below have only been worked out approximately and provisionally.)

4,200 square miles.

" Hand-book on Arabia " (Admiralty) 1917.

This seems to be based on an eastern frontier running south-east from near Dhala to Megatin and would include the original " nine tribes " except the Yafai and Aulaqi.

9,000 square miles.

Colonial Office List 1931, etc.

This would give the Protectorate an eastern frontier running due south from Beihan-al-Kesab, and may be said to cover approximately the country of the original " nine tribes ", except the Aulaqi.

17,000 square miles.

An otherwise unidentified " official publication of the Colonial Office " of 1933 quoted by an Italian paper in October, 1937.

This would take the eastern frontier to approximately Longitude 47° East or to the end of the country of the Upper and Lower Aulaqi.

42,000 square miles.

Colonial Office List 1932, etc.

This would give a northern frontier following approximately Latitude 16° North, so as to embrace the whole of the Protectorate, including the Hadhramaut, to where the desert begins north of the Wadi Hadhramaut.

78,000 square miles.

The area to which the Protectorate was said in an Italian paper in October, 1937, to have grown since 1933.

This would give a northern frontier following approximately Latitude 18° North and embracing the whole of the Protectorate except an area in the extreme North-East (or possibly except the areas which His Majesty's Government are provisionally prepared to cede to King Ibn Saud, although the Italian press can know nothing about the details of such proposals).

110,000 square miles.

Recently quoted by the Governor of Aden as the true area of the Protectorate.

This is said to be the area of all the territory south and west of the 1905 line, the Violet line and the boundary between the Protectorate and Muscat.

December, 1937.

ANNEX 3.

Mr. Philby's views on the Aden Protectorate especially as affected by the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915.

The inconsistencies in the history of the British occupation of the Aden Protectorate have been well advertised by Mr. St. John Philby and there is little doubt that his unauthorized visit to Shabwa in 1936, the subsequent publication of articles from his pen in the Saudi Arabian newspaper Umm-al-Qura, misrepresenting the terms of the Aden Protectorate Order, 1937, as a new acquisition of British territory, and later articles in the *Daily Herald* based on his views, have not been overlooked by the Italian and possibly Yemeni Governments and have probably put the idea of complaints into their heads.

2. Mr. Philby also contests the right of His Majesty's Government to the eastern and out-lying portions of the Aden Protectorate on grounds quite distinct from any supposed rights of Saudi-Arabia or the Yemen to particular areas. He apparently maintains that the promise in Sir Henry McMahon's letter of the 24th October, 1915, to King Hussein that Great Britain would support the independence of the Arab countries within limits previously quoted by King Hussein, i.e., *inter alia* ". . . . on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of Aden to remain as it is . . . .", means that except for the immediate vicinity of Aden, His Majesty's Government have no right to exercise any control in Southern Arabia. (This difficulty was intended to be covered by the proviso laid down by Sir Henry McMahon in the same letter that this promise should be " without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs.")

December, 1937.

ANNEX 4.

Mr. Philby and the official Hand-book on Arabia 1917 issued during the Great War.

Mr. Philby has on occasion quoted, as evidence for his assertion that His Majesty's Government have no true title to the Hadhramaut, an official hand-book on Arabia issued during the war. In this hand-book it is supposed to be stated that the Aden Protectorate did not include the Hadhramaut. The Italian press have lately also used this argument, although it is improbable that the Italian Government have ever actually seen the hand-book or know exactly what it says.

2. In the circumstances a summary of the statements on the subject made in the " Hand-book of Arabia " issued by the Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, in 1917 (which is probably the hand-book meant) is given below. It will be seen that the statement imputed to the hand-book is indeed made, although qualified by other statements which if properly understood alter the sense given to it by Mr. Philby and the Italian press.

3. The summary is as follows:—

" (pages 179 *et seq.*) . . . . The Resident of Aden exercises political influence over a very extensive tract of country south of a line running from the Straits of Bab-el-Mendeb in a north-easterly direction into the desert, inclusive of the Hadhramaut. This region will be considered in two sections: (A) Aden and the Interior (including the Aden Protectorate proper) and (B) the Hadhramaut . . . .

. . . . . .

" (A) The Aden Interior includes the actual Protectorate and the remoter tribes under the outer Aden sphere of influence, but excludes the Sultanates of the Hadhramaut and the Wahidi . . . . . the northern frontier is the Rub-el-Khali [N.B. no mention of the Violet line] . . . . The boundaries of the Protectorate proper are (the 1905 line) to a point some few miles north of Dhala and thence a vaguely-defined line south-eastwards to the sea near Megatin. Its area is about 4,200 square miles . . . . . The Tribal confederations are the: Subeihi, Abdali, Fadhli, Hanshabi, Amiri, Alami, Agrabi and other smaller tribes. Without are the: Yafai, Aulaqi, Beidha, Oleh, Andilla . . . . The British Government has no troops in normal times outside the Settlement and does not interfere in tribal or inter-tribal politics. Different confederations are under different degrees of influence, usually according to their distance from Aden. None render tribute in troops or money. Most of the chiefs have stipends from the British Government and some are entitled to salutes. . . . .

. . . . . .

" (B) (pages 239 *et. seq.*) The frontiers are in no sense defined, but roughly the Hadhramaut is bounded on the west by the Aulaqi, on the north by the great Ahgef tract of desert and on the east by the Dhofar Province of Oman . . . . . The Government is in the hands of a number of tribal chiefs. The most powerful is the Qu'aiti; next the Kathiri. These have both been in political relations with the British Government, but the Kathiri have had less extensive relations and have recently broken them off . . . . . Other tribes are the Wahidi and the Makir Sultan of Qishn . . . . . The Hadhramaut chiefs also nominally recognize the supremacy of the Sublime Porte and profess to be its protégés. But no part of the country has ever been really incorporated in the Ottoman Empire, nor has the Porte ever imposed taxes, sent troops or officials, or exercised any sort of sovereignty. . . . . "

December, 1937.

ANNEX 5.

The terms " Aden Protectorate " and the " Hadhramaut ".

A distinction between the term " Aden Protectorate " and " the Hadhramaut " unquestionably existed for many years after 1888. It was even observed in official circles, as may be seen from the following quotation from a Colonial Office memorandum of November, 1926, in which the Foreign Office concurred:

> " The process [of extending British influence in the neighbourhood of Aden] may be said to have continued throughout the last half of the 19th Century and for some years afterwards. The result was (1) the creation of what is now known as the ' Aden Protectorate ' and (2) the extension of British influence, of a shadowy kind, over the Hadhramaut, i.e., the whole coastal area running eastwards from Aden to the borders of the Sultanate of Muscat. The northern boundary of the ' Aden Protectorate ' was fixed by agreement with the Turks (then its neighbours) in 1905. The Protectorate proper is a strip of coastal territory some 130 miles in length, with an average depth of about 50 miles. The depth is considerably greater in the eastern section of the area (behind Aden itself) than at its western extremity. "

2. The distinction was also observed in the Consular Regulations, the Colonial Office List and various works of reference. In addition many maps, as the Italian Government have observed, have shown the Protectorate and the Hadhramaut as separate areas, although Stieler's Handatlas (1921), strangely enough, shows practically the whole of the southern coast of Arabia as a British possession.

3. An interesting example (although presumably not known to the Italian Government) is the map accompanying " Routes in Arabia " issued by the General Staff in India in 1915. This shows an eastern frontier to the Aden Protectorate at about 100 miles east of Aden, a western frontier to Muscat at about 150 miles from the Gulf of Oman reaching the sea opposite Masirah island, and a southern and western frontier to the Trucial Sheikhdoms at about 100 miles from the Persian Gulf: and all the rest, including the Hejaz, Nejd, the Hadhramaut and the Muscati province of Dhofar as a single vast territory. There is no sign of the Blue or Violet lines. The map is not important in itself, but it shows the uncertainty prevailing in official circles, notwithstanding international agreements and the Protectorate treaties, as to frontiers in Southern Arabia.

4. The reason for the distinction was probably purely accidental. The Hadhramaut was always a somewhat distinctive area as compared with the territory of the " Nine Tribes " of the original Protectorate, and even after the conclusion of treaties with its rulers in 1888 it was probably never thought necessary to extend to it the term " Protectorate ". But the distinction, such as it was, was a distinction without a difference. The treaties with the Qu'aiti and Mahri Sultans were to precisely the same effect as those with the rulers of the " Protectorate " in the narrower sense and with the tribes, such as the Wahidi and Lower Haura, whose territory lies on the borderline between the two, and their relations with the Resident at Aden were the same. Moreover the Resident constantly visited Mukalla and Qishn in his yacht.

5. It was the present Governor of Aden who in 1932 drew attention to the discrepancy and it was then decided that in future the Aden Protectorate should be definitely regarded as including the Hadhramaut. But it is impossible to deny that a purely verbal distinction existed in the past.

December, 1937.

ANNEX 6.

The Publication of the Protectorate Treaties and the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.

Aden Protectorate Treaties have been published in State Papers, Volumes LIX (1874) pages 1172–1176, and LXI (1877) pages 191–195 and in Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, Volume XIX (1895) pages 80–95.

2. In addition all the Protectorate Treaties, but not the Quaiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918, were published in the 4th Edition of Aitchison's Treaties (an official collection of treaties issued by the Government of India) which appeared in 1909.

3. The Quaiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 was published in the 5th (1929) Edition of Aitchison's Treaties, the particular volume in which it appears being issued in 1933. The Protectorate Treaties are also re-published in this edition.

4. The Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 was intended to be published soon after its ratification but this action was suspended owing to the outbreak of the Great War. It eventually appeared in the 5th (1929) Edition of Aitchison's Treaties, the particular volume in which it appears being issued in 1933.

5. So far as is known, no official pronouncements made before 1927 (the date of the Rome Understanding) are on record as indicating with precision the extent of British influence in Southern Arabia. But the following facts can be quoted as evidence that the Italian Government knew or should have known before 1927 that the Hadhramaut was a British Protectorate:

(*a*) On the 3rd February, 1913, a letter was received from the India Office enclosing correspondence concerning the seizure by the Italians of a dhow belonging to the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla. The Italian Government was informed on the 2nd May, 1913, that the " Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla was an independent ruler enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty under the terms of the Treaty of the 1st May, 1888, between Her Majesty's Government and the rulers of Shehr and Mokalla ". The reply of the Italian Government of the 20th May, 1913, took note of the point of view of His Majesty's Government.

(*b*) In 1915 the Italian Government requested and was granted leave to recruit Hadhramaut Arabs from the Hinterland of Aden.

(*c*) A British Order in Council of the 14th October, 1913, applied the provisions of the Slave Trade Act of 1878 to the " territories of the Kaiti, Wahidi, Bahen, Audali and Beda tribes near Aden and to the territories of the Mahri tribe of Kishin and Socotra ". (This is, in effect, the same area as that referred to in the Aden Protectorate Order of 1937).

December, 1937.

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6. MUKALLA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES

78263/37 [No. 2]: Enclosure. No. 53.

MEMORANDUM ON HADHRAMAUT AFFAIRS, FROM DECEMBER, 1936, TO APRIL, 1937, BY Mr. W. H. INGRAMS (FIRST POLITICAL OFFICER).

(Covering despatch from Governor, Confidential 2, dated 1st September, 1937, received 13th September, 1937.)

My previous Memorandum* written about Christmas gave an appreciation of the political situation in the Hadhramaut as I had found it from 16th November to that time. In brief the picture it painted was of a country heartily fed up with internal feuds and lack of order and ready for almost any intervention which would give it greater security. In the coastal towns a new reign of oppression had begun in which the two new ministers of a well meaning but weak Sultan had already succeeded in earning the execration of all classes, so that their deeds had become a byword all over Qu'aiti and Kathiri dominions. The atmosphere was favourable to foreign intrigue and there were plenty of signs that the Italians were making the most of the atmosphere on the coast and the 'Irshadis of that in the interior. Incidentally too, though that was not recorded in my Memorandum, forward moves had been continuing for some time by the Imam, particularly in so far as the northern tribes, the Manahil, Nahd and Sei'ar, were concerned.

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* No. 13.

At the beginning of my work the situation on the coast seemed the most difficult. The influence of Ahmed Nasir Batati and Hamid Mihdhar (with his family behind him) was paramount and they appeared completely to control the Sultan. I saw at the time very little chance of making much headway there until they were removed.

In the interior things were different. The people knew me better and the principal difficulties to contend with were the old distrust and fear of the Qu'aitis and a difficulty in persuading the people that the British Government was interested in the welfare of their country.

I had one or two definite tasks to perform. It was necessary to procure acceptance to the Tribal Guards scheme, agreement to buy a wireless set and I wanted also to get dispensers trained and some boys sent to the College. On the more political side I had stated before I left that I was anxious that a truce should be arranged between Bin 'Abdat and Bil Fas. The feud between these two neighbouring chiefs had developed into a fairly organized spasmodic trench warfare extended over a number of years in the neighbourhood of Al Ghurfa. It had been financed regularly from Singapore and at one stage an " armoured car " had been imported from Java. One of the principal troubles was, and incidentally is, that the war was profitable for 'Umar 'Ubeid. Bin 'Abdat has not got the money of his brother Salih who lives in Singapore and Salih furnished plenty of money as long as the war was kept going.

I have described in my previous Memorandum the beginning of the peace negotiations, vide pp. 12 and 13. I was aiming at the conclusion of a three years truce, the period being chosen because it did not seem in the least likely at that time that anything longer could be achieved and it was equally unlikely that the country could be got into some sort of order in less than three years. Gradually, therefore, I began evolving a kind of three year programme in which peace might be stabilized, forces to maintain order trained, and some sort of development begun, for I had always in my mind that given peace and the completion of the Shihr–Tarim road something ought to be done to improve the irrigation of the vast area of the Wadi Hadhramaut and its tributaries which could be brought under cultivation, as I had mentioned in my recommendations two years before.

I have stated in my previous Memorandum that opinion in the Hadhramaut was unanimous that some sign of determination to enforce peace was necessary and the chance came with the Risib incident which took place on 14th December. Hitherto no air operations had taken place in the Hadhramaut but on this occasion it was decided that the usual procedure should be followed by calling in the offending section for trial, fining them if they were found guilty, and if they failed to pay the fine bombing their empty villages and banning them from ports and markets. I returned by air to the Hadhramaut on 2nd January complete with a wireless set and the various notices approved. It is not necessary to reproduce all these documents in this Memorandum but I include in Appendix I one of the propaganda notices which we knew as Propaganda 2 (and its post-bombing version known as Propaganda 2a) as this was the most widely distributed (some 600 copies) and had far reaching results. I also append the document drawn up by the Peace Conference referred to on page 13 of my previous Memorandum and the covering note approved by the Resident (Appendix II).

The valuable new provision about this peace arrangement was the establishment of a Board to " study the problems and solve them during the truce either by means of compromise or arbitration and to endeavour to establish permanent peace among the people of Hadhramaut," the point being that in previous truces no effort had been made to settle the outstanding differences.

On my return to the Hadhramaut I took up my Headquarters at Seiyun, the capital of the Kathiri Sultan, which was the best place from which to attend to the Risib offenders as they owned their vague allegiance to him (though they also, it may be noted, claimed the protection of the Sultan of Turkey!) and to continue with peace conferences and propaganda.

The 'Aqils of the Bin Yemani duly appeared on 15th January and were tried by the Sultan and myself in the large audience hall of the palace, arranged for the day like an English court of justice. The proceedings were held in public and with considerable ceremony and were generally considered impressive. A common comment afterwards was that " this was proper justice, that it would be well if cases were always heard like that for if it was the English Kanun if was also the Islamic Sharia." The section was pronounced guilty and ordered to pay a specified fine by 28th January. A notice of the judgment passed was exhibited in the market place and forwarded to other important towns. At the same time the other tribes on the Shihr–Tarim road, the 'Awamir and

other " cutters of the road " were deluged with propaganda by air when occasion offered and by messengers, warning them to take heed from the Bin Yemani case and telling them of the effects of bombing. Even so, it should be noted, no one really believed the bombing would take place and the threats were looked upon as being merely lies.

While all these things were going on propaganda towards the truce was also continued and there were further meetings of the Peace Board. I spent a great deal of time travelling backwards and forwards from various villages and urging peace and truces on the Kathiris. The principal difficulty was of course Bin 'Abdat, and Salih in Singapore started manœuvres attempting to assert independence as the third Sultan of the Hadhramaut. With personal visits and letters, particularly the letter given in Appendix III, Bin 'Abdat gradually became more amenable. At a meeting of the Peace Board at the Seiyun palace on 18th January it was decided that the first batch of the Kathiri tribes should be summoned to meet at Hautat al Ahmed bin Zein on 24th January and asked to accept a three years' truce commencing from Dhul Hijja 1355 (12th February, 1937). This first meeting was not completely satisfactory and though the majority of sections signed there were a number of abstentions. Bin 'Abdat had not yet come to heel.

As the Bin Yemani did not pay the fine, bombing notices were issued and they were told they would be banned from all ports and markets, and other tribes were told not to help them. The bombing notices were still considered to be idle threats. Bombing began on 1st February and as each day's message was received stating the number of bombs dropped and the damage done it was issued in the form of a bulletin and posted in the market places of Seiyun, Tarim, Shibam and Hureidha. The cumulative effect of these notices, to which was added occasionally the total number of pounds of bombs dropped, was considerable and the letter referred to brought a note to me from Bin 'Abdat imploring me to go and see him even for five minutes. I went and he agreed to accept the truce and help me in persuading others to do so too. The next day I attended the second gathering of Kathiri sections at Buheira. By this time most of the defaulters from the first meeting had joined in and there were no dissentients. Bil Fas and Bin 'Abdat had both joined the truce and on that day it was also reported that the Bin Yemani had collected their fine and were ready to come to Seiyun.

The bombing had had its effect in many ways but principally it demonstrated the fact that the British Government kept its word for until the event no one really believed it would happen. Even when bombing had started and notices were posted in the bazaar there were many who said they were fictitious. Confidence was established by the bombing and there was no longer difficulty in making people believe that the Government was disinterestedly interested in their welfare and would support the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans in trying to establish a general and permanent peace.

After the Buheira meeting knowledge of the truce was circulated throughout the country and headmen of sections and clans were pouring into Seiyun asking for truces and there were deputations thanking the Sultan and the Seiyids and myself for what had been done. Even the Beduins of the 'Awamir from the north came asking to be included in the truce.

Then came the Bin Yemani surrender ceremony attended by Sultan 'Ali bin Salah, the Governor of Shibam, and chiefs and notables from all over the country. It will probably give the best idea of the crowds if I say that " every hotel in the place was full." People came on foot, by camel and by donkey and never had there been seen so many motor cars in Seiyun. Appendix IV gives the order of the ceremony as I drew it up and there were also unrehearsed items, a speech of the Sultan, a speech by the Bin Yemani and the completely unexpected bestowal on me of the title " Friend of the Hadhramaut."

During the next few days I visited Tarim where in two days the whole of the Tamimis signed on and in following days came the Jabir, Bajri, 'Awamir, Johi, Ma'ari and Madhi. The truce in fact had become more infectious than an outbreak of smallpox. Nothing could have been more affecting than the arrival of a deputation of the Al 'Ali Kathir from far to the north-east who live among the Mahras. It was late at night and the three men clad in long brown kamises, an unfamiliar garb in Hadhramaut, came and kneeling down said " We have heard of the peace in this country, please give us a share of it." It was they who had had four men brutally murdered by the 'Awamir a few short months before and they went away after signing on the three years' truce with an invitation to me to visit them, to make landing grounds in their country and a promise that the Board would investigate their case.

On 25th February the truce party consisting of Sultan 'Ali bin Salah, the Seiyids of Al Kaf, the mansabs of the Nahd and myself left for Qa'udha, the capital of the Nahd. The Nahd and the Ja'da were the biggest fences left. The Nahd had twenty-one continuous years of warfare behind them and a system of trenches as elaborate as that of Al Ghurfa. Only fifteen yards separated the nearest houses of the principal warring sections and there were people in those houses who had not been out of them for literally many years. The Ja'da in Wadi 'Amd had at least thirty major feuds, but the whole lot had signed on in two days for the Nahd Rodhan, three days at Hureidha for the Ja'da and one day at Henin for the rest of the Nahd. When this was done we returned to Seiyun having sent a copy of the truce document to Du'an for the Ba Surras to obtain the signatures of the tribes in that neighbourhood and having arranged for the Manahil to be signed on by 'Ali bin Salah at Tarim.

I had for some time been anxious to return to Mukalla as Sultan Sal ih had left for India some time before, but on the occasion of our last visit he had personally asked me to try to bring the Nahd and Ja'da into the truce so that I felt it would strengthen my position a good deal if I was able to achieve this.

By the time the Tamimis had signed the truce I had come to the conclusion that I might perhaps best make headway in Mukalla against the Mihdhars and Batati by having the whole country united and leaving them, as it were, on a small island, and when I left Seiyun this was in a fair way to being achieved. Before going I arranged that the Peace Board should begin to hold further meetings for the settlement of disputes as from 1st Mukarram (14th March) and urgently counselled the members to start work early and to work hard.

Deputations and letters of thanks poured in, of which extracts are given in an Appendix*. Women expressed their thanks for the safety their menfolk enjoyed and when the Ja'da signed at Hureidha there were women weeping in the streets for relief.

One of the most striking indications of the changing attitude in the country was the slump in the sale of arms, many of those coming in from Yemen were returned unsold and rifles that a short time before had fetched from $400 to $700 could not now be sold for $150. Another sign was the mild speculation which began in house property for there was a conviction that many people would return from Java and that prices would rise enormously. One huge house changed hands at $15,000, the purchaser assuring me that he would have no difficulty in getting $100,000 for it in the near future.

It is to be noted in the letters of thanks several express the hope of a permanent British representative in the country.

I left Seiyun for Mukalla on 6th March and at Risib received a great welcome, with tribal zamil, from the Bin Yemani. No Beduins could now be better behaved or more amenable. Men and women were uniformly friendly and bore no illwill, indeed the 'Aqils with all their men thanked us for the bombing. "You have done well," they said, "If we had not been bombed everybody would have laughed at us and said we were cowards and the Government was lying and we wouldn't have been bombed if we hadn't paid." They gave us a primitive dinner but it was warm hospitality and I should very much like to have been able to help them over their water supply. They had but one day's supply left in their pool and the next day they were going to move with their crops to find water and grazing.

At Reidat al Ma'ari next day there were further signatures and on arrival at Maadi, the car terminus, I heard that 'Ali bin Habreish, the paramount chief of the Hamumis, was at 'Arf, a day's journey from Shihr. On the 10th I went to visit him and although he is the most feared of Hadhramaut beduin chieftains, the mansabs who accompanied me persuaded him to sign and incidentally to offer three years' extra truce to the Qu'aitis who had just concluded one year's truce with him at the price of over $2,000.

On the 15th I met the Ba Hasan at Habs. They also signed the truce as did the Sha'mila that day. A few days later I had a letter from 'Ali bin Salah to say the principal Sei'ar sections had signed and also some sections in the Wadi Rakhia on the way to Shabwa. News also came from Du'an that the Du'an tribes had signed.

I received extraordinary ovations in Shihr and Mukalla and one of the best pieces of news I heard was that owing to the security, imports of goods had largely increased in the last three ships and that there was a drop, in some cases of as much as 50 per cent., in transport charges on the roads.

* Appendix V: not printed.

In Mukalla I arranged with the Qu'aitis the truce with 'Ali bin Habreish. 'Ali bin Habreish wanted rather more than the Qu'aitis were prepared to give but several journeys back and fore to Shihr completed terms satisfactory to both sides, and the truce was particularly satisfactory to the Qu'aitis who had only to pay $600 as a present to 'Ali bin Habreish instead of the rate of $2,000 per year for which they had previously been accustomed to purchase peace from him. I also determined to make an effort to clear up the long outstanding bitterness dating from the time when the Qu'aiti had thought the best way of settling the Hamumi trouble was to invite 'Ali's father and the principal chiefs to Shihr and murder the lot. I got the Qu'aitis to agree to entertaining 'Ali in Shihr and what was more difficult persuaded 'Ali to accept. On 5th April I drove out from Shihr to meet 'Ali and he came in with fifty followers and was given a great reception and a robe of honour. His response has been most favourable so far and he is keeping his people in excellent order.

Since I have been at the coast practically all the remaining tribes have signed and negotiations are proceeding with the few outstanding, but the three years' truce now includes the whole of Qu'aiti and Kathiri domains from the sea to the desert.

I received a letter, reproduced in Appendix VI*, from a historically minded Seiyid in which it is said that never in history has such a general peace been known and before I turn to other subjects it may be useful to examine some of the reasons for its success.

(1) A general desire amongst all classes of the population, including the beduins, for peace, providing some promise of security offered for the future.

(2) The bombing of Risib, with every possible use made of propaganda in connexion with it. The real value of the bombing lay in the hope it offered of the British Government really being interested in the maintenance of peace.

(3) The arrangements for the Peace Board, which offered a chance of an honourable settlement of old disputes.

(4) An attention to realities in the political situation. Practically none of the tribes of the Hadhramaut consider themselves really subordinate to either Sultan and neither attempts to exercise any authority over them. Whenever the question arose I steadfastly declined to listen to suggestions that there should be more than two Sultans in the country, but while I always had one or the other Sultan with me, I let the tribes negotiate as they liked and introduced the Sultans to them as those who would help them. In the Sultans themselves the tribes had little confidence. They knew them of old, they said, but they had no particular objection to them as long as they felt the British Government was taking a lively interest. In this way, notably in Wadi 'Amd and among the Nahd, I was able to increase Qu'aiti influence considerably.

(5) Unremitting advice and persuasion and settlement of any affairs brought to me with the aid of the Sultans. The help and tireless energy of Seiyid Bubekr bin Sheikh al Kaf contributed more than I can possibly say to success. His labours were almost superhuman and he was always able to influence the right people, mansabs in particular. I shall hope to address Government further on his services before long.

Of course as we progressed success became easier for each fresh recruit to the truce meant a greater surety for peace and there is a general hope that I shall remain in the country. It is difficult to avoid the personal note, because Arabs place much more real reliance on personal presence than abstractions, despite their religious beliefs, and people have I know a definite trust in my doing my best to help them in their difficulties.

So much for the peace. I am now recording from week to week such events as are worthy of notice in my weekly intelligence summary, but in order to make this story complete it is necessary to include the story of the removal of Ahmed Nasir and Hamid Mihdhar from the scene of action.

On the occasion of my first return to Shihr in connexion with 'Ali bin Habreish's affairs, I was sitting with the Governor when a man of the Ardhi approached me with a petition regarding an act of oppression by Ahmed Nasir, who had a share with him in some land at Gheil Ba Wazir: Ahmed Nasir it appeared had come to Gheil with soldiers of the Sultan, seized all the crop and had it sold on his own account. Neither his partner, nor the cultivator who was working the land on a share basis got anything. The Governor said the complaint was true, but shrugged his shoulders and said "I can't do anything, Ahmed Nasir is the Government himself, perhaps you can help."

* Not printed.

The use of the soldiers for personal ends struck me as an appalling misuse of authority and next day, on my way back to Mukalla, I called at Gheil, saw the land and the people concerned, discussed it with the local Governor who confirmed the whole story, and returned to Mukalla where I spoke to Sultan 'Awadh who was acting as his father's representative. 'Awadh told me that he had heard of the case and had tried to intervene, but that Ahmed Nasir had torn up his letters and forbidden him to speak to me about it. I promised him support and we wrote a letter from him ordering the Governor of Gheil and the only honest Qadhi in the place to hear the case " without fear or favour, affection or illwill." The court thus appointed had at first some qualms: it said it would only look ridiculous as its judgment would not be enforced, but I promised it would. The case was heard with due form and order and on the one count, of using the soldiers without authority, Ahmed Nasir was sentenced to be dismissed from Government service and on the other concerning the property was ordered to restore what he had taken and pay a fine of $100.

On 4th April Ahmed Nasir was summoned to hear the judgment which had been passed on him. He tried, however, to avoid this by going on board the *Al Amin* by which ship he was to go to Aden, but Sultan 'Awadh ordered him to be brought back to the palace where the judgment was read and sealed. With the Governor's assistance, Sultan Salih subsequently confirmed the action in Aden and wrote a letter ordering that both Ahmed Nasir and Hamid Mihdhar, of whose behaviour he was now fully aware, should cease to belong to the Government.

It is not easy to describe the relief with which news of their dismissal was received and the way is now open to the reforms which are gradually starting. Up country the major questions are mainly of a political nature between tribes, here at the coast it is the internal administration which gives rise to most questions, but with Sultan 'Ali bin Salah as the Sultan's representative, progress is being steadily made, though nothing very great can be achieved until the finances are organized.

During these months that have followed the truce there have been continual anxieties caused by small incidents, which if they had been allowed to remain unsettled would have inevitably developed fnto something big. Realizing it was impossible to call on Government for assistance in these matters, I have had to settle them by political means reinforced when necessary by strong language. The first two incidents took place while I was still in the Hadhramaut. In the first a slave of the Al Faheidha section stopped a Seiyid on the public road and took his goods with the object of getting his own masters into trouble. He was arrested, largely by bluff, and, after a sensational escape and a still more sensational recapture by the Sultan in person with his slaves and those of neighbouring chiefs, who a week or two before would not have raised a hand to help him, was imprisoned and brought by me to Mukalla where he is still in jail. The second case took place a day or so before my arrival in the Wadi 'Amd when men of the Al Humeidi fired on and wounded a boy of the Al Hilabi with which section they had a bloodfeud. Again by bluff I made the offenders deposit $300 with me, the price of two rifles, as a pledge they would accept judgment.

Settling these incidents meant that many incidents settled themselves. I was continually hearing of cases in which a threat that a case would be brought to my notice was enough to make an aggressor settle. One of these which I remember concerned the Al Bajri. They take their pledges very seriously and though they have many feuds among themselves have a reputation for not interfering with others. (A few years ago two friendly Bajris were conversing when a wasp flew round them. One tried to kill it and the other, in whose home the incident took place, said " I take it under my protection, on my face." The other, laughing, killed it. Whereupon his host upped and killed him with his jambiya.) Some of the Bajri, while I was in Seiyun, damaged the irrigation plant of a " maskin " (townsman). The townsman said he would go to me. The tribesmen begged him not to and paid compensation. Even children were heard to settle their disputes by saying, " Shut up, or I'll tell Ingrams." I was told in Seiyun that cases of cruelty to animals had practically ceased, owing to threats of the same nature, but this was probably due to Mrs. Ingrams having dealt with a small boy who was rough handling a puppy.

It will be seen from Intelligence Summaries that incidents are continually happening and they require constant watchfulness to prevent their developing into larger affairs. None the less I am told that as a moderate estimate the truce has probably saved about 360 lives in the wadi alone as there are usually about 10 murders a month.

I should perhaps record here that, as regards the matters mentioned on the first page of this report, Sultan 'Al bin Mansur has sent two sons and two other relations to

the College in Aden and the Ba Surras of Du'an, three; that dispensers and wireless operators have been trained for Seiyun and that the Tribal Guards look like becoming an efficient body of armed constabulary.

On 28th March rain began to fall all over the country and long before it ended it was generally said that it was the heaviest rain for fifteen years: later it was generally declared to have been the heaviest in the memory of man. The blessing of the rain was universally believed to be the Almighty's reward for the peace and the following letter expressed a common attitude:—

To the Friend of Hadhramaut.

Hadhramaut has been overspread with useful rain and the floods have watered it from East to West without causing any damage or destruction. All the people are happy with this and say that the cause of it is the security and peace, and they remember you and say that the peace is general and the mercy is general too by the blessing of Ingrams.

Mukalla,
19th June, 1937.

W. H. INGRAMS,
First Political Officer.

APPENDIX I.

Propaganda 2.

To

The Tribes of Ba Hasan of the Hamumi, Ma'ara and Al Jabir and Others living on the Shihr–Tarim Road.

To

The Al 'Awamir and Other Cutters of the Road.

We warn you to take heed of the fate that is befalling the Al Yemani section of Al Jabir for their interference with the road. The roads are Haqq Allah for the use of all and the Great British Government under whose protection you are and which supports your Sultans—the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans—will not countenance interference with the road.

The Al Yemani have held up travellers and fired on cars and demanded money. Now they are being fined, camels and rifles and goats and money, and if they do not pay they will be bombed from the air and banned from the ports and markets.

It is a very terrible thing to be bombed, for the bombs destroy houses and crops and drive the people from their homes. The Great Government wishes to be friends with the people. It does not want to bomb them but it wants all people in the Hadhramaut and in the whole of the Protectorate to be safe to live in peace so that they may pursue their work and achieve prosperity, but the cutters of the road will always be punished by the Great Government and by the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans.

Therefore take heed from what is happening to the Al Yemani and cease to hold up caravans and to take money from travellers, lest such a punishment as is being inflicted on the Al Yemani is yours.

Propaganda 2a.

We warn you to take heed of the fate that has befallen the Al Yemani section of Al Jabir for their interference with the road. The roads are Haqq Allah for the use of all and the Great British Government under whose protection you are and which supports your Sultans—the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans—will not countenance interference with the road.

The Al Bin Yemani have held up travellers and fired on cars and demanded money, and owing to their failure and non-compliance with the British Government's orders for the payment of the fine imposed on them, they have been bombed from the air for several days, and the result of which is that they have suffered great losses, damages, etc., and are banned from the ports and markets.

Bombing is a very terrible thing, for the bombs destroy houses and crops and drive the people from their homes. The Great Government wishes to be friends with the people. It does not want to bomb them but it wants all people in the Hadhramaut and in the whole of the Protectorate to be safe to live in peace so that they may pursue their work and achieve prosperity, but the cutters of the road will always be punished by the Great Government and by the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans.

Therefore take heed from what has happened to Al Bin Yemani and cease to hold up caravans and to take money from travellers lest such punishment as has been inflicted on Al Bin Yemani is yours.

APPENDIX II.

Peace Board Notification.

Whereas His Britannic Majesty's Government desire a general peace in the Hadhramaut and are interested in the mutual co-operation between Sultan Salih bin Ghalib bin 'Awadh al Qu'aiti and Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur al Kathiri in the maintenance of this general peace and whereas this co-operation has actually taken place in the presence of Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur al Kathiri and Sultan 'Ali bin Salah—representative of Sultan Salih bin Ghalib bin 'Awadh al Qu'aiti, therefore

now as a preliminary step towards the establishment of this peace desired by His Britannic Majesty's Government, both the said Sultans have arranged a three years' truce between the Shenafir themselves, Al Tamim themselves and between Al Tamim and Dolat Al 'Abdulla and other tribes of Hadhramaut in accordance with their usual customs of peace commencing from Dhu'l Hijja 1355.

2. In order to achieve the desire of His Britannic Majesty's Government, both Sultan Salih bin Ghalib bin 'Awadh al Qu'aiti and Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur have formed a board composed of five men whose names are given below:—

1. Sultan 'Ali bin Salah,
2. Sultan 'Abdulla bin Muhsin,
3. Sheikh Salim bin Ja'fer,
4. Sheikh 'Awadh bin 'Azzan,
5. Sheikh 'Abd 'Alawi bin 'Ali at Tamimi,

in order to study the problems and solve them during the truce either by means of compromise or arbitration and to endeavour to establish a permanent peace among the people of the Hadhramaut. So all should accept the decision of the said board.

3. Both Sultans desire the said board to report to them every breach of violation done by any of the tribes and propose to inform His Britannic Majesty's Government of such violations.

(Sd.) Sultan Salih bin Ghalib.
(Sd.) Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur.

Covering Note by the Resident.

The Resident commends the Notification approved by the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans regarding the general peace and co-operation which they are establishing in the Hadhramaut, to the attention of all the people of the country.

2. The British Government is sincerely desirous of seeing peace and prosperity established in the country and that the peoples of the Hadhramaut should flourish under the rule of H.H. the Qu'aiti Sultan and the Kathiri Sultan working in co-operation, with the approval of the British Government, the Protecting Power.

3. The Resident greatly regrets the recent incident of interference with the roads by the Al Bin Yemani of the Al Jabir tribe and advises all wrongdoers to take heed of their case and the action that is being taken against them, for those who interfere with the roads will be punished by the British Government supporting the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans.

Appendix III.

Letter to Bin 'Abdat.

To

Bin 'Abdat,

1st February, 1937.

The Resident at Aden has requested me to inform you that he has received a letter from Messrs. Sisson & Delay, Lawyers of Singapore, in which they state that you claim to be an independent ruler and that signatures on powers of attorney, etc., from Al Ghurfa only require your signature.

The Resident has informed Messrs. Sisson & Delay, as well as the Government of Singapore and the British Consul-General at Batavia that you are the head of the Bin 'Abdat of Al 'Umar of the Kathiri tribe, part of the Shenafir Confederation, of which the Kathiri Sultan of the Al 'Abdulla is recognised as Sultan and that you have no independent status and that powers of attorney, etc., must be signed by the Kathiri Sultan and on behalf of the Resident at Aden.

We take this opportunity of advising you in your own best interests and with a view to preserving your heshima not to persist in attempting to get your independence recognized for the British Government will never recognize it. Arrangements are now being made for all passports of members of the Shenafir to be approved by the Kathiri Sultan and we are anxious that you and he should be on good terms.

We entertain personally the most friendly feelings for you and are anxious to see you taking a lead in peace matters in the Hadhramaut. For this reason we hope very much that you will at once engage in the three year truce now being negotiated in order that you may win the respect and thanks of the British Government and of all the people of the Hadhramaut.

We beg you will not be misled by lies and false hopes: someone has misled the Al Bin Yemani of Al Jabir into believing that the British Government would not act and bomb them, but to-day they are seeing that the British Government means what it says, for they are being bombed, and we hope that you will listen to our friendly advice before it is too late.

Appendix IV.

Programme of Surrender Ceremony.

Item 1.

Whereas the Bin Yemani of Al Jabir committed offences on the road in the month of Ramadhan and whereas they were summoned to appear before the First Political Officer on behalf of the British Government and the Kathiri Sultan at the Palace, Seiyun, on 15th January to answer the charges made against them, and whereas they duly appeared and were tried on the same charges on the 15th January, and whereas they were found guilty of the charges, and whereas the following judgment was delivered against them:

"Whereas your defence to the charges detailed in my Notification of Wednesday 23rd Shawal 1355—6th January, 1937, has been found unsatisfactory.

You have therefore been considered guilty of the charges namely: (1) that on the night of Tuesday, the 16th Ramadhan corresponding with the 30th/31st December, 1936, a man of the section, to wit, Salih bin Sa'id bin Isma'il bin Jahim bin Yemani built barricades across the road near Al Khurob and prevented cars belonging to the Seiyids of Al Kaf in which Mr. Ingrams, the First Political Officer and his party were travelling and demanded money by menaces;

(2) that on the night of Tuesday, 30th Ramadhan, corresponding with the 14th/15th December, 1936, near Risib, a man of the section, to wit, Sa'id al Ma'arri or another, fired on a car belonging to the Seiyids of Al Kaf in which Captain Beach, a British Officer, and his party were travelling and damaged the car and wounded two men;

Further, that a man of the section, to wit, Sa'id al Ma'arri or another demanded money by menaces from the party;

You are hereby ordered by the Resident:—

(1) to hand over immediately
10 sound she camels,
30 serviceable rifles,
100 goats.

(2) Twice the amount of money and goods taken from the parties mentioned in the charges, viz., M.T.$30.

(3) Six hostages, two each from Beit Bin Hotali, Beit Bin Ahmed bin 'Abdulla and Beit Bin Akshat.

The camels, rifles and goats are to be delivered to the Political Officer of the Aden Residency and the Kathiri Sultan in the Square before the Palace at Seiyun.

The hostages will be kept by the Kathiri Sultan at Seiyun as long as the British Government decides and can be changed at your desire at such intervals as the British Government may agree, provided the hostages offered in exchange are considered satisfactory.

Should you have failed to comply with the above terms by Al 'Asr on the 28th January, 1937, your territory will be bombed from the air until further notice, or until you have complied.

You will also be banned from Shihr, Mukalla and all ports of the Qu'aiti Sultan and from Shibam, Seiyun and Tarim and all markets and towns of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans until you have complied."

And whereas they failed to pay the fine and deliver the hostages in the time given, namely by the 28th January, and whereas they were accordingly in terms of the judgment bombed from the air and banned from the ports of Shihr, Mukalla and all ports of the Qu'aiti Sultan and from the towns of Shibam, Seiyun and Tarim and all markets and towns of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans until they did pay, and whereas they state they have now brought the said fine and hostages to be delivered in accordance with the judgment to the First Political Officer of the Aden Residency and the Kathiri Sultan in the Square before the Palace at Seiyun, now therefore we are present to-day to receive the said fine and hostages on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

Item 2. *Summoning of the 'Aqils by name.* Answers of those who are present.

Item 3. *Examination and Surrender of the Camels.* The assessor appointed by the Sultan will examine the camels and see that they are sound she-camels. If they are satisfactory they will be accepted by the First Political Officer and led off to a place appointed by the Sultan.

Item 4. *Examination and Surrender of Rifles.* The rifles will be examined and counted by Thabit Qasim. If there are thirty and they are judged serviceable they will be accepted and placed beside the First Political Officer.

Item 5. *Counting and Surrender of Goats.* The broker, Sa'id bin Yeslem, will count the goats. If there are a hundred they will be accepted and led off to a place appointed by the Sultan.

Item 6. *Counting and Surrender of Dollars.* The dollar fine will be explained, i.e., double the amount in cash and goods taken from the travellers in respect of whom the charges have been made.

The 'Aqils will count out M.T.$30 on to a table by the side of the First Political Officer.

Item 7. *Surrender of the Hostages.*

Hostages from Beit Hotali will be called for.
Hostages from Bin Akshat will be called for.
Hostages from Bin Hizez will be called for.

Conditions of detention of hostages will be read out. Hostages will be removed to prison by guard provided by Thabit Qasim.

Item 8.

Whereas the full penalty has now been paid by the 'Aqils and people of Bin Yemani of Al Jabir and whereas the hostages demanded have been surrendered.

Now therefore the ban on their entry to the ports of Shihr, Mukalla and all ports of the Qu'aiti Sultan and the towns of Shibam, Seiyun and Tarim and all markets and towns of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans is removed and their submission is accepted.

Let them and all men take heed that neither the Tarim-Shihr motor road nor any other trade route whatever may be interfered with on pain of similar penalties which will be inflicted by the Great British Government and by the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans.

Item 9.

Propaganda No. 2a will be read out (vide Appendix I).

End of Proceedings.

Speech by the Kathiri Sultan.

OH RESPECTABLE GUESTS,

I stand now in this delightful ceremony in order to welcome all visitors who have attended it. I take this opportunity to express my hearty rejoicings on account of the friendly tidings and sincere affection existing between you and myself.

The political assistance rendered by the British Government to my native land as well as that of my respected forefathers who reigned in it hundreds of years ago, is of great help and proof of the sole friendship and firm affection existing between the officials of the British Government and myself.

I, therefore, express my great pleasure and warm thankfulness for the efforts and assistance rendered by those honourable men in the maintenance of peace and suppression of troubles in this province.

There is no doubt that the confidence exchanged between Aden and Hadhramaut would result in great interest to both parties. I entertain a great hope from this great friendly junction in order to cause the discharge of my peaceful obligations towards my country and nation which has continued, since a long time ago, in tribal disturbances but which have recently been suppressed. Such disturbances spoil the establishment of peace and security.

I confirm that I appreciate the assistance of the British Government which I can only recompense by the preservation of the continuance of British friendship and be loyal friends to them. I wish to see to the welfare of the Hadhrami country during my time and the nation must be educated and developed in its social and economic administration by virtue of the peaceful arrangements which have been established to-day, on account of the efforts and assistance rendered by the " Friend of Hadhramaut," viz., Mr. Ingrams, the First Political Officer, on this subject.

I trust that my beloved nation will, in completion of their education and progress, remember this favour and preserve it for the sake of the welfare of the country. God, the Supporter, may help us for good acts and for peace.

Thursday, 1st Al Hijja 1355-1322.37.

Speech by the Bin Yemani.

OH SULTAN AND MR. INGRAMS,

We are Beduins and do not know how to speak nor the rules, but anyhow we will speak as far as we know.

Please excuse us for what we have done, and we thank Mr. Ingrams for his advice which we did not accept, and we did not consider that we would be put into great trouble. Now we should like to speak with Mr. Ingrams, and on the day we said "Al Hamdulillah," everything is all right, and now we request to be excused by Seiyid Bubekr bin Sheikh Al Kaf, as he has helped us and we thank him very much.

(Sd.) SHEIKH 'ABDULLA SALIM BAL HADOR.
,, 'UMAR TAHSH.
,, YEMANI BIN 'UMAR.
,, 'ABDULLA BIN 'UMAR.

As Sultan 'Ali bin Mansur bin Ghalib al Kathiri has bestowed the title " Friend of Hadhramaut " upon Mr. Ingrams, every person of the people should address him by this title.

May the " Friend of Hadhramaut " live long. (Thrice shouted out.)

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7. AGREEMENT WITH THE SHABWA TRIBES

78233/37 [No. 1]. No. 54.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6th July, 1937.)

[Answered by No. 55.]

(Confidential (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 23rd June, 1937.

I have the honour to state that I have recently had under consideration, and I am now in favour of, the conclusion of an agreement with the tribes of Shabwa and its vicinity, who are not in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government and are not

covered by any existing agreement between His Majesty's Government and tribes such as the Balharith and the Aulaqi which border on them.

2. My reasons for desiring to conclude an agreement with the Shabwa tribes are as follows:—

(1) The locality, if unrelated to His Majesty's Government by an agreement, constitutes a weak area in the north of the Protectorate, easily accessible from both the Yemen and Najran, separating the Kathiri, Aulaqi and Beihani confederations, all covered by existing treaties, and having to their south the loose confederations of Hathina and Jardan which are mostly part of the Abdal Wahid confederation of Balihaf and of Bir Ali.

(2) The localities, most likely to contain oil in the Protectorate, lie in an almost straight line between north Beihan and Shabwa, and are all distinguished by outcrops of rock salt which are mined by the tribesmen; four such localities are reported in the neighbourhood of Shabwa, the altitude of which is about 600 feet below that of Beihan. Geologists surveying for oil would naturally desire to prospect at or near Shabwa, which is accessible by motor car from the Hadramaut, and the absence of any agreement with the tribes there would lead to considerable political difficulties and might involve a choice between the use of force and the withdrawal of the survey party.

(3) The tribes of the Shabwa area, which is shown on the map* enclosed with this despatch, are a loose confederation of small sub-tribes called the Ahl Bal 'Obeid, who have no paramount head and are not under the control of any one particular sub-tribe. To conclude an agreement with this confederation through one man or family is therefore impossible but the sub-tribe in control of Shabwa and of the Shibam-Beihan road is the Ahl Karab, who number, with the Mansabs or holy men of Ahl Bareik, about 1,000 men. These holy men of Ahl Bareik share the present village of Shabwa with the Ahl Karab and mine the salt pits close to the village, which salt is sold in Shibam, in Wadi Hadhramaut, being transported there on the camels of the Ahl Karab. The remainder of the Ahl Bal Obeid confederation are so scattered and so loosely related that it appears that the conclusion of an agreement with the Ahl Karab presents the best practical method of dealing with them. For this purpose the agreement should make it plain that, whereas the chiefs of Ahl Karab accept responsibility for the Ahl Karab and the Ahl Bareik only, His Majesty's Government will guarantee the protection of the whole Ahl Bal Obeid, since they lie within the northern boundary of the Protectorate. The chief of the Ahl Karab, Sheikh Admad bin Nasir bin Qatayan and his brother Abdalla have considerable personal influence among the Ahl Bal Obeid and the conclusion of an agreement by His Majesty's Government with the former would doubtless extend this influence. He is the accepted protector of the Ahl Bareik.

3. The proposed agreement is drawn up in a form similar to other road agreements. Article I is worded in the usual way. In Article II the Sheikh of Ahl Karab guarantees the safety of the roads and of the projected Royal Air Force landing ground near Shabwa. Article III points out that the Ahl Bal Obeid confederation lies within the British Protectorate and roughly defines the territory of the Ahl Bal Obeid Confederation; the Sheikh of Ahl Karab also promises not to allow interference other than British with his own tribesmen and to report any interference of such nature among the tribesmen of the Ahl Bal Obeid Confederation. Article IV is framed with a similar intention.

4. Article V arranges for a monthly payment of Rs.50 to the Sheikh of Ahl Karab, out of which a monthly payment of Rs.10 is to be paid to the charitable endowment of the local saint. This saint, like most saints in Arabia, is one to whose tomb a yearly visit is paid by surrounding tribes. It forms the nucleus of a poor relief organization administered by a " Mansab ", the principal living descendant of the saint. Article V makes both the Sheikh of Ahl Karab and the Mansab responsible for the administration of this allowance. Although it is a very small sum I consider that it will have political value, not only because of the assistance it will afford to poor travellers but as a continual reminder of the respect His Majesty's Government pay to Islamic customs and traditions.

5. The Ahl Karab and the Ahl Bareik, with whom we have in the past been completely out of touch, influenced by the encouraging state of our relationships with their neighbours and with the success of our policy in the Hadhramaut, and alarmed by the visit, with an armed party, of Mr. St. John Philby last year, have recently made friendly approaches towards the Aden Government, through the Sharifs of Beihan. Air Commodore McClaughry and Mr. Hamilton and the Royal Air Force flight of four machines which landed there in May this year, were given a very friendly reception, and there appears to be no doubt of the willingness of the Shabwa people to conclude some agreement of this nature with His Majesty's Government.

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* Not reproduced.

6. The agreement that I recommend will involve an initial expenditure of £120 for presents in the form of a few rifles and ammunition and money gifts and an annual recurrent expenditure of £175 in the form of allowances, presents and entertainment, as mentioned above and in the draft agreement.

7. I consider that this outlay is justified in order to regularize the position of His Majesty's Government in this outlying part of the Aden Protectorate, and to secure the goodwill of its principal inhabitants, whose co-operation may in the future be desired both in investigating the mineral potentialities of the country and in resisting intrusion from elsewhere. I therefore submit the accompanying draft agreement for your approval. If this is accorded, steps will be taken to open negotiations to secure its acceptance, which I anticipate will be obtained without difficulty if action is taken at once, while the good impression created by the Royal Air Force visit is still strong, and before other and possibly rival influences have time to be introduced.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 54.

DRAFT SHABWA AGREEMENT.

Article I.

The British Government and the Sheikh AHMAD BIN NASIR BIN QUTEIYAN AL KARBI, the paramount Chief of the AHL KARAB section of the AHL BAL OBEID, being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them and of providing for the safety of the country of the AHL BAL OBEID and of the roads agree as follows:—

There shall be peace and friendship between the British Government and the Ahl Karab and the Ahl Bareik. The subjects of the British Government and the tribesmen of Ahl Karab and the Sheikh of Ahl Bareik shall be free to enter the territories of the other; they shall not be molested but shall be treated mutually with respect at all times and at all places. The Karabi Sheikh and the principal people of Ahl Karab and of Ahl Bareik shall visit Aden when they please and shall be treated with respect and given passes to carry arms.

Article II.

The said Sheikh of Ahl Karab, Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasir bin Quteiyan Al Karbi promises on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors and all his tribesmen, subjects and dependants that he will keep open the roads in the territory of the Ahl Karab and its dependencies and protect all bona fide travellers thereon and that he will assist His Majesty's Government in the establishment and maintenance of a landing ground at some covenient place near Shabwa.

Article III.

His Majesty's Government, taking into consideration that the whole confederation of AHL BAL OBEID lives geographically within the borders of that country to which the gracious favour and protection of His Majesty the King is already extended, guarantee to protect from foreign aggression the territories of the Ahl Bal Obeid, that is all the country lying between Hadhramaut, the Upper Aulaqi and the territories of Beihan on and within the Empty Quarter. The said Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasir bin Quteiyan Al Karbi of Ahl Karab hereby agrees on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors and of the people of Ahl Karab and of Ahl Bareik under his jurisdiction, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty with any foreign State, Company, Association or person, Arab or otherwise and further promises to give immediate notice to His Excellency the Governor of Aden or to his Representatives of the attempt by any such State, Company, Association, or person to interfere with the territories of the Ahl Bal Obeid.

Article IV.

The said Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasir bin Quteiyan Al Karbi hereby binds himself, his heirs and successors for ever that they will not cede, sell, mortgage, lease or hire or give or otherwise dispose of any part of the territories under their influence and jurisdiction, to any such State, Company, Association or person without the previous approval of His Majesty's Government.

Article V.

In consideration of these undertakings being faithfully and fully carried out, His Excellency the Governor of Aden, on the part of the British Government agrees to pay to the said Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasir bin Quteiyan Al Karbi and his successors a monthly sum of Rupees 50, out of which amount a monthly sum of Rs.10 is to be paid to the Wali Bureik for the assistance of the poor, this charity being administered by the head Mansab of Ahl Bureik, under the supervision of Sheikh Ahmad bin Nasir bin Quteiyan Al Karbi.

Article VI.

The above agreement shall have effect from

78233/37 [No. 8]. No. 55.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Confidential.)

SIR, Downing Street, 18th August, 1937.

With reference to your despatch confidential (2) of the 23rd June*, I have the honour to inform you that I approve generally your proposal to negotiate an agreement with the Shabwa tribes.

2. As to the actual text of the draft enclosed with your despatch, in view of the fact that the agreement will presumably be published at some later date, I would prefer that the term "British Government", which has no precise meaning and is now obsolete, should be avoided. I therefore suggest that in Article I the phrase "the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the Government of the United Kingdom)" should be used, and that corresponding amendments should be made in subsequent Articles. Also the reference in Article 3 to His Majesty the King should give His Majesty's full title, i.e., "His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India."

3. These suggestions apply only to the English version of the text. There is no reason why whatever Arabic phrases are commonly used locally to denote the "British" Government and His Majesty should not be used in the Arabic version.

4. I observe that the negotiation of the agreement will involve an initial expenditure of £120 and an annually recurrent expenditure of £175. Any expenditure in the current financial year should be met from savings.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78233/37 [No. 11]. No. 56.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13th September, 1937.)

[*Answered by No. 57.*]

(Secret (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 1st September, 1937.

I have the honour to enclose copies of correspondence that has passed between the King of the Yemen and myself regarding Shabwa and some of the tribes that inhabit the country in its neighbourhood. This correspondence arose from a request made to the King to arrange for the co-operation of tribes under his control in the general truces

* No. 54.

that have been made among the neighbouring tribes connected with the Hadhramaut. It is evident from the letters that have been interchanged that the Imam maintains claims over some of these tribes which conflict with those of His Majesty's Government. Captain Seagar, who has recently been in San'a, reports that the King is greatly incensed by recent British action in the Shabwa area, and he has followed up his verbal protests to Captain Seager by his written protests to me.

2. In his letter the King invokes Article III of the Treaty of San'a, which provides for the maintenance of the *status quo* at the time of the signature of the treaty, and he also appeals to the list of tribes under British protection that was communicated to him by the Resident at Aden. It will be recalled that this list was sent, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to the Imam as an appendix to the draft treaty transmitted to him under Sir Stewart Symes's letter No. C.715 of 11th November 1929, a copy of which was sent to your predecessor with Sir Stewart Symes's secret despatch No. 193 of 11th November, 1929*. A reference to this list was made in Article 4 of that draft of the treaty, which the Imam rejected *in toto*. He subsequently, in September, 1931, sent an alternative draft in which he omitted the list of tribes and substituted the words " the situation existing at the date of the conclusion of this treaty shall remain as it was before ". This draft was discussed in my secret despatch No. 208 of 21st October, 1931†, and no reference was made to the list of tribes in the Aden Protectorate in the subsequent negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of San'a in 1934. The King, in appealing to the tribal list, is therefore reverting to a form of defining the British Protectorate which he himself previously rejected.

3. At the time of the negotiation of the treaty in San'a discussion regarding the frontier centred round various portions of the border extending from the sea opposite Perim up to and including the Beihan-Masa'abi frontier. At that time, as stated in my semi-official letter No. 187 of 11th July, 1934‡, to Mr. Cowell, the Imam evinced no interest in the uninhabited territory lying to the north-east of Beihan, and his control did not then extend eastwards beyond Harib near the Beihan border. On the other hand we also at that time had no direct contact with the tribes inhabiting the country along the line running north-eastwards into the Rub'-al-Khali, so that in fact there was then no effective contiguous Anglo-Yemeni frontier to stabilize in that area, and it was not known whether our neighbour beyond the due north-east line would eventually be the King of the Yemen or Ibn Saud. Although we had at that time no control or even influence over this north-eastern area, it can be maintained that the north-east line was in fact our legal boundary when the treaty was signed, and that therefore any action that His Majesty's Government may decide to take within this line constitutes no breach of the 1934 *status quo* situation.

4. If His Majesty's Government were to base their claim on tribal connexions, the position would be less simple. It has been held in the past that some of the tribes in the Shabwa neighbourhood had a long standing connexion with the Upper Aulaqi Sultan, and that they are therefore covered by the Upper Aulaqi Treaty. This claim through the Upper Aulaqi is, however, a very vague one, and is apparently unsupported by documentary evidence. It moreover extends to only some sections of the Shabwa tribes. The Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans also have claims on the Shabwa area in virtue of ancient agreements, and so, in a very shadowy form has the Wahidi Sultan of Balihaf. None of these treaty Chiefs was, however, in occupation or wielded any real influence in this area at the time of the treaty.

5. A further difficulty in reconciling the north-east line with tribal actualities is that the Sei'ar, whom we claim to be dependents of the Qu'aiti Sultanate, live to the north-west of the line as well as to the south-east of it. This is a complication which may, and probably will, give rise to controversy in the near future.

6. The position with the King of the Yemen is one of some delicacy, especially at the present time when he is receiving a diplomatic Mission from Italy, and is probably subject to strong anti-British influences, which will be strengthened by his hostility to British policy in Palestine. It is important that His Majesty's Government should convince the King that they are committing no breach of their obligations to him, and that they have no intention of repudiating Article III of the Treaty of San'a. That Article refers to the southern frontier of the Yemen and it is arguable that it does not cover Yemen boundaries in the east. There are therefore the alternatives of saying

* No. 391 in Middle East No. 22. † No. 264 in Middle East No. 34.
‡ No. 154 in Middle East No. 52.

(*a*) that Article III does not apply to the boundary question now raised, and (*b*) that even if it does so, there is no breach of the Article as there is no change in the *status quo*. It is also possible to combine these two alternative arguments.

7. In view of the strong feelings that the King entertains on this subject I have decided to refer the matter to you before engaging in further argument with him, and I am accordingly replying to him that I am reporting this difference of opinion to His Majesty's Government, whose views I shall communicate to him in due course.

8. I suggest that the King be informed that although the Ottoman Government has disappeared from Arabia, His Majesty's Government have ever since 1914 continued to regard the legal boundary of the Aden Protectorate in the countries lying to the east of the Yemen to be that which was fixed in 1914, and this was not affected by the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934, which dealt with the southern boundary of the Kingdom of the Yemen. It may, if you think desirable, be added that the tribes within this line in the north-east direction already had long standing connexions with certain Chiefs in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, namely the Upper Aulaqi, and the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans, and were at the time of the signature of the treaty already regarded by His Majesty's Government as being included in their treaty with the Upper Aulaqi Sultan. His Majesty's Government therefore cannot accept the view that in treating this area as being within the Aden Protectorate they are in any way altering the *status quo* existing at the time of the signature of the Treaty of San'a.

9. In view of the situation that has arisen with regard to this area I am of opinion that it may be necessary to reconsider the question of making a direct agreement with the Shabwa tribes as proposed in my confidential (2) despatch dated 23rd June 1937*, and in any case it would be advisable to delete any expressions which suggest that a promise of protection against foreign aggression is a new development. I am therefore delaying action regarding the proposed agreement until you have seen my present despatch and the correspondence enclosed with it.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

Dated 27th Rabi Awal 1356.
(7th June, 1937).

From
His Majesty the King of Yemen

To
His Excellency the Governor of Aden.

A.C.,

We have received your esteemed letter No. 388 dated Rabi'a Awal 1356 (15th May, 1937) and while going through its contents and the object explained therein, we, with full appreciation, could see that you wish peace to be maintained and disputes in existence between the tribesmen living on the extreme borders to be put to an end. These attempts on the part of Your Excellency speak of your excellent and praiseworthy intentions, but the custom in vogue for the establishment of such permanent peace requires thorough investigations into the causes of disputes between every tribe and their neighbours in order to ascertain the true facts of each case and to pass necessary decisions, viz. to instruct the party against whom claims have been proved to pay them to the other party, to see that written undertakings are entered into by both parties for the final settlement of their differences and that guarantees are given by their notables and leading men to maintain the terms and if this is not done, the result would be nothing but temporary settlement and its maintenance by both parties is doubtful.

Should Your Excellency approve that both you and ourselves should use endeavours for the adjustment of disputes as per first suggestion, then both should take the matter into consideration (viz. take the matter in hand) and do their best in that which is conducive of good to human beings and beneficial to those concerned. As already explained this cannot be achieved before making local investigations and full consideration of the matters of differences in order to find out means of solution of each case in accordance with its merits.

* No. 54.

Your esteemed letter has invited our attention to the description about the numbers of the tribes wherein Ahl Bal Harith were mixed up with those of Ahl Karab and other sections. If it meant by Ahl Karab the well known tribe of Ahl Al Karab whose sections are too many and in whose neighbourhood live the Sei'ar and the Ashqas (or Meshqas) please note that these tribes as is already known to you live beyond the boundaries of the present situation referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty.

In the last year, however, settlements have been effected by us between them owing to their being attached to us and their being part of us and belong to us. This is a matter which can be realized by Your Excellency.

We have heard from some sources that some (British) officers had been to that part in order to complete peaceful attempts and that some of the wicked persons have misled some of the tribes to do a thing which we do not believe that Your Excellency will accept it particularly since it affects the terms of Article 3 of the Treaty.

We hope that Your Excellency who is known with sound judgment will reject the overtures of some of the wicked persons if the report we have received is true, but if it is not true we have informed you of what we have heard in order to know the real facts of the case.

We hope that time will permit the fixing of future date for the resumption of discussion of matters which had been put off as early as possible Inshalla.

We have already explained to Your Excellency that which we consider reasonable as regards the conclusion of truce between the tribesmen under reference, and request you to let us have your opinion on the subject.

In conclusion please accept our best respects and regards.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

(No. 923.)

YOUR MAJESTY, Governor's Office, Aden, 6th July, 1937.

With reference to Your Majesty's letter of 27th Rabi Awal 1356 (7th June, 1937) regarding certain matters relating to the far borders, I have the honour to inform Your Majesty that it will no doubt serve a very useful purpose, if at a convenient time to both parties, investigations are made in those regions and full consideration is given to all local problems and disputes. These will no doubt involve careful and lengthy study, but inshallah these will be satisfactorily solved in the course of time.

As regards Shabwa, the quotation by Your Majesty of Article 3 of the auspicious treaty would appear to be inconsistent with the recent action alleged to have been taken by Your Majesty in your letter under reference and it is difficult to see how it applies in the circumstances. It should be known to Your Majesty that Shabwa has always been considered by us to fall within the Upper Aulaqi tribes sphere of influence. Moreover it is bounded on the west, south and east by countries in treaty relations with this Government; and, in virtue of Shabwa's relations with the Upper Aulaqi tribes, it was included within the British side during the Anglo-Turkish boundary negotiations of 1903–05. That an earlier consolidation of our position there had not been made effective is easy to understand. We have, as already explained above, always known that Shabwa was within the British zone, and it was with concern and no little astonishment that we learned that during and following the unauthorized entry of Haj Abdullah Philby into the Protectorate last year our tribesmen became greatly disturbed and even alarmed, so that it became imperative to dissipate the concern and take adequate and unmistakeable measures to clear up the position finally.

I trust that this explanation will place Your Majesty in possession of all the facts.

I take this opportunity to convey to Your Majesty the expression of my high esteem and regard.

B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

To
His Majesty the King of the Yemen.

Enclosure 3 in No. 56.

Dated 23rd Jumad Awal 1356.
(1st August, 1937).

From
His Majesty the King of Yemen

To
His Excellency Sir Bernard Reilly,
Governor of Aden.

A.C.,

We have, with full interest received your letter No. 923 dated 27th Rabi Thani 1356 (6th July, 1937) and gone through it carefully and deeply. It is deemed necessary and we are obliged frankly to state to Your Excellency that the last persistence on the part of the honourable British Government to extend their hand and influence to the places with which they had never had in the former or later times any relationship with its people, viz. Shabwa and Al Kaarab, Sei'ar and Al Ashqas tribesmen and the like, would decidedly cause the frustration of our (good) ideas, reliance and the trust we had on the virtues of the treaty concluded by us between the British Government and Yemen. Truly speaking, this new phenomenon causes very painful feelings, let alone disappointment and disheartening.

It is a well known fact that Article 3 is clear in not allowing change or alteration of the *status quo* at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. The treaty is supported in as far as the fixing up of the *status quo* is concerned on the schedule which was set in order, organized and submitted by your Government. In it all places with its tribes were included. In accordance with the said schedule, the difference between the Kingdom of Yemen and the countries in occupation by (or under the control of) the English as well as those parts (divisions) attached to them (countries) is prescribed or recorded. There is no chance whatever either by a clear mention of Shabwa or by allusion to it and no news were heard of it either in the former or latter times.

It is known to Your Excellency that the entry of Haj Abdullah Philby which caused the disturbance of the minds of the people both in and out on account of his movements and pronouncements which could not have been made by a sensible person and his revelations which are unbecoming, is in fact, one of the obligatory duties which necessitate the taking of precautionary measures, caution and vigilance by the honourable British Government and in the same way it necessitates the taking of measures for peace by us. There will be no place for objections to be raised by either party for such vigilant measures taken nay it should receive thankfulness and gratification. But it cannot be conceived that such an incident and the arrangement which should necessarily be made for it should be made possible to reach such a degree of annexation of the parts of the Yemen territory to the other parts, the decision on which had been postponed. It is not thought also that by means of a claim of the Aulaqi tribesmen or other tribes, it would be possible to extend the borders in occupation (or under control) to that which is considered to be part and parcel of the body of our Kingdom.

The historical and geographical line of Yemen is already known and part of them are the countries which were bound up by a special decree or decision in Article 3 of the British-Yemen treaty. It has never struck our mind that the great British Government will condescend by taking advantage of the opportunity of incidents and the encountering of danger, in order to expand and enlarge its occupations. We did not think for a moment that our sincere and friendly engagements and ties would cause the loss of any of our territories.

It is needless to explain to your prudent sense of justice that Shabwa is within the line of Yemen and the latter will not agree to dissociate or separate it from the body of Yemen. We do not expect that the most dignified and great Government in treaty with us would be in the place of a rival to us.

As regards the reference to the compacts and agreements made with the usurping and vanished Ottoman Government, Your Excellency is already fully conversant and well aware from the negotiations which lasted between your honourable Government and ourselves for nearly 20 years, that we have neither accepted nor acknowledged any decision or dealing made by the Ottomans. We have (on the contrary), refused and objected to it in every paper, letter and communication sent by us. We have always made a stipulation to leave off all investigation about any dealing made with them and that there should be no regard for any pact or agreement made with them. Our blessed treaty was concluded on this basis. Such being the case, there should naturally be no place for mentioning the Ottomans. We, therefore, hope, desire and earnestly request you to rectify and clear the minds and acts relating to the said places for we consider them to be part and parcel of the Husuns (fortlets) of our Kingdom and of its internal parts. After having given this frank explanation we entertain good hope of the

sense of justice, gratefulness and sympathy of the great British Government (in this matter). We beg to confirm our statement that we consider ourselves to be their (Government) sincere and loyal friends both now and in future. We wish and desire to unify our policy and movement with them in each and every time. We are naturally averse to what will compel us to be far away from them.

We therefore request you to use all that your sound judgment will dictate and to do your utmost, moved by your kind attention and admitted love and friendliness to remove suspicions and causes of differences in as far as our permanent concord or agreement is concerned.

78233/37 [No. 16]. No. 57.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, 4th November, 1937.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Sir Bernard Reilly's Secret (2) despatch of the 1st September* enclosing copies of correspondence with the King of the Yemen regarding recent action in the Shabwa area. The nature of the reply to be accorded to the King is under consideration and as to this I will address you further in due course.

2. As to the negotiation of direct agreements with the Shabwa tribes, to which Sir Bernard Reilly refers in paragraph 9 of his despatch, His Majesty's Government regard themselves as fully at liberty to conclude these agreements, since they consider that the areas concerned form part of the Aden Protectorate, but, in view of the importance of maintaining good relations with the King of the Yemen at the present time, I think it desirable that you should defer the negotiation of the agreements until a more favourable occasion.

3. Moreover, in the event of your receiving any application for permission to prospect in the area in dispute, you should refer to me before entertaining it.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78233/38 [No. 2]. No. 58.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

[*Answered by No. 59.*]

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, 9th March, 1938.

I have the honour to refer to my secret despatch of the 4th November, 1937† and to inform you that the correspondence with the King of the Yemen regarding British action in the Shabwa area, copies of which were enclosed with your secret (2) despatch of the 1st September, 1937*, has been the subject of my consideration in consultation with the other interested Departments of His Majesty's Government. Advantage was also taken of the opportunity for personal discussion with you on the matter during your recent leave in this country.

2. The main considerations involved appear to me to be as follows. Article 3 of the Treaty of Sana'a embodies an undertaking on the part of the two High Contracting Parties " to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier at the date of the signature of the Treaty ". This must in my view be interpreted as applying to the maintenance of the frontier as it existed at the time of the treaty, to the exclusion,

* No. 56. † No. 57.

during the validity of the Treaty, of any frontier previously recognized or laid down (e.g. by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914), but as imposing no restriction upon the action of either party on its own side of the border. It is to be noted, however, that the frontier referred to was the *de facto* frontier established at a precise date, whereas in the area north-east of Beihan no such *de facto* frontier had in fact been established, since the Aden and the Yemeni authorities were not in contact with each other north-eastwards from Beihan. In these circumstances you suggested that it might be possible to contend that Article 3 of the Treaty was not intended to apply to the frontier in this particular area. On the other hand it must be remembered that, at an early stage in the treaty negotiations, a proposal was presented to the King of the Yemen for a settlement on a tribal basis, and that this proposal was accompanied by a complete list of all tribes under British protection. The proposal was rejected by the King; but the list remains as evidence that it was at least the intention of His Majesty's Government to deal with the whole frontier of the Protectorate, although it may perhaps also be regarded as an indication that the Shabwa tribes were not then expressly claimed to be under British protection.

3. But whatever may be the true legal interpretation, I incline to the view that on practical grounds, the Treaty of Sana'a must be regarded as having settled nothing north-eastwards of Beihan, since, assuming for the sake of argument that the Treaty meant that neither side should advance from its *de facto* position at the date of signature, even to the north-eastwards of Beihan, what has happened since seems to show that the Treaty has been quite as much disregarded by the King of the Yemen as by His Majesty's Government. If His Majesty's Government have been at fault in considering the negotiation of a Protectorate Treaty with the tribes of Shabwa, the King has been much more at fault in extending his influence eastwards from Harib, beyond which it does not seem to have extended in 1934, into territories which might have equally belonged at that time, so far as His Majesty's Government could judge, to King Ibn Saud. It is unlikely, therefore, that this interpretation of the Treaty could be sustained by either side in view of subsequent events.

4. If it is to be concluded that the Treaty in fact settled nothing in respect of the area beyond Beihan, even though its terms did not specifically prevent it from doing so, then the position in regard to that district remains as it stood before the Treaty was signed; that is to say, His Majesty's Government claim the territory bounded by the north-east (violet) line laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1914. This is a claim which His Majesty's Government must clearly maintain, but it is also one that the King is obviously not precluded by anything in the Treaty of Sana'a from disputing.

5. After full consideration of all the circumstances I consider that a communication should be addressed to the King of the Yemen on the following lines, but in the most conciliatory language possible.

6. In the first place, the King should be assured that it is not the desire of the British Government to take any action in contravention of the Sana'a Treaty. The reply should go on to point out that, under Article 3 of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agreed to maintain the position in regard to the southern frontier of the Yemen as it existed at the time of the signature of the Treaty; that such an agreement could affect, and did affect, only the political dividing line between the areas administered by the Yemeni Government and those under the protection of the British Government; and that these areas were contiguous from the coast opposite Perim to the north-eastern boundary of the Beihan province. The King will doubtless recollect that it was only this line that formed the subject of the discussions upon which the Treaty was based. Beyond Beihan the areas administered by the King in 1934 were not in fact immediately adjacent to the area claimed by the British Government as being under their protection.

7. His Majesty's Government would gladly defer, were it possible, to the King's expressed wish that all reference to treaties concluded with the late Ottoman Government should be excluded from these discussions, but he will hardly fail to appreciate that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 was an internationally valid agreement concluded with the then recognized Ruler or Suzerain of the territories bordering upon the areas in Southern Arabia under British protection; and that, while British relations with the several tribes in the Protectorate are based upon the several treaties concluded with them, the definition of the northern boundary of the whole area included in the Anglo-Turkish Convention is clearly authoritative. While, therefore, the British Government do not claim to derive their rights of suzerainty from the Anglo-Turkish Convention the latter has always been regarded—and must continue to be regarded—as evidence of the geographical extent of the area under British influence. The boundary line as defined in

those treaties passes considerably north of the areas occupied by the tribes of Shabwa, and these areas are therefore indisputably within the territory which the British Government has always claimed in the past as lying within the sphere of its influence.

8. Since, therefore, the Shabwa area is geographically within the limits claimed to be under British suzerainty, and since the area under Yemeni administration in 1934 lay at some distance both from the Shabwa area and from the Protectorate boundary to the north of it, as laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it is the view of His Majesty's Government that no administrative action taken therein can be construed as a breach of Article 3 of the Sana'a Treaty.

9. Moreover, the tribes of Shabwa, though it is admitted that no very close contact has been maintained with them in the past, have always been regarded as being subsidiary to the Upper Aulaqi Sheikh, with whom His Majesty's Government have been in Treaty relations since 1903, and consequently as being covered by the provisions of the latter's Treaty with His Majesty's Government. It is only because it has become apparent in recent years that the tribes of Shabwa are not subordinate to the Upper Aulaqi Sheikh at the present date, that the Aden authorities have recently considered the conclusion with them of a Treaty similar in kind to the treaties with all other tribes and rulers within the area of British influence.

10. You are further authorized to suggest, for the King's consideration, that, in view of his attitude on the boundary question, and having regard to the probability that officers of the Yemeni Administration may in future come into closer contact with those of the Protectorate Government in the area north-west of Beihan, arrangements might suitably be made at some convenient date for an informal and friendly discussion between representatives of the two Governments with a view to arriving at an agreed settlement in regard to the Yemeni-Protectorate boundary in this area.

11. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government, though they regard themselves as free to take such action as they think fit to consolidate their influence among the Shabwa tribes, are prepared, in deference to the King's view, to postpone such action for the present provided local conditions permit and provided also that no action is taken by the Yemeni Government tending to prejudice the position of the Protectorate Government in the area under dispute. But while this is in fact the intention of His Majesty's Government, they would prefer, subject to your further observations, not to tell the King of this intention unless and until it is clear that only by telling him can a serious dispute be avoided, since any assurance of the kind might be taken as an admission that the 1914 frontier was legally open to doubt—an admission which might have unforeseen consequences in further discussions about this frontier not only with the King himself but also with King Ibn Saud and the Italian Government. Any eventual communication to the King on this point must in any case be made in such a way as to avoid this danger as far as possible.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

78233/38 [No. 6]. No. 59.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12.4 p.m., 26th March, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 61.*]

No. 8. 26th March. Your despatch of the 9th March*, Shabwa. I have received protest from the King of the Yemen to recent Seiar operations in Hadhramaut. I propose, subject to your approval, to make reply to cover both Shabwa and Seiar as His Majesty's Government's arguments apply with equal force to the latter as they do to the former. With regard to both I intend to omit in the present communication any reference to the undertaking suggested in paragraph 11 of your despatch which would be inappropriate in the case of Seiar in whose Territory of the Husn Al Abraham [? Abr] has been occupied by Luniti [? Quaiti] troops under British advice and protection. I am sending you copy of the King's protest by despatch.

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* No. 58.

78233/38 [No. 8]. No. 60.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11th April, 1938.)

(Secret (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 30th March, 1938.

With reference to my telegram No. 8 dated 26th March, 1938*, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated 9th March from the King of the Yemen protesting against the recent air operations carried out against the Sei'ar country in the Hadhramaut.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Dated, 7th Muharram, 1357
= 9th March, 1938.

From His Majesty the King of Yemen.

To His Excellency the Governor, Aden.

After compliments.

We inform Your Excellency that we have sent you a reply on the 27th Rabi' Awal 1356 (7th June, 1937) wherein we explained to you that both the Karab tribe, one of whose several places is Shabwa, and the Sei'ar tribe as well, form part of the Yemeni Kingdom and their dwelling places are included in it in accordance with the Pact of Friendship. They are not of those places, the settlement of which was postponed between the two Kingdoms. We have given satisfaction to our brother, His Majesty King 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud, about them when he wanted to punish them for having interfered with some of his subjects and given him guarantees to take the necessary measures (against them) in this matter.

Incidents have been reported to us to have taken place in these days in those places which show that there has been some interference on the part of those attached to your esteemed Government in the matter of Al Karab and Sei'ar by erecting new buildings, arresting some of the people of Sei'ar, and the flying of aeroplanes in those parts, while we think that such action is not likely to receive your support. We are very sorry for what we have heard because we consider it, if it has really taken place, to be a clear case of aggression against our rights and on the pacts concluded between both you and ourselves. We entertain (good) hope and place reliance on your good intentions and desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship and love and this we always expect from you. We await accurate information about this incident in case it has really occurred.

In conclusion please accept our best regards.

78233/38 [No. 12]. No. 61.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 10 p.m., 25th April, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 52. Your telegram of 26th March*. Shabwa. Since Seiar occupy areas on both sides of the violet line, it does not seem possible to treat arguments advanced in my secret despatch of 9th March† as entirely applicable to whole of area occupied by Seiar Tribe. I agree however that reply to King can conveniently be made to cover both Shabwa and Seiar provided that some variation of wording is used. Basis of reply regarding Seiar must presumably be that incidents complained of took place in territory clearly on Protectorate side of violet line. You should also consider whether it is advisable to say that Seiar are subordinate to Quaiti Sultan.

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* No. 59. † No. 58.

8. INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

78278/37 [No. 1]. No. 62.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
(Received 15th October, 1937.)

(No. 274.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 29th September, 1937.

I have the honour to address you on the subject of internal security organization in the Aden Protectorate.

2. The forward policy of indirect control, which we have been pursuing for the past few years with increasing vigour, has brought the need of a small mobile ground Police force very much to the fore. In countries showing similarity to the Aden Protectorate, notably in Trans-Jordan, great use has been made of small mobile forces, and the lack of such a force is being increasingly felt in the Protectorate day by day. Now that political control within the Protectorate is steadily increasing and agricultural and road development and scientific exploration are contemplated, it is evident that the promotion of these enterprises will be greatly facilitated if we have at our disposal a small force which we can trust, raised on Arab lines similarly to the Desert Force in Trans-Jordan, and instantly available for protective duties such as inner camp guard. This need is already met in areas where Tribal Guards have been established but there are still many parts of the Protectorate in which, for various reasons such as the lack of an authoritative Chief or the primitive character of the people, Tribal Guards cannot easily be raised, and in the wilder districts Political Officers and others must still depend for local protection on undisciplined tribesmen.

3. The lot of the Political Officer when he is moving through country where doubt exists as to his reception by the inhabitants is peculiarly difficult. His own personal staff, on whom he depends for his comforts and his food, are insufficient for the tasks their loyalty and their sense of duty require them to perform. The Political Officer hesitates to engage an increased staff, not only because the expense would be beyond his purse, but because the new members of his party might be found to be, for many reasons, unsatisfactory and a source of trouble. Consequently it has frequently happened that an officer has helped to pitch his own tents and even cooked for himself, to allow his staff to sleep after a night spent on self-imposed sentry duty.

4. There are tasks also which could be performed, by such a force as I have in mind, during the settlement of frontier disputes, where an undisciplined tribal escort hired by the Frontier Officer might desert him, were the decision in the case, given by him and his Yemeni colleague to be against the escort's tribe. In such a case, were the Frontier Officer to be deprived of his escort, he would have either to appeal to Yemeni forces for protection or to request that he might be extricated by air action. The former course would be most undignified and the latter a dangerous and complicated operation, unless some mobile and loyal ground force could co-operate with the Royal Air Force in his extrication.

5. The force that I contemplate would be an expansion of the Tribal Guard system under direct Government control. It would be an internal security Police force, and, as such, should be able to deal with cases of disorder before they grow to a magnitude requiring the drastic remedy of air action. The men for this force would have to be carefully selected. A European organization would be too rigid for them. They should be able to travel as the Arab does, with little or no transport, in small parties and to protect and to be able to ration themselves on the march in any locality. A modicum of military discipline would be required in order to weld them into a unit and, after their preliminary training, they would have to assemble for refresher courses at a central headquarters from time to time. They should be ready to move to any place in the quickest possible time, ready for any work which the Government might require them to do, including, for instance, pioneer work on roads.

6. The headquarters of the force could, within limits, be as mobile as the force and in frequent touch, while in the Protectorate, with the Secretariat by W/T.

7. The force could be at the commencement 100 strong, organized into nine parties of ten each with nine non-commissioned officers and commanded by a Political Officer with an Arab officer as second in command. It is hoped that a suitable Arab for this post can be found. A maximum rate of pay is budgeted for and the pay allotted would depend upon the suitability of the candidate selected. He would be assisted by one Arab Quartermaster clerk.

8. Such a force must be well paid in order to attract a suitable type of man. They could at once be enlisted from ex-Aden Protectorate Levies and Aden Protectorate Arabs who already have done military training and from selected men of the Tribal Guards.

9. I am in favour of making the force part of an organization in which the Tribal Guards, which I hope will increase both tribally and numerically, will form the local police forces and this force, for which I suggest the name of Government Guards, would co-operate with the Tribal Guards where necessary and perform the duties specified above. The whole organization could conveniently be called Protectorate Guards and would be under direct political control.

10. It is realized that the organization, training and employment of these forces cannot be carried out without direct British supervision. Mr. Hamilton, Second Political Officer, has already been entrusted with the control of the Tribal Guards. As I stated when recommending the creation of the latter (paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 305 of 21st November, 1934*), Mr. Hamilton has special qualifications for work of this nature, inasmuch as he is a soldier by profession and training, who has had several years' experience with the Aden Protectorate Levies, before becoming a Political Officer, and he thus has an intimate knowledge of the people of the Protectorate from both military and political points of view. I therefore propose that he should be placed in charge of the Government Guards as well as of the Tribal Guards, the two being linked under the common designation of Protectorate Guards. This would be Mr. Hamilton's principal duty, as the organization of the new force will demand a large amount of his time and attention, but he will be able to perform other Political work as well: his employment with this policing force will give him many opportunities of doing so.

11. Mr. Hamilton will be responsible for the organization and training of the force, which, for this purpose, should periodically be concentrated for a few weeks either in Aden or in some part of the Protectorate where Mr. Hamilton could simultaneously pursue his other Political duties. Apart from these periods of training, the force would ordinarily be dispersed, the basic unit for detachments being a section of one N.C.O. and ten men.

12. An estimate of the cost of the force will be found attached to this despatch. I consider that the armament should be the short muzzle L.E. rifle. A yearly recurrent expenditure of ammunition in practice would be incurred of 15,000 rounds, while 10,000 would form a sufficient reserve, and the cost of arms and ammunition is included in the detailed estimates as an appendix to this despatch.

13. The estimates include provision for a modicum of medicines and the provision of field dressings and also for sports equipment. Portable canvas bivouacs are also provided for. The headquarters of the force, consisting of the British Officer and his orderly and the Quartermaster clerk are provided in the estimates with riding and baggage animals, which will greatly facilitate their movement and their work in the various districts to which they will have to travel in the course of their duties. The accounts of this new force and of the Tribal Guards would be subject to yearly audit. The estimates also include provision for a motor truck and for the hire of motor transport in the event of an emergency. When roads have been made in the Protectorate the number of trucks should be increased, probably to one for each section, but in the meantime hired vehicles will probably meet the case, and these will not require the construction and upkeep of garages.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

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* No. 94 in Middle East No. 52.

Enclosure in No. 62.

ESTIMATES.

GOVERNMENT GUARDS.

No. of Item.	*Subject.*	*Recurrent yearly expenditure.*	*Non-recurrent expenditure.*	*Remarks.*
		Rs.	Rs.	
1	Pay, Rations and Allowances, all ranks.	42,240	—	1 Arab Officer at Rs.300 p.m. 1 Quartermaster clerk at Rs.120 p.m. 1 Quartermaster clerk assistant at Rs.40 p.m. 9 N.C.Os. at Rs.40 p.m. 90 Privates at Rs.30 p.m.
2	Uniforms	3,600	—	Yearly grant of uniform at Rs.32 a head. This uniform includes cartridge belt and water bottle.
3	Waterskins	—	40	Provided at scale of 2 goat-skins for every party of 10 men ; non-recurrent.
4	Casual engagement of sweepers	100	—	When more than 50 men are in standing camp.
5	Water, when in Aden Colony ..	300	—	—
6	Housing grant	200	—	To assist in purchasing ropes and matting when erecting standing camp.
7	Blanket store	1,000	1,000	2 blankets issued to each man yearly. Two per head kept in store for issue and return when men proceed to cold countries.
8	Arms and ammunition ..	1,500	9,850	110 rifles and 150 rounds for yearly practice ; 100 per man in reserve. No estimate for operations.
9	Medicines	910	—	100 field dressings ; 40,000 5 gr. tablets quinine ; Iodine 12 pints ; 3-in. bandages 240 ; 12 lbs. lint ; 12 lbs. cotton wool ; 1 lb. permanganate of potash ; 40 lbs. Epsom salt.
10	Contingencies for musketry ..	1,000	—	—
11	Portable bivouacs	200	900	Carried in rolls strapped to cartridge belt, 9 sq. yds. per man.
12	Cooking pots	—	50	Re-furnished when necessary at men's expense.
13	Travelling office boxes ..	—	100	Two teak boxes suitable for carrying on pack saddle.
14	Pony and mule syces	780	—	One head syce at Rs.25 p.m. and two syces at Rs.20 p.m.
15	Saddlery and piqueting gear for ponies and mules.	60	220	Officers provide their own saddlery.
16	Purchase of 3 ponies and 3 mules	—	1,800	*i.e.*, at Rs.300 per horse, including travel expenses of buyer.
17	Feeding : 6 animals	1,800	—	—
18	Stable equipment	40	—	Includes horse-blankets.
19	Rifle buckets, 6	40	—	Made locally.
20	Sports equipment	200	—	—
21	Purchases of truck, provision of rifle racks, extra springs.	—	2,550	—
22	Running expenses	1,200	—	—
23	Repairs	300	—	—
24	Canvas collapsible garage ..	150	—	—
25	Spares, tyres, lamps, etc. ..	600	—	—
26	Hire of motor transport in an emergency.	3,000	—	—
	Total	Rs. 59,220 (about £4,450)	Rs. 16,510 (about £1,240).	

9. ANGLO-TURKISH RELATIONS IN ARABIA AND THE RED SEA

79174/37 [No. 6]: Enclosure. No. 63.

THE GROWTH OF THE ADEN PROTECTORATE.

Although it is not intended that this memorandum should deal with events prior to the British occupation, it may be said that the Government of Bombay issued instructions in 1837 for endeavours to be made to obtain Aden by purchase in order that British commerce in the Red Sea might be placed on a safer footing for the future and that a secure coal depôt for the vessels engaged in the overland transit might be established. On 23rd January, 1838, a written bond was obtained from the Sultan at Lahej stating that he would cede the peninsula to the British in the following March in consideration of an annual pension of 8,700 dollars. Following the committal of further outrages against British shipping and the failure of the Sultan to honour his agreement of 1838, Aden was bombarded and occupied by British troops on 16th January, 1839.

(2) While it seems unnecessary to go into details it may be stated that information concerning the measures taken for the pacification of the tribes of the hinterland and of the various rebellions, etc., during the period 1839–1872 is contained in Captain Playfair's "History of Arabia Felix or Yemen" (8vo. 4972) and in Major General Tremenheere's "Report on the Various Arab Tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden . . ." (8vo. 5556). The texts of the various treaties concluded by the British Government (The East India Co.) at Aden and the neighbouring chiefs during this same period are contained in Aitchison, Volume XI of 1933.

(3) It is to be observed that on 2nd April, 1869, the Peninsula of Jebel Ihsan, or Little Aden, was purchased for the sum of $30,000 and the stipend of $40 per month paid to the Sheikh of the Akrabees.

(4) When in 1873 the Turks, who had evacuated the Yemen in 1633, reoccupied that province, there were nine tribes in the Hinterland of Aden with whom Her Majesty's Government had direct relations, and whom they considered to be more or less under their protection. These tribes were the Abdali, the Fadhli, the Akrabi, and the Subaihi, which were the nearest to Aden; the Haushabi, the Alawi, the Amiri (i.e., the subjects of the Amir of Dthali), the Yaffai, and the Aulaki. These two last-named tribes were divided into two sections, the Upper and Lower Yaffai and the Upper and Lower Aulaki.

(5) The Turkish Government contended that the Sultan's sovereignty extended over those tribes in virtue of the former occupation of Yemen. We, on the other hand, always maintained that they were independent. In addition to the Turkish claim of sovereignty, there have, even since 1873, been constant disputes in regard to the frontiers between these tribes and the territory under the direct administration of the Turkish authorities. Both subjects have from time to time given rise to discussions, sometimes of an acute nature, with the Porte.

(6) In 1873 it was proposed that the nine tribes above named should be taken under British protection. The proposal was not sanctioned; but while the question was under consideration at home, the Resident at Aden had, under instructions from India, sent a British force to support the Chief of Lahej (in the territory of the Abdali tribe) against the Turks, who were giving military assistance to a rebel against the Chief. The Turkish Government endeavoured to make a bargain that, as they had disclaimed any intention to interfere, the British force should be withdrawn from Lahej. This was declined, and it was not until the Turkish troops had evacuated Lahej that the British force returned to Aden. The right of the Porte to request the withdrawal of the British troops was at the same time expressly denied by the Secretary of State for India, "since the relations of the British Government with the tribes round Aden are independent of Turkey, whom we do not admit to have any *locus standi* in that region."

(7) In the same year (1873) Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople informed the Porte that Her Majesty's Government would not tolerate the interference of the Ottoman authorities in the territory of the nine tribes. The intrigues and interference of the Turkish officials nevertheless continued in the following years, and in 1885 culminated in a more decided forward movement, resulting in the occupation of Jalela, in the heart of the Amiri country, and several other villages belonging to the Amir of Dthali.

(8) Her Majesty's Government protested against this occupation, though Jalela was not mentioned, but the Turks were in strong force at the time, and nothing more was said than that Her Majesty's Government could not acquiesce in the indefinite occupation of the Amir's villages. In the autumn of 1885 the whole subject of our relations with the Aden tribes was discussed, and certain proposals were made which were referred to the Government of India. These proposals were to the effect that, of the nine tribes, the four nearest to Aden (the Abdali, Subaihi, Akrabi, and Fadhli) should be placed under British protection by Agreements concluded with the Chiefs; that Agreements should be concluded with the Haushabi and Alawi and with the Lower Yaffai, binding them not to sell their territories, or accept the domination of any other Power; that the Upper Yaffai and the Aulaki should be left independent; and that as regards the remaining tribe—the Amiri—we should quietly desist from our present attitude of opposition to the Turks, allowing the absorption by them of the hamlets on the uplands, and possibly pensioning off the Amir and his immediate successors.

(9) In 1886 the Government of India expressed themselves in favour of these proposals, but recommended that Treaties should also be entered into with the tribes occupying the coast eastwards between Aden and the limits of Muscat, so as to exclude all chance of foreign interference on the seaboard. Owing to negotiations on other matters proceeding at Constantinople, no action was taken till the end of 1887, when the Government of India were authorized to proceed with Protectorate Treaties with the Akrabi, one of the nine tribes, and with the Wahidi and Mahri, two tribes on the coast to the east of the Aulaki and outside the nine tribes. As regards the substitution of a Protectorate form of Treaty for one binding the Chiefs not to sell their territories or accept the interference of any other Power, Lord Salisbury expressed the opinion that " the responsibility incurred by the British Government in either case is much the same, while a Treaty of Protectorate gives a more complete control and is more efficient to counteract interference by foreign Powers than the less definite Agreement previously suggested."

(10) In 1890 Protectorate Treaties were ratified with the Fadhli, Akrabi, Lower Aulaki, and certain Atifi and Bashemi sections of the Subaihi, and also with the principal Chiefs* along the coast, east of the Aulaki, as far as the Muscat frontier; in 1895, with the Haushabi, Alawi, and Lower Yaffai; in 1903 and 1904, in consequence of the difficulties experienced by our Commissioners during the work of delimitation with Sultan Khatan of the Upper Yaffai, and with three sections† of that tribe, with two Sheikhs representing the Upper Aulaki‡, and with the Chief of Behan-el-Kasab; and in 1905 (after the completion of the delimitation) with the Amiri. As regards the Abdali, the fact that the territories of the Sultan were already under British protection was recognized in an Agreement of 1882.

(11) In 1900 a Turkish subject erected a fort at Ad Darejo, in the Haushabi territory. Diplomatic representations proved unavailing, and a force had to be sent from Aden in July, 1901, to expel the intruders, who were assisted in their resistance by Ottoman troops. Further encroachments in Amiri territory were reported, and in October, 1901, the Government of India suggested a delimitation of the frontier, an independent proposal to the same effect being made almost at the same time by the Ottoman Government.

(12) The proposal was accepted, and the Commissioners met at Dthali, the chief village of the Amiri, in February, 1902.

(13) It transpired, however, that the Turks had utilized the interval before the Commissioners met to occupy with regular troops and artillery a number of points in Amiri territory which had hitherto been in the possession of the Sheikh, among other Jalela, which they had previously occupied in 1885. They also established irregular Arab levies over a great part of the Amiri territory, terrorising the natives and making them believe that Turkish rule was to be established.

(14) The Turkish troops and levies had orders to prevent any British party from moving about for purposes of survey or inquiry, and persons attached to the Commission were actually fired on. His Majesty's Government protested against these encroachments without result, and eventually, to ease the situation, it was proposed in June that the delimitation of the Amiri country should be postponed, and that the delimitation of the country of the Yaffai (another of the nine tribes), lying to the north-east of the Amiri, should be proceeded with. This led to no result, as, though the Turkish

* Could these " principal chiefs " be indicated? The point is rather important.
† Dthali, Mausatta, and Muflahai. ‡ Yeshbum and Nikb.

Government professed to accept the proposal, the Commissioners on the spot received instructions not to recognize the Yaffai as one of the nine tribes. A complete deadlock ensued, the Turkish Government being unable or unwilling to control their local authorities.

(15) In these circumstances, it was decided, on the recommendation of Sir N. O'Conor, that Mr. Fitzmaurice, second dragoman of the Embassy at Constantinople, should be appointed to the Demarcation Commission as Joint Commissioner and he joined the Commission at Dthali at the end of November.

(16) In December, 1902, His Majesty's Government reluctantly decided that it was necessary to send up troops to support the Commission at Dthali and to reinforce the Aden garrison from India. Four hundred men and four guns were accordingly sent early in January, 1903, to Dthali, and reinforcements were sent from India to Aden. In order to prevent the arrival of Turkish reinforcements at Hodeida, His Majesty's ships " Hermione " and " Intrepid " were sent to Aden from the Mediterranean. By May the force on the Dthali plateau and on the communications had been increased to about 1,500.

(17) These proceedings had a good result. Orders were sent from Constantinople in February which caused the local authorities to modify their attitude, but it was not till towards the end of March, 1903, that the levies were finally disbanded, and the Turkish forces withdrawn behind the line which His Majesty's Government had claimed provisionally for the Chief of Dthali, leaving Jalela in his possession. With this withdrawal of the Turkish troops the preliminary difficulties disappeared, and delimitation, in the proper sense of the word, may be said to have begun—thirteen months after the meeting of the Commissions.

(18) Though organized obstruction ceased with the withdrawal from Jalela, it was some time before the excitement created in the tribal country ceased, and progress was at first slow. However, in May, 1903, it was possible to withdraw the ships. In June a proper survey of the Amiri border was completed, and the British proposals as to the general line to be followed by the demarcation were referred to Constantinople. In September and October the Shaibi country up to the Wadi Bana was surveyed by the Joint Commissioners, and a line agreed to and demarcated. In October the actual demarcation of the Amiri country was begun by the Joint Commissioners, the doubtful points as they arose being settled by negotiations at Constantinople, and it was completed towards the end of December, 1903. The Haushabi territory was dealt with by the Commission in January and February, 1904.

(19) The delimitation of the Subaihi border involved considerable delay.

(20) The proposals of His Majesty's Government for the settlement of the outstanding portion of the frontier beyond Mudariba (up to which point there was no difference of opinion between the two Governments) were embodied in a Memorandum presented to the Porte by Sir N. O'Conor on the 11th August, 1904.

(21) There was considerable controversy about the districts of Dabiani, Nawa, Juban, and Rubeaten, which the Ottoman Government claimed as part of their district of Rada, but they were considered by His Majesty's Government, on satisfactory evidence, to be connected with the Yaffai, and thus to fall within the British Protectorate.

(22) On the 23rd September, Sir N. O'Conor reported that, at a farewell audience before he left Constantinople, the Sultan " opened the conversation by assuring me that he would give his formal consent to the Aden frontier delimitation next day ". This undertaking, however, was not observed.

(23) On the 25th October, Lord Lansdowne found it necessary to instruct Mr. Townley to inform the Porte that His Majesty's Government proposed to send a ship of war to the coast to watch over British interests, and the Admiralty gave orders to the Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station to send a ship.

(24) On the 28th October, Mr. Townley reported that the Minister for Foreign Affairs begged that the dispatch of the ship might be delayed, and promised an answer by the 3rd November.

(25) On the 4th November, Mr. Townley telegraphed that the Sultan's reply had been handed to him in the shape of a telegram to the Turkish Ambassador for communication to Lord Lansdowne, but that, having regard to the terms, he had refused to act on it. On the same day the Turkish Ambassador presented the reply to Lord Lansdowne. It spoke of the line proposed for the Subaihi border as a " marked encroachment ", claimed Dabiani, Nawa, Juban, and Rubeaten as " belonging

incontestably to the Kaza of Rada ", and begged for a reopening of the question. Lord Lansdowne replied by reciting the Sultan's promise of the 23rd September and the failure to give effect to it. He said it was " outrageous that at the last moment an attempt should be made to reopen the question;" and that the arrangements for sending a ship of war to the coast, which had been suspended at the Ambassador's special request, would certainly now be carried out.

(26) On the 30th December, Mr. Townley reported that an Iradé had been issued instructing the Turkish Commissioners to draw the boundary outside Bab-el-Mandeb to Kudam (the Vilayet of the Yemen retaining Turba and the wells, as also the territory bounded by a line terminating at Sheikh Mirad). The wording of this Iradé betrayed complete ignorance of the question, and also stated that neither Government was to be allowed to send troops into the Nine Cantons. No mention was made of the delimitation of the boundary north-east to the desert, but a promise was given that no portion of the territory would be ceded to a third Power.

(27) His Majesty's Government decided that the stipulation as to the dispatch of troops to the Nine Cantons was inadmissible, and Mr. Townley was instructed to press for compliance with the original demands, including the recognition of the north-eastern frontier. (To Mr. Townley No. 3, Telegraphic, of the 9th January, 1905.)

(28) The Turkish Ambassador was also informed that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the Porte were acting in a most unreasonable manner.

(29) On the 7th February, 1905, Mr. Townley was instructed to inform the Porte that His Majesty's Government took note of the new Iradé, and of the Porte's intention not to send troops into the Nine Cantons, but that His Majesty's Government would reserve to themselves their indisputable right to send British troops there when and wherever they pleased. On this understanding His Majesty's Government were ready to demarcate the line from Mudariba to Sheikh Murad, but should fresh difficulties be raised by the Porte, His Majesty's Government would be obliged to decline all further negotiations, and would take their own measures for defining the line they considered it necessary to claim, and for maintaining their rights over territory included in it.

(30) At Sir N. O'Conor's suggestion, His Majesty's Government later consented to drop all reference to the dispatch of troops into the Nine Cantons.

(31) On the 14th March, 1905, Sir N. O'Conor was informed by the Porte that instructions had been sent to the authorities of the Yemen for the delimitation of the frontier of the Subaihi from Mudariba to Sheikh Murad, as also for the prosecution of the delimitation of the frontier between the Yaffai and the Yemen, from the Bana River north-east to the desert.

(32) On the 21st April, Sir N. O'Conor reported the signature of the *procès-verbal*, which, after reciting the boundary as far as the Wadi Bana, defined on the signed maps, stated, as regards the frontier beyond the Wadi Bana, that it was generally in a line north-east from Lakmet-es-Shah to the desert; that the whole of the Aulaki and all districts of the Yaffai (including Rubeaten, Nawa, and Dabiani) lying to the south and east of the line to the desert belonged to the nine tribes.

(33) In order to place officially on record the settlement which had been arrived at, Sir N. O'Conor proposed (despatch No. 396A of the 10th June) an exchange of notes, to which were to be attached copies of the maps showing the frontier as finally traced by the Joint Commission, and of the *procès-verbal* exchanged at Sheikh Said between the two Commissioners.

(34) A map* of the frontier delimitation is attached. (General Staff No. 2124.)

(35) In view of certain difficulties which arose on the Turkish side it was decided not to ratify the boundary arrangement but merely to compare the maps at His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople with those in possession of the Ottoman Ministry of War.

(36) It is to be observed that there was a divergence of opinion in regard to the territory belonging to one of the nine cantons of the Aden tribes—that of the Subaihi: the Ottoman Commissioner claimed here as part of the Yemen an area of about 550 square miles, which the British Commissioner on the other hand was satisfied was an appanage of the Subaihi. His Majesty's Government agreed not to insist upon their claim provided the Ottoman Government undertook never to alienate to a third Power the territory marked in yellow on the last map in Cfl. 10517. (Convention between the United Kingdom and Turkey respecting the boundaries of Aden and of Ottoman Territory in Southern Arabia: (with Map) signed at London 9th March, 1914.)

* Not reproduced.

(37) The Anglo-Turkish conventions of 1913–14 are dealt with in a memorandum of 30th April, 1934 (Annex 3*). Although it would seem unecessary to make any further comments as regards the unratified convention of 1913 it may be as well to place on record the brief exchanges which preceded the signature of the convention of 9th March, 1914. On 16th September, 1913, a memorandum was communicated to Hakki Pasha by the Foreign Office suggesting that the agreement arrived at by the signature of the protocol by the Ottoman and British Commissioners on 20th April, 1905, should be ratified by the British and Ottoman Governments. In his reply of 5th November, 1913, Hakki Pasha intimated that his Government were of opinion that the opportunity should be taken to ratify, not only the protocol of 1905, but also that of 1903. Following further investigation in the Foreign Office it was decided that to complete the records of the boundary settlement it would be necessary to ratify the protocols of 1903, 1904, and 1905. The Convention of 1914, ratifications of which were exchanged on 3rd June, 1914, was therefore drawn up so as to include the protocols concluded in the earlier years, and the relevant boundary maps. The text of the Convention is attached. (Annex 1*).

(38) The extent of the Hadhramaut and its relations with His Majesty's Government forms the subject of a memorandum of 11th November, 1932. (Annex 2*).

(39) From this memorandum it will be seen that the term " Protectorate of Aden " is one which has been very loosely used. At that time (1932) there had been no formal establishment of such a protectorate or any official declaration or notification.

Major Merewether (*Tribes in the Vicinity of Aden*) states that the zone within which British influence is more immediately felt may be said to be comprised within a semi-circle having a radius of 80 miles, with the Peninsula of Aden for its centre. Beyond this to the eastward Great Britain is, he says, looked on as a kind of paramount Power, which, while recognizing independence in regard to internal government, yet is ready to prevent alienation of territory to foreign nations, or inter-tribal disputes which are carried on to the detriment of public peace or commercial interests. He points out that by 1880 the number of tribes regarded as under British protection were nine in number (presumably those most frequently described as " the Protectorate ") but that since then it has been found advisable to extend British intercourse with the tribes in certain directions, so that by 1908 the number of tribes in direct treaty relations amounted to fifteen. The list he gives shows that the fifteen tribes consisted of the nine tribes of the " Protectorate " together with the six covered by the Hadhramaut.

(40) A study of the 1933 edition of Aitchison reveals the fact that in addition to the fifteen tribes mentioned in the previous paragraph we also have engagements with the Audhali and the Beihan. It may thus be said that the so-called " Protectorate of Aden " covers the following tribes and confederations:—

(1) the Abdali (Sultanate of Lahej).
(2) the Subaihi.
(3) the Fadhli
(4) the Akrabi.
(5) the Aulaki (Upper and Lower).
(6) Irka.
(7) Lower Haura.
(8) Beihan.
(9) the Yaffai (Upper and Lower).
(10) the Audhali.
(11) the Haushabi.
(12) the Alawi.
(13) the Amiri (Amirate of Dhala).
(14) the Wahidi.
(15) the Kathiri (in Hadhramaut).
(16) the Kaiti (Sultanate of Mokalla).
(17) Socotra (Sultanate) and the Mahri (Kishn).

(41) As regards publications containing the texts of the numerous engagements upon which British rights are based it can be said that Aitchison, Vol. XI of 1933, is the only comprehensive work. It is true that certain documents are published in Hertslet's Commercial Treaties and in State Papers but in view of their fragmentary nature it would seem preferable to ignore them. The Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1913 has not been published.

* Not printed.

(42) According to our records the following Orders in Council have been issued:—

(1) British Order in Council of 30th April, 1877, applying " the Slave Trade Act of 1876 " to certain parts of Asia and Africa (. . . . . Tribes near Aden . . . . . , etc.). This Order was applied to the " territories of the following tribes near Aden—The Abdali, the Foodli, the Akrabi, the Howshabi, the Alawi, the Amiri, the Subahi, the Yafai and the Oulaki."

(2) Order in Council of 14th October, 1913, applying the provisions of the Slave Trade Act of 1876 to the " territories of the Kaiti, Wahidi, Behan, Audali and Beda tribes near Aden and to the territories of the Mahri tribe of Kishin and Socotra."

(3) Aden Protectorate Order of 18th March, 1937, which applies to the " territories of Arabia which are bounded on the south by the Colony of Aden and the Gulf of Aden, on the west and north by the Kingdom of the Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and on the east by the Sultanate of Oman, and also to the Islands of Socotra and Abdul Quri and any other islands adjacent to the said territories."

(43) No statements have been made in Parliament since the war defining the limits of the Aden Protectorate, but references have been made in the House of Lords, in very general terms, to the treaty relations existing between His Majesty's Government and the Arab tribes of the Aden hinterland.

Foreign Office,
23rd August, 1937.

10. PUNITIVE AIR ACTION

78195/37 S. [No. 9]. No. 64.

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR)
to
SIR COSMO PARKINSON (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Received 27th April, 1937.)

MY DEAR PARKINSON, Governor's Office, Aden, 12th April, 1937.

Thank you for your letter of 25th of March, 1937*. I am very glad that you are satisfied that there has been justification for recent air action, which has been undertaken only in cases in which it has appeared to be clearly necessary.

In this connexion I enclose a copy of a memorandum on the procedure usually followed in the Aden Protectorate. It has been written by Air Headquarters in consultation with the Political Secretary and indicates the method of co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the political authorities and the precautions taken to ensure that ample opportunities are given to culprits to answer charges against them and to accept alternative punishment when guilty. It will be seen that air action is confined to the smallest possible unit and that a whole tribe is not punished if only a section of it is to blame, and that the greatest care is taken to guard against loss of life and the infliction of unnecessary damage.

The Air Officer Commanding is sending a copy of this memorandum to the Air Ministry.

Yours, &c.,
B. R. REILLY.

Enclosure in No. 64.

AIR CONTROL IN THE PROTECTORATE OF ADEN.

Experience in the Aden Protectorate during recent years, and more particularly during the past 12 months, has resulted in the development of a technique for the conduct of air operations which in view of inaccurate reports in foreign press and broadcasts, it is perhaps desirable to describe in some detail.

* 78195/37 S. [No. 5]: not printed.

2. In the first place, it should be appreciated that the Protectorate covers an area of 42,000 square miles and is almost entirely devoid of roads suitable for wheeled transport and other communications; apart from the small forces maintained by local rulers and the Aden Protectorate Levies whose role is limited to local defence of the Aden Settlement, no ground forces are available for dealing with any situation which might occur, and in any case it is most undesirable that ground forces should be employed in this inhospitable terrain, which is so poorly served with communications. One squadron of 12 aircraft, therefore, is the only force available to maintain order in this vast territory, and as it is not uncommon for more than one situation requiring air action to occur simultaneously, quick results are essential.

3. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Aden Protectorate to develop indirect control through local Treaty Chiefs and to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes, and only to intervene if a tribe or any members thereof interfere with caravans or travellers on trade routes.

When such interference occurs, the first step is to ensure that the local Chief investigates the case and establishes the guilt, or innocence, of the accused persons. If their guilt is established, they are ordered by Government to comply with certain terms such as handing over hostages, paying a fine in money, livestock or rifles, either separately or conjointly. If this is not complied with in the allotted time, the local Chief has to take such coercive action as he is able to enforce compliance, usually with the support of the Government, which includes the despatch of a Political Officer to advise him and probably also air demonstrations. It is only when the local chief fails, or is unable, or unwilling, to enforce compliance that direct action by His Majesty's Government becomes necessary.

4. When the Government intervenes, the first step taken is to summon the leader of the offending section to appear before the local Chief and a Political Officer on a notified day. Before this meeting, the case is considered by the Governor, in consultation with the Air Officer Commanding, who agree on the attitude to be adopted in the event of the offenders' guilt being definitely established or of their failing to appear at the specified time. An ultimatum is then prepared demanding the payment of an appropriate fine in a specified time, and possibly the fulfilment of certain conditions to ensure future good behaviour, failing which the offenders are warned that air action will be taken against them. This ultimatum is delivered by a Political Officer to the leader of the offending section if guilt is established and is also dropped by air on the whole tribe; or, if he fails to appear to answer the charge his guilt is assumed and copies of the ultimatum are dropped from aircraft on his villages and additional copies are sent by the hand of special messengers.

5. If submission is not made by the stipulated time, a further 48 hours warning is given before air action commences. This warning is given by messages dropped from the air and copies sent by hand. The warnings are always given according to a recognized form which specifies clearly the area which will be attacked and instructs the inhabitants to vacate the area before bombing commences.

6. During the period of the ultimatum, which varies from ten days to three weeks according to circumstances, intelligence is collected and a photographic mosaic of the area involved is made, and oblique photographs are taken of all possible targets. These photographs are carefully checked by the Intelligence Staff to ensure that only targets of the offending sections are engaged, and that each target is properly identified. During the whole of this period, and also after bombing, if necessary, has commenced propaganda is distributed to the tribe both by air and by land. A Political Officer with a w/t set remains in the close vicinity of the area throughout the whole of this stage and until operations are concluded. Great care is taken to ensure that the delinquents are aware of the action which is required on their part to cause cessation of operations.

7. Before any bombing is commenced, aircraft fly low over the area to see if it has been evacuated. If it has not, first of all harmless smoke bombs and then small bombs are dropped in the vicinity but away from persons or property as a further warning before serious bombing of the specified area is commenced.

8. By means of this w/t set, the Political Officer can keep Headquarters advised of developments and as the situation changes, plans can be changed or air action can be discontinued.

9. Methods of bombing vary according to the characteristics of the offending tribes and the nature of their habitat. Every effort is made to obtain results without casualties to personnel or stock and with as little damage to property as possible. In some cases, it is possible to obtain results by spreading small bombs over an area in order to keep tribes from their villages and from cultivating or using grazing. This, however, generally means protracted operations and slow results. The mentality of

the Arab is more easily impressed by tangible evidence of force, and a few well aimed bombs on the property of the head men generally produces immediate results with economy in eventual damage and hardship on both the tribes and their stock. The more determined tribesmen require definite proof of our ability to damage their property before they will submit, though they may be prepared to suffer discomfort or inconvenience for some time before doing so.

10. During the period July, 1936–March, 1937, five incidents on trade routes have occurred in the Aden Protectorate which necessitated the threat of punitive measures. One of these was successfully dealt with by the local chief backed by air demonstrations; two required actual bombing, and on the other two occasions submission was made at the last minute before bombing was commenced.

11. The two instances when bombing was necessary occurred in remote parts of the Protectorate, where Government authority had not been enforced to any great extent previously, and where the natives had no experience of the effects that could be produced by air action. Each instance arose out of holding up British Government officials on a main trade route. On the first occasion, bombing was necessary on seven days, and on the second occasion on five days, after which complete submission was made.

12. In every case, the political results have been excellent. At first there was a tendency for the delinquents to consider that the Government were merely making empty threats which they would not, or could not, put into effect. This attitude was, doubtless, due to the fact that Government authority had not been enforced in these obscure regions for some time. As soon as the first bombs went off, it was realized that the Government were in earnest and the effect was electrical. Moreover, the reactions of the neighbouring tribes over very large areas were most satisfactory. In the Hadhramaut, where the second instance occurred, it had been unsafe to travel even short distances without armed escorts. Now this is all changed and truces have been signed between all the important tribes and sections over a very large area, making trade and travel safe where previously it was impossible.

11. RECOMMENDATORY LETTER SYSTEM AND ISSUE OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO PROTECTORATE CHIEFS AND TRIBESMEN

78001/37 [No. 30]. No. 65.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 18th October, 1937.)

(No. 291.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 6th October, 1937.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a circular which I have recently had communicated to all Chiefs in the Aden Protectorate in regard to (1) the Recommendatory Letter system, a system which, in effect, involved the annual payment of about 1,800 cash presents to Chiefs' relatives, Sheikhs and headmen, etc., on the recommendation of a Chief; and (2) the free issues of arms and ammunition to Protectorate Chiefs and tribesmen.

2. It is unnecessary to dwell at greater length on the reasons governing my decision to abolish (1) and discontinue (2) as these, I think, are sufficiently set out in the circular itself. It would, however, serve a useful purpose if I referred to the financial aspects of this measure.

3. Between 15th September, 1937, and 31st March, 1938, it is expected (*a*) that over £600 will be saved under the Recommendatory Letter head and (*b*) that about £600 will be saved following the discontinuance of free issues of arms and ammunition. In the latter case the saving is a book saving only, which does not affect the present year's budget, as annual provision had not been made for an amount to cover the cost of free issues of arms and ammunition, which were bought four years ago out of Imperial funds, for a particular year.

4. In the next financial year the position will be different and the savings more than proportionately larger. Under (*a*) a saving of at least £2,000 should accrue and under (*b*) about £2,100. In this last case, and, as distinct from the present financial year, this sum represents an actual saving to Government as it will be seen in Aden despatch No. 292 of 6th October, 1937*, that it is anticipated that the present Secretariat stock of Le Gras rifles will have been exhausted before the end of March next and needs replenishment.

5. It is too early yet to judge how Protectorate Chiefs and others will react to the present circular. At the moment of drafting this despatch, nearly three weeks after its circulation, the news appears to have been received calmly, but I have not overlooked that, in the first instance, there may still be a great show of indignation followed by disturbances of the peace and even requests for the abrogation of Protectorate Treaties as this measure contemplates a violent break with a policy which appears to have started before the Great War. The Arabs, as you are aware, are notoriously conservative, and I do not doubt that at the outset Aden Protectorate tribesmen will assume that they have been deprived of a right to which they are entitled by custom if not by tradition.

6. It is, however, clear that this essential step had to be taken at some date and I consider that the present moment is propitious when it is desired to introduce a progressive policy and services in lieu of a system that amounts to placation by bribery with its attendant evil consequences.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 65.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO ALL CHIEFS.

His Excellency the Governor has for some time had under his consideration the question of the issue of arms and ammunition to Chiefs and others in the Protectorate and also the question of the Recommendatory Letter system. The reasons for the issue of arms and ammunition by the Government have been to enable Chiefs of the Protectorate to maintain peace and security in their territories and to defend their territories against attack from outside. It is well known, however, that in very many cases the arms and ammunition have not been used for proper purposes but have been sold or otherwise disposed of, with the result that they frequently fall into the hands of people for whom they are not intended. Their issue thus adds to the dangers and insecurity of the country instead of preventing them. With regard to attack from outside, the forces of His Majesty's Government are responsible for the protection of all territories within the Protectorate, and this protection is now effective.

His Excellency the Governor has therefore decided to discontinue the free issue of arms and ammunition entirely. The issue of arms and ammunition on payment will be continued temporarily, but only when the Government is satisfied that they will be put to a proper use and will not be resold or allowed to pass into the hands of people who should not possess them. His Excellency the Governor desires that as many Chiefs as possible should establish in their countries the system of Tribal Guards, to which Government assistance will be given in the manner already in force in certain Sultanates.

His Excellency the Governor desires that Chiefs and others who come to Aden at the invitation of the Government should be received honourably and with suitable entertainment, but he considers that the Recommendatory Letter system has led to jealousies and discontent and has produced bad results and he has therefore decided to discontinue it.

These decisions will come into force from the date of this notification. The Governor hopes that all Protectorate Chiefs will realize that the time has come for Government assistance to them to take a better form than the granting of these doles which have been a cause of dissensions and disturbances. The Government desires to apply its resources to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the Chiefs and all the people of the Protectorate, and His Excellency the Governor hopes that the Chiefs and their tribes will co-operate with the Government and with each other by the conclusion of truces and the settlement of their affairs by peaceful means and by putting an end to the traffic in arms and other abuses.

B. W. SEAGER,

Acting Political Secretary.

15th September, 1937.

* **78001/37** [No. 31]: not printed.

12. RUMOURED MOVEMENT OF YEMENI TROOPS—SHABWA TERRITORY

78323/38 [No. 1].

No. 66.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.42 p.m., 22nd April, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 11. 22nd April. Reports received through Assistant Resident Adviser Mukalla and Sharif of Beihan that the King of the Yemen massing troops at Jauf and Marib and their objectives are said to be Shabwa Alabr and Hadhramaut. Mukalla is trying to discover the true facts and I am establishing intelligence agency with wireless telegraph at Beihan and will keep you fully informed of the situation.

78323/38 [No. 6].

No. 67.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.25 p.m., 29th April, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 69.*]

No. 14. 29th April. My telegram of 22nd April*. Political Clerk Hodeida whose news is usually reliable reports King of the Yemen said to have ordered 300 mounted men from Marib and Harib (Sana map N.D. 38) and reinforced by irregulars from Sana to watch an intrigue with Eastern frontier tribes. He adds his opinion that if true attack on Shabwa and Seiar may be contemplated. As it seems desirable to make every effort to prevent any action which might lead to serious tension between the two Governments I intend sending Seager back to Sana with the reply to the King outlined in your despatch of 9th March† and with special task of discovering the King's intentions and if necessary warning him of possible grave consequences of Yemen active interferences with Shabwa tribes and Seiar and particularly of any Yemen attack on Shabwa or Alabr. As the King has openly displayed in his correspondence with me that both Shabwa and Seiar belong to Yemen I do not consider it impossible that he may send regular or irregular force into those areas. If this is his intention our experience is that the only effective deterrent will be the prospect that British force would at once be used to expel intruders. Air Officer Commanding considers that this could be done without difficulty by air action.

I recommend that if it appears that Yemen advance of this nature is really contemplated this retaliatory action by the Air Force be approved and that Seager be authorized to warn the Yemen Government that it will be taken. Seager leaves for Sana on the 3rd May and I therefore request urgent reply.

Meanwhile I have telegraphed on the 27th April to the King stating that reports are reaching me of preparations by his Dahm and Abida tribes to advance towards Shabwa Husnalabr, and that if true I rely on him to restrain them as any hostile action on their part would endanger the friendly relations between the two Governments.

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* No. 66. † No. 58.

78323/38 [No. 15].

No. 68.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.57 p.m., 2nd May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 69.*]

No. 15. 2nd May. My secret telegram No. 14 of the 29th April*. Reply received from the King of the Yemen which commenced by denying any intention of disturbing friendly relations. But it continues regretting incidents indicating His Majesty's Government's desire for expansion in the territory which the King claims as Yemen. He denies any intention of advancing except to protect his own country. As he clearly regards Shabwa and Alabr as being part of his own country, this statement is almost tantamount to acknowledging possibility of an advance against that district. I am therefore of opinion that nature of reply makes a warning as proposed in my telegram under reference all the more necessary. This warning would be given by Seager personally and verbally.

I have authorized Seager to tell the King of His Majesty's Government's intention as outlined in paragraph 11 of your secret despatch of the 9th March† should conditions governing advisability of doing so be apparent.

78323/38 [No. 21].

No. 69.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 8.45 p.m., 3rd May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 55. Your telegram No. 14 of 29th April*. Your telegram No. 15 of 2nd May‡. I approve. In paragraph 10 of my secret despatch of 9th March† " north west " should read " north east ".

78323/38 [No. 26].

No. 70.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.44 p.m., 9th May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 75.*]

No. 16. 9th May. Reference my telegram No. 15 of the 2nd May‡. Political Officer now at Beihan reports that Shabwa Sheikh Ahmed Nasir Quteyan has written to Sharif of Beihan's uncle who assisted Shabwa negotiations last year enquiring when his agreement with His Majesty's Government is to come into force as he has received invitation to treat with Yemen Amil of Marib, and officially reply by the 15th May. He will be advised to refuse Amil's overtures and to forward any letters received from him or other Yemen sources for information of the Aden Authorities. I am informing Seager who is now at Sana of this development by telegraph, and instructing him to seek assurance of the Yemen Government that they will abstain from any action prejudicial to His Majesty's Government in the Shabwa area and to state that failing such assurance His Majesty's Government will have to consider measures to safeguard their position in that State. I recommend that if the Yemen Government declines to give

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* No. 67. † No. 58. ‡ No. 68.

satisfactory reply I should be authorized to proceed with the conclusion of the Shabwa Agreement as approved in your despatch of the 18th August, 1937*, provided that Shabwans still desire it. Incidentally Pike of the Petroleum Concession reports that convinced that no oil in Shabwa or the neighbourhood, and apart from the loss of prestige I do not consider that British interests would be very seriously affected if Shabwa preferred to give its allegiance to Yemen, and I suggest the addition of a clause to the agreement making it terminable by either party after giving due notice.

78323/38 [No. 37]. No. 71.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.33 p.m., 17th May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 72.*]

No. 17. 17th May. Seager, who is at Sana, reports that Yemeni Foreign Minister expressed to him the view that lack of recognition of North-east line by the Italians in the recent agreement would prevent His Majesty's Government from resisting a Yemeni advance south-east of Mareb.

King of Yemen and his Government naturally do not know of the exchange of confidential notes dealing with the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 and it might go far to make the King hold his hand in the present crisis if he could be informed. I, therefore, request instructions as to whether I may so inform him.

78323/38 [No. 46]. No. 72.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 7 p.m., 21st May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 61. Your telegram No. 17†. Exchange of confidential notes defining present southern and eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen as frontiers laid down in Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 could not be communicated to King of Yemen without permission of Italian Government, who would be unlikely to agree since it was at their request, in order to avoid letting Yemen and Saudi Governments know of their acceptance of this frontier, that matter was treated as confidential. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government do not feel disposed to approach Italian Government.

2. While I appreciate advantage which might be gained in present difficulty by conveying information to King, I regret that for reason given I cannot agree to such action being taken.

3. In any case His Majesty's Government cannot accept view expressed by Yemeni Foreign Minister as reported in first part of your telegram, and unless you see strong objection, the Yemeni Foreign Minister should be informed that His Majesty's Government cannot accept this view as they do not regard recognition or non-recognition of 1914 frontier by Italy, or indeed by any other Power, as a relevant factor in the situation at all.

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* No. 55. † No. 71.

78323/38 [No. 54]. No. 73.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.26 p.m., 26th May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 19. 26th May. Addressed to the Colonial Office repeated to the British Minister at Jeddah.

Seager reports from Sana that Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a long code message on the 24th May to Ibn Saud and thinks this may have been in connexion with dispute about Shabwa and Seiar. I suggest that endeavours be made at Jeddah to ascertain whether this is so, and if the King of Yemen is consulting with Saudi Government on this subject to request the latter to advise him not to send troops to these districts or to quarrel with His Majesty's Government about them.

78323/38 [No. 62]. No. 74.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.38 p.m., 31st May, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 75.*]

No. 22. 31st May. Reference my telegram No. 16 of the 9th May*. Confidential.

Yemen Government have not yet given assurance but Seager reports that the King may agree to reciprocal undertaking to partake in *status quo*, both he and His Majesty's Government promising not to interfere with Shabwa, Kurab and Seiar. Your despatch of the 9th March Secret† authorizes the giving of undertaking in respect of the first two, but the position of Seiar is different. We maintain that they are dependants of Quaiti State and their habit of raiding Hadhramaut makes their inclusion in Hadhramaut peace system and maintenance under effective control essential. This is also required in compliance with instructions in your telegram No. 128 of 31st December, 1936, secret‡. Measures so far taken regarding Seiar have been air action, establishment of Quaiti post and Royal Air Force landing ground at Husn Al Abr and formal submission of heads of tribes reported in paragraph 662 of Hadhramaut Intelligence Summary 40, 30th January, 1938§. Circumstances may necessitate further measures to maintain control, and undertaking desired by Yemen cannot therefore be given in respect of Seiar, and I have so instructed Seager. Best solution appears to be acceptance by both Governments interested in *status quo* in the sense of retention of His Majesty's Government's already established control (on behalf of Quaiti) and freedom of action in the Seiar country and mutual non-interference with Shabwa and Kurab pending final frontier settlement, and if you approve I shall endeavour to attain this result. But refusal by His Majesty's Government to give way about Seiar may lead to refusal by the King to give assurance about Shabwa, and he may renew intrigues in that area. In that case, do you approve counter-measure proposed in my telegram of 9th May*?

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* No. 70. † No. 58. ‡ 78018/1/36 [No. 3]: not printed. § 78263/38 [No. 1]: not printed

78323/38 [No. 63].

No. 75.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5 p.m., 2nd June, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 76.*]

No. 67. Your telegram No. 16 of 9th May*. Following are conclusions of His Majesty's Government. You have already been authorized to warn the Yemeni Government that retaliatory action would be taken by Air Force in event of any advance into Protectorate. These instructions apply to any attempt to seize Shabwa area by force and warning should be conveyed to King without delay, if this has not already been done. Please report that warning has been given. His Majesty's Government agree with you, however, that Shabwa area is in itself of small importance either from a political or strategical point of view, and they adhere to view that attempt should be made to enter upon a friendly discussion with the King with a view to settlement of boundary. Care should be exercised to limit the scope of any such discussion since otherwise it may be found that areas in which Ibn Saud is interested may be brought within the purview of the negotiations.

In the meantime negotiations with the Shabwa tribes should not be proceeded with for the present.

I have now received your telegram No. 22† but see no reason to vary preceding instructions. I approve of instructions given to Seager in regard to Seiar.

78323/38 [No. 71].

No. 76.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.42 p.m., 6th June, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 24. 6th June. Your telegram No. 67 of 2nd June‡. Seager reports that at interview with the Yemeni Foreign Minister 23rd May he made it clear that advance over 45° line would be considered trespass and left the Minister in no doubt as to our action in that event. Seager has since been instructed to give warning authorized by you in clear and specific terms but I still await report that this has been done. Meanwhile information from various sources indicate that the Yemeni intention to advance in force has been abandoned at any rate for the present. This is doubtless due to Air Force patrolling over disputed area and to warning given by Seager in the manner reported. Seager is endeavouring to reach amicable settlement of maintaining position of His Majesty's Government as indicated in my telegram No. 22 of 31st May† to you but avoiding if possible any open humiliation of King of the Yemen.

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* No. 70. † No. 74. ‡ No. 75.

78323/38 [No. 75].

No. 77.

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE)

to

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR).

[*Answered by No. 80.*]

(Secret.)

MY DEAR REILLY, Downing Street, 10th June, 1938.

Will you please refer to the Secretary of State's telegram No. 67 of the 2nd June*, in which we stated that His Majesty's Government agree that the Shabwa area is of small importance either from a political or strategic point of view?

Since that telegram was sent Ingrams has seen at the Royal Geographical Society a map which shows the information obtained by Philby during his incursion into the Aden Protectorate a year or two ago. This information, we think, puts the matter in rather a new light, and I enclose a memorandum by Ingrams on the matter together with a tracing† prepared by the Royal Geographical Society, which shows the position of the important places.

I do not know how quickly discussions with the King of the Yemen as to the frontier area are likely to develop, but you should see this note without delay, and we should be glad to have your observations upon it. It may be that the Imam is ignorant of the actual position of Shabwa in relation to Beihan and Al Abr. In any case you will no doubt consult us before the negotiations reach a stage at which we are committed in any way to surrender any part of the Shabwa area.

Yours, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

NOTE ON SHABWA AREA.

Hitherto the main arguments for retaining Shabwa in the Aden Protectorate have been

1. It is historically and economically dependent on the Hadramaut with which the people have continual contacts and where they sell their salt and buy their necessities;

2. It was believed to be dependent on the Upper Aulagi Sultan;

3. It lies on the direct route from the Hadramaut to the Western Aden Protectorate.

(2) is a particularly weak argument and the other two by themselves were perhaps not sufficiently vital to insist on retaining Shabwa when at no great sacrifice it would be possible to show a spirit of accommodation to the Imam, even though he has not in recent times at any rate had anything to do with the tribes of Shabwa.

Recently, however, I had the chance of seeing the survey work excellently done by Mr. Philby on his recent invasion and I was immediately struck by the lie of the land. A tracing† of his work as far as it is relevant is attached and the following points should be noted.

Shabwa is now an astronomically fixed point and has retreated a good many miles southward of its position shown on the million map.

Al Abr is within a few miles of a point fixed by Mr. Philby and its own position is therefore probably almost a fix.

Mr. Philby reached almost to Marib town which is therefore well placed.

Mr. Philby travelled in the northern part of Aulagi country (Wadi Markha, etc.), and that is probably well placed.

Beihan is probably better placed than it has been before, though the Royal Air Force may have a fix which will settle its position finally.

Taking these points into consideration and remembering (1) that Beihan, wherever it is, is definitely ours by recognition from the Imam in accordance with the Treaty of Sanaa; and (2) that we propose to retain Al Abr and that recent air reconnaissances have shown that the Seiar Steppe is our side of the violet line, I feel that further consideration should be given to the matter of Shabwa, before we go too far on the path of surrendering it, for the following reasons.

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* No. 75. † Not reproduced.

1. It would make an extraordinarily bad frontier to come in round Al Abr and cutting out Aulagi country to return to the violet line at the points to which it has been adjusted N.E. of Beihan. (Incidentally the people in Wadi Irma definitely belong to Hadramaut and depend like those in Juhr and Rakhia westward on the Quaiti Sultan. They have corresponded with me quite recently.)

2. The violet line from the point it leaves the Beihan area by the greatest luck runs simply through a sea of sand which separates the mainland of Yemen from the mainland of Hadramaut, the "coast line" of which is well-shown on this map. To cut out Shabwa would almost be like England reannexing Calais.

It will be realized that the fact that it is Mr. Philby who has supplied this new information does not detract from its value. Sir Bernard Reilly is unaware of this new information and he may be glad to take it into consideration.

78323/38 [No. 85]. No. 78.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.35 p.m., 18th June, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 96. 18th June. Reference my telegram No. 24 of the 6th June, 1938*. Seager after giving warning to Yemeni Government returned to Aden 14th and brought the King's reply to my letter to him of the 23rd May which was based on your despatch of the 9th March† Secret.

King expresses his determination to maintain good understanding and friendship with His Majesty's Government but refuses to accord any recognition to 1914 Anglo-Turkish Convention and protests against claims by His Majesty's Government aimed at territory which he considers beyond their rights according to Article 3 of the Treaty of Sana. He disclaims any connexion between Aulaqi Sultan with Shawba and Kurab and asserts that the latter are entirely independent of the Sultan. He treats Seiar similarly in respect of their relations with Quaiti Sultan, and in particular claims Husn al Abr alleging that wells there were sunk under orders of his ancestors. He refers to our recent activities in the disputed areas where previously we had no contact and suggests that His Majesty's Government are possibly aiming at the occupation of the Yemen.

I am sending the King a short interim acknowledgement of his letter in which I assure him of continued friendship of His Majesty's Government and of their desire to respect his independence in accordance with the terms of the treaty and promising him further reply after communication of his letter to His Majesty's Government.

Copy of the King's letter follows by post with comments.

78323/38 [No. 107]. No. 79.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8th July, 1938.)

[*Answered by No. 86.*]

(Secret.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 22nd June, 1938.

I have the honour to refer to your Secret despatch of 9th March, 1938†, and to enclose a copy of the letter dated 3rd May, 1938, addressed by me to the King of the Yemen. This letter was conveyed personally to the King by the Frontier Officer, Captain B. W. Seager, who after a stay of four weeks at San'ā, during which time he endeavoured to arrive at an understanding with the Yemeni Government, has now returned to Aden with a reply from the King, a translation of which I enclose.

* No. 76. † No. 58.

2. The King professes continued friendship for His Majesty's Government, but it will be seen that he has yielded none of his claims in regard to the area in dispute. With regard to the north-east line the King's statement that the Anglo-Turkish Convention was never ratified is not correct, as the Convention was ratified in June, 1914. His Majesty's Government will also doubtless decline to accept the King's view that the Agreement embodied in the Anglo-Turkish Convention automatically lapsed as a result of the war between the two Powers concerned.

3. His Majesty's Government may nevertheless be prepared eventually to abandon their full claim up to the north-east line if a satisfactory substitute can be found. If so, I suggest that the King be informed that, while His Majesty's Government cannot accept his view of the invalidity of the north-east line, they might be willing to agree to a modification of it by a mutual friendly agreement between the two Governments, and that, pending such agreement, while unable to withdraw from any positions that they at present hold or to waive their right to take any measures necessary to safeguard the peace and security of the Hadhramaut, they are prepared for the present to limit their action in the areas in dispute to the districts that are already under their control, and to leave the question of Shabwa and the tribes in its vicinity in abeyance if the King of the Yemen will agree to do likewise. This would leave His Majesty's Government free to consolidate their position in the Shabwa district if the King refused to reciprocate in an undertaking to leave its status undetermined for the present.

4. I also enclose a copy of a Memorandum written by Captain Seager dealing with his last visit to San'ā. Captain Seager has had intimate personal contact with the Yemen for the last four years, and he has been impressed by the recent marked change of feeling towards His Majesty's Government, which has been rapidly deteriorating from friendly respect to veiled hostility. Apart from frontier questions such as the present dispute, Captain Seager attributes this development largely to the Palestine question, which, in his opinion, causes very deep and genuine concern to Arab minds. Captain Seager assures me that he has recently found the atmosphere at San'ā very different from what it was even a short time ago, and the present antipathy of the Yemeni King and his Ministers towards His Majesty's Government has been exemplified by his closing of the whole of his southern frontier to overland trade with the Aden Protectorate. His pretext for doing so has been the recent interference by Subeihis with Yemeni cars travelling on the Aden-Mafalis Road, one of the main roads leading to the Taiz district; but it appears probable that he has been largely actuated by his anger at the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding Shabwa and the Sei'ar and by his dislike of their policy in Palestine.

5. The King's present attitude towards His Majesty's Government is further indicated by his Foreign Minister's parting statement to Captain Seager that continued forward action by the Aden authorities would produce regrettable results.

6. I have been in correspondence with the King about the closing of the frontier, as reported in paragraph 474 of Aden Political Intelligence Summary No. 24 of 15th June, 1938, and enquiries are being made into the incidents on the road which provided the excuse for the King's action. I am at present endeavouring to treat this question as one distinct from the boundary dispute in the hope that it may be adjusted separately, but in present circumstances I am not very hopeful of a satisfactory issue.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Governor's Office, Aden, 3rd May, 1938.

To

His Majesty the King of the Yemen,
The Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid Ud Din,
San'a.

YOUR MAJESTY,

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter No. C/1216, dated the 4th September, 1937, and to Your Majesty's letter dated 7th Muharram, 1357, (9th March, 1937) regarding Shabwa and the tribes in that region, I am directed by His Majesty's Government to assure Your Majesty that it is not their desire to take any action in contravention of the San'ā Treaty.

2. I am desired to point out that, under Article 3 of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agreed to maintain the position in regard to the southern frontier of the Yemen as it existed at the time of the signature of the Treaty; that such an agreement could affect, and did affect, only the political dividing line between the areas administered by the Yemeni Government and those under the protection of the British Government; and that these areas were contiguous from the coast opposite Perim to the north-eastern boundary of the Beihan province. Your Majesty will doubtless recollect that it was only this line that formed the subject of the discussions upon which the Treaty was based. Beyond Beihan the areas administered by Your Majesty in 1934 were not in fact immediately adjacent to the area claimed by His Majesty's Government as being under their protection.

3. I am further directed to say that His Majesty's Government would gladly defer, were it possible, to Your Majesty's expressed wish that all reference to treaties concluded with the late Ottoman Government should be excluded from these discussions, but Your Majesty will hardly fail to appreciate that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914 was an internationally valid agreement concluded with the then recognized Ruler or Suzerain of the territories bordering upon the areas in Southern Arabia under British protection; and that, while British relations with the several tribes in the Protectorate are based upon the several treaties concluded with them, the definition of the northern boundary of the whole area included in the Anglo-Turkish Convention is clearly authoritative. While, therefore, His Majesty's Government do not claim to derive their rights of suzerainty from the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the latter has always been regarded—and must continue to be regarded—as evidence of the geographical extent of the area under British influence. The boundary line as defined in those treaties passes considerably north of the areas occupied by the tribes of Shabwa, and these areas are therefore indisputably within the territory which the British Government has always claimed in the past as lying within the sphere of its influence.

4. Since therefore the Shabwa area is geographically within the limits claimed to be under British suzerainty, and since the area under Yemeni administration in 1934 lay at some distance both from the Shabwa area and from the Protectorate boundary to the north of it, as laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention, it is the view of His Majesty's Government that no administrative action taken therein can be construed as a breach of Article 3 of the San'ā Treaty.

5. Moreover, the tribes of Shabwa, though it is admitted that no very close contact has been maintained with them in the past, have always been regarded as being subsidiary to the Upper Aulaqi Sultan, with whom His Majesty's Government have been in Treaty relations since 1903, and consequently as being covered by the provisions of the latter's Treaty with His Majesty's Government. It is only because it has become apparent in recent years that the tribes of Shabwa are not in practice subordinate to the Upper Aulaqi Sultan at the present date, that the Aden authorities have recently considered the conclusion with them of a Treaty similar in kind to the treaties with all other tribes and rulers within the area of British influence.

6. I am further authorized to suggest, for Your Majesty's consideration, that, in view of Your Majesty's attitude on the boundary question, and having regard to the probability that officers of the Yemeni Administration may in future come into closer contact with those of the Protectorate Government in the area north-east of Beihan, arrangements might suitably be made at some convenient date for an informal and friendly discussion between representatives of the two Governments with a view to arriving at an agreed settlement in regard to the Yemeni-Protectorate boundary in this area.

7. The foregoing deals with the question of Shabwa.

But with reference to Your Majesty's letter of 7th Muharrum, 1357 (9th March, 1938) in which Your Majesty claims the Ahl Sei'ar as well as Shabwa to be in the Yemeni Kingdom, and complains of certain recent activities on the part of His Majesty's Government in connexion with this tribe and in their territory, it must be clear to Your Majesty that the arguments and facts quoted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter apply equally to the Ahl Sei'ar as they do to Shabwa and its tribes.

Moreover, the Ahl Sei'ar are considered to be subordinate to the Qu'aiti Sultan of Mukalla. It is realized that certain nomads of the Ahl Sei'ar, trade and graze in, and have constant contact with Your Majesty's Kingdom, but this is only a limited number and does not affect the principles set forth in the preceding paragraphs. These nomadic Sei'ar may be compared to similar tribal movements of the Bal Harith in the Beihan area.

I take this opportunity to convey to Your Majesty the expression of my high esteem and regard.

B. R. Reilly,
Governor.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

(Translation.)

San'ā, dated 7th Rabi II 1357.
= 5th June, 1938.

From

His Majesty the King of the Yemen,
The Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid Ud Din,
San'ā.

To

His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief,
Aden.

After Compliments,

We have received your esteemed letter No. 385/38/612 dated 3rd Rabi' Awwal, 1357 (3rd May, 1938) through Captain Seager and have gone through it with full respect, thoroughness and deep care and interest. As we personally in particular and our Government in general have sincerely and truthfully agreed and are determined in an absolute manner to maintain love, earnestness and good understanding and treatment with the great British Government, we deem it suitable and necessary to make a frank and just declaration (viz. representation) and in reply to your letter under reference to explain the following articles:—

1. Your Excellency knows that there had been negotiations which lasted about 15 years or more between the two Governments, part of which were lengthy official correspondence and all of which refused in an absolute manner any contract (pact), or discussion or plan (viz. arrangement) made with the Ottomans or others relating to Yemen and an agreement has lastly and finally been arrived at on this basis between the two parties to confine the understanding and decision direct between the two Governments only, and on this basis the auspicious Treaty was concluded between the two kingdoms and we pray God that that Treaty shall be observed (viz. maintained) and its terms executed under the goodwill and friendship of both parties. Such being the case, it is not conceivable that there should be any place for the repetition of claims relying on those (alleged) documents which were already refused. For this reason we can find no way or reasonable authority to repeat the mention or reference to those refused documents and to make them as an authority or basis to rely on in justifying the execution of the desire for expansion of lands inside or within our pure (viz. real) territory. The attempt to approach or have connexion with such places as (those of) Al Karab including Shabwa where there exist up to date, some of our soldiers residing there viz. the Qarmushiyun, and (with places such as) as Sei'ar including Al 'Abr in which a Husn (fort) known as the Husn of Al Hadi, our great grandfather, is but a delusion and merely following the rule—" Rule is for the Conqueror " (Right is might). Your Excellency knows that the document which you claim and which you call as the British-Ottoman Agreement of 1914 cannot in any way be considered as binding either from an international point of view or from a special (viz. private) point of view because it is simply a paper methodically incomplete and undecided (or unacceptable) by both Governments and unratified by the Royal sides of both parties. Over and above this, that paper mentioned for was not placed for execution not even for a single day or an hour, either before or after but subsequent to its conclusion, the two contracting Governments entered into a state of war with one another which lasted four years in all parts (of the world) and in accordance with Public Law, every contract or decision, pact, understanding or plan (viz. arrangement) is abolished from its basis, root and branch between belligerents. The rise and desire for gain and the argument impressed on us now by means of such worthless implements, is unbecoming of the dignity, honour and greatness of the great British Government.

2. The understanding and decision arrived at between the two Governments in all transactions and its branches have been confined without any restriction to any part or item, to the articles of the Treaty signed by both Governments honourably and truthfully by both sides. We did not believe or imagine that it will be followed by an unbecoming treatment such as this. It must not occur between loving and sincere contracting

parties who undertook to be sincere and to maintain the firm undertaking and agreement signed by both of them. The honourable Treaty referred to has confined the conflicting or points of disagreement between both sides and declared it in Article 3 very clearly and plainly and showed the way of its solution in a friendly way and by agreement. It is not reasonable that means shall be created and claims made outside the contents or text of the Treaty and the idea constituting it.

3. As to the attempt for invention that there exists between Al Karab tribe including Shabwa (on the one part) and the Aulaqi Sultan (on the other) any relation or connexion and to the cherishing of profit by this reference, this is justly speaking causing great surprise. Your Excellency knows that there exist between the Aulaqi Sultan and the said tribe no old bindings or administrative relations up to now, but if it is intended to base the claims on imaginary relations, it is refused from its origin. Take for granted that there exist any private relations of neighbourhood between the two tribes, do these relations make the Al Karab tribe which is entirely independent of the Aulaqis in as far as territory, country, and relationships are concerned, connected with it or subordinate to it. We do not hesitate in deciding that you will not answer this except negatively. If we allow ourselves freedom to make such claims, shall we be at right if we say that we have relations with Lahej, Dhalā, the Fadhli country and the Hadhramaut? Will such things be not considered as violating the undertaking, if we make it as a means to get what rights we have in these localities, the taking of a final decision on them has been postponed and we desire to have them executed now? The subordination of As Sei'ar to the Queiti Sultan or the Sultan of Mukalla does not go beyond the meaning of that very thing understood and explained above.

4. It is certain, self-evident and an agreed fact which accepts no objection and free from doubt that the said places are part of our old and original country. It is a known clear fact that till recent days there had been no relation or connexion between the Government of Aden and the said places. The Government of Aden did not claim till recently anything of the sort except in your letter No. 388 dated Rabi' Awwal 1356 (15th May, 1937). In it Your Excellency requested and asked us, basing your point of view on the introduction that the desert tribes residing on the corner of the Empty Quarter for maintenance of security and peace between them by concluding a three year's truce and requesting us to help in that and in that Your Excellency touched our feeling while mentioning the protected tribes by referring to Al Karab tribe and we had answered Your Excellency at once in our letter dated 27th Rabi' Al Awal 1356 (7th June, 1937) by explaining that the Al Karab tribe, as also the Sei'ar are of the Yemeni original tribes which have had no relation up to now with any other side. We express with much regret that after this the attempts of Aden Government continued by sending aircrafts and by endeavouring to obtain papers from some inhabitants of Al Karab. They have likewise sent their aircrafts to fly over Al 'Abr in the direction of Sei'ar tribe and landed in that place and took a group of men of Sei'ar tribe by force in their aircraft and led them to the interior of the Hadhramaut and they continue to be under captivity up to now. They have established a military post over the Al 'Abr wells dug by our ancestors over 1,000 years ago and it is attached to us till to-day without any claim or interference having been made for it previous to this by any direction (or Government). These manœuvres and the like ought not to have been made with the Yemeni country which is in treaty with the great British Government. Notwithstanding all these stubborn claims also, nothing can be profited except that there exists no relation or connexion between the Aden Government and the said places up to now. It is stated that in these recent days, that in spite of the provisions of the treaty, the Government of Aden has passed a judgment in favour of themselves to expand the occupied territory and to add to them new territory of the Yemen Kingdom.

5. As we on our side have submitted and declared all that proves our rights and all that which necessitates the moderation of the Aden Government in this matter in our letter dated 23 Jamad I, 1356 (1st August, 1937), we repeat and assure and request the great British Government from an honour and justice point of view not to go so far as to violate the firm undertaking concluded between the Governments, the maintenance of which is based on

honour, and to start executing the expansion as an ambition for the barren desert and poor villages for they have never been one day fit or worthy of the ambition of any ambitious person whoever he may be. It is not conceivable that any profit or benefit would be gained by the Aden Government by such expansion unless they have an idea (intention) to occupy the Yemen. As to our side, it is actually considered to be one of our forts in order to keep the neutrality and continuance of the administration of the Kingdom and its protection.

6. In addition to all that we have stated in this, we return, repeat and confirm and assure you in a sincere and eternal manner that we have not spread any action whatever which would cause any infringement or touch the honour, dignity and security of the British Government's administration at all and everywhere. For this we with our complete sincerity and resolution inform and assure Your Excellency that we are prepared and ready to accept and enforce all that which the British Government wish to do for the peace and security of the roads and the continuance of the communications and the administration of the country which is under their authority till the date of the conclusion of the auspicious treaty between both sides and we do not ask for anything other than requesting that no attention would be directed to expand or annex new territory from our poor country.

7. It is a known fact that great Powers pride in justice and uncovetousness in the rights (viz. countries) of others without justification. The most fit men to observe these noble qualities is the great British Government due to the precedency they possess in the line of or among Great Powers. It is also a known fact that the reversion to the way of justice and equity is nobler and more honourable and loftier than the persistence to digest (viz. to take away) the rights (countries) of others. Notwithstanding this it is expected of Your Excellency if the order for expansion has been issued by the London Government to explain to them fully that it is not feasible to persist on these causes for the required expansion. You were the person who conducted the honourable Treaty and who knows those territories which have no (previous) relations with the great British Government.

8. We request the high and great British Government kindly to direct their just and true attention towards us and to place reliance on our actions and moral and material hopes, that we shall always firmly be helpful and useful and shall have regard for the beloved great British Government at all times viz. at the present and future times.

Greetings!

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

MEMORANDUM.

(Secret.)

I submit the following observations on my recent visit to the Yemen (3rd May to 14th June) in connexion with the north eastern frontier.

2. At the outset I should state that it is beyond any question of doubt that the Yemeni Government had, at no time, anticipated that we should take up the line set out in the Secretary of State's Secret despatch of 9th March, 1938*, in regard to that part of the frontier.

3. I presented the Arabic letter I carried (based on the instructions set out in the despatch referred to above) from the Aden Government to the King through the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 11th May last and so furious was he on reading it that, instead of receiving me in first audience within three days as has been his practice in the past four years, he kept me kicking my heels for a total of nine days. It may be of interest to report that he gave out to his advisers on or about 18th May last that if he had known in advance of the contents of the letter I carried he would have given orders to his troops to go ahead and attack over the 45 degree line.

4. It became evident to me that if, following the presentation of the letter, I also passed on the warning specifically it was more than likely that he would consider himself too humiliated and take a course which he would have regretted later. It should

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* No. 58.

be borne in mind that the whole of the Yemen had been aware of his preparations and the purpose of them; while the Yemeni tribes immediately on his side of the 45 degree line, whom he wanted to employ in the operations, have never been wholly loyal to him. The letter I carried was, in the circumstances, a great shock to him as, owing to his mistaken forecast of our reactions, he had prepared no graceful line or lines of retreat which would save his face, dignity and prestige (as it is, he knows and I know that, at present the tribes referred to above are enjoying a huge laugh at his expense and this must infuriate him). For days and weeks, I was reliably informed, he brooded and fumed and I deemed it expedient, in the abnormal circumstances ruling, to postpone the passing on of the warning in specific terms in case any words of " provocation " might make him desperate. I took good care, however, to pass on through several sources, which would inevitably lead to him, what steps we would take in the event of Yemeni aggression: and on 23rd May I made it clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that any advance over the 45 degree line would be considered a trespass and left him in little doubt as to our action in that event.

5. On 7th June the King took a decision, which I had foreshadowed in my letter of 24th May last, namely, to content himself merely with a reply to the letter I had taken up with me. As I saw it, after a fortnight's stay in the capital, it was the only decision he could take in the circumstances. Once he had *taken* the decision and it was tolerably clear that he was not going ahead with further war-like preparations, I visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicated the warning to him specifically for the information of His Majesty. Raghib was apparently well prepared for this communication and in his turn passed on a warning saying that " if we continued to go ahead the results would be most unfortunate ". From this he led me to believe that the Yemenis would oppose any forward policy of the Aden Government in the area under dispute.

6. The passing on of the return warning and the closing of the frontier is a sign of the times and is an indication of the King's temper and shows to what extent Anglo-Yemeni relations have deteriorated of recent months. In my main report on the Yemen of 11th April last I laid stress on the effect of our Palestine policy on the Yemeni King and on prominent Yemenis. There is, under this head alone, a considerable hardening of opinion against His Majesty's Government and I should be the least surprised to learn that the King's present bias and prejudice against His Majesty's Government because of her policy in Palestine has caused him, almost in spite of himself, to take up an unreasonable and unhelpful attitude over the matter of the north-eastern frontier. This brings me to a subject which, while it is irrelevant in the present memorandum, I would do well to set down in parenthesis. (From the few official papers I have read in recent months and from what I have heard, I have been considerably astonished at the opinions which appear to have been expressed by responsible British Officials in other parts of Arabia who apparently hold the belief that because an Arab Ruler or Chieftain or Seiyid or Sheikh or Notable is careful enough to be extremely guarded in the expression of his views about Palestine, it can be assumed that the individual in question does not take the matter very seriously. The reverse is the case, I cannot lay sufficient stress and emphasis on the fact that all literate Arabs with their one-track religious minds are ardent supporters of the Arab Cause in Palestine and will do all they can secretly or openly, directly or indirectly, to help the Cause and thwart or embarrass His Majesty's Government whenever a chance presents itself. It would be unnatural if they did otherwise. If no action, such for instance as I outlined in my Memorandum of 4th April last, can be taken to placate them or keep them in check, it should at least be known what is their real attitude. I have had, perhaps the unique privilege, of travelling about in a foreign Moslem State in Arabia for 5½ months in the past 11 months where I have lived with and been in exclusive touch with Moslems in every walk of life and I should indeed fail lamentably in my duty if I did not place these views on record).

7. But to return to the north-eastern frontier. It is not unlikely that the King of the Yemen after expressing his views on paper may content himself, for the time being, by holding a watching brief on events in the area under dispute; and I venture to suggest that we do the same for the time being with the one difference that we continue to control the Ahl Seiar as loosely as it may be possible to do so. The Yemeni King may let us be, but I say this with reserve in view of the clear warning passed on to me by Raghib.

B. W. SEAGER.

18th June, 1938.

78323/38 [No. 109].

No. 80.

SIR BERNARD REILLY (GOVERNOR)

to

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Received 15th July, 1938.)

[*Answered by No. 86.*]

(Secret.)

MY DEAR COWELL, Government House, Aden, 29th June, 1938.

Thank you for your secret letter of 10th June* enclosing a memorandum by Ingrams about Shabwa, together with a tracing prepared by the Royal Geographical Society. As you will have seen from my telegram of 18th June†, Seager returned from San'ā without arriving at any settlement of the frontier question with the King of the Yemen who still refuses to recognize the N.E. line, and continues to maintain his claim in this direction to all territory that was not under effective British control at the time of the signature of the Treaty of San'ā in February, 1934. In the circumstances no part of the British claim to all territory up to the N.E. line has so far been surrendered, nor would I commit His Majesty's Government in any way to such a surrender without the Secretary of State's previous approval. All that has been done as regards Shabwa is to suggest that neither side should for the present attempt to enforce its claim to it. The Yemeni Government have not, however, yet agreed to a reciprocal undertaking of this nature, and it is for this reason that I have recommended in my telegram of 9th May‡, and again in my despatch of 22nd June§, that, failing an assurance of this nature from the Yemen, His Majesty's Government should consider themselves free to safeguard their position in the Shabwa district, either by proceeding with the previously proposed agreement with Shabwa, or by other means.

2. The exact position of Husn Al'Abr has now been fixed by the R.A.F., and is about 15 miles W.N.W. from where we thought it was and 13 miles inside the North-east line. Our present location of Al 'Abr corresponds with that given by Philby.

The R.A.F. have not had an opportunity of fixing Shabwa, but Philby's placing of it is about 10 miles S.S.W. from where it was latterly considered by us to be.

The position of Beihan al Qasab was definitely fixed about four years ago, and its position is 45° 47′ E. and 14° 48′ N. Part of the Beihan territory thereby lies beyond the North-east line, which incidentally is incorrectly shown on our existing maps.

3. I realize that a frontier that included Beihan and Husn al 'Abr in the Protectorate and left Shabwa to the Yemen would be an extremely irregular one, but it would not be more irregular than the frontier that now exists nearer to Aden as a result of allowing the Yemen to retain the large Beidha salient. An irregular frontier of this sort is obviously open to many objections, but in the case of Beidha it has not given rise to any insuperable difficulties, and I do not think that it would necessarily do so in the case of Shabwa, although I agree that it is undesirable to admit the Yemen to an enclave on the Protectorate side of the natural barrier of sand that extends North-eastwards from Beihan.

4. Of the three reasons for the retention of Shabwa that Ingrams mentions in his memorandum, we have hitherto emphasized its alleged dependence on the Upper Aulaqi Sultan because in the negotiations that preceded the Treaty of San'ā we frequently asserted that we were in practice claiming only territory that was covered by existing Protectorate treaties. On this principle, for example, we did not press our claim to Beidha because no treaty had been signed by us with its Sultan, although it is clearly within our side of the Anglo-Turkish boundary line. Similarly we have based our claim to the Sei'ar country mainly on the ground that this tribe is covered by our Protectorate Treaty with the Sultan of Mukalla. If, at this stage, we abandon our contention that the Shabwa area is covered by an existing treaty, and at the same time admit that we were not in effective control of it when the Treaty of San'ā was signed, our claim to it will remain based only on the continued validity of the old Anglo-Turkish boundary, on which we have not insisted in the case of Beidha. I think this undoubtedly weakens our claim in the case of Shabwa.

5. The other two arguments for retaining Shabwa that are mentioned by Ingrams are that it is historically and economically dependent on the Hadhramaut, and that it lies on the direct route to the Western Aden Protectorate. It might similarly be claimed that Beidha and the southern districts of the Yemen in the neighbourhood of Ta'iz are

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* No. 77. † No. 78. ‡ No. 70. § No. 79.

historically and economically more dependent on Aden than on San'ā, for many of their people have long habitually come to Aden for employment, and they draw most of their supplies from Aden. Beidha also lies on the direct route from Aden to Beihan. We have nevertheless acquiesced in the exclusion of these areas from the Protectorate without any very bad results, although the King of the Yemen's habit of sometimes closing his frontier as a protest against lawlessness in the Protectorate undoubtedly causes considerable inconvenience both to the people of these districts and to Aden itself.

6. There are, however, strategic reasons against the surrender of Shabwa, and these have been very clearly stated by the Air Officer Commanding in a letter that he has now written to me. He writes as follows:—

"4. The chief value of the Aden Protectorate from a strategical point of view in so far as defence of the Colony is concerned is that it provides a buffer between the fortress and the Yemen which would be especially valuable should the Yemen become more powerful from a military point of view or be absorbed by a first class Power. In so far as this aspect of the problem is concerned, the giving away of a few miles of territory near Shabwa would be a matter of little importance owing to its distance from Aden.

"5. From an internal security and frontier point of view, however, such a cession of territory could not I suggest be regarded so lightly.

Under existing conditions, if the Imam wants to advance towards the East in the direction of the Hadhramaut he must first of all concentrate his forces in the vicinity of Marib. The next stage involves a long trek across an open and waterless desert which provides ideal conditions for the employment of aircraft by us and it was these conditions which caused me to say with such confidence recently that no difficulty would be experienced in dealing with the Imam's forces should they advance, provided we were given a free hand in the taking of air action.

If on the other hand the Imam were allowed to establish himself at Shabwa and could commence his advance from there either into the Hadhramaut or to Husn al 'Abr, our task would be very much more difficult. It is true we could always bomb him out of Husn al 'Abr even if he got there but air action in the Hadhramaut proper would be more difficult once his forces mixed with the local population.

You are better able to judge the effect upon the confidence and morale of the people of the Eastern Protectorate should the Imam be allowed to establish himself at Shabwa, but I am inclined to feel that one of the effects would be a lowering of confidence in His Majesty's Government added to which the Yemenis would be in a better position to intrigue against us. I might also mention that one possible motor road to the Hadhramaut would pass through Shabwa.

"6. Presumably if it were decided to allow the Imam to occupy Shabwa, suitable safeguards would be provided on paper against further aggression. No doubt the Imam would keep his bond so long as he lives, but I wonder whether his successors would be equally reliable and from a military point of view it therefore seems a pity to relinquish the admirable natural barrier now provided by the desert between Marib and Shabwa or Husn al 'Abr."

7. Air Commodore McClaughry's arguments are undoubtedly strong ones, and they, added to those put forward by Ingrams, lead me to reconsider the view expressed in my telegram of 9th May that, apart from loss of prestige, British interests would not be very seriously affected if Shabwa were included in the Yemen.

8. The solution that I have suggested is that the question of its future should be left in abeyance for the present, provided that the King of the Yemen will agree to this course and will abstain from trying to enforce his claim to it; but that, if the King declines to accede to this arrangement, His Majesty's Government should proceed in the manner proposed in my telegram of 9th May and my despatch of 22nd June, to which I have referred in the first paragraph of this letter. The first alternative would produce a neutral zone, such as that established on part of the frontier between Iraq and Sa'ūdi Arabia, which, if accepted by both Governments, would, I think, be unobjectionable. The Air Officer Commanding is in agreement with the policy that I have recommended.

Yours, &c.,

B. R. REILLY.

78323/38 [No. 116]. No. 81.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 12.7 p.m., 13th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 82.*]

No. 56. 13th September. Yemeni official with 20 soldiers reported at Shabwa demanding hostages possibility of more following. Subject to your approval propose sending political officer by air to land and find out exact position. Shall be glad of early reply. Seager passed on to the Yemeni Government the warning approved in your telegram of 3rd May*.

78323/38 [No. 124]. No. 82.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 9.0 p.m., 16th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 89. Your telegram No. 56†. Despatch of Political Officer to Shabwa. I approve.

78323/38 [No. 126]. No. 83.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 3.55 p.m., 16th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 84.*]

No. 60. 16th September. My telegram No. 56, 13th September†, report of reliable agent returned yesterday from Shabwa has caused me to abandon proposal to send aircraft with Political Officer through fear of incident. Aircraft reconnoitring to-morrow area of Beihan, Shabwa and Abr. Agent reports Yemeni reinforcements expected in eight days. Have telegraphed to King of the Yemen requesting him to stop reinforcing, if true, to withdraw Agent and tribesmen from Shabwa and to cease from intrigue in an area which is indisputably within territory under British influence. I have told him that the question of Shabwa is now under reference to His Majesty's Government, and that any advance towards Shabwa by Yemeni forces might have unfortunate results. Might I be authorised to repeat verbatim warning given the King through Seager last May which I assume holds good. I propose taking retaliatory air action should an advance be made on Abr within the next few days. Saudi Agent reported to be watching events at Shabwa.

78323/38 [No. 131]. No. 84.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 6.30 p.m., 20th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 85.*]

No. 91. Your telegram No. 60‡. Shabwa. I approve your proposals.

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* No. 69. † No. 81. ‡ No. 83.

78323/38 [No. 135]. No. 85.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 3.18 p.m., 23rd September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 86.*]

No. 65. 23rd September. Your telegram No. 91* Shabwa, warning sent yesterday. It is probable from the latest reports that Yemeni reinforcements which most likely (? are) tribes from Abida and other(s) in the vicinity of Marib will be sent to Shabwa in parties of five to ten at a time.

This scheme of gradual occupation of Shabwa makes an air action against advancing reinforcements difficult if not impossible and also against the Yemenis actually in occupation by reason of the latter being mixed with Shabwans and undesirability of damaging Shabwa itself.

As forced Yemeni occupation of Shabwa, either by this or any other method, cannot be tolerated, I may therefore have to recommend to you that Yemeni garrison there is ordered to withdraw under penalty of air action against Yemeni bases of Marib and Harib.

78323/38 [No. 140]. No. 86.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 8.0 p.m., 27th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 90.*]

No. 95. Your telegram No. 54 of 8th September†, and connected correspondence. Proposals in your secret despatch of 22nd June‡ have been considered by departments concerned, and I now convey to you approval for reply being sent to King of the Yemen as proposed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that despatch, but in view of considerations set out in Reilly's letter to Cowell of 29th June§, while offer of friendly discussion to reach agreement as to line of frontier to be observed should be repeated, no reference to a possible modification of the frontier should be made.

I note position disclosed in your telegram No. 65 of 23rd September‖, and that you will consult me on matter if necessary.

Instructions as to policy to be adopted if King refuses to reciprocate in an undertaking to leave status of Shabwa area undetermined for the present, will follow shortly. In view, however, of international situation you should take any steps possible to avoid situation arising in which air action against Yemen or Yemeni forces will be needed.

78323/38 [No. 141]. No. 87.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 12.38 p.m., 27th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 70. 27th September. My telegram, No. 60, 16th September¶, Shabwa King of the Yemen in a telegram dated 20th September last, has replied in his usual ambiguous phraseology that he does not wish to disturb at present relations between both Governments, and expresses the conviction that after reading his letter, 5th June last, a copy of which was transmitted to you under cover of Reilly's secret despatch, 22nd June last‡, His Majesty's Government are now well aware of the strength of his case and will have regard for justice.

I do not propose to reply to his telegram at present.

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* No. 84. † 78323/38 [No. 115]: not printed. ‡ No. 79. § No. 80. ‖ No. 85. ¶ No. 83.

78323/38 [No. 150]. No. 88.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 5.30 p.m., 29th September, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 93.*]

No. 72. 29th September. I am informed that on 17th September a battalion of regulars with two guns and three machine guns left Sana for Al Jauf via Amran under the command of Sherif Abdullah Dumain who it is said will probably be instructed to proceed to Shabwa either direct or via Marib.

It is reported reliably also that the Yemen Government intend to avail themselves of the opportunity given to them by the present international crisis to initiate a forward movement in Shabwa Al Abr areas.

78323/38 [No. 158]. No. 89.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 10.0 p.m., 6th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 90.*]

No. 102. My telegram No. 95 of 27th September*. Shabwa. Consideration has been given to policy to be adopted if King refuses to reciprocate in undertaking to leave status of Shabwa area undetermined for the present. While the advantages of proceeding with the negotiation of agreements with the tribes in this area are not overlooked, it is felt that for the present at any rate, while the Palestine situation is acute such action should be avoided even at risk that tribes may enter into relations with Yemen.

I do not wish, however, to rule out the possibility of taking some active steps later, and you will no doubt make recommendations to me if necessary, but for the moment I think it best to proceed cautiously. You should reply to King's letter in conciliatory terms renewing suggestion of friendly and informal discussion contemplated in paragraph 10 of my despatch of 9th March†.

78323/38 [No. 165]. No. 90.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9 a.m., 8th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 91 and 94.*]

No. 77. 8th October. Your telegram No. 95* and your telegram No. 102‡. Shabwa. Telegraphic reply to Yemeni King's letter in the sense desired by you was sent 28th September and his reply is awaited. I note the instructions contained in your telegram No. 102.

In the meantime reports of small reinforcements to Shabwa and of an intensive advance in the very near future continue to reach me. I assume approval given in your telegram No. 91§ to meet Yemeni advance by retaliatory air action still holds good in spite of cautionary nature of your telegram No. 102 and Shabwans have been assured that they need not fear Yemeni occupation. If Yemenis are now permitted to occupy Shabwa by peaceful infiltration (my telegram No. 65‖) without retaliation effect on the Shabwans and all the protectorate will be bad. I therefore recommend action against bases contemplated in my telegram No. 65.

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* No. 86. † No. 58. ‡ No. 89. § No. 84. ‖ No. 85.

78323/38 [No. 166]. No. 91.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 7.30 p.m., 12th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 92.*]

No. 104. Your telegram No. 77 of 8th October*. Question of policy to be pursued is being considered urgently, and I hope to telegraph instructions shortly. Meantime please telegraph when and in what precise terms assurance was given to Shabwans that they need not fear Yemeni occupation.

78323/38 [No. 169]. No. 92.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.1 p.m., 14th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 79. 14th October. Your telegram No. 104 of 12th October†. Copies of the warning to the Yemeni King (my telegram No. 60 of 16th September‡ and your telegram No. 91 of 20th September§ refers) were dropped on the Yemeni and Aulaqi Sultans on 23rd September but it is reported to-day that copy at Shabwa was not received by Shabwans but picked up by the Yemenis and handed to their agent at Al Qardai. Contents of warning will however certainly have reached the Shabwans through the Sultan who has sent me a protest against Yemeni peaceful penetration. King was warned that any Yemeni force advancing into the area in question and constituting a threat to Shabwa or Al Abr would be expelled by air action.

78323/38 [No. 172]. No. 93.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.35 p.m., 15th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 81. 15th October. Recent reports from Abr by wireless are (1) Yemeni agent at Qardai "Surveying" Shabwa district (2) asking for pledges from local chiefs (3) stated he and his followers will next proceed to blockade (? Abr) and the Hadhramaut (4) also reported that Sharif Abdullah Dumain in Jauf will proceed either to Shabwa or Abr (my telegram No. 72 of 29th September‖). I cannot state reliability of reports. Certain tribes are reported to have pledged themselves to Yemeni Government but the majority appear to be waiting to see the policy of His Majesty's Government.

I consider that as long as the Yemeni agent remains on the spot in Shabwa and His Majesty's Government remain in the background Yemeni Government boundaries make headway. The danger lies in the possibility of the agent collecting representative hostages from Shabwa tribes and sending them to the Yemen which would virtually mean the handing over of Shabwa and or El Abr title deeds to the Yemenis. Recent air demonstration over the district had good moral effect and will be repeated on the 17th.

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* No. 90. † No. 91. ‡ No. 83. § No. 84. ‖ No. 88.

78323/38 [No. 173]. No. 94.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 11.15 p.m., 18th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 97.*]

No. 106. Secret. Your telegram No. 77 of 8th October* Shabwa. Question has been further considered by interested Departments in consultation with Reilly. I confirm that in the event of advance of Yemeni troops across the frontier the authority previously telegraphed to you to expel intruders by air action still holds good. This authority does not, however, cover air action in what is recognised as Yemeni territory and His Majesty's Government are not prepared to sanction action against Yemeni bases of Marib and Harib. At the same time His Majesty's Government consider it most desirable that steps should be taken to prevent Yemeni Government gradually occupying Shabwa by methods of infiltration against which air action is impracticable. If it becomes clear that Imam will not agree to refrain from such interference in Shabwa, you should try to arrange for a small irregular force from either Western or Eastern Protectorate to occupy Shabwa on lines similar to those already adopted in Husn Al Abr. In that event it would seem desirable to negotiate with Shabwa tribes temporary agreements for the provision and maintenance of a landing ground and other facilities (thus ensuring rapid communication) in return for small payment. So far as applicable these agreements could follow Article two of draft enclosed with your despatch confidential (2) of the 23rd June, 1937†. Question of negotiating full protectorate agreements should not be pursued for present. Please telegraph your views as soon as possible.

78323/38 [No. 180]. No. 95.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 11.25 p.m., 18th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 96.*]

No. 82. 18th October. My telegram No. 77, of the 8th October*. Reply now received from Yemeni King, of which précis is as follows, he starts by repeating his non-recognition of Anglo-Turkish Frontier Agreement, thereby giving him cause to consider His Majesty's Government's interests in Shabwa as a breach of *status quo*. He continues by giving assurance of the maintenance of friendship and professes improbability of commitment by him of any act contrary to the terms of the treaty. He states that he is "always prepared to come to agreement," and will not agree to any disturbance of the peace or the safety of Hadhramaut. He concludes with assurance of sincere neighbourly relations with His Majesty's Government and expects reciprocal treatment. He also adds that the presence of Yemeni agent in Shabwa is for the purpose of concluding truces between section of tribes in the vicinity. This latter statement is, of course, absurd.

Subject to your approval, I propose taking advantage of portion of the King's reply quoted above in inverted commas, and again suggest reciprocal non-interference with Shabwa District pending agreement between the two Governments.

This would necessitate withdrawal of Yemeni agent and party on which I should lay stress.

78323/38 [No. 181]. No. 96.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 10.0 p.m., 19th October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 107. Your telegram No. 82 of 18th October‡, Shabwa. See my telegram No. 106§. I approve proposed action.

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* No. 90. † No. 54 ‡ No. 95. § No. 94.

78323/38 [No. 184]. No. 97.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 8.20 p.m., 21st October, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 86. 21st October. Your telegram No. 106 of 18th October*.

Your instructions are noted. I am again addressing the King (your telegram No. 107 of 19th October†) and shall now add to further request for reciprocal non-interference in Shabwa the information of receipt of your instructions to occupy Shabwa if he refuses. I shall also repeat warning (my telegram No. 65 of 23rd September‡).

I have discussed with the Air Officer Commanding question of occupation of Shabwa by small irregular force and consider it quite feasible with air co-operation as in the case of Abr. *

In view of the fact that the King has already been told that His Majesty's Government's claim to Shabwa is based on protective treaty with the Upper Aulaqi Sultan I propose that the irregular force should be found from his tribesmen and have sent the Political Officer by air to-day to discuss with him details of advance and occupation needs.

Should the King's reply be unfavourable and necessitate action proposed I shall inform you of details of execution in due course. Probably garrison of 20 would suffice provided they had wireless telegraphy. I agree regarding desirability of conclusion of agreement on lines proposed by you and anticipate no difficulty. Negotiations would be commenced by Political Officer immediately after landing of aircraft and occupation of Shabwa by irregulars.

I consider garrison which would probably only be temporary would preferably be furnished by Government guards in view of claims to Shabwa by several Protectorate Chiefs, but present size of force and non-completion of training precludes this for the present. But this might be possible later on should a proposal which I am submitting to increase force be sanctioned. A Government guard garrison would effect a saving in pay of tribal garrison.

The month of fasting commences 25th October, and it is possible (1) that the King's reply may be delayed, (2) Yemeni activities be suspended, and (3) Aulaqi tribesmen be disinclined to move. In any case I do not anticipate (3).

78323/38 [No. 192]. No. 98.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 5.4 p.m., 2nd November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 100.]

No. 96. 2nd November. Reference to my telegram No. 86 of 21st October§.

I have authorised Seager to discuss the question of Shabwa with the Yemeni King during his forthcoming visit to Sana. Seager's main effort will be directed towards persuading the King to accept the principle of non-interference. Seager will also make it clear to the King that Yemeni party now in Shabwa must withdraw over the North East Line before the discussion on the boundary in Shabwa area with a view to an agreed settlement can take place (paragraph 10 of your despatch of the 9th March, 1938‖). Should the King agree to the terms he may ask for discussion to take place immediately. If so, I should like to be in a position to tell him through Seager that His Majesty's Government have agreed that such discussion should take place as soon as possible. Do you agree? As presumably both Governments will hold out for inclusion of Shabwa within their boundary I foresee no conclusive result of discussion, but I shall be glad of instructions as to what the principal aims of His Majesty's Government would be in discussing boundary of North East Beihan, and you may wish to obtain Reilly's views before he leaves. If these instructions were issued to me by 18th November Seager would be able to inform the King of His Majesty's Government's final views before returning to Aden.

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* No. 94. † No. 96. ‡ No. 85. § No. 97. ‖ No. 58.

78323/38 [No. 196]. No. 99.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 6.3 p.m., 9th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 100.]

No. 102. 9th November. Reference my telegram No. 96*.

At my request representative (of) Kurabi Sheikh Shabwa has arrived at Aden (?group omitted) brought in by air from Beihan. He reports the present situation as follows: (1) Gradual infiltration into Shabwa as surmised in my telegram No. 77†. (2) Construction of two forts commanding Shabwa. (3) Enforcement of free local labour for (2) under penalty of imprisonment. (4) Levying of taxes on Shabwa salt mines. This gradual consolidation of Yemeni occupation of Shabwa is making our proposed occupation by tribal force without air action, my telegram No. 65‡ refers, more difficult the longer it is delayed. I consider, therefore, that it is essential that the Yemeni King should be asked to give a definite reply at once. I am, therefore, instructing Seager to bring the present situation in Shabwa to the notice of the King, and propose that, subject to your approval, Seager be instructed to demand a satisfactory reply by the 18th November, and the withdrawal of the Yemeni party by the 28th November, failing which we shall take immediate steps to expel them. Arrangements for this are now being made with air co-operation. Recent Yemeni activities at Shabwa point to the fact that the King is probably unwilling to comply, and the situation appears to be becoming acute, and is being carefully watched by all the Protectorate.

78323/38 [No. 202]. No. 100.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 7 p.m., 14th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 103.]

No. 126. Your telegram No. 96*. Your telegram No. 102§. Shabwa. I agree to offer of early discussion. In event of discussion the following principles should be kept in view. Our claim to Shabwa should be maintained such proof as is possible of claim being adduced. Our essential object is to keep open Beihan Shabwa route to Hadramaut for strategic and economic reasons. Effort should be made to secure neutralisation of Shabwa area with free right of passage for civil traffic. Failing this you should announce intention of occupying Shabwa in accordance with instructions in my telegram No. 106‖ with a view to maintenance of right of passage, but steps should be taken to have tribal force immediately available to forestall any possible reinforcements by Yemenis during period to 18th or 28th November. In neither case should you demand categorical surrender of Yemeni claims to Shabwa, final settlement of boundary being left open for future decision during currency of Treaty of San'á. I approve proposal in your telegram No. 102.

78323/38 [No. 208]. No. 101.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 2.7 p.m., 14th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 104. 14th November. Reference to my telegram No. 102§.

Korabi Sheikh here wishes his followers to comprise the tribal force to occupy Shabwa, and in view of possible jealousies I am planning their use instead of Aulaqis, my telegram No. 86€ refers. A few Aulaqis of Hammam Tribe living near Shabwa will however assist.

Subject to approval of the recommendations made in my telegram No. 102, Government guard will be flown to Beihan on 22nd November. Plans for operations have been drawn up in co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief. His telegram V-442** to-day's date addressed to the Air Ministry refers.

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* No. 98. † No. 90. ‡ No. 85. § No. 99. ‖ No. 94. € No. 97. ** No. 102.

78323/38 [No. 209]. No. 102.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ADEN

to

AIR MINISTRY.

TELEGRAM.

V.442. 14th November. Your X.958 11/11*. First political officer and approximately twenty Government guards will be flown to Beiham in advance and will trek from there to a camp approximately four miles from Shabwa, taking W/T, and there meet tribal force under Shabwa Sheikhs. This advance is throughout friendly tribal territory with suitable escorts. Close air co-operation and flank reconnaissance to be maintained on trek. First P.O. to signal dawn 22nd November whether Yemeni party still in occupation of Shabwa. If in occupation letter to be dropped warning them to vacate forts and surrender to first P.O. failing which evacuation will be forced by air action and village occupied by ground force. Operation would be similar to Dirjah operation described in Aden/71/Air 22/12/37. After occupation and receipt of "all clear" signal from first P.O. aircraft will land to advise on siting of landing ground. Not considered reinforcement by B/T aircraft justified at present stage but should be available at short notice. In view probable reinforcement of Yemeni party after rest strongly recommend approval of dates in Governor's telegram 102†.

78323/38 [No. 212]. No. 103.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.16 p.m., 15th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 107. 15th November. Reference to the information contained in Howes' telegram No. 105‡ of to-day's date. This is sent for the information of His Majesty's Government. I propose to carry on with arrangements already made for carrying out your instructions as Seager has been instructed by me to take immediate action on your telegram No. 126 for the 14th November§ and Shabwas have been given encouragement. Air Officer Commanding concurs.

78323/38 [No. 214]. No. 104.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.32 p.m., 17th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 109. 17th November. Shabwa. As it appeared that Yemeni King would be unwilling to discuss Shabwa situation with Seager I telegraphed the King on 10th November asking for early telegraphic reply to my letter to him of the 25th October (my telegram No. 86 of 21st October‖) and intimating that reply cannot await much longer in view of continuous Yemeni consolidation at Shabwa.

King has now sent a telegram in which he mentions careful perusal of letter and intended submission of explanation and suggestions through Seager. He requests me not to exaggerate situation nor to consider it serious(ly) and to refrain from any action which may result in disturbing friendly relations.

Were it King's intention to agree to withdraw Yemeni party and to subsequent reciprocal non-interference he could do so at once and I anticipate that his explanation and suggestions will be in his usual ambiguous style and unsatisfactory. I therefore consider King's telegraphic reply should not interfere with ultimatium already issued through Seager and with arrangements made for expelling the Yemeni party from Shabwa and for its occupation and I am carrying on.

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* 78323/38 [No. 201]: not printed. † No. 99. ‡ No. 102. § No. 100. ‖ No. 97.

78323/38 [No. 222]. No. 105.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.44 p.m., 25th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 107.*]

No. 114. 25th November. Shabwa. Seager returned from Sana'á on the 23rd November. Hamilton with party of Government Guards and tribesmen leave Beihan for Shabwa to-day arriving at the place four miles west of Shabwa on the 27th. Seager brought reply from the King to my letter of the 25th October in which in brief the King agrees not to interfere with Shabwa if we do likewise with Al Abr. King considers the proposed action in regard to Shabwa as a breach of the Treaty and it is not impossible that he may retaliate by violating portions of the frontier elsewhere. Beihan, Audhali, Dhala and Subeihi would be most likely. If so Protectorate tribes are not in a position to resist and Air Officer Commanding considers only possible means of forcing Yemenis to withdraw from violated territory would be by issue of ultimatum threatening air action against local Yemeni bases, e.g., Marib Beidha Qataba Taiz. But such ultimatum to be effective should be immediate. I therefore request urgent authority for issue should necessity arise and in order to meet eventualities (which might even arise on 28th November) dissimilar to those which motived the instructions contained in your telegram No. 106 of the 18th October last*.

I have sent telegram to the King making last moment appeal to him regarding compliance over Shabwa and in the hope of preventing retaliation elsewhere I have referred him again to Reilly's letter of the 3rd May, 1938† (your despatch of 9th March, 1938, Secret‡), denying that our interest and proposed action over Shabwa constitutes a breach of the status quo and the Treaty respectively and assuring him that His Majesty's Government has no intention of breaking the Treaty.

78323/38 [No. 235]. No. 106.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 8 p.m., 25th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 109.*]

No. 138. My telegram No. 126§. Action proposed in regard to Shabwa was notified to King Ibn Saud who made an offer of mediation. King was informed in reply that His Majesty's Government would welcome action if he were to feel able to urge the King of the Yemen to accept proposal that Shabwa shall be neutralised pending final frontier settlement, and Yemeni forces at once withdrawn. Following further comments were conveyed to H.M. Minister Jedda for use in communicating with Ibn Saud. H.M. Government had no desire to maintain a force in occupation of Shabwa. It was only the occupation of Shabwa by Yemeni forces that had led to the present crisis. If Yemeni Government will agree to withdraw their forces and not to reoccupy district, His Majesty's Government for their part would also agree not to send forces to occupy the district. Action against Yemeni forces now in Shabwa could not however be delayed. Such delay might well allow Yemenis to send reinforcements, whose later expulsion would involve major military operation. It was moreover hoped that Ibn Saud, who would have small patience with a Yemeni attempt to jump a claim to his own territory, might appreciate bad effect which would be caused locally by impression that His Majesty's Government were hesitating to implement their announced action. If Ibn Saud could extract definite undertaking from the King of the Yemen to withdraw his forces from Shabwa, instructions would at once be sent to Aden to hold up action. Otherwise present programme must stand, but even after expulsion of intruding Yemeni forces offer of neutralisation would still hold good, and British forces would be withdrawn if the King of the Yemen undertakes not to attempt to re-occupy district. His Majesty's Minister Jedda replied that Ibn Saud will try to persuade the Imam to agree to neutralisation of Shabwa that is all. Ibn Saud realises our difficulty but still hopes that it may be possible to go slow. French and Yeman wireless not working and Ibn Saud has had to send his telegram of enquiry to the Imam by hand from Jizan. Ibn Saud believes Yemen forces in Shabwa recently reduced from 2,000 to 600. Discuss with Air Officer Commanding and report views as soon as possible.

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* No. 94. † Enclosure 1 in No. 79. ‡ No. 58. § No. 100.

78323/38 [No. 241]. No. 107.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 7 p.m., 26th November, 1938).

TELEGRAM.

Private and Personal. Your telegram No. 114 of 25th November*, Shabwa. I hope to let you have instructions on Monday, but as at present advised I see little prospect that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to authorise issue of ultimatum on lines suggested.

78323/38 [No. 243]. No. 108.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 7 p.m., 26th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 112.*]

Private and Personal. Your telegram, 114, 25th November*, Shabwa. Should be glad to have your views not later than Monday morning on compromise suggested by King of Yemen, viz.:—reciprocal undertaking covering both Shabwa and Al Abr. You will understand how anxious we are, having regard to present position of Palestine question and its repercussions on Anglo-Arab relations, to find solution of Shabwa difficulty that will avoid clash with King of Yemen.

78323/38 [No. 244]. No. 109.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 2.10 p.m., 26th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 115.*]

No. 115. 26th November. Your telegram No. 138†. I have discussed with the Air Officer Commanding.

As Yemeni wireless station at Marib is not working, and therefore communication with the Shabwa from Sana'á is a matter of days, it is most improbable that any order from the Yemeni King to the party at Shabwa could now be in time to stop operations. They will, therefore, almost certainly have to take place as arranged. Air Officer Commanding is, however, going to refrain from air action if possible, or if it should be necessary at all, to limit it to the minimum.

Ibn Saud's mediation could usefully be put to (1) urging the Yemeni King not to complicate matters further by taking retaliatory action elsewhere in case the King so intends, and (2) by pointing out to the King after expulsion of the intruding Yemeni forces offer of neutrality would still hold good, and the British Forces would be withdrawn if the King of Yemen undertook not to attempt to re-occupy the district. This last I am also communicating to Sanaa by telegraph.

78323/38 [No. 245]. No. 110.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 6 p.m., 26th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 115.*]

No. 116. 26th November. My telegram No. 114*. Yemeni King's reply. Main points of the King's letter are as follows: he repeats his claim to Shabwa and Abr by ancient right. He complains of occupation of Shabwa and of bringing Seiar under control. He considers these extensions of our activities to imply intention to occupy Yemen. He agrees to withdraw party from Shabwa if we do likewise at Abr and destroy the fort there, but makes no mention of subsequent maintenance of the *status quo*. He expressed the belief that the Aden Government alone is responsible for the recent ultimatum, and that His Majesty's Government was not concerned. Full text‡ follows by post.

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* No. 105. † No. 106. ‡ No. 126.

78323/38 [No. 246]. No. 111.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12.29 p.m., 28th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 115.*]

No. 120. 28th November. I have just been informed by the Sultan of Lahej that preparations are being made in Taiz District for an advance against Lahej on or about 9th December next.

I await confirmation of this when I will communicate with you again.

Air Officer Commanding requests that this telegram be repeated to the Air Ministry.

78323/38 [No. 248]. No. 112.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 11.10 a.m., 28th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 115.*]

No. 117. Your telegram of the 26th November*. Reciprocal undertaking to Shabwa al Abr.

Too late now to stop expulsion of the Yemeni party and occupation for reasons given in my preceding telegram. But in any case I consider that the King should still be made to withdraw before any consideration of his proposal for reciprocity is given both for the reason of prestige locally and because it is probable that the Yemeni occupation of the Shabwa was deliberately for use as a bargain over Abr.

Have consulted Ingrams but not yet received reply, but I anticipate his opposition owing to the fear of Seiar raids on the Hadhramut if Abr abandoned and his dislike of giving up control of the junction trade routes afforded by garrisoning Abr.

Were it not for the Palestine question and the effect of a clash with the Yemenis on Anglo-Arabic relations I should be averse to any concession to the Yemeni King but for the above considerations and for difficulty which would be involved if a serious clash occurred and His Majesty's Government were unwilling to retaliate on Yemeni territory. I consider the above considerations (?Ingrams) with regard to our possible withdrawal from Abr are secondary to political and having once forced the Yemeni King to abandon Shabwa any future discussion over areas in dispute might well be extended to acquiesce on our part in reciprocity for which the King asks. But refer you to my immediately preceding telegram in which I pointed out that the King had made no mention in his letter of his intention to maintain *status quo* in future in those areas, and I am of opinion that no acquiescence should be given unless he first gives a written undertaking of complete non-interference in the two areas, and we should do likewise and as past experience has proved even if one can usually rely on the Yemeni Government not breaking the *status quo* actively one cannot rely on them to the same extent not to break it by insidious intrigue and peaceful penetration of Yemeni influence. I consider that the King should also be warned that any sign of such intrigue in future will lead (?) to our reoccupation of either Shabwa or Abr or both.

Air Officer commanding concurs and considers that there is no strategic objection to our withdrawal from Abr provided there are no Yemeni bases further east than at present.

78323/38 [No. 251]. No. 113.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 11.44 a.m., 28th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 119. 28th November. My telegram No. 114†. Owing to miscalculations of distance Hamilton does not reach rendezvous near Shabwa until to-day and operations are therefore postponed until the 29th. Report from Hamilton concerning the tribal assistance is satisfactory.

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* No. 106. † No. 105.

78323/38 [No. 254]. No. 114.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.25 a.m., 29th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 115.]

No. 122. 29th November. Yemeni Party at Shabwa under the Al Qardai surrendered to Hamilton 1900 hours 28th and evacuation was completed by dawn to-day. Hamilton now proceeding to occupy Shabwa and to prepare landing ground: General atmosphere very friendly. Hamilton arranging passages of the Yemeni Party across the frontier. It is reported from Beihan that the Yemenis however fear air action.

As you have intimated in your telegram No. 138* that even after the expulsion, offer of neutrality still holds good I propose subject to your approval and with the Yemeni King's consent whom I have already forewarned to send Seager to Taiz to discuss the matter of reciprocal non-interference at Shabwa personally with the Crown Prince. If the Yemeni King still adamant Seager could then discuss reciprocal non-interference in both Shabwa and Abr should you finally acquiesce in the King's proposal about Abr.

In view of the present situation, I have instructed Hamilton to refrain from bringing up with Shabwa tribes matter of the temporary agreement (your telegram No. 106 of 18th October† applies); and no action will be taken under this head until I have further communicated with you.

78323/38 [No. 253]. No. 115.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 8.0 p.m., 29th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 117.]

No. 141. Your telegram No. 114‡. Your telegram No. 115§. Your telegram No. 116‖. Your telegram No. 117¶. Your telegram No. 120**. Your telegram No. 122††. Shabwa. Question has received further consideration and I now approve your replying to King of Yemen on following lines in answer to his proposals as reported in your telegram No. 116. His Majesty's Government regret that it is not possible for them to cancel the arrangements which have already been made for the protection of the inhabitants of Shabwa from molestation by armed intruders from the Yemeni side of the border. After these intruders have been expelled however His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to following arrangement. They will evacuate both Shabwa and Husn el Abr, destroying the fort at the latter place, and treat these two areas as a neutral zone pending a final settlement provided that the King first gives a written undertaking that he for his part will treat these areas as a neutral zone and will refrain from any attempt to occupy them. On receipt of his written undertaking the Aden Government will give a similar written undertaking and we will then withdraw our forces from both places. The King should be told that our occupation of Husn el Abr was never intended as a threat to the Yemen but was carried out solely in order to stop raids by the Seiar tribes against the Hadhramaut. It has effectively stopped such raids. Withdrawal of Protectorate forces from Husn el Abr may give rise once again to raiding by Seiar and in that event Aden Government must take such police measures as may be necessary but would inform the King of the Yemen as to action being taken to stop raiding.

Question of issuing threat of air action in event of violation of boundary elsewhere is still under consideration, but pending further instructions approval cannot be given for issue of ultimatum proposed.

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* No. 106. † No. 94. ‡ No. 105. § No. 109. ‖ No. 110. ¶ No. 112. ** No. 111. †† No. 114

78323/38 [No. 255]. No. 116.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.25 p.m., 29th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 123. 29th November. Ingrams' reply Al Abr now received. He comments that withdrawal would have deplorable effect politically and upset the peace of Hadhramaut. That the function of the post is to protect travellers and allow the use of the wells. He considers that our duty should be to our own people and that vacillating increases the difficulty. He adds that the proposal will be considered sign of weakness in the same way as the proposal to give more to Ibn Saud. This last comment leads me to believe that Ingrams has a mistaken idea that the proposal is to hand over Al Abr to the Yemenis.

Ingrams stresses the point that Al Abr is occupied by Quaiti and not by His Majesty's Government. I cannot wholly agree with him in this as His Majesty's Government not only maintains a wireless telegraph set there but at present pays for the entire upkeep of the post according to reference Reilly's despatch of the 14th April, 1937*.

His Highness agrees with Ingrams' views and has remarked that he cannot see why Hadhramis should not rule their own country.

Ingrams' views do not make me alter opinion expressed in my telegram No. 117 of the 28th of November† and I still consider that if refusal to agree to the King's proposal is going to strain relations to the extent of causing His Majesty's Government serious embarrassment on other more important parts of the frontier we should acquiesce in it. As regards the present functions of the post as given above by Ingrams perhaps future joint Yemeni-Quaiti control of the post might still serve the purpose.

78323/38 [No. 269]. No. 117.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.55 a.m., 30th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 121.]

No. 125. 30th November. Your telegram No. 141‡. Your instructions are noted. Would you approve of Seager going to Taiz personally to inform the Yemeni King through the Crown Prince of His Majesty's Government's concession as set forth in your telegram under reference. I consider personal contact better than communication by telegraph, and Seager can get there in nine hours.

If you approve, I suggest that Seager be authorised to bargain over Shabwa first and treat your instructions in telegram No. 141 as the maximum to which His Majesty's Government are prepared to go.

If you should approve joint control of the Abr post as suggested in my telegram No. 123§ Seager could also raise this question with the Yemeni King and if agreement was reached it would not then be necessary to destroy the fort and it would still safeguard security on the desert route to Hadhramaut and against Seiar raids.

78323/38 [No. 270]. No. 118.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.35 p.m., 30th November, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 126. 30th November. My telegram No. 120 of the 28th November‖. My Assistant Political Officer reports from Subeihi country that Yemenis appear to be taking certain military measures and these may either be preparatory to advance into Wadi Maadin in Subeihi country or merely a defensive precaution.

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* 78018/1/37 [No. 7]: not printed. † No. 112 ‡ No. 115. § No. 116. ‖ No. 111.

78323/38 [No. 278]. No. 119.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.53 p.m., 2nd December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 121.*]

No. 129. 2nd December. Yemeni King has replied to my proposal that Seager should proceed to San'a or Taiz by referring to my knowledge of the King's suggestion in his letter (presumably in connection with Abr) and stating that his solution dealt with the wishes of both sides. He " insists " on despatch of the original letter to London and says that he awaits its reply. So it is clear that the King does not want Seager to go. I have replied informing him of the despatch to you by the last mail of his letter. Subject to your approval therefore I propose now telegraphing to the King on the lines of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 141 of 29th November*, but it would be useful if at the same time I could put to him the proposal of the combined post at Abr if it has your approval but I realise that there are perhaps Saudi-Arabian feelings to consider in this connection. I have arranged to visit Shabwa on 7th December and if by virtue of an agreement with the King of Yemen it is decided to withdraw from there and leave it neutral I consider it of importance that the Shabwans should be first given an assurance that we shall continue to maintain their independence and to protect them in future from Yemeni re-occupation. The nature of the King's reply referred to above and our intelligence leads me to believe that chance of Yemeni aggression over other portions of the frontier in the near future has lessened, though it is by no means impossible but I am assuming that sanction to use air action on the Yemeni forces advancing across the north-east line which was given in your telegram No. 106 of 18th October† applies equally to all parts of frontier and pending final consideration of the proposal to bomb Yemeni bases, any serious Yemeni advances across any part of the frontier will be expelled by air action. Please confirm.

78323/38 [No. 287]. No. 120.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

1. A dispute has recently arisen with the King of the Yemen regarding a section of the undelimited frontier, between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, and the acting Governor of Aden has asked for authority to issue, if need arises, an ultimatum that if Yemeni troops cross to our side of the frontier, certain Yemeni bases will be bombed from the air.

2. The frontier between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate is claimed by His Majesty's Government to be, broadly speaking, that laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1903/4, which was ratified in 1914. The King of the Yemen has never regarded himself as bound by this Convention. The Convention laid down the frontier in detail from the sea near the Island of Perim up to the Wadi Banaa, whence it defined the rest of the frontier as a line drawn at an angle of 45° extending out into the desert (this line is called the Violet line). For many years after the war the Yemen had encroached at certain points into Protectorate territory, and by the Treaty of Sanaa, concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Yemen in 1934, it was provided that the frontier as it existed on the date of the signing of the Treaty should be regarded as the frontier pending a final settlement, which was to take place some time during the duration of the Treaty (that is during the next 40 years). What, in effect, happened during the period of the negotiations of this Treaty was that the King of the Yemen withdrew his troops from certain areas and the frontier as settled on the date of the signing of the Treaty varied a little at some points from the Anglo-Turkish Convention frontier. Nothing was specifically said with regard to the frontier which proceeds at an angle of 45° into the desert.

3. A great part of the Protectorate is occupied by tribes in treaty relations with His Majesty's Government, and specifically under the protection of His Majesty's Government: but with certain tribes near the border no treaties have been concluded, and their dependence on His Majesty's Government has no clear documentary support.

4. Certain areas in the north of the Protectorate, that is to the south-east of the violet line, have remained out of touch with Aden and have till recently been rarely visited by political officers from Aden. In this area are two small settlements called Shabwa and Husn-el-Abr. Some two years ago, when Anglo-Italian tension was at its height, it was felt essential that we should establish more clearly our position in the Aden Protectorate generally. It was decided that the Sultan of Mukalla, within whose sphere of influence Husn-el-Abr lies, should send a small garrison to this place in order to make it clear that it is in Protectorate territory and to prevent raiding into the Hadhramaut by the neighbouring Seiar tribes. Shabwa was not similarly occupied; it has no definite connection with Mukalla, and the claim of another of our protected chiefs (the Upper Aulaqi Sultan) that it falls within his sphere, is shadowy. We have no Protectorate Treaties with the Shabwa tribes, and only recently have visits been paid by political officers and the Royal Air Force to this area. With the development of the Protectorate generally interest in these outlying parts has increased, and Shabwa and Husn-el-Abr are places of some value to the Protectorate. In the first place, they are on the direct

* No. 115. † No. 94.

route from the Hadramaut to Aden, and, if they were handed over to the King of the Yemen, the frontier at this point would form a salient projecting into the Protectorate, and the protection of the frontier would be made more difficult. This is especially important in view of the fact that both places are separated from the Yemen by deserts difficult of transit, and enemy forces assembled in those places would be in a much more advantageous position to attack the Hadramaut than if they were stationed north of the violet line. For strategic reasons, therefore, as well as economic, it is certainly preferable that these places should form parts of the Protectorate.

5. The King of the Yemen, who has never formally abandoned his ultimate claims to the whole of the Protectorate (and indeed to Aden itself) has for some time been reported to be preparing to occupy Shabwa. With the approval of the Secretary of State, the Governor of Aden warned the King that if he did attempt to occupy Shabwa he would be ejected by force, that is by Royal Air Force action. Recently, information was received that the King was " jumping " his claim to the place by a process of infiltration, that is, by sending a few tribesmen at a time into the area. Our answer to this has been to press the King to agree to a friendly discussion of the frontier, or, alternatively, to agree that the Shabwa area should be treated as a neutral zone pending a final settlement. To this the King has always returned an ambiguous reply and recently the process of infiltration developed so much that it was found necessary to tell the King that unless he withdrew his irregulars from Shabwa by a certain date they would be ejected by force. A small party of Government Guards with a political officer accordingly proceeded to Shabwa for the purpose of carrying out this operation, and since the King had not withdrawn his adherents, they were ejected on the 29th November and sent back across the frontier. This action appears to have been taken without any resistance.

6. There have been persistent reports that the King of the Yemen, as a result of his annoyance over the Shabwa dispute, may be intending, if we occupy the Shabwa area, to retaliate by sending his troops across the Protectorate frontier at other points. The part of the frontier settled by the Treaty of San'á is not in dispute, and if the King were to send his troops across any section of this frontier, it would be a clear act of aggression against the Protectorate, and action would have to be taken immediately to eject the invaders, even to the extent of air action against the invading forces in the Protectorate. This operation might, however, be difficult to carry out if the invaders were interspersed amongst friendly tribes, and the acting Governor of Aden has asked that, in order to discourage the King from taking any such action, he may have authority to issue an ultimatum, if the necessity arises, to the King of the Yemen to the effect that if he invades the Protectorate the Aden Government will retaliate by bombing certain bases in Yemeni territory. The acting Governor has been informed that the matter is under consideration, but that pending further instructions no such ultimatum should be issued. It is possible that as a result of the occupation of Shabwa on the 29th November, the King will realise that the Aden authorities are pursuing a firm policy over this dispute, and that this will discourage him from any act of aggression against any other part of the frontier; but the latest reports still indicate some movements of Yemeni troops, and it is therefore necesssry to ask the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider whether the provisional authority asked for by the acting Governor should be given.

7. It should be stated that the acting Governor asked for similar authority in connection with the incursion at Shabwa, but was informed that it could not be given in that case. Aggression against tribes definitely under our protection might be regarded as justifying measures which could not be approved in the case of Shabwa, where the tribes have had no previous relations with His Majesty's Government.

8. There are two points that appear to call for a decision, *viz.*:—

(1) whether the Aden Government should be authorised to issue an ultimatum to the King of the Yemen to the effect that, if he encroaches upon the frontier, air action will be taken against bases in his territory; and

(2) whether the Aden Government should be authorised, in the event of an actual encroachment by the Yemenis, to take air action against the Yemeni bases forthwith.

Colonial Office,
5th December, 1938.

78323/38 [No. 280]. No. 121.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 2.15 p.m., 6th December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 123.*]

No. 148. Your telegram No. 125*, your telegram No. 129†. I approve of communication to the King of the Yemen on the following lines. You may offer neutralisation of Shabwa in the first instance explaining purposes of post at Al Abr as indicated in my telegram No. 141‡. No offer for neutralisation of Al Abr and withdrawal therefrom should be made at present. I shall await receipt of King's letter and I contemplate that offer with regard to Al Abr should be made only in the last resort if satisfactory settlement cannot otherwise be reached. Joint Yemeni Quaiti control is not considered practicable or desirable. You may inform Shabwans that our willingness to neutralise Shabwa is dependent on the receipt of an undertaking from the King of the Yemen that he for his part will treat the area as a neutral zone and will refrain from any attempt to occupy it. I confirm authority to take air action if necessary against any serious Yemeni advance within any part of Protectorate territory.

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* No. 117. † No. 119. ‡ No. 115.

78323/38 [No. 305]. No. 122.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 7.30 p.m., 7th December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 151. In reply to telegram, dated 16th November*, from King of the Yemen, copy of which was shown to Reilly, His Majesty replied on 28th November in the terms of my immediately following telegram in Code.

"I have received Your Majesty's telegram of the 16th November, and I am sincerely grateful for the expression of friendship and goodwill which it contains. I am glad to be able to reassure Your Majesty with regard to the intentions of the Government of Aden, which are in no way directed against the Government or the territory of the Yemen, but are concerned only with the welfare and the protection of the inhabitants on the Southern side of the border.

Your Majesty may be certain that the contents of Your Majesty's letter of the 24th Ramadhan 1357 will be examined by my Government in the most friendly spirit, as soon as it has been received from the Government of Aden.

I can also assure Your Majesty that Sir Bernard Reilly will leave England early in December to return to his post.

GEORGE R.I."

Copies of further telegram from King of the Yemen† and of His Majesty's reply‡ when sent will be forwarded to you by air mail.

78323/38 [No. 312]. No. 123.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 5.50 p.m., 9th December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 133. 9th December. Your telegram No. 148 of the 6th December§.

Letter to the King of the Yemen is issuing to-day in the sense of your telegram under reference.

I visited Shabwa 7th of December, where everything was satisfactory and the atmosphere very friendly.

Tribes were clearly relieved at Yemeni expulsion.

78323/38 [No. 297]. No. 124.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 1.15 p.m., 12th December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 157. Sultan of Mukalla has telegraphed direct to His Majesty the King protesting against alleged intention to cede Al Abr to Yemen. Text is repeated in my immediately following telegram‖. Unless you have comments you may reply to Sultan on following lines. You may inform him that his telegram has been received and that His Majesty has directed me to reply to it. He may be assured that there is no intention of handing over Al Abr to the Yemen. Occupation of post was intended to check raids by Seiar tribes, and there is no intention of abandoning the right to take any necessary measures to stop raids. In the general interests of maintaining amicable relations with the Yemen it may become desirable to agree to neutralisation of certain border areas in return for a definite undertaking by Yemen not to interfere in neutralised zone, and negotiations are being conducted on this basis. You may also use your discretion in giving Sultan such further information based on instructions in my telegram No. 148§ as you may think fit.

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* 78323/38 [No. 213]: not printed. † 78323/38 [Nos. 279 and 308]: not printed.
‡ 78323/38 [No. 324]: not printed. § No. 121. ‖ No. 125.

78323/38 [No. 298]. No. 125.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

(Sent 2.15 p.m., 12th December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 158. My immediately preceding telegram*. Following is text of telegram from Sultan of Mukalla to His Majesty the King. *Begins.* I and all my people of Hadhramaut are very grateful for Your Majesty's help towards my country, but I now understand it is talked of to give up Al Abr in exchange for the Imam giving Shabwa, but Al Abr is ours and always has been key of our country, and I cannot agree to Imam taking part of country and wish vigorously protest to Your Majesty. If this is proposed we thank Your Majesty for help in the past and for it in the future. None of this proposed action can effect Palestine question in any way as we have never been involved. I beg Your Majesty to see that I get justice. With sincere respect. *Ends.*

78323/38 [No. 327]. No. 126.

THE ACTING GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 16th December, 1938.)

[*Answered by No. 130.*]

Secret (3).

Governor's Office, 30th November, 1938.

Sir,—I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 116 of the 26th of November, 1938†, and to enclose a translation of the King of Yemen's reply to my letter to him of 25th October, 1938.

2. My telegraphic summary mentioned all the salient points in the reply, but did not stress the continuous references made by the King to his fear, genuine or otherwise, that His Majesty's Government wish to expand into the Yemen.

I have thought it advisable to send a telegram to the King assuring him that his fears are groundless.

I have, etc.,
M. C. LAKE,
Acting Governor.

Enclosure in No. 126.

(TRANSLATION).

SAN'Á Dated 14th Ramadhan 1357.
= 7th November, 1938.

From
His Majesty the King of the Yemen,
SAN'Á.

To
His Excellency the Governor,
ADEN.

After compliments.

We have received your letter No. 385/38/1467, dated the 1st Ramadhan 1357, and noted its contents. The manner of the treatment you are showing us certainly cannot be (accepted) as being part of the excellent policy that your Government has been accustomed to show to other Powers, friends and leaders who are in friendly relations with them. For this reason, before we say anything else, we submit our profound sorrow at the repeated threats and warnings, which we have received, without any justification and reason.

We do not think that the Aden Government by this treatment of theirs, or for any other reason, wish to embroil us and draw us to actions which our conscience does not permit us to take against the Great British Government with whom we have, with all sincerity, undertaken to be always in true friendship in all our points of policy, and in our general administration.

It is well known to Your Excellency that we have submitted, pointed out and explained every reason and authority and proof of our ancient and permanent right to the Kurab which includes Shabwa, and the Seiar which includes Al 'Abr.

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* No. 124. † No. 110.

Our claims (representations) have never rendered (previously) us liable to any warning or threat, and even if pressure is brought to bear on us, we do not believe at all that His Majesty's Government will prevent friendly Powers from speaking and defending any of their rights. The representations made are sufficient for consideration and acceptance, and are the means for the adjustment of interests in the case of justice, kindness and gratitude, if the Aden Government has no intention of expanding at the expense of our kingdom and to deprive us of our natural fortresses, without which we cannot guard and protect our country.

You are aware that our awakening (reason) in taking these precautions have only been made because we have been forced to do so, as the Aden Government for no reason or cause suddenly rose and began to expand their territory and occupy our important military position, Al 'Abr, which, from time immemorial, has been under the Yemeni Government. At Al 'Abr a fort has been built overlooking wells which were dug by our forefathers. They have posted troops in it, and surrounded it and threatened the population of the district who were forced by threats of (bombing) by aircraft to sign documents placing themselves under the protection of the Aden Government.

All this cannot but be considered by sensible men to be a clear preliminary step to occupying our country. We request you to judge, in the face of all these facts, whether we should keep silent and agree to your forts and to your troops advancing day by day to threaten our kingdom and places under our rule, and by finding (making) out imaginary reasons and rights.

Although we deeply regret these actions, we are still sure that the occupation of our country, the building of forts and the taking of the above actions is not, Insha'allah, for any bad intention towards us and our kingdom.

Therefore, and in order to prove again our good intentions towards His Majesty's Government, we suggest the removal of the forts and the withdrawal of troops from Al 'Abr. We shall then be prepared to recall Al Qardai and strictly refrain from hostility—Insha'allah, on condition that the Aden Government undertakes not to repeat such actions thereafter, and to assure us of their sincere intentions which do not include evil designs towards our kingdom for more expansion. We strongly believe that your Government did not subscribe to these incidents which were taken by the Aden Government.

Over and above this we deem it our duty to say that it is not becoming of the Aden Government to warn us and threaten us every now and then about any great or small matter, important or otherwise, and to send representations merely to threaten and to make out causes for dispute.

Before everything we think that this method of treatment is not like the British Government, which is well known for its greatness and esteem.

We request you also to send this letter of ours to your Government, and we are absolutely sure they will dispose of this matter with complete justice and care befitting their reputation and honour.

In conclusion we confirm our sincere regards.

78323/38 [No. 331]. No. 127.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR

(Sent 10.0 p.m., 23rd December, 1938.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 169. My telegram No. 141 of 29th November*. His Majesty's Government have now considered question of air action against Yemeni bases and decision is as follows: They do not rule out in principle proposal either (1) to issue ultimatum threatening air action against Yemeni bases, or (2) to take such action in event of Yemeni encroachment, but they regret that they cannot give you general authority in advance to take either of these two courses. If situation arises, which in your opinion renders either course necessary, you should at once refer to me for instructions, which will be conveyed to you with least possible delay.

78323/38 [No. 344]. No. 128.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 6th January, 1939.)

[*Answered by Nos. 131 and 134.*]

Secret (3). Governor's Office, 21st December, 1938.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence and the instructions that have been sent to me in connection with the future of the post of Husn al 'Abr in the Sei'ar district of the Hadhramaut, and to the telegraphic protect addressed by the Sultan of Mukalla to His Majesty the King regarding the intentions that he erroneously suspected His Majesty's Government were

* No. 115.

entertaining on this subject. In my opinion His Highness was not within his rights in addressing this communication direct to His Majesty. As a Chief of the Aden Protectorate he should have sent it through the Acting Governor of the Protectorate, and under the arrangements in existence at Mukalla he should have done so through the Resident Adviser at Mukalla, who would have fully represented his views. I suggest that in future direct communications from Chiefs of the Aden Protectorate to His Majesty or to His Majesty's Government should not be accepted, and that they should be required to address any representations that they may wish to make through the proper channel.

2. With reference to the question of Husn al 'Abr, the Resident Adviser has written three memoranda and has requested that they should be submitted to you. I enclose copies of them. I cannot agree with Mr. Ingrams that the neutralisation of Husn al 'Abr would necessarily be a breach of the Mukalla Treaty of 1888. Article I of that Treaty provides that protection should be extended "to Mukalla and Shihr and their dependencies which are under their authority and jurisdiction." The northern boundaries of the State of Mukalla are not even yet precisely defined, and it is questionable whether the authority and jurisdiction of the Sultans were ever effective over the Sei'ar tribe until they were enforced this year through the instrumentality of the British Government. Even then the Sei'ar made their submission to the British Government and not to the Qua'iti Sultan, whose sovereignty they were reluctant to accept. In this connection I ask you to refer to my confidential despatch of 14th April, 1937*, in which I supported the proposal of Mr. Ingrams that a garrison should be placed at Husn al 'Abr, and that in Imperial interests a contribution to its cost should be made by His Majesty's Government. In that despatch I reported the opinion that I had received from Mr. Ingrams regarding the attitude of the Sultan of Mukalla towards the Sei'ar at that time. The Sultan's view was that the Sei'ar were of no great economic importance to him, and that while there were obvious advantages to him in extending his influence in their direction, these advantages did not justify the outlay of paying for a garrison at Husn al 'Abr himself.

3. With regard to the internal security of the Qua'iti territories, I refer to your telegram No. 141 of 29th November, 1938† in which you pointed out that the occupation of Husn al 'Abr was carried out solely in order to stop raids by Sei'ar tribes against the Hadhramaut, and emphasised that the Aden Government must take such police measures as may be necessary if the withdrawal of Protectorate forces from Husn al 'Abr were to result in a revival of these raids.

4. Although I do not consider that a withdrawal from Husn al 'Abr would constitute a breach of His Majesty's Government's treaty obligations to the Qua'iti Sultan, I nevertheless earnestly hope that no such withdrawal will be necessary. This post occupies a commanding strategic position which dominates the northern approaches to an important part of the Hadhramaut valley, and it has now been in effective occupation for nearly a year with results that have been wholly beneficial to the peace of that part of the Protectorate and to the reputation of His Majesty's Government and of the Qua'iti Sultan. A withdrawal from it now would generally be regarded as a retreat made in deference to Yemeni threats, and local opinion would be quick to jump to the conclusion that these threats were supported by Italian influence to which His Majesty's Government were once again giving way. The fact that this view would be entirely erroneous would in no way prevent its being widely held. Long experience of the mentality of the Yemeni King convinces me, moreover, that an apparent surrender to his wishes on a point on which we have hitherto resisted him will enhance neither his respect nor his friendship; and it will certainly not influence his views regarding Palestine. On the latter point I am in entire agreement with Mr. Ingrams. In the minds of all Arabs the Palestine question stands by itself, and no re-arrangement of frontiers in other parts of Arabia or permission to the larger Arab States to gain advantages at the expense of their weaker Arab neighbours will reconcile Arab opinion to a solution of the Palestine problem, which, in their opinion, endangers legitimate Arab interests in that country.

I have, &c.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

To THE POLITICAL SECRETARY, ADEN.

SHABWA—HUSN AL 'ABR AFFAIRS.

The Residency, Mukalla,
No. 44/38/2733. Secret. 29th November, 1938.

I forward herewith a copy of a letter received from H.H. Sultan Sir Saleh bin Ghalib Al Qu'aiti, K.C.M.G., with reference to the above subject.

2. You will notice that he is more than ordinarily anxious at what he considers a retrograde step on our part with regard to Al 'Abr and Shabwa.

3. It should be pointed out that the phraseology of the letter forwarded is not all that might be desired, for His Highness writes of "the Imam taking part of my country," which was not of course contemplated: what His Highness wished to convey however was that by the withdrawal from Al 'Abr the way to invasion of the Hadhramaut was left so obviously unguarded as to presuppose (having regard to the previous actions of the Imam) that probably rather sooner than later part of the Hadhramaut would fall a prey to his hands. The idea of giving up part of the Qu'aiti Territory to the Imam is therefore implicit in any withdrawal from the place. His Highness fully understands the proposals suggested in your communication as I stated in my telegram No. 2666.

4. It is important to note the remarks with respect to Palestine: here His Highness wishes to point out that, if it is thought that by pandering to Islamic sentiment in other parts of the world by a *volte-face* in these parts the effect will be lamentable as regards loyal Muslims in Hadhramaut, who never have interfered, nor greatly interested themselves in the troubles of Palestine certainly not to the extent of extending any form of active help. And that therefore if it is inherent in the idea, as appears

* 78018/1/37 S.: not printed. † No. 115.

to be the case, that by the proposed action as regards Shabwa-Al 'Abr the position will be eased *vis-a-vis* the Islamic world nearer Palestine, such an idea is likely to prove but a damp squib. On the contrary His Highness states that having relied upon the help of His Majesty's Government in the past, and at last, when the benefits were beginning to be appreciated, he feels entitled to ask for a continuity of that help, for which he is very grateful.

5. It will be seen at paragraph 3 of the letter under discussion that His Highness notes that there are a few disaffected persons in Hadhramaut whose objects would be served by the action now proposed by His Majesty's Government: these persons have always intrigued for the Imam's forces to enter Hadhramaut and foment troubles: Ali bin Salah, ex-Governor of Shibam, is one of these and probably the most important: it would be lamentable should it appear to the tribesmen, aside from the hurt to the *amour-propre* of His Highness himself, whose consistent loyalty to the policy of His Majesty's Government against such intriguers has always been a happy feature of relations with the Resident Adviser here, that the intrigues of the type of persons mentioned have triumphed against law and order, and the rule of the constituted Sultan.

W. H. INGRAMS.
Resident Adviser.

From:— HIS HIGHNESS SULTAN SALIH BIN GHALIB AL QU'AITI.

To:— RESIDENT ADVISER.

(Dated 6th Shawwal, 1357 (28th November, 1938).)

A.C.,

We have to inform you, Oh friend, that we have heard terrible news about Al 'Abr, i.e., Al Imam will withdraw from Shabwa if I agree to withdraw from Al 'Abr.

2. Will you please note that as Al 'Abr is a part of my territory and it is the key of my Government boundaries, we will never agree to leave it, as if we do so, we are afraid that trouble will occur among the neighbouring tribes and our boundaries will also be in danger, and probably the troubles will be extended to the end of Hadhramaut as there are connexions between the tribes of Hadhramaut and those of 'Abr.

3. You are aware that, in Hadhramaut there are a few persons who do not appreciate the peace in the country for personal reasons, and who are always intriguing against me. We were informed that they are in communication with Al Imam not because they love him, but only because they want to make disturbances in Hadhramaut. Some of these troublesome persons are Al bin Salah and Arbitrator Mubarak bin Muhammad and others.

4. There will be no doubt if we withdraw from Al 'Abr and return our soldiers, that their schemes will be enlarged amongst the Hadhramaut tribes we fear therefore the inconveniences and troubles in Hadhramaut after the spreading of the peace, which is created by the help of the British Government to ours. We did our best to confirm this help until the peace spread over all Hadhramaut. We are very thankful for what has been done by the British Government in this connection.

5. As the British Government helped us very much in making the peace in the past, we strongly request to help us in future so as to keep the peace into force and settle the question of Al 'Abr, through justice and right, and we have, therefore, to be thankful ever so much.

6. We assure you, oh friend, that Ahl Hadhramaut have not any connexion with Ahl Palestine and are not interfering with their political affairs, so the settlement of the question of Al 'Abr will never worry them, but they will be thankful to the British Government.

7. Wise men of Hadhramaut are fully aware that Al'bra is the key of their country and must not be lost.

8. We submitted our complaint regarding Al 'Abr by wire to His Majesty King George VI—a copy of message is enclosed herewith for your information, please.

TELEGRAM.

From:— SULTAN SALIH BIN GHALIB AL QU'AITI, K.C.M.G., MUKALLA.

To:— H.M. KING GEORGE VI., BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON.

Dated 28th November, 1938.

I and all my people of Hadhramaut are very grateful for Your Majesty's help towards my country, but I now understand it is talked of to give up Al 'Abr in exchange for the Imam giving Shabwa. But Al 'Abr is ours and has always been key of our borders, and I cannot agree to Imam taking part of my country and wish vigorously protest to Your Majesty if this is proposed we thank Your Majesty for help in the past and ask for it in the future. None of these proposed actions can effect Palestine question in any way as we have never been involved. I beg Your Majesty to see that I get justice with sincere respect.

From:— THE RESIDENT ADVISER

To:— H.H. SULTAN SALEH BIN GHALIB AL QU'AITI, K.C.M.G.

No. 2674/44/38. Dated 29th November, 1938.

After compliments,

We acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1638/5/89/3 of the 6th Shabwa (28th November).

We have already made representations to the Governor at Aden on your behalf on this matter and will communicate your letter to him.

We note you have sent a telegram direct to His Majesty the King in this matter, but we think you ought not to have done this.

W. H. INGRAMS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

THE POLITICAL SECRETARY, ADEN.

(Secret.) The Residency, Mukalla.

No. 44/38/2751. 3rd December, 1938.

In continuation of my letter No. 44/38/2733 of the 29th of November, 1938, covering a letter from His Highness regarding Shabwa and Al 'Abr, I regret to notice from your telegram No. 123 that you are left with the impression that I have the mistaken idea that the intention is to hand over Al 'Abr to the Yemen. I feel sure that you will have now realised that the proposals were fully understood. I enclose a copy of my telegram. I feel it is implicit in it from passages marked that the proposal was understood, and my further telegram (copy enclosed) makes it clearer. My reference to concessions to Ibn Sa'ud means that the proposal to hand over more of the Hadhramaut, contained in Secretary of State's despatch of 4th March, 1937, in the hope that it would result in a more favourable attitude to His Majesty's Government's policy in Palestine was based on wrong psychology. With this view Sir Bernard Reilly agreed, and as we have seen from recent correspondence the reactions in the Persian Gulf have been the same. In the same way I wished to indicate, that a concession to the Imam in respect of Qu'aiti territory (for the proposed withdrawal is a concession to the Imam) would have equally little effect in appeasing Arab sentiment towards the Palestine question. There has never yet been any question that Al 'Abr was part of Hadhramaut. Shabwa was perhaps more arguable, but Al 'Abr is at the very entrance of the Wadi. It belongs to the Sei'ars, who agreed to us going there, and the Sei'ars have always been accepted by the people and by His Majesty's Government as belonging to Hadhramaut. It must be remembered that the Imam claims also the Nadhis and the Nadhis extend right along the Wadi (as opposed to the steppe) from Al 'Abr to Henin and Al Qatn. There is nothing neutral about either of them, and as Captain Seager has often stated the Imam has continually complained of our lack of control on our frontiers. Here we have shown control and apparently he desires that control should disappear and anarchy again reign.

As regard the post now situated at Al' Abr His Majesty's Government contributed £20 a month, Wireless Telegraph now installed was put there recently for His Majesty's Government's convenience, and has been communicating direct to Aden. As you are aware negotiations with Air Headquarters for the purchase of a wireless set for Al 'Abr by the Mukalla Government have been going on since about February last, and the Mukalla Government was and is quite prepared to pay for it. Over and above the £20 a month contributed by His Majesty's Government to the maintenance of the garrison at Al 'Abr the garrison costs the Mukalla Government at least £40 a month in salaries, motor transport, etc. So that it is hardly correct to state that the entire cost is borne by His Majesty's Government.

I received the following signal from Captain Hamilton: " 58/29/11. For interest in view of present situation N. borders since occupation Husn Al 'Abr no Sei'ar have raided on Shabwa Beihan road xx. Evacuation of Husn Al 'Abr would inevitably lead to increased insecurity whole Shabwa Yemen main route which would collapse Ingram's peace occupation of both Husn Al 'Abr and Shabwa give strong chance of extension Ingram's peace ends."

This bears out all I have said regarding the benefit from Al 'Abr part from a security point of view. It is more midsummer madness to throw up this solid contribution to peace for the sake of chasing the fickle butterfly of Arab affections in other parts—not that His Majesty's Government need be under any illusions that they will be able to secure Arab acquiescence in Jewish immigration into Palestine by making concession of this nature or indeed that they will create a favourable impression as regards their Arab policy generally by so doing.

I observe that you are now proposing that there should be a joint Yemeni-Qu'aiti post at Al 'Abr. Joint control would, of course, be unworkable, but I see no reason why there should not be a Yemeni representative sitting at the post. Indeed we always welcome Yemeni spies here as they can see there is nothing imperialistic in our actions, and if there were one at the post he could help in questions concerning the Abida and Dahm. Hitherto despite earnest entreaties by Yemeni tribes that we should extend peace to them, we have always loyally referred them to the Imam.

W. H. INGRAMS,
Resident Adviser, Mukalla.

TELEGRAM.

From:— THE RESIDENT ADVISER, MUKALLA.

To:— THE POLITICAL SECRETARY, ADEN.

28th November 1938. Secret. (1) I need not comment on boundary aspect but Al 'Abr is key to Hadhramaut and to control of Sei'ars who if uncontrolled form insuperable obstacle to pacification of country. (2) Sei'ars are immemorially dependent on Hadhramaut towns and their country is integrally and geographically part of it. Agreements between them and Qu'aiti and Kathiri very old. (3) Imam's action Shabwa considered locally to have been made easier by traitorous aid Ali bin Salah and other intriguers notably some Nadhis whom Imam also claims. Even if 'Abr left empty, withdrawal will be considered victory for traitors and for Imam whom Hadhramaut detests account cruelties and fact that he is heretic. (4) Sei'ars themselves deny they ever had dependence on Imam

and themselves agreed establishment post. Occupation is by Qu'aitis and not by His Majesty's Government. (5) News of proposed forcible evacuation Shabwa greatly heartened country which with good reason considers Shabwa integral part of Hadhramaut. (6) Recent declaration that Jewish immigration Palestine would be discussed had excellent effect and there was much talk about it during recent Id visits from all classes.

I discussed with His Highness who got angrier than I have ever seen him. He agreed comments above which I know to be general opinion. On (1) he said that the rot would spread, and that the whole country would be disturbed. On (2) that he could not see why the Hadhramis could not be allowed to rule their own country. On (3) that his and his people's honour would be broken. On (5) that it had caused people to say that His Majesty's Government were not so weak as was thought, and on (6) that in addition Palestine was one question and Hadhramaut another. He did not believe that weakness in Hadhramaut would give strength in Palestine.

Figgis tells me that 'Amd, Du'an and Hadhramaut all declared the strength of the Qu'aiti in Hadhramaut was holding Al 'Abr. My personal views are that withdrawal would have deplorable effect politically and upset peace to such an extent as might mean considerable modifications present arrangements. Day to day function of post is to protect travellers and allow them use of well, withdrawal means Imam favours disturbances. I feel our duties are to our own people and consider this evident vacillation greatly increases difficulties. This is one place where our prestige is high, why jettison it. Proposal will only be taken as sign of weakness in same way as proposal to give more to Ibn Sa'ud. We should gain no genuine goodwill from it, and it would not help one more Jew into Palestine.

TELEGRAM.

From:— RESIDENT ADVISER, MUKALLA.

To:— POLITICAL SECRETARY, ADEN.

29th November, 1938. 2666. My telegram of 28th November. I have received a letter from His Highness about Abr full of protests and stating he has sent a telegram direct to His Majesty Would you like me to telegraph latter to you? The English is faulty and gives an idea your proposal was that Al 'Abr and Shabwa should be exchanged. His Highness fully understands, however, that the proposal is for both parties to withdraw and leave places unoccupied.

Enclosure 3 in No. 128.

To:— THE POLITICAL SECRETARY, ADEN.

(Secret.) The Residency, Mukalla.
No. 44/38/2752. 4th December, 1938.

In continuation of my letters Nos. 44/38/2751 of 3rd December, 1938, and 44/38/2738 of 29th November, 1938, I have to bring to your notice a further point raised by His Highness.

2. His Highness holds that the matter of the garrison at Al 'Abr is a matter of internal concern, and that he had been told by the Governor that in such matters the advice to be given to him must be in the interests of the State. In this connexion I would refer you to paragraph 4 of the Governor's letter of 13th August, 1937, to His Highness, forwarded under cover of your No. 1172 dated 28th August, 1937.

3. I observe that the paragraph refers to " other considerations " in the matter of Foreign Affairs, and to the fact that in such matters His Highness is bound to follow the advice of the Protecting Power.

4. I confess, though, that His Highness seems to me to have a good case in this matter. Article 1 of the 1882 Treaty, and Article 1 of the 1888 Treaty, both speak of the " dependencies " of the Qu'aiti State, and in correspondence referring to Asad Al Faya, the Governor pointed out to His Majesty's Government, that the Hamumi Tribe was a dependency of the Qu'aiti Government, and therefore it had no power to cede part of its territory to the Italians.

5. His Majesty's Government has recognised that the Sei'ar are included amongst the dependent tribes of the Qu'aiti State, and they have further emphasised the point by making a contribution to the maintenance of the Garrison at Al 'Abr.

6. It seems, therefore, that it is well acknowledged that the Sei'ar country is part of the Qu'aiti Territory, and this being so matters affecting it are a subject for internal concern.

7. It is not the proposal of His Majesty's Government that Al 'Abr should be handed over to the Imam, or that he is to be made responsible for security there, and the result of the new proposals seems, therefore, to be that the internal security of the Qu' aiti State is to be risked in order to placate a foreign power.

8. Yet advice in internal affairs has to be based (*vide* Governor's letter referred to) solely on the Adviser's view of the interests of the State, and it has been " the policy of His Majesty's Government to maintain the authority of the Ruler in all such matters."

9. It appears, therefore, to me that the proposal may well be regarded as a breach of the Treaty between His Majesty's Government and the Qu'aiti Sultan: it does not seem to me right to take advantage of a loyal chief in this way, and as the matter becomes better understood it may very well be that His Majesty's Government, far from gaining credit with Foreign Powers for this rather doubtful procedure, may well find themselves the subject of criticism.

10. I wish to state most earnestly my conviction that such tactics based on political expediency, and a sacrifice of moral principles, more often than not defeat their own object. Our efforts to bribe Arabs, whether in cash or by concessions, rebound only to our own discredit, and after nearly 20 years' service amongst Arabs and Orientals and much study of the history of our relations with them, I am still sure that the best way we have of serving our own interests is truly to serve the interests of those amongst whom we work.

11. I have to-day received from Professor Coupland a copy of his new book on the History of East Africa: that is a lesson which he brings out very clearly.

12. I shall be grateful if my communications in this matter may be forwarded to the Secretary of State. I should feel it heavily on my conscience if I did not think that at any rate I had put forward all the points possible for his consideration.

W. H. INGRAMS,
Resident Adviser.

78323/39 [No. 1]. No. 129.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 11.40 a.m., 16th January, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

(Secret.)

No. 15. 16th January.—Yemen King has replied to the proposal of the neutralisation of Shabwa. He ignores the proposal completely and refers to his previous request for the evacuation of Abr. He also mentions his acceptance of Ibn Saud's intervention and that he is awaiting the result. I have acknowledged his telegram and informed him that a telegraphic précis of the contents has been submitted to His Majesty's Government. Full text of the translation will be sent by mail.

78323/38 [No. 350]. No. 130.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To

THE GOVERNOR.

(Secret.) Downing Street, 23rd January, 1939.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Lake's despatch Secret (3) of the 30th November, 1938*, on the subject of the post of Husn al Abr, and to enquire whether any further information is available bearing on the strength of the conflicting claims to the post which are advanced by the King of the Yemen and the Sultan of Mukalla respectively. I notice, for example, that in his letter of the 7th November† the King speaks of Al Abr being Yemeni from time immemorial and states that the wells there were dug by his forefathers.

2. It is possible that this question may be raised by the Yemeni delegation when they arrive in London for the Palestine discussions, and I shall be glad, therefore, to receive by an early despatch any further information which may be available.

I have, etc.,

MALCOLM MACDONALD.

78323/39 [No. 2A]. No. 131.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5.0 p.m., 27th January, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 133.*]

(Secret.)

No. 19. Your despatch Secret (3) of 21st December‡. Shabwa. As question may be raised by Hussein on arrival in London please telegraph any further information available as to strength of conflicting claims of Yemen and Mukalla to Al 'Abr. In his letter of 7th November King speaks of Al 'Abr being Yemeni from time immemorial and states wells there were dug by his forefathers. My secret despatch of 23rd January§ refers, but need not be awaited.

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* No. 126. † Enclosure in No. 126. ‡ No. 128. § No. 130.

78323/39 [No. 9]. No. 132.

THE GOVERNOR.
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 3rd February, 1939.)

(Secret (3).)

Governor's Office, 18th January, 1939.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 15 of the 16th of January, 1939*, and to enclose a translation of the telegram, dated 9th January, 1939, received from the King of the Yemen regarding Shabwa and the tribes in that region.

I have, etc.,
B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Telegram from the King of the Yemen, San'a, to The Governor, Aden, 9th January, 1939. In reply to your telegram we beg to state that in order to avoid misunderstanding and any cause for differences between the two Governments, both now and in the future, we have already explained to Your Excellency in our previous letter of 24th Ramadhan 1357 (7th November, 1938†) the necessity for the restoration of the state of affairs at Al 'Abr as it was before and by doing so all cause for friction between the two Governments will disappear until such time as this matter may be disposed of in a just way. We have also accepted the intervention of His Majesty King 'Abdul Aziz bin Sa'ud in this connection and we are awaiting the result.

Your return to your high post makes us hope that matters will be adjusted in a becoming and peaceful way. We place full reliance on your good intentions and on your interest in not violating the friendship and good relations which exist between both parties. We have gone through your letter and noted your well-intentioned arrangement. Please accept our high regards.

78323/39 [No. 10]. No. 133.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 1.45 p.m., 3rd February, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

(Secret.)

No. 31. 3rd February.—Your telegram of January 27th‡. Shabwa.

No further information. Only mention of claim to Al 'Abr is contained in King's letter of November 7th and in the correspondence from Mukalla forwarded under my Secret despatch of December 21st, 1938§.

78323/39 [No. 6]. No. 134.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

Secret.)

Downing Street, 9th February, 1939.

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch Secret (3) of the 21st December, 1938§, regarding the future of the post of Husn Al 'Abr, and covering a letter addressed by the Sultan of Mukalla to the Resident Adviser.

2. You refer to the communication addressed by the Sultan to His Majesty the King. I agree in principle with your views as to the procedure which should be adopted by a Ruler of the Aden Protectorate in addressing His Majesty. I should not, however, think it expedient to raise any formal objection to the Sultan of Mukalla addressing a communication himself to the King. In any such case the reply would be sent by the Secretary of State on His Majesty's commands and be transmitted through the Governor.

3. I fully appreciate the importance of policing Husn Al 'Abr, as to which the instructions in my telegram No. 141 of the 29th November, 1938¶, and my telegram No. 148 of the 6th of December, 1938**, still stand, and I trust that it may be possible to avoid any change in the occupation of the post. At the same time I cannot admit that there would be any breach of the treaty relations with Mukalla if it should in the future be found desirable to withdraw the permanent garrison from Husn Al 'Abr as part of an arrangement for the neutralization of border territory.

I have, &c.,
MALCOLM MACDONALD.

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* No. 129. † Enclosure in No. 126. ‡ No. 131. § No. 128. ¶ No. 115. ** No. 121.

78323/39 [No. 16]. No. 135.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 10.10 a.m., 14th February, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

(Secret.)

No. 42. 14th February.—My telegram of February 3rd*. 'Abr. Ingrams was informed that wells dug by Seiar and states that this is confirmable by Bedouin marks of identification. Also that original fort built by Seiar, though by Wahabis according to Philby.

78323/39 [No. 20]. No. 136.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 1.24 p.m., 6th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 140.]

No. 56. 6th March.—My telegram No. 54, of 3rd March†. Increase of Government guards.

Reports of increase of Yemeni troops on the Mafalis Taiz Mawiya and Qataba frontier and of military preparations which have recently been prevalent have become stronger during the week-end with rumoured threat against Dhfab Lahej. These signs of Yemeni activity have been regarded as defensive rather than offensive up to now and I am still disinclined to believe that any serious attack on the Protectorate is contemplated.

But one cannot ignore the most recent rumours and the situation needs careful watching. After consultation with the Air Officer Commanding I am establishing political intelligence centres on the Mafalis and Taiz lines of advance with motor patrols. These will be furnished by Government guards, but in view of their commitments in other parts of the Protectorate, such as Shabwa Abyan, etc., they are not sufficient for this intelligence work. I am, therefore, enrolling another 100 men immediately in anticipation of your sanction.

78323/39 [No. 21]. No. 137.

THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.24 p.m., 8th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 140.]

No. 57. 8th March. My telegram No. 56‡. Yemeni fronter. Situation deteriorated and reports of extensive aggression a great deal stronger. Protective measures have been increased and Levies and aircraft standing by. Air Officer Commanding has pointed out that ground troops quite insufficient for the dual duties of assisting in defence against Yemeni land attack and assisting in the defence of the fortress in the event of major war. I am in entire agreement and wish to press for an Indian battalion as asked for in paragraph 4 of the Governor's Secret despatch of the 31st January§.

Should the fears of aggression materialise it may be necessary to refer to you for instructions to compel air action against the Yemeni bases (your telegram No. 169 of the 23rd December, 1938‖, refers).

As it appears to me that the present situation is due to mutual suspicion on both sides, I have telegraphed to the Yemeni King bringing to his notice the increase of Yemeni activity on the frontier concerned and the strong reports of its significance and have asked for assurance that he has no aggressive intentions and giving him reciprocal assurance. I have also proposed to despatch a political officer to Taiz to confer with the Crown Prince who is temporarily in charge of the district.

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* No. 133. † 78157/38 [No. 25]: not printed. ‡ No. 136. § 6214/14/C/39: not printed. ‖ No. 127.

78323/39 [No. 22]. No. 138.

THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.35 p.m., 9th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 140.*]

No. 58. 9th March. My telegram No. 57*. As definite report received from Yemeni notable in Aden last night, after lengthy interrogation, that attack on Wadi Maadin (P.2733) being staged for tonight or tomorrow morning, which cannot be ignored, have telegraphed the Yemeni King warning him of the consequences of such attack which would constitute breach of the Treaty of Sana'á and making it clear that any serious aggression on any part of the Protectorate will be repelled by action (your telegram No. 148 of the 6th December† refers). Have repeated assurance of the desire of His Majesty's Government for the maintenance of peace and friendship and repeated lack of design on any part of Yemeni territory. Similar warning and assurance sent by letter to Taiz and Mafalis. Preparation for defence of Lahej in hand.

78323/39 [No. 23]. No. 139.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.46 a.m., 11th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 140.*]

No. 59. 11th March. My secret telegram No. 58 of the 9th March‡. King of Yemen denies reports of troop moves and gives assurance to respect treaty.

78323/39 [No. 24]. No. 140.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 7.0 p.m., 11th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 45. Your telegram No. 56§. Your telegram No. 57*. Your telegram No. 58‡. Reported Yemeni troop movements. I approve action taken, but am glad to note information in your telegram No. 59‖. Please telegraph extra expenditure anticipated this month as a result of enrolment of 100 additional Government guards.

78323/39 [No. 28]. No. 141.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 3.5 p.m., 13th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 60. 13th March. Reference Yemeni. I have received from the Crown Prince at Taiz telegram assuring me that no foundation exists for reports of intended Yemeni aggression and that the King is extremely anxious to respect the terms of their Sana'á Treaty however His Majestys' Government may act. King has agreed to my sending officer to Taiz to exchange views with Crown Prince and I propose sending him in H.M.S. *Egret* as the latter intends visiting Mocha 17th March. Military defensive precautions are now being relaxed but intelligence posts on the frontier will be maintained for the present.

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* No. 137. † No. 121. ‡ No. 138. § No. 136. ‖ No. 139.

78323/39 [No. 33]. No. 142.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.34 a.m., 15th March, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 66. 15th March. Arabic Broadcast. Colonel Lake Political Secretary Aden proceeded today in H.M.S. *Egret* to Mocha en route Taiz on a visit to His Royal Highness Seif Al Islam Ahmed Crown Prince of Yemen to discuss matters of mutual interest.

78323/39 [No. 41]. No. 143.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.29 p.m., 13th June, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 144.*]

No. 141. 13th June. Owing to recent reports of local Yemeni attacks on Al Arif a border section of the Masabi tribe who are covered by Beihan Protectorate Treaty, Seager who is now at Sana'á has been instructed to ask the King to order withdrawal by his Amil of Harib who is said to be responsible for the attacks and to take up any complaint he may have against Al Arif through the proper channels. Seager reports that the King has admitted that he ordered the advance against Al Arif whom he accuses of giving him provocation. Meanwhile I have ? sent (group omitted) Davey, Political Officer, to Beihan to investigate. He reports today that Amil and 500 men from Yemen territory have entered Wadi Khir well inside the Protectorate border and are advancing towards Beihan. Force is said to be mostly tribesmen with a few Yemen regulars. Davey has sent letter to the Amil requiring him to withdraw and at my request the Air Officer Commanding is sending three aircraft to investigate and if report of incursion is confirmed to drop warning messages demanding immediate withdrawal. If the invaders fail to comply, I propose to ask the Air Officer Commanding to eject them from the Protectorate by air action.

78323/39 [No. 48]. No. 144.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 8.0 p.m., 14th June, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 145.*]

No. 119. Your telegram No. 141*. Trust it will not be necessary to resort to air bombing and unless situation develops constituting in your opinion serious Yemeni attack on Aden Protectorate tribes I should be glad to be consulted before bombing is authorised.

78323/39 [No. 51]. No. 145.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.31 p.m., 15th June, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 144. 15th June. Your telegram No. 119†. Yemen force in Beihan district has withdrawn to Saha on or near the frontier and Davey has gone to see the Amil of Harib there. Seager has made representations at Sana'á. Yemen authorities allege provocation by the Protectorate of Masabi tribes and there is also argument regarding the precise frontier line. Situation eased by the Yemen withdrawal and the questions at issue will now be investigated.

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* No. 143. † No. 144.

78323/39 [No. 62]. No. 146.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7th July, 1939.)

[*Answered by No. 153.*]

(Secret (3).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 21st June, 1939.

I have the honour to state that the Frontier Officer, Captain Seager, who is now at Sana'á, reports that during his present visit to the Yemeni Capital the King and his Ministers have pressed him strongly for a settlement of the questions of Shabwa and Al 'Abr in a manner favourable to the Yemeni claims. He states that this problem appears to be an obsession in the mind of the King, who, in his interviews with Captain Seager, has displayed an unusually violent state of agitation and impatience.

2. Captain Seager himself is strongly in favour of an attempt to find a compromise that will remedy the Yemeni grievance. I enclose a copy* of a semi-official correspondence between Captain Seager and myself on this question, from which it will be seen that he is mainly influenced by his concern about the probable attitude of the Yemen in the event of a general war.

3. Possible solutions suggested by Captain Seager in another communication from him are neutrality of both Shabwa and Al 'Abr pending discussions at some future date, plus the following alternatives:—

(1) Maintenance of post by us at Al 'Abr.

(2) construction and maintenance by us of a fort and a well at about 20 miles east of Al 'Abr and withdrawal from present post.

(3) maintenance of a post jointly with the Yemenis at Al 'Abr, and

(4) maintenance of a post at Al 'Abr by Yemenis, provided that the Yemeni Government gives us adequate guarantees regarding security of routes and an undertaking not to intrigue in the Protectorate.

Captain Seager has added that in his opinion, Yemeni acceptance of the first alternative is out of the question, but is possible in the case of the second or third alternatives, and is almost certain in the case of the fourth alternative.

4. My own views have been expressed in my secret (3) despatch to you, dated the 21st December, 1938†, and in my semi-official letter of 6th June, 1939*, to Captain Seager, a copy of which is enclosed with this despatch. The views of Mr. Ingrams, Resident Adviser at Mukalla, have been stated by him in his secret memoranda of 29th November, 1938, 3rd December, 1938, and 4th December, 1938, copies of all of which were enclosed with my secret (3) despatch of the 21st December, 1938†.

5. While I adhere to my previous opinion I realise that this question, in so far as it may affect the attitude of the Yemen towards His Majesty's Government in relation to the international situation, has wider aspects which may override local considerations. If you decide that the question requires further examination in order to search for a compromise that will satisfy the Yemeni demands without endangering the security of the Protectorate I strongly recommend that no decision should be reached without further consultation with Mr. Ingrams, the Resident Adviser at Mukalla, as the Eastern Aden Protectorate, for which he is responsible, will be vitally affected, as well as those parts of the Western Protectorate that lie in the neighbourhood of Shabwa.

6. The present position is that whereas we are awaiting a reply from the King of the Yemen to Colonel Lake's letter to him, dated 7th December, 1938 (which was sent under the instructions contained in your telegram No. 148 of 6th December, 1938‡), the King on his side states that he is awaiting a reply to his letter, dated 7th November, 1938, addressed to the Governor of Aden, a copy of which was forwarded to you with Colonel Lake's secret (3) despatch, dated 30th November, 1938§. It is therefore desirable that any further communication that is addressed to the King of the Yemen on this subject should make it clear that his letter has been received and considered.

I have, etc.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

* Not printed. † No. 128 ‡ No. 121. § No. 126.

78323/39 [No. 65]. No. 147.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 2.55 p.m., 11th July, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 159. 11th July. My telegram No. 144 of the 15th June*. In the absence of Davey who was recalled to Aden for consultation, the Amir of Harib's forces again attacked a village, which, pending confirmation, there is every reason to suppose lies in the Protectorate, but were driven out by Ahl Masabein, a British Protectorate Frontier tribe. It is stated that there were casualties on both sides.

I sent Davey back to Beihan yesterday and have addressed a telegram to the Yemeni King suggesting that the present *status quo* should remain in that area pending investigation by frontier officers later in the year. As far as I can judge at the moment the existing *status quo* position would represent a fair definition of the Anglo-Yemeni frontier which is unfortunately obscure at that particular sector.

78323/39 [No. 68]. No. 148.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 4.28 p.m., 13th July, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 160. 13th July. My telegram No. 159 of the 11th July†. Situation normal again. Yemeni casualties six killed and three or more wounded; Masabis had four wounded.

Confirmed that Ghaniya the village in question is within Protectorate limits.

78323/39 [No. 78]. No. 149.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 22nd July, 1939.)

[*Answered by No. 153.*]

(Secret (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 5th July, 1939.

I have the honour to refer to my secret (3) despatch of the 21st June, 1939‡, on the subject of Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

2. Captain Seager has since addressed a further letter to me on the subject, a copy of which I enclose§. It will be seen that he now suggests that an offer of arbitration should be made to the King of the Yemen for the settlement of this dispute. I have expressed my views about arbitration between His Majesty's Government and Saudi Arabia with regard to the south-eastern frontiers of the latter in my semi-official letter of 31st May, 1939‖, to Mr. Blaxter, and in my opinion the same considerations would apply to arbitration between His Majesty's Government and the Yemen with regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

3. I also enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter§ that I have received from the Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Aden in which he has expressed his views on the subject from a military point of view. Air Vice-Marshal Reid wrote this letter in connection with my secret (3) despatch dated 21st June, 1939.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

* No. 145. † No. 147. ‡ No. 146. § Not printed. ‖ 79100/1/19 [No. 67]: not printed.

78323/39 [No.79]. No. 150.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 22nd July, 1939.)

[Answered by No. 153.]

(Secret (3).)

Sir, Governor's Office, Aden, 5th July, 1939.

In connection with the recent reports that I have submitted to you regarding the questions of the fortification of Sheikh Said and the dispute about Shabwa and Husn al 'Abr, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a report from Captain B. W. Seager, O.B.E., of an interview between him and the Crown Prince of the Yemen which took place on 30th June, 1939, when Captain Seager was on his return journey from San'a to Aden.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,
Governor.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Record of an interview between the Yemeni Crown Prince and Captain Seager at Mocha on Friday, 30th June, 1939.

This morning, at 9 a.m., accompanied by Salih Jafar, I was received in audience by the Crown Prince, who was attended by Qadhi Hussein Ali al Halali (who was recently in Aden in connection with the Yemeni Government's request for arms and ammunition). Seif Al Islam Ahmed looked fit and well.

2. After an exchange of compliments and at a pre-arranged signal Halali took Salih Jafar to one end of the audience chamber and the Crown Prince and I were left alone in a corner of the room. He asked me at the outset how I had managed in the capital. I told him that I had simply gone up to pass on advance news of His Majesty's Government's recent statement of policy: and that in early June his Royal Father had broached the matter of Shabwa and El 'Abr; that I had taken up the matter with the Aden Government who had taken it up with His Majesty's Government and that the Yemeni Government might expect to receive a further communication on this subject at a future date. He snorted at this (the Zeidis are good snorters) and asked me what was the *status quo* of these two places on the date of the signature of the Treaty. I replied that it was not perfectly clear. He then asked why we wished to neutralise Shabwa and not El 'Abr, to which I replied that the latter was undoubtedly in the Protectorate in virtue of the 1914 agreement; and that besides it was the hunting ground of the Ahl Seiar who were our tribe, and that we had to control them in order to ensure the safety of the northern Hadhramaut. Here he snorted again and said that as it suited us to hold on to El 'Abr and pretend that the Ahl Seiar were ours, when it was clear that they were nomads who wandered in the Protectorate, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, we talked about neutralising Shabwa only: and that El 'Abr fell into a very special category all by itself because we intended to hold on to it at all costs. He asked what case we had to differentiate between these two places. I referred him here again to the 1914 line and the Ahl Seiar and he smiled adding that we had not a leg to stand on and that nobody knew it better than ourselves. I took him up warmly here and retorted that I should like to hear how strong was the case of the Yemeni Government and would be glad to hear it set out.

3. He waved this away and left detail for a general talk on the subject. He said that he and his father had always had an unbounded admiration for His Majesty's Government's sense of equity and justice and long-sighted policy: and that he failed to understand why it was that His Majesty's Government when she had it in her power to do otherwise should elect to sacrifice Yemeni good-will and good faith and friendship for the small matter of El 'Abr; he wound up by requesting me to do all in my power to get this matter reconsidered and get justice meted out to the Yemen.

4. He then turned to the Yemeni Government's request for arms and ammunition: he said that the Imam was bitterly disappointed with His Majesty's Government's reply to his representations as the reply was so evasive as to mean nothing at all: that once again the Yemeni Government had come forward as beggars and once again had they been spurned. I replied that all this was sheer nonsense and that the advice that His Majesty's Government had given was sound and logical. He waved his hand and went on that his Royal Father had taken a certain measure after he had been informed of His Majesty's Government's views as he intended to get war material to defend his own country. I pressed him to be more explicit but he only said that whatever might come the Yemeni Government still wanted the war material from His Majesty's Government (I presume that in this last passage he meant that the Imam had already ordered arms and ammunition from another power: perhaps my secret telegram of 28th June from Hodeidah applies. On being pressed by Salih Jafar, Halali said that arms and ammunition were on the way and that it was not unlikely that they were Italian). The Crown Prince told me to make this abundantly clear to His Excellency the Governor: pointing to a nail in the wall, he said dramatically: "Not a nail or a screw have we had to date from His Majesty's Government, and the latter says she has a deep and abiding friendship for the Yemen: surely there is an inconsistency somewhere."

5. (At this stage I started whispering into his ear as hangers-on idling about were trying hard to hear our conversation). I told him that it was my opinion that he and his Royal Father were making a song and dance about Sheikh Said all for nothing and that every penny they spent on armaments there was money wasted. I said that any Power could take Sheikh Said if they really wanted to and that I failed to understand what was bothering them. He replied that if the French took the place he much feared the outbreak of a general war: I laughed loud and long at this and asked him whether he was joking when he said that the French might be the aggressors. He looked hurt and insisted

that the French had been making such a fuss about the place that it was quite likely that they would attack it. I laughed again and told him that he could safely forget the French "menace." He retorted that whatever my views he intended to go ahead with the Sheikh Said fortifications. I shrugged my shoulders.

6. He then asked me how I found things in the Yemen. I hastened to reply that since his advent things were going better. This seemed to please him although he could have expected no other reply. I told him quite frankly that I had found his Royal Father ageing fast and this seemed to please him too! Here he struck himself on the chest and said dramatically, "Never forget our talk together at the top of the pass nine months ago (*see* Aden confidential despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 9-11-1938*); one day perhaps quite soon I might call you again to that pass and we might discuss greater things." Here I suppose he referred to a time following the present Imam's death when he would like to discuss his coming rule. I replied that I had much cherished our talk of nine months ago and that I was always ready to meet him when he wanted to see me.

7. Other subjects were discussed, but they are not worth reporting except for one. I told the Crown Prince that if the Yemeni Government wished to continue to enjoy the friendship of His Majesty's Government he would do well to tell his Royal Father that he could expect little sympathy if the Yemeni Government continued its present policy of bad faith towards the Aden Government: and that this had showed itself in a variety of ways in the past few months. "In other words," said the Crown Prince, "you can seize what places you wish (referring here to Shabwa and El 'Abr), and that we are to do nothing at all but approve of your actions." I replied that he was side-stepping the issue: and that I referred to his intriguing with Protectorate Chiefs, using armed forces to create troubles on the frontier, and generally doing everything to embarrass the Aden Government. I added that we had a matter in dispute (Shabwa and El 'Abr), but that that was no excuse for the Yemeni policy of deliberate pin-pricks in other matters. He replied that he had taken note of what I had said and that he would think about them if I would think about Shabwa and El 'Abr. I replied that if we both co-operated I did not doubt things would work out better in the long run.

8. At the end of two hours I asked permission to take leave, and he said: "When next you see His Excellency the Governor tell him to help us: and that if he does, things might happen that will far exceed his highest expectations." He said this meaningly although I cannot interpret it. I replied that I would not fail to pass on this message.

CONCLUSION.

My conversation with the Crown Prince confirms at every turn the views I have been setting out by telegram and letter from San'a in the past 36 days. I recommend—

(1) that we reconsider our views about Shabwa and El 'Abr and/or suggest arbitration as a means of ending the dispute once and for all;

(2) that we meet the Yemeni requests for arms and ammunition;

(3) that His Majesty's Government are moved to request the French Government to assure the Yemeni Government that they have no designs on Sheikh Said: the Yemeni fear of the French is real and the dissipation of this fear will in a great measure calm and quieten the Yemeni Government.

OBSERVATIONS.

(*a*) The German Arabic broadcasts have much disturbed the Yemeni literate classes particularly since 9th June last under two heads, Palestine and Shabwa and El 'Abr: where, for instance, three weeks ago I might have been able to put across a compromise in regard to the last subject—fairly satisfactory to us; I cannot say the same thing.

(*b*) Yemeni and Imamic mentality has undergone a change for the worse in the past eight months: international events, the position in Palestine and Arabic broadcasts have made the Yemeni much more susceptible, sensitive, touchy and opportunist-minded generally.

B. W. SEAGER

Mocha, 30th June, 1939.

78323/39 [No. 82A]. No. 151.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 10.22 a.m., 9th August, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 177. 9th August. On the 2nd August last the Misfar section of Ahl Qurab (of Shabwa) attacked El 'Abr post as the officer in charge of that post had taken camels from them which had been in dispute. One of the garrison was killed and two Qurabis wounded, one of whom has since died. Figgis has proceeded to El 'Abr and hopes to be able to settle the dispute. The above is telegraphed for your information and for broadcasting at your discretion.

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* Not printed.

78323/39 [No. 92]. No. 152.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.30 p.m., 11th August, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 153.*]

No. 182. Secret. 11th August. I should be grateful if I may be informed at earliest opportunity of His Majesty's Government's views and/or instructions with regard to Sir Bernard Reilly's secret despatches, 21st June*, 5th July last† Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

The Acting Resident Adviser, acting on the instructions of the Resident Adviser which conflict with Sir Bernard Reilly's instructions issued in early June (a copy of which was sent to Mukalla) which were to the effect that Shabwa was to be considered neutral, recently visited it without my prior knowledge and consent. Shortly after his visit an incident occurred—see my telegram (Most Secret), No. 177, of 9th August‡—which may not necessarily have been motivated as a result of his visit, and he now informs me that he is at Al 'Abr negotiating for Qurabi (Shabwa) hostages in spite of the fact that I again caused him to be instructed on the 26th July not to disturb the existing position.

Thus the *status quo* and/or neutrality of Shabwa has been upset, and it cannot be expected that the Yemeni King will view such action with complete equanimity in the light of the present tension in Anglo-Yemeni relations, which is, in any event, nearly exclusively caused by Shabwa and Al 'Abr impasse.

As you will appreciate the position is an anomalous one, and if I had the advantage of your instructions I would no doubt be able to extricate the Acting Resident Adviser from an embarrassing position while setting in motion a line of action that has involved His Majesty's Government.

78323/39 [No. 93]. No. 153.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

TELEGRAM.

(Sent 12.45 p.m., 12th August, 1939.)

No. 158. Secret. Your Secret telegram, No. 182§, Shabwa. Governor's despatches, 21st June* and 5th July†, will be under consideration here at Conference, 14th August, and further telegram will be sent to you as soon as possible thereafter.

In meantime you should appreciate that proposal for neutralisation made in my telegram No. 148 of 6th December, 1938‖, was dependent on receipt of undertaking by Imam that he for his part would treat area as neutral zone and refrain from any attempt to occupy it. No such undertaking to my knowledge has been forthcoming, and therefore we are in no way committed to treat area as neutral in present circumstances, and I do not agree that visit of Acting Resident Adviser creates anomalous position.

You should not take any further steps in matter of proposal for neutralisation unless you have instructions from me.

78323/39 [No. 102]. No. 154.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

(Sent 9.0 p.m., 18th August, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 162. Secret. As a result of consideration of Shabwa and Al 'Abr question at Conference referred to in my secret telegram, No. 158, of 12th August¶ His Majesty's Government have decided that their policy is to be based on reply given by His Majesty the King in telegram of 14th July to Imam in response to telegraphic representations from latter for British evacuation of Shabwa and Al 'Abr. Purport of His Majesty's telegram was that Treaty of Sana'á provides for question of southern frontier of Yemen to be subject of friendly negotiations and suggesting if Imam considers time has now come for negotiations for this purpose he should approach Sir Bernard Reilly on his return to Aden, who would then endeavour to reach equitable and mutually acceptable settlement.

Copies of complete text of telegrams exchanged between His Majesty and Imam were sent to you by mail of 15th August**.

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* No. 146. † No. 149. ‡ No. 151. § No. 152. ‖ No. 121. ¶ No. 153.
** 78323/30 [No. 100]: not printed.

Meanwhile (1) earlier proposal for neutralisation of Shabwa in return for undertaking by Imam mentioned in my telegram of 12th August continues to hold good, but it is not a very satisfactory solution in itself and unless and until Imam makes direct reference to it proposal should not be revived or mentioned. (2) As regards Al 'Abr His Majesty's Government cannot modify their decision to maintain the existing position in that place.

78323/39 [No. 116]. No. 155.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3.30 p.m., 16th September, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 175.*]

No. 194. Secret. My confidential despatch of 15th August*. Imam has now replied to the King's telegram of 11th August agreeing to the suggestion that he should approach you on your return to Aden with a view to the initiation of frontier discussions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Sana'á. The Iman reiterates his claim to Shabwa and Al 'Abr as vital for the security of the Yemen.

A reply has been sent by His Majesty noting Imam's agreement with procedure suggested, and stating that you will be prepared to make any necessary arrangements for discussions and will endeavour in co-operation with Yemeni Officials, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1934, to reach an agreed settlement of the Southern frontier of the Yemem which shall be equitable and mutually acceptable. For your own information it is *not* desired that you should take initiative with the Imam in this matter, but you should report at once any approach made to you by Yemen Government.

Meanwhile, I request that you will consider what procedure should be contemplated for the negotiations which would be likely to serve our own interests and also be acceptable to the Imam. It is intention of His Majesty's Government that if boundary discussions take place their object shall be settlement of whole Southern boundary of Yemen with Protectorate, including Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

Addressed Aden No. 194.

Repeated to Cairo No. 671 for Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

78323/39 [No. 122]. No. 156.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.30 p.m., 20th October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 284. 20th October. Repeated to Cairo No. 15.

Reference paragraphs 607, 608 of Political Intelligence, Summary Numbers 37, 38, 20th September, 27th September.

In spite of repeated protests to the King of Yemen and warning to Amil of Beidha, Yemen force of about 500 to 900 consisting of Rasasi tribesmen with some Zeidi stiffening and a mountain gun on 17th October, 18th October attacked village of Alhajar which was held by Davey, Political Officer, with a few Government Guards and small tribal force, and it became necessary to give him immediate help. Attackers were accordingly ejected by air action and are reported to have suffered casualties. No casualties on our side but invaders burnt four small villages. They have now withdrawn to Nuquq and Halhal just across the Yemen border. It is possible that attack will be repeated and in Air Officer Commanding's opinion, with which I agree fully, there is only one way to deal with these incursions should direct action against attackers fail (and failure is possible if attack is determined in view of difficulty of keeping aircraft continually over area), and that is by attacking objectives within Yemen border. In present case action would be taken gradually starting with two villages just within Yemen border and continuing on local bases of operation should this prove ineffective. Due warning would be given to clear out married inhabitants. This process to continue in growing intensity until raids cease. General authority to take such action is essential in order that prompt assistance may be forthcoming to Political Officers and our own tribesmen when attacked. This does not imply that such action is inevitable from present situation but if required it should be taken immediately, and I request your approval.

Question of reparation for destruction of villages is difficult as it is probably impossible to obtain except by threat of air action against Rasasi territory which is under Yemen control. If you approve I propose nevertheless take up matter with the Imam, though without threat of force, which I do not recommend in present circumstances. Imam may support Rasasi on ground that villages concerned are theirs, but there is no doubt that they are on Protectorate side of *status quo* line.

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* 78323/39 [No. 100]: not printed.

78323/39 [No. 127]. No. 157.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.40 p.m., 21st October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 286. 21st October. My telegram No. 284*. I have sent a telegraphic protest to the King of the Yemen regarding the attack on Al Hajar and neighbouring villages, but I am not asking for reparation pending your approval.

Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

78323/39 [No. 123]. No. 158.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.19 p.m., 22nd October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 159.*]

No. 287. 22nd October. My telegram No. 284*. Davey reports Yemen reinforcements under Shariff Abdullah Dómain at Nuquq and receipt by Ali Markha and Ahl Nisiyin of threat of aggression in default of immediate submission. He therefore expects renewed attack and I request authority for action proposed in my telegram which should be taken tomorrow if necessary.

78323/39 [No. 124]. No. 159.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 8.45 p.m., 22nd October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 241. Secret. Your telegram of the 22nd October†, No. 287. Your request for authority for air action against villages in Yemen territory is under urgent consideration and I will telegraph decision at earliest possible moment. If in meantime tomorrow it is essential to take defensive air action, this should be confined if possible to action against attacking forces and not against other objectives in Yemen territory.

78323/39 [No. 130]. No. 160.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

TELEGRAM.

(Sent 10.30 p.m., 23rd October, 1939.)

[*Answered by No. 161.*]

No. 242. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 785. My telegram No. 241‡. In the event of repetition of attack I approve air action to extent necessary to defend our territory and expel raiders. For this purpose air action may be taken against raiders not only after they have crossed into our territory but also in pursuit of them after expulsion and if necessary against Yemen villages near the border from which raiders emerge, provided that usual bombing notice is given as far as circumstances permit and that action against such villages can be represented as part of a single series of operations directly connected with defence of our territory.

2. I approve your action in protesting to the Imam and you may make it clear to Yemen Government that we shall take all necessary steps to defend our territory, but in any communication to Imam I do not desire that you should refer to our intention if necessary to take air action against objectives in Yemen territory, as it is important that such action if taken can be shown to have been an integral part of immediate local defence operations.

3. If you consider any useful purpose would be served by taking up question of reparation you may do so as opportunity offers as you propose.

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* No. 156. † No. 158. ‡ No. 159.

78323/39 [No. 139]. No. 161.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.44 p.m., 24th October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

24th October. Your telegram No. 242*. Grateful for instructions received. Yemeni attack not yet renewed and latest reports from Davey more reassuring but hostile reinforcements have not withdrawn yet and situation still uncertain.

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13. RELATIONS BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND IBN SAUD—ARABIAN FRONTIERS

79100/36 S. [No. 12]. No. 162.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE RESIDENT.

(Sent 12.30 p.m., 15th March, 1936.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 163.*]

Addressed to Aden No. 25. Repeated to Jedda No. 36. Reference Jedda despatch to Foreign Office No. 351 of the 10th December, 1935†, a copy of which was sent to you direct. His Majesty's Government have decided that in the first instance and as the next step Saudi Government should be asked for further information as to agreement stated to have been concluded before 1916 between Ibn Saud and the Shaikh of Qatar by which latter is stated to have accepted former's sovereignty over Jebel Nakhsh. It is not proposed to issue further instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda on general question of frontiers until this point has been cleared up.

As matters stand at present there is no intention of offering Ibn Saud any further concession of territory but it is important that His Majesty's Government should be in possession of fullest possible information when the time comes to issue final instructions to Sir Andrew Ryan. To this end your early views are invited on Fuad Hamza's suggestion (reported in paragraph 22 of second enclosure to Jedda despatch under reference) that a line might be drawn to run somewhere between the line proposed by His Majesty's Government (see paragraphs 6 and 7 of first enclosure to Jedda despatch under reference) and that proposed in the Saudi memorandum of 3rd April, 1935. In particular I should be glad to learn whether in your view any Imperial or local interests would be adversely affected if the proposed line in this sector were carried somewhat further to the south at any point. The Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf are being consulted with regard to other sections of the frontier.

79100/36 S. [No. 17]. No. 163.

THE RESIDENT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11.35 a.m., 19th March, 1936.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 164.*]

19th March. Addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies repeated to the British Minister at Jedda. Your telegram of the 15th March‡. Aden is concerned only with boundary line west of approximately longitude 53. In paragraph 8 of

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* No. 160. † Enclosure in 79100/36 S [No. 1]: not printed. ‡ No. 162.

Ingrams' note of 19th August, 1935, forwarded to you with Lake's secret despatch of the 20th August, 1935*, certain principles were proposed to govern our attitude regarding this frontier of which most important was that no steppe land or territory occupied by our tribes to the north of Hadhramaut valley should be surrendered. I agree with this view and in accordance with it line proposed in your telegram to me No. 80 1935† represents the utmost concession that can be made. Line suggested by Fuad Hamza would violate this principle as it would cut through territory of Mahra Manahil Awamir and Seiar tribes. The first of these is racially and politically connected with Qishn, the second and fourth with Mukalla, and the third with Kathiris and prospectively thus with Aden Protectorate. The proposed line in this sector cannot therefore be carried further south without giving [Dha ?] footing within outlying border of Hadhramaut and a possible opening for further extension of his influence that would have politically a disturbing effect on treaty chiefs and their people in that part of the Protectorate. There would also be a likelihood of interference with grazing and watering rights of tribes concerned. These developments would thus adversely affect both Imperial and local interests. I am also strongly opposed to any boundary that intersects tribal territory. Our experience of divided control over Audhali tribe showed it leads to constant discontent and unrest, and I recommend His Majesty's Government insists on retention of all tribal territory chief(s) of Aden Protectorate intact within our border.

79100/36 S. [No. 18]. No. 164.

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE)

to

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR BERNARD REILLY (RESIDENT).

(Secret.)

DEAR REILLY, Downing Street, S.W.1, 26th March, 1936.

We have received your telegram of the 19th March‡ about the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia and we note that in your view the line proposed in our telegram No. 80 (of the 9th October, 1935†) represents the utmost concession that can be made on Ibn Saud west of the meridian 53° East.

In actual fact, the frontier which was offered to Ibn Saud at Riyadh would, east of meridian 52° East, lie very slightly to the south of that defined in paragraph 3 of our telegram No. 60 (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of enclosure 1 to Jedda despatch of the 10th December, 1935§, a copy of which was sent to you direct), but we assume that such a slight modification need not be regarded as adversely affecting any local protectorate interests at this spot. We called your attention to this point in paragraph 2 of our secret despatch of the 6th November last‖.

I should explain that this further slight concession to Ibn Saud was suggested at the last moment, and since it did not appear to affect the Aden Protectorate, we felt justified in agreeing to it without consulting you again.

Yours, &c.,

H. R. COWELL.

79100/36 S. [No. 25]. No. 165.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR BERNARD REILLY

to

MR. H. R. COWELL (COLONIAL OFFICE).

(Secret.)

MY DEAR COWELL, The Residency, Aden, 7th April, 1936.

Thank you for your letter of 26th March, 1936¶, about the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia.

* No. 94 in Middle East No. 57. † No. 95 in Middle East No. 57. ‡ No. 163.
§ Enclosure in 79100/36 S. [No. 1]: not printed. ‖ 79100/35 S. [No. 177]: not printed.
¶ No. 164.

I regret that in sending my telegram of 19th March, 1936*, I overlooked the slight modification that has been made to the east of meridian 52 in the line proposed in your telegram No. 80 of 1935†.

I agree with you that this concession to Ibn Saud does not affect the Aden Protectorate, as the boundary between the Protectorate and the Sultanate of Oman will probably—when defined—meet the Saudi Arabian frontier in the neighbourhood of meridian 52 east rather than in that of meridian 53. I mentioned the latter in my telegram of 19th March, 1936, to allow a margin as this point has not yet been determined.

Yours, &c.,

B. R. REILLY.

79100/1/37 S. [No. 2]. No. 166.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

(Sent 5 p.m., 9th January, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 167.*]

No. 5. Secret. Reference Jedda telegram No. 128 of 29th December to Foreign Office repeated to you No. 11‡. I should be glad if you will furnish me by telegraph with any observations which you may have to offer on paragraph 2 (2).

79100/1/37 S. [No. 5]. No. 167.

THE RESIDENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.35 p.m., 12th January, 1937.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 168.*]

No. 6. 12th January. Your telegram No. 5§. My telegram of the 13th October, 1935‖, in reply to your telegram No. 80 of 1935† gives the utmost concession which I consider should be given to Ibn Saud on the Aden Protectorate frontier. I have no further observations to make to those contained in my telegram No. 20 of 15 [? 19th] March, 1936.*

79100/1/37 S. [No. 17]. No. 168.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE RESIDENT.

[*Answered by No. 169.*]

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 4th March, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 6 of the 12th January¶, and to previous telegraphic correspondence, and to inform you that the question of the eastern and south-eastern boundaries of Saudi-Arabia has recently formed the subject of further discussion by the Departments concerned.

* No. 163. † No. 95 in Middle East No. 57. ‡ Enclosure in 79100/1/37 S [No. 1]: not printed.
§ No. 166. ‖ 79100/35 S. [No. 162]: not printed. ¶ No. 167.

2. His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that, in view of certain important Imperial and international considerations which are briefly set out below, it is desirable that every endeavour should be made to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the question of these disputed frontiers.

3. In the first place the contingency must be envisaged that the report of the Royal Commission on Palestine and the subsequent decisions of His Majesty's Government will not give general satisfaction to the people of Palestine, and that as a consequence there may be a recrudescence of disorder in that country on a more serious scale than has hitherto been experienced. Moreover, it is likely that the effects of such developments, in so far as they arise from Arab opposition, would not be confined to Palestine alone, but that the relations of His Majesty's Government with the independent Arab States throughout Arabia would be adversely affected; and there is the obvious possibility that Italian activities in Arabia would be directed, in such an event, to widening the breach. It is of importance that no unnecessary strain should be placed upon the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Saudi-Arabia at such a critical time; and the conclusion of a friendly agreement in this frontier dispute should appreciably improve those relations.

4. In these circumstances, it has been suggested that the position of the frontier negotiations should be reviewed, and that consideration should be given to the question whether some further concession cannot be made towards meeting King Ibn Saud's claims, both in the more northern area and in the Aden Protectorate zone. So far as the Protectorate is concerned, I shall be obliged if you will consider whether, in the light of this despatch, some additional concession might not be made in the area between parallels 17 and 18, particularly to the west of meridian 51. It is desirable that the question should be examined from the point of view of the limits of the area over which our tribes have indubitable claims, rather than with a view to the exclusion of King Ibn Saud from districts of which the ownership is quite indeterminate. It is realized that the cession of any part of the territory to the north of the Hadhramaut would mean some diminution in the desert area which separates the Protectorate from foreign territory, and on the retention of which great importance has been laid in the past. Nevertheless I feel that the special considerations mentioned above justify me in asking you once again to review the position and report whether some further concession can be made in the Protectorate zone without sacrificing local interests.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

79100/1/37 S. [No. 28].

No. 169.

THE RESIDENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5th April, 1937.)

[Answered by No. 171.]

(Secret.)

(No. 123.)

SIR, The Residency, Aden, 24th March, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch, dated 4th March, 1937*, in which you direct me once again to review the position regarding the question of the boundary between Sa'udi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate, and to report whether some further concessions can be made in the Protectorate zones without sacrificing local interests.

* No. 168.

2. I have consulted Mr. Ingrams, First Political Officer, who is now on special duty in the eastern part of the Protectorate, and who, as you are aware, has made a special and careful study of the tribes in the Hadhramaut district. His knowledge of them has been augmented by the personal contact that he has had with them during his stay for the last five months in the Hadhramaut, where he has been actively engaged in assisting the local tribes to join in a general truce, the form of which emphasizes their dependence on the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans. The tribes occupying the area affected by the question of the northern boundary with King Ibn Sa'ud are (from west to east) the Seia'r, the Awamir, the Manahil and the Mahra. Of these, Seia'r and Manahil are dependents of the Qu'aiti Sultan and the former are also closely allied with the Kathiri; the Awamir are part of the Shenāfir confederation of which the Kathiri Sultan is the head; and the Mahra belong to the Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra. In addition to the four tribes mentioned there are outlying sections of the Kathiris living among the Mahras in the neighbourhood of Sanau and Thamut, about 150 miles to the north-east of the Hadhramaut Valley.

3. In accordance with the wishes expressed in paragraph 4 of your despatch I have examined the question at issue from the point of view of the limits of the area over which these tribes have indubitable claims. Mr. Ingrams reports that he has no doubt that they not only claim but are in scattered but permanent occupation of the whole of the steppe country up to the desert area. The limit of this steppe country may be taken to be represented by a line parallel to and about 20 miles south of the line indicated in your telegram No. 80 of 1935*. The 20 mile wide strip of territory between these two lines is the desert area mentioned in paragraphs 4 and 8 (2) of Mr. Ingrams' note of the 19th August, 1935, transmitted to you with Colonel Lake's secret despatch of the 20th August, 1935†. This desert area has no permanent inhabitants but is visited after rain for purposes of hunting and grazing by the Hadhramaut tribes I have mentioned. It is not frequented by tribes from the north. It should therefore be included in the sphere of the Aden Protectorate rather than in that of King Ibn Sa'ud, and I remain of the opinion that admission of the latter to it involves a real risk of opening a door for his penetration into Hadhramaut affairs, and of sacrificing local interests by enabling him to restrict or prohibit the ancient customary rights of our tribes to enter the district.

4. If His Majesty's Government decide that this risk must be taken in view of the special considerations mentioned in your despatch it will be possible to concede to King Ibn Sa'ud a part or the whole of this desert area, and to limit the British claim to the retention of the steppe country. I recommend most strongly that in no circumstances should any of the latter be sacrificed. To do so would undermine the confidence of the tribes that has been gained by our more active policy in that part of the Protectorate, and would undo much of the very successful political work on which Mr. Ingrams has lately been occupied; and it would render very difficult, if not impossible, a peaceful development of the policy indicated in your secret telegram No. 128 of the 31st December, 1936‡. I therefore consider that the maximum possible concession to King Ibn Sa'ud is a line drawn from the intersection of the violet line with meridian 48 to a point 20 miles south of the intersection of parallel 19 and meridian 52. For the reasons that I have urged on this and previous occasions I hope that it will be possible to concede less than this, especially in the neighbourhood of the violet line, which already intersects a portion of the Seia'r country. I trust that His Majesty's Government will in no event contemplate any further retreat beyond the line that I have now suggested.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Resident, etc.

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* No. 95 in Middle East No. 57. † No. 94 in Middle East No. 57.
‡ 78177/36 [No. 3]: not printed.

79100/1/37 S. [No. 29]. No. 170.

COLONIAL OFFICE

to

FOREIGN OFFICE.

SIR, Downing Street, S.W.1, 14th April, 1937.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ormsby Gore to refer to the letter from this Department of the 5th March*, enclosing a copy of a despatch† to Sir Bernard Reilly regarding the boundary between Sa'udi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate, and to transmit to you herewith, for the consideration of Mr. Secretary Eden, a copy of the Governor's reply‡.

Mr. Ormsby Gore is in agreement with the Governor's view, that in no case should any concession beyond that indicated in the final paragraph of the Governor's despatch be considered.

I am, &c.,

K. W. BLAXTER.

79100/1/37 S. [No. 49]. No. 171.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Secret (2).)

SIR, Downing Street, 8th July, 1937.

With reference to your Secret despatch No. 123 of the 24th March‡, and to Foreign Office telegram to Jedda No. 58 of the 1st of July§, regarding the south eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, I have the honour to transmit to you, for your information copies of the correspondence‖ noted below.

2. With reference to paragraph 4 of Foreign Office telegram of the 1st of July, the Middle East Official Sub-Committee reached the view that there might be some advantage in refraining for the present from any attempt to define the frontier between the Aden Protectorate and Saudi Arabia. The present policy of establishing our position more firmly in the interior of the Protectorate will enable increased knowledge to be obtained and His Majesty's Government may thus be in a stronger position a little later on to state their claim in this area.

I have, &c.,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

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* L.F.: not printed. † No. 168. ‡ No. 169. § Enclosure in 79100/1/37 [No. 47]: not printed.
‖ Sub-enclosures in 79100/1/37 S. [Nos. 38 and 44]: not printed.

14. REPORT ON THE HAJR PROVINCE OF THE HADHRAMAUT BY MRS. INGRAMS.

78428/39 [No. 1]. No. 172.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 12th June, 1939.)

(No. 206.)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 30th May, 1939.

I have the honour to transmit for your information a copy of a report submitted by Mrs. Ingrams through the Resident Adviser, Mukalla, on her journey to the Hajr Province in the Hadhramaut.

2. The report is most interesting and is a valuable addition to our literature concerning the Hadhramaut.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

Enclosure in No. 172.

EXCURSION INTO THE HAJR PROVINCE OF HADHRAMAUT.

On Saturday, 25th March, 1939, Salih 'Ali al Khulaqi, an officer of the Mukalla Irregular Army, and I left Mukalla by car to visit the Hajr Province, the only one of the five provinces of Hadhramaut—Mukalla, Shihr, Shibam, Du'an and Hajr—that I had not seen. Two Beduins with two donkeys had left the day before and we were to meet them at Kherba, a few miles west of Mukalla. Salih's personal luggage consisted of his rolled up bedding in which he had stuffed change of clothes and on which he sat when riding his donkey. Mine was slightly more elaborate, a camp bed, three rugs, two pillows, an overcoat which formed my saddle, a light bag with a change of clothes and a despatch box for films, notebooks, etc. Our joint items were 2 saucepans, 2 kettles, 1 spoon, 3 enamel plates, 2 enamel mugs, a lantern and 2 water bottles. Catering had been left to Salih who bought 10 lb. of rice, 5 lb. ghee, 6 lb. onions, 6 tins tomato juice, 6 lb. hanid (dried fish), 6 lb. flour, 1 lb. spices, ½ lb. tea, 2 lb. sugar, 1 tin milk, 1½ lb. ground up coffee husks and ginger, 8 lb. dates, 3 tins of pineapples and 4 dozen Arab cakes.

We left shortly before seven in the morning, drove along the beach to Fuwa where we turned up the wadi, and bumped over the stones till we came to the track that goes off westwards to Lermi and Kherba. The road was in a shocking condition after the recent rains but no obstacles daunted our driver who soon passed the huge pile of stones near Lermi known as the Ferenji's grave. We splashed through pools left by the seil in Wadi Kherba and wound among date groves in an astonishing fashion, rebounding from one stone wall to another, and finally climbed up to the houses of Kherba.

Outside the largest of the houses we found the donkeys. Their owner, Muhammad of the Samuh tribe, with freshly oiled curly hair and a serious expression, and Muhammad of the Al Ba Haj, older and not so serious, soon had them loaded. Then, walking across the streams and grassy banks to beyond the village, we mounted and rode up the wide Wadi Kherba, part of the habitat of the Beni Hasan and 'Akabira tribes. After a fairly long spell in the wadi bed we climed gently to Jol Hadari, then crossed a tributary of the wadi and up on to Jol Sadi, whilst Muhammad Ba Haj went off to fetch water from a well, with a siqaya attached to it, known as Ben al Jeilah.

Wadi Kherba, with the disconcerting habit of most Hadhramaut wadis, now changed its name to Wadi Asfal al 'Udh which presently bore off to the right while we continued along Wadi Lijmat. Wadi Asfal al 'Udh joins Wadi Medheineb which leads to the settlement of Medheineb, the home of Muhammad Ba Haj who told me that though they had few date palms, they had a great number of lime trees and bananas.

My white donkey now collapsed under me for the second time and Salih insisted upon taking it over and giving me Bukheit, a stalwart black animal. Poor Salih spent most of the day on his feet as the weight of a rider and luggage was obviously too much for it and we decided to try and hire a third donkey when we reached Bahth. We halted to change loads on the donkeys for half an hour and took the opportunity to eat some Arab bread and hard boiled eggs, provided by Salih's family. Away to our right was

the peak of Jebel Azaqun and ahead of us we could just see the summit of Jebel Bahth towards which we rode. Since leaving Kherba we had only met two boys and an old woman and I remarked on the scarcity of caravans, but was told that after the rains the Beduins had gone off to the hills to graze their animals. Normally their occupation is taking firewood for sale to Mukalla and carrying goods or passengers from Mukalla to Du'an or Hajr.

Jebel Suweidan, a massive dome-shaped mountain sharply cut by gullies, was pointed out to the southwest of us by Muhammad Ba Haj who had been to the summit, from which, he said, you get a fine view of Mukalla and the coast westwards. We came to the small settlement of Lijmat with dates and pools of water and grass, and quite soon afterwards passed Al Qerba, belonging to sections of the 'Akabira. Here Muhammad Ba Haj met his mother tending goats and his sister washing her hair in a filthy pool. They exchanged news and when Muhammad went up to the village of two or three mud huts to fetch water he had another long talk with his father. The family were not on their own ground but had wandered to Qerba in search of pasture.

There were many tall ariata trees in the wadi which brought back memories of Wadi Maseila and how we had plucked off branches to swat the flies that had so pestered us. We halted at two o'clock under some date trees near Bahth as Sufal and Jebel Bahth looked much more formidable now that we were close to it. Bahth belongs to the Ba 'Awadh Muhammadiyin but is also occupied by Al Ba 'Alawi Seiyids. Among the many friendly villagers who came to talk to us there was one particularly striking looking young man who went off to Bahth al 'Ulia to try and find us a donkey, as there were none to be had here. While Muhammad as Sumhi brewed coffee we discussed rifles. He was carrying no arms but the other Muhammad had brought his rifle which he said was now only an encumbrance. It had taken a year's savings, earned by carrying goods to Du'an or selling goats, to pay the $500 that it had cost. It was a 1912 German rifle and he had only three bullets left and could get no more and no one wanted to buy rifles when there was peace.

We moved on at 4 o'clock, following Wadi Bahth which narrowed considerably. We left it to climb the long, steep 'Aqabat al 'Arqub from which we had a splendid view over Bahth al 'Ulia. Part of this village is known as Hauta and is enclosed by a wall inside which is the tomb of Sheikh 'Ali Ba 'Umar, a sanctuary. Just where we were standing admiring the view there was a large pile of stones with two upright ones at each end, rather like a grave, but it was a " meshhed " for Seiyid 'Ali bin Hasan al 'Attas. The handsome Beduin who had gone to fetch a donkey joined us with the news that there were none at Bahth al 'Ulia so we had to give up the idea of a third until we reached Yuwan.

We now climbed on foot. Salih and I were soon out of breath owing to our sedentary lives and the Beduins laughed at us. We greeted a passing Beduin who surprisingly returned some time later having talked with Muhammad Sumi further down the 'aquba and heard who we were. He came running up to offer us a sheep for dinner and overwhelmed us with welcomes. He was so friendly that though we persuaded him not to slaughter his sheep we did induce him to come on further and spend the night with us. We halted at sunset and Muhammad Sumhi cooked us an excellent dish of rice and dried fish and baked some flour bread in the embers.

Sitting round the fire after dinner Salim bin Sa'id, the Beni Hasan Beduin who had joined us, had many questions to ask about affairs at Mukalla, the peace, and in particular was anxious to know what it felt like to fly. He remarked how curious it was that the sayings of past years become the facts of to-day. I asked him to explain and he told me that years before aeroplanes were known it was customary to say " Fly to Qishn " to denote speed, and in the days of matchlocks there was a common saying " I'll have a gun that takes five ". I asked him what were the sayings of to-day and the only one he, or the others, could think of was " The Beduins will be ' kelal ' ", meaning that they will become extinct! Perhaps a foresight of the days when they will all be peacefully settled on the land.

Salim was untravelled and appeared afraid even to visit Aden I asked why and he repeated the story that I had heard told before, that people there kidnap the Arabs, fatten them up, kill them by knocking a nail into their heads and then take their blood for medicine!

We spent a very cold night for we must have climbed about 2,000 feet. I woke early and made tea while the Beduins shivered round the fire. I said good-bye to Salim and started ahead up the 'aqaba. The stillness was absolute and for some time I heard nothing but my plodding footsteps, but gradually the birds began to take an interest in the day and burst into song. Thin veils of clouds hung round the mountains and when I had reached the top of the 'aqaba I sat uncomfortably on a stone on Jol Sarafa and admired the view. When the others came up we rode, keeping to the left of Wadi Sarafa

and passing Naqaba as Sarafa with five scattered empty naqabs (rain water cisterns). I was told that these cisterns cost from $50 to $100 and that the Beduins dig them out on payment from some charitable minded person.

Wadi Hauradh ran into Wadi Sarafa and the latter winds down to Wadi Bahth, but changes its name. From its source it is Wadi Hemerun and becomes Wadi Sarafa about half way to Wadi Bahth. Rain had fallen on Jol Sarafa and there were bright yellow dandelion-like flowers, a bush with small purple blossoms, another with long petalled red and yellow flowers and a tiny plant with delicate white flowers. The purple flowered bushes were most popular with the donkeys who had constantly to be buffeted away from them. The white donkey sat down quite soon after we had started riding and continued to do so at frequent intervals throughout the day. We came to a very steep and narrow 'aqaba that led to a ridge overlooking Wadis Hauradh and Sarafa or Hemerun. This ridge is so narrow that in times of war the Beduins can make it impassable by blocking it with stones.

The top of this 'aqaba is known as Ras Sherara and on it were quite a number of heaped stones, like broken down murabba'as, said to be very ancient. We wound across Jol Mahusah to Naqab Mahusah, another empty cistern. There had been no rain above Jol Sarafa and it was badly needed. We crossed Wadi Ma'tuf on foot and climbed to Jol Berka, noticing many burnt stumps of the geradh tree which is the most popular wood for charcoal burning. The vast mountain of Heid Berka reared up to the left of us all day until we reached our night halt when it came to an abrupt perpendicular end and is known, from the other side, as Heid Kisa'i.

At 11 o'clock we halted at Qarif al 'Uweifar with a little revolting looking water lying at the bottom of the rain water pit. Donkeys and Beduins drank indiscriminately but Salih and I drank the spring water from Qerba with which our flasks had been filled. I had just remarked that we had not seen a soul all morning when three women with loads came and sat down some way off under a sumr tree where they were soon joined by an old woman who came from the opposite direction with her son. The son joined us and shared our dates and coffee. He and his old mother had walked from Bahth and were intending to reach Yuwan that day. I carried some coffee and dates to the women who had come all the way from Yuwan with loads of dom, the berries of the 'elb tree, which they were taking to Bahth. Endlessly walking, these Beduin men and women think nothing of 30 miles or more a day over steep 'aqabas and stony jols. There was a pretty unmarried girl, her mother who had been to Mogadishu with her late husband, a coffee seller, and had three sons living there, and an old toothless friend. They were pleased with the dates as they had had nothing to eat but dom since leaving Yuwan and they scraped the coffee cup with their fingers and chewed the grains. Our two Beduins joined us for they all knew each other, and though the men feigned not to notice the unveiled girl they evidently took her well in for there was much discussion afterwards as to whether she was pretty or not. No Beduin would think of speaking to a lone woman or accosting her in any way, but, as Muhammad Ba Haj said to Salih " Of course if she talks to us and seems anxious for closer acquaintance we're only too willing to comply!" Though the Beduin women are far freer than townswomen they are not treated with the same respect, for example a Beduin man will never kiss the hand of any woman other than his mother and then only after she has kissed his, whereas townsmen kiss their mothers' hands and heads, older sisters, and any elderly woman, before she returns it. The Beduin women kiss the hands of even their sons, younger brothers and husbands.

We went on soon after noon and after an hour's riding Salih spotted an inscription as we were passing Qari Ba Dhalā. We spent nearly an hour looking round and found four stones in all bearing much weathered carvings of a face, ankh-like symbols and wavy water line symbols roughly resembling ancient Egyptian. The best of them we decided to send down to Mukalla. The place was scattered with heaps of stones with large upright ones in the midst of them and near by there was a modern cemetery, no longer used, but amongst the Islamic graves were some of perhaps an older date, for they were formed by a wide circle of stones filled in with pebbles and one upright stone planted in the centre of the circle.

We came to Qarif as Sultan which divides Jol Berka from Jol Lejm and we then climbed steadily to the magnificant view from Heid Kiss'i. We decided to night at the top of the 'Aqabat an Nemāl which leads down to Jol Kasa'i and Salih and I made tea whilst the Beduins fetched firewood and prepared dinner. We sat between the peaks of Jebel al Quleila on the west and Heid Kisa'i on the east, a very beautiful setting for the firelight and the Beduins as they cooked the rice and chanted some qasidas about " Ingrāms ".

The voices of the Beduins trying to rouse Salih, who finds it difficult to get up in the mornings, woke me and very soon afterwards Salih, Muhammad Ba Haj and I started off on the very long and very exhausting climb to see the lignite deposits on Jebel Kisa'i, visited previously by Mr. Little. These deposits show a surface debit of three to four

feet but the mountain side has been so broken up by landslides that it was not possible to follow the seam, but it would appear to cover a stretch of at least 150 to 200 yards. Salih and Muhammad dug out specimens of what they called " coal " and then we wended our way down towards Wadi Kisa'i. By the time we had reached the foot of the mountain we had been walking for four and a half hours and we sent Muhammad on to find the donkeys. Tiring of sharing the scant shade of a small sumr tree, Salih and I plodded on and as we were getting more and more tired the donkeys tactfully appeared and trotted us to a lethub tree in Wadi Kisa'i where we refreshed ourselves with ginger coffee, cakes and a tin of pineapples. We were so exhausted after our long climb that we rested for over two hours and I had a short sleep, rudely broken by the piercing bites of a small black ant.

When walking ahead in the afternoon I found some scrawls on slabs of rock, like those on the road to Du'an, and stopped to note them down, then, joined by the others, we rode quite swiftly over Ras Bisheima until it ended abruptly at 'Aqaba Bisheima where we once again had to take to our feet. We had a glimpse of houses in Wadi Yuwan from the jol but once down the steep and long 'aqaba we rode among low hills which hid any views and came quite suddenly to the ploughed up parched fields of Wadi Yuwan. It is a wide wadi filled with 'elb trees and date palms and villages rising on the cliff sides. Although everyone speaks of Yuwan as if it was a town there is no such place but the whole area is known by the name of the wadi. There are 8 villages, Al Qarn, Al Qara, Al 'Arum, Al Jinein, Al Kuteifa, Al Quzeim, Mahruah and Al Qari. We rode up to Al Qarn where we were met by many of the inhabitants, Al Bat-haf and Al Ba Hibri Sultans, relations of the Ba Hibri Sultans at Zemen as Saghir. From the moment we entered the mud dar of the one-eyed Bin Ash Shubeil we had no peace. I was taken straight to the women's quarters and was the object of much smiling and friendly curiosity. A room was prepared for me and water placed in the jar in the bathroom and as soon as I had had a wash and changed my clothes an interested group of women came to watch me patch up my face and comb my hair. They retired veiled to a corner when a number of men came to talk, but the gathering was broken up by the news that dinner was ready. It is customary here for guests to eat alone so that everyone cleared out of the U-shaped room downstairs where Salih, the Beduins and I shared a dish of rice and boiled meat.

When I went back to my own room it was soon filled with women and children who viewed my camp bed with almost as much astonishment as they viewed me. The men and women in Yuwan are fine looking types, tall and with well shaped regular features, though the women are marred by tattooing. When at last I murmured I would like some sleep I was quickly left alone and told to bolt the door against any more sightseers.

Before six the next morning (Tuesday, 28th March) I heard the mistress of the house call " Duri, Duri, subh (morning)". I answered that I was awake, dressed and unbolted the door. Bin Shubeil and his No. 1 wife brought in a delicious breakfast of millet bread and honey which Salih and I ate together. It was not long before men poured in either to gossip or bring complaints. There was a case of a stolen camel, and a slave woman who had been turned out of her house, and our host's protest that the Yafa'i Irregulars used his house as if it was their own. Two of them had gone off with the key of one of the principal rooms which they had left bolted, and they were said to have no manners and had even tried to make Bin Ash Shubeil show them his wives and the other women in the house. Then I was asked to write a letter in English to someone's relatives in India, and another to a halwa seller in Mukalla. Eventually I cleared the room of men in order to let the women have a chance of talking.

We lunched early and lunch was " on us " to-day so that Salih ate with the men and I ate with Bin Ash Shubeil's two wives. Afterwards we packed up and walked a mile or so to Al Jinein to stay the night with 'Abdulla bin Salim Ba Rahim, a silversmith and friend of Salih's. His house was of five storeys of stone and mud, but rather more ornamental inside than the home of Ash Shubeil. It was a poor edition of a Du'an house, and it was of course as dirty as anywhere else but I hastily took off my glasses and managed not to see more than the stained walls where people place their backs and the general grubby look of the homemade mats.

Children abounded in this house, runny nosed whining babies, dirty little girls and bossy small boys. As more and more women squeezed themselves into my bedroom I was very surprised to be greeted by a great number of them in Swahili. East Africa is the country to which this wadi emigrates and many of the men take their wives with them. The man becomes a soldier or a coffee seller or a water carrier or coolie and the woman bakes bread and cakes and sells them. After three or four years of hard work they return to live on their savings. The percentage of good looks though high among the women is often barely perceptible as they are fond of painting the upper half of their faces yellow and the lower half green.

I dined quietly with one of 'Abdulla's wives and by 9 o'clock the room was cleared of all the women from the town and I was left to settle down for the night with the friendly bugs and mosquitoes.

'Abdulla woke me in the morning by bringing tea and cake and his old mother whom he declared was a hundred. We slipped away before the town was really astir and here we parted from Muhammad Al Ba Haj who had been taken on as our guide from Mukalla to Yuwan. Instead we had Yeslem Ba Faqqash who was a fine graceful creature with a magnificently musical voice. We also had acquired a third donkey. We left Wadi Yuwan shortly after leaving Al Jinein and crossed Jol Museijid, Wadi Med-hun, another short jol and came to 'Aqaba Dhoba which we climbed on foot. I discovered we had a slave with us, whom at first I thought was in charge of the donkey, but it appeared he wanted a word or two in private with me and had decided to go with us to our lunch halt. There he would certainly be out of earshot of the town but he would have walked 25 miles or so by the time he returned to Yuwan. However he insisted on carrying on so I supposed it meant no more than a pleasant stroll for him.

At the top of 'Aqaba Dhoba we parted from two Irregular soldiers who were on their way to Sidara and who took the direct track to Kanina, whilst we diverted to see some rock inscriptions in Wadi Mardaha. One of the soldiers was an ancient slave who could barely stagger a hundred yards without a rest and I doubted if he would ever reach his destination. We had to climb still more 'aqaba for this province is far more mountainous and broken up than Du'an and there were no long stretches of monotonous jol land but one continuous climb or descent. The jol on either side of Wadi Mardaha was covered with round broken up piles of stones that might once have been small forts but are of course known now as " Ad " ruins. It took three and a half hours from Al Jinein to reach the inscriptions which are painted in red on the underside of an overhanging cliff on the right bank of the wadi, and I was very interested to see that some of the letters were in cartouches like the ancient Egyptian. The site is similar to Sad in Wadi Maseila and affords an excellent shelter. There is water near by and Yeslem told me that further up the wadi there were still many incense trees, so it might well have been a place where incense gatherers rested.

Having copied the letters we crossed to the left bank to lunch and hear the tale of Salih bin Sarur, the slave. Although born a slave he was subsequently freed and a few years ago was given Halima bint Yeslem, slave of Sheikh Salim Ba Ras, as a wife on condition that half their children should belong to her master and half to the parents. They had had two sons, both of whom were still with the parents who did not want to part with either of them. Halima and the children, said Salih, were kept by him on his earnings of ½ a dollar a day as a mason, but in spite of that the woman was continually being ordered to work by the son of her master. One day on refusing to obey him he hit her head with a stone and beat her until some people pulled them apart. She wanted her freedom and I suggested he should take her to Mukalla, but on hearing that one of the children was only a baby I told him to go to the Qaim of Hajr who would give her a manumission paper.

As Yeslem assured us it was only a matter of about three hours from here to Kanina we had our first hot lunch when travelling, and while the rice was cooking Yeslem talked to me of Mogadishu where he had lived for a short while. He said he was often hearing from friends there of the bad treatment they received from the Italians and that they could earn very little. In the old days, he said, you earned more money there than in Mombasa or Zanzibar.

We left soon after two and rode along the seil bed until the Wadi Mahrad ran into Wadi Mardaha from the south when we left the wadi and had a seemingly endless climb up and down 'aqabas with occasional patches of wata' (low places) where we could ride. Finally we descended steeply again into Wadi Mardaha. Winding some way along the bed we ran at last into Wadi Yuwan which had now become Wadi Kanina, and though wide at this junction and full of trees and shrubs it quickly became narrow, reminiscent of the Wadi Qubhudh and the bed was so filled with boulders that we had to take to our feet. We clambered over and round rocks followed by the donkeys which had a slippery time. Above us the right bank rose up in a perpendicular cliff and this pass is known as 'Aqaba Nu'man, for years ago a great number of the Nu'men tribe fell over the cliff during a fight.

To our astonishment we overtook the old slave soldier who had taken all this time to reach Wadi Kanina from where we had separated early in the morning. He was utterly spent and could only murmur " Esh hadha? Esh hadha?" (What is this, what is?) The younger soldier, his companion, had gone on but 'Ubeid was not alone as he had fallen in with an 'Amudi Sheikh, an old man on his way from Qeidun to visit Hajr. He introduced himself as the Mansab though Selih whispered that he was only one of many

who style themselves such, and he handed me a very ornate silver walking stick. " The weli's walking stick," he said, " Sheikh Sa'id bin 'Isa ". I felt it reverently and with interest, thinking of Von Wrede who had so nearly been killed when discovered at the fair in honour of Sheikh Sa'id bin 'Isa, and handed it back. The Sheikh then asked me who I was and when I had told him he burst into rapturous exclamations: " Ingrāms! I met him at the Meshhed fair and shook his hand. He's a very good man is Ingrāms."

The old mansab had a very small donkey and we had soon left him and the slave behind when we were once more able to ride. But we did more clambering than riding and had to dismount very frequently. Yeslem had completely, though unwittingly, deceived us, for he was thinking of a Beduin's capabilities and not ours or the donkeys, and the sun had set long before we were anywhere near Kanina. Fortunately there was a moon and the clouds that had kindly shaded us from the sun now scattered and let us have the clear moonlight to help us. It was five hours after we had left our lunch halt when we came to the village of Sherij Ba Jamun on a spur on the right bank. The houses were in darkness but the dogs barked as we passed and it was not long before we had a crowd round us. Yeslem fetched a friend and a lantern who guided us a short way up Shab Qahlan to see some more rock writings. The villagers pressed us to stay but we had agreed to be in Kanina that night so thanked them and went our way, riding along high banks between ploughed up fields studied with 'elb trees.

It was half past eight when we came under the steep cliff on which Kanina is built, appearing by moonlight to be rather like Hajarein. We had yet another 'acaba to face to reach Masna'a and the house of the Naib of Hajr, 'Ubéid Miftah Bensh. He had given up expecting us that night but soon produced tea and made us comfortable in his high, narrow dar with very small rooms. The house seemed strangely quiet for he had not brought his family from Mukalla and he was there with only a clerk and a servant.

After supper we talked of many things but principally of the caravans from Bir'Ali and the routes they take to try and avoid customs duty. He said also that now that Balhaf caravans which brought with them a chit from the Customs Clerk there were allowed through free, goods were much cheaper than they had been before, notably sugar which had fallen from 2½ annas a pound to 1½. One of the reasons why we had seen no caravans at all since leaving Mukalla was that the Beduins were now mostly going to Balhaf to bring goods for sale in Hajr and Du'an.

The next morning, Thursday, 30th March, it was the sun that woke me and drove me off the roof where I had been sleeping. Masna'a is the furthest point of the town eastwards and rises on a pinnacle of rock. The town itself looks quite magnificent with high houses close packed on the hill. Below the hill the wadi bed is wide and a great part of it ploughed up and divided into fields, then sadly parched for rain. Date palms and 'elb trees are scattered fairly thickly. There were very few people about when I went in to dress but a child's voice singing rose shrilly from the valley.

A number of people came to see us after breakfast and among them the very friendly Seiyids 'Umar bin Bubakr and Ahmed bin Muhammad Al Beiti who invited us to spend the day with them. We compromised by going round to their house for half an hour. Compared with others it was a very clean house as it was new. Unlike Du'an or Hadhramaut the houses in Hajr are nearly all built of stone, cleverly interwoven narrow slabs held firmly with a mud and straw plaster. They rise to six or seven storeys and as they are of stone they have no need to use lime as a protection against weathering. Though many of the men of this Al Beiti family had travelled they had not taken their women with them, consequently they had never seen anything like me before. The little girls had been dressed up in their best clothes, their faces yellow and green and broad red bands painted along the centre of their heads. I spent a quiet half hour with the women, two of whom told me of the killing of their husbands in a feud with other Al Beiti Seiyids, who are all arm-bearers. Three brothers had been killed in a single fight.

As we walked back to Masna'a for lunch the children swarmed after us calling " Marrat Ingrams " (the wife of Ingrams) and were waiting for us again when after we had lunched, too well and not at all wisely, we walked down the narrow path to the wadi. On reaching the foot of the hill we mounted our beasts and trotted off, waving a goodbye to the Naib whom we were to meet again at Muhammada. We passed the village of Sherij Ar Rakh, which lies on the left bank, and continued for some way in the seil bed. Clouds were gathering and as everyone wherever we had been had expressed the hope that rain would fall soon, it was good to see them and better still when we heard distant thunder. Wadi Jifeir ran into Wadi Kanina from the right and we passed the few dars occupied by Ba Rahma, Ba Rajash and Subians.

As we left Wadi Kanina to climb slightly on to a jol, Yeslem pointed out two large holes on the hillside and said " I have been told that they're bottomless and were caused by falling stars." So of course we went out of our way to have look at them, scrambling with difficulty over the loose earth on the hillside. The caves proved to be shallow and

filled with boulders. With the aid of a torch we clambered down one of them as far as we could but the only sign of a bottomless hole was a very small opening down which we threw pebbles and heard them falling a long way.

Soon after we had rejoined the donkeys a slight drizzle began and we hastened on to Wadi Mazrab, a continuation of Wadi Kanina. There were pools and streams, grass, date palms, bushes of all sorts and for quite a long way we rode under a beautiful avenue of ariata trees. The water is permanent and runs into the Wadi Hajr. The village of Mazrab is on the right bank, just a few dars belonging to Ba Ras Sheikhs and Al Beiti Seiyids. Then we had to climb another 'aqaba called Miseila and descend the other side to rejoin Wadi Mazrab. The descent was tiring as it was all on small pointed stones that cut through my rubber shoes. As we drew near the mud and brush huts of Kineiyana, only inhabited by Subians, it began to pour and the thunder and lightening increased. We sought shelter in a cave together with men, women, children, goats and donkeys. Muhammad and Yeslem eagerly seized the opportunity to make a fire and have a smoke from the rusheba. The women sat gazing wide eyed at us and nursing their babies which they carried in baskets hung from their shoulders by a strap. When the rain turned to a drizzle we set off at speed on foot to try and make our destination—Hauta—before it became worse.

As Wadi Mazrub runs into Wadi Hajr the view is quite beautiful. A river flows down the centre of Wadi Hajr and either side is one mass of date palms and cultivation. We turned up the wadi under the village of Duqeim situated on the left bank of Wadi Hajr and the right bank of Wadi Mazrab, and a short way further we came to Al Qeima with its houses scattered up the hillside on the left bank. We were riding among the date groves beyond Al Qeima when we heard shouts and cries and then a dull roaring sound. The seil had come. We dismounted and ran to the bank overlooking the river bed but found the flood was pouring down among the date trees on the other side of the high bank across the river bed and we could not see it. We debated whether to cross but decided there was not time before sunset, but scarcely had we remounted when we heard the sound of another approaching torrent. By the time we again reached the bank a wall of water was thundering down the wadi and the river bed was at once a raging flood, some 20 feet deep stretching over 100 yards across to the far bank on which we might have been stranded with our food and goods on the other side, if we had not indeed been caught as we were crossing! I would willingly climb all the 'aqabas again to see such a sight. Date trees, their trunks bobbing about like some tormented beasts, huge branches of ariata trees and anything that had been in the way was being whirled along in the turbulent waters. I now understand how it is that people and animals are drowned by the seil and the wonder is that there are not more accidents, but the people can always tell when a seil is coming and hastily remove themselves and their movable property out of the route they know it will take. It comes down at a tremendous pace, quite impossible to withstand. I roughly estimated a distance of 100 yards and timed the trunk of a date palm passing over it and it took 15 seconds. The flood was coming from two directions, down Wadi Hajr and down Wadi Sirra which runs into Hajr just below Hauta. Consequently we could not reach Hauta and took shelter for the night under an overhanging cliff.

Yafa'i soldiers from Al Qeima joined us and brought with them 'Ubeid, the slave, who had managed to stagger thus far from Kanina. It was not long before a Subian appeared up the hill side with a complaint. His sister, he told us, had become pregnant by a certain man whom he named and the Muqaddam of the Irregulars had imprisoned them both at Sidara. He then demanded $60 from the father of the woman and $60 from the man said to be responsible. Neither would pay and after 15 days or so both were fettered and taken on camels to Mukalla where the Sultan, on hearing their case, ordered their release. The Muqaddam had taken the man's jambiya from him and on their return from Mukalla the man went to fetch it and was not given it until he had paid $1 to the Muqaddam. The Muqaddam then demanded $8 from the woman's brother, who was telling us the story, on account of her expenses of transport to Mukalla and was threatening him with imprisonment if he did not pay. It was only one aspect of the story we heard then and we were to hear more about it later.

Muhammad, meanwhile, was busy preparing supper. He was perhaps one of the most delightful Beduins I had met, quiet, doing his work without fuss and shouting and with not a vestige of that " I wonder what bakshish I'll get " look about him. He and Yeslem kept away the small boys who wanted to climb up to see us but we welcomed a number of other Subians who came up when it was quite late in order to relate their complaints. When everyone had had his say it was so late that instead of returning to their homes they curled up for the night on the rocks beside us.

We could not hurry off in the morning as we had to wait for the seil to settle down and it was eight o'clock when we climbed down and crossed Wadi Sirra. The torrent was now fordable, but it had been up to at least 20 feet for we could see the high water

marks on the banks. We climbed up on to the jol between Subahiya, on the right bank of Wadi Sirra, and Hauta, quite a large village on the left bank of Wadi Hajr and I discussed the price of date palms with a Subian who was walking along with us. A good palm costs about $25, very much cheaper than in Du'an, but they can be bought for a great deal less than that. We left the villages behind and rode swiftly over the wide plain of Jefjef. The river bed was now far away to the left and this area was uncultivated. It could perhaps be used as a landing ground but it would probably be only possible to land machines up or down the wadi owing to the high cliffs on either side. The surface seemed firm enough where we were riding though it might be boggy in places.

Over on the right bank we could see the village of Ba Qusheim where live the Ba Hasan Subians. The wadi is very extensively occupied by Subians who are all cultivators. They are descendants of the Abyssinians and are very much blacker than the Beduins. All those whom we spoke to expressed their gratitude for the peace. They were now happier than they had ever been before as they could grow their crops and cultivate their date palms without the perpetual fear of robbery by tribesmen, in particular the Deiyeb tribe from the west. I saw many traces of this oppression among the ruined date palms which had had kerosene poured over them. They were all extremely anxious for the peace to continue and in fact so were all the settled tribesmen, and the only signs of any liking for war were among a few young nomads who had nothing to lose and enjoyed the excitement that a feud engendered.

The Yafa'i soldiers in Husn al'Asala, built by Sultan Ghalib on a spur with a good command of the wadi, called out to us to come in, but we were anxious to get on to Sidara and rode fast till we came to a vast area of cultivated land when it was difficult to urge on the donkeys who found much to satisfy their hunger. Most of this area is Government land bought from the Bal Baheith, who own a great part of the wadi in the Sidara neighbourhood. The working of the lands and the sale of produce is in the hands of the Muqaddam at Sidara and we heard many rumours of oppression, forcing people to work without pay or lend their oxen without compensation. The people quite appreciated that it was not the Government that was benefiting from these exactions but only the Muqaddam and they were relieved to hear he was being recalled from his post.

The wadi was full of hot springs running down from both banks and though advantage has been taken of a great deal of this water, there is probably room for much more extensive cultivation. Bullrush millet was the staple crop and as we swept through the fields the women and children perched up on wooden supports to throw stones at the birds were diverted from their work by the unusual sight we presented. When we had ridden beyond the cultivated area we found a wide plain thickly covered with the 'asaf palm from which the people obtain their nebidh. They cut down the palm and the white sap flows into plaited straw cups. The palm grows again and it is said that one palm can be cut down about eight times before it ceases to yield the wine. The very poor even consider this nebidh as both food and drink, and indeed it must have a satisfying effect for I have never seen more sturdy or fatter Beduins than those who live near here. But it is undoubtedly intoxicating though the people declare that only the nebidh drawn off when the sun is high is " harem " and that it is quite lawful to drink it in the early morning.

We heard shouts ahead of us and a labourer called out that another seil had come down. When we reached the bank opposite Sidara we found the river bed between us and the village was in flood so we had to wait there for an hour or two until we could ford the river. We had lunch, coffee and dates, joined by a soldier from a nearby husn. People from Sidara gradually appeared on the far bank and one of them, a Yafa'i soldier, plunged into the water and half waded, half swam across, being swept at least 100 yards down stream. Shortly afterwards he was followed by several others who arrived dripping and out of breath, but we now thought we could send our belongings over by hand and then take the donkeys. The bedding and the odds and ends were taken over without mishap held high above the heads of those carrying them, who had a hard struggle against the current. The old slave, 'Ubeid, who had been very cheerful on having at last reached Sidara and who had danced shakil beside the river, was rather daunted at the prospect before him. I went in first holding with one hand the arm of a Yafa'i soldier and with the other trying to keep my skirts from billowing round me as we sank deeper and deeper. We had quite 70 yards to wade with the water up to our shoulders, and it was probably further as the force of the water made us take a diagonal course. Salih followed holding on to two men and 'Ubeid was half carried across with much laughter by several others.

The Qaim of Sidara, Sheikh Ahmed al 'Alawi 'Abdnal Mani, had gone to Mukalla and the Muqaddam of the Irregulars was inspecting the Government lands on the right bank of the wadi. A runner had already gone to tell him of our arrival and meanwhile we were taken to his dar and were able to change our wet clothes. I was given a room on the roof with a ceiling of palm fronds laid over slats of wood. The houses in Sidara are

of stone and built high and narrow with only slits for windows. They expressed very clearly the state of insecurity that had previously existed there.

Half an hour after our arrival the Muqaddam, 'Atif bin Hussein, returned and for the next hour or so he scarcely stopped talking for a moment. He told us that when he had come there nearly six months before there had barely been anyone living in the wadi as the people had fled from the raiding tribes. But he started cultivating the Government lands and showed the people there was now nothing to fear and gradually they came back and were all living peacefully and contentedly. Salih and I gave approving nods, without looking at each other, but both of us were thinking of the many complaints we had already listened to. He said how he had turned waste land to profitable cultivation and that Government gets a clear profit of one-tenth and the rest goes to the labourers and those who irrigate the land.

He spoke, too, of Bir 'Ali and Balhaf caravans. He declared that hardly any came from the former port, or if they did they came at night and could not be caught, though he had garrisons posted all down the wadi. The ports of 'Irqa and Haura, too, he said were sending goods via Yeb'eth and he thought caravans could be taxed there. He had recently spent a fortnight in Yeb'eth, where, he said, the tribes want the Mukalla Government and not the 'Abdul Wahid. He thought about twenty caravans from Balhaf came through in a month and if they brought the chit from the Customs Clerk he let them through free.

Some 'Abd al Mani Sheikhs and Baheith tribesmen joined us and gave tribal information. One of them, echoed by the others, then said " Why is our Uncle 'Atif being taken from us? He knows us all now and the good people from the bad and we all like him and he's brought us peace." The effect was rather spoilt by the frequent exchange of looks between them and 'Atif. The latter protested insincerely that he wanted to go to Mukalla to see his family but was met by a chorus of " No, no; you must wait until at least after the kharif ". The kharif would be the time when they would expect to receive their reward for supporting him, when the produce of the lands would be sold. It had already been whispered into my ear that 'Atif had his supporters and friends to whom he doled out bakshish.

Tiring of the obviously insincere talk, Salih asked the Baheith tribesmen about East Africa to which many of them emigrate. They said that Mogadishu was now becoming impossible, for the Italians refused to let them stay and work there. " If you will become our subjects ", we were told the Italians said, " you may stay, but otherwise we do not want you as we don't wish you to make money out of us to spend afterwards in British territory." One of them had a friend who had been caught smuggling out about $4,000. The money was seized and the man imprisoned for a week or more.

When the visitors had left and I was alone with 'Atif, I mentioned casually to him that I had met a man who said that he was being threatened with imprisonment if he did not pay $8. I was of course referring to the Subian who had told me the story of his sister when we were nighting near Hauta. But I had no need to say more as 'Atif at once knew who I meant and began a rambling account which differed entirely from that which I had heard before. He declared the man had intended to murder his sister and had been found digging her grave, and that it was he, the brother, who had insisted on the woman being sent for trial to the Sharia Court at Mukalla, hence he was being ordered to pay her transport expenses. His story was somewhat obscure for I could not see why he had imprisoned the woman and not the brother who, according to him, had intended to cut her throat. But I said no more, thinking that the truth was probably to be found in Mukalla.

Dinner was brought to us on the roof and as soon as I could afterwards I settled down to sleep. No one was early astir next morning (1st April) and it was seven when I heard people talking and moving about downstairs. Yeslem, with his hair loose and curling round his shoulders, brought me a cup of tea and 'Atif followed with some nebidh in a large plaited cup. It was certainly extremely good but I am sure it would be intoxicating if taken in large quantities. The 'asaf palms belong to no one in particular so that anyone has the right to cut them down and we had seen many of these cups hung round the bases of the broken stumps.

Many of the visitors of last night, with a few additions, came up to extol the virtues of 'Atif, but methought they did protest a great deal too much. It was by no means an atmosphere of complete sincerity and they were apt, to prompt each other to bring out titbits of praise, with sidelong looks at 'Atif. I was amused, too, that none of them so much as mentioned his name when he was not actually in the room with us.

The Muqaddam insisted that we should lunch before leaving so a large dish of rice and meat was put before us at half past nine. We started off at ten, after I had spent a few moments in the house of Sheikh Ahmed, the Qaim, to meet his family. Having said

goodbye to 'Atif and many others at the outskirts of Sidara we rode fast for several miles, keeping to the right bank of the river bed until beyond Husn Ba Suleiman and Murabba when we waded waist deep through the seil to the left bank and rejoined our track of the day before. Three Baheith tribesmen were accompanying us and once away from Sidara they no longer burst into praise of 'Atif, in fact when two of them had gone off in the direction of Husn Ba'ba the third hinted at his pleasure that 'Atif would be leaving them.

We were passing close to a settlement of Subians living in brush huts and working in the fields, when a number of them came towards us and asked to speak. We dismounted and Salih and I sat under a tree and listened to complaints, most of which had to do with heavy fines imposed on them by 'Atif for one reason or another. We had barely left this settlement when we were held up by a band of tribesmen with more complaints, this time to do with the taxation on goods they had brought from Bir 'Ali. They said they had been perfectly willing to pay the proper tax (which I rather doubt) but that 'Atif took enormous sums off them. I was interested to hear this considering 'Atif had assured me he never caught any caravans from Bir 'Ali. As Salih afterwards said, " That's how he has been able to buy a new rifle. He never had one before and I was surprised to see it."

About a mile from Husn al 'Asala a small pile of stones was pointed out to us as making the spot where about 15 days before a Ba Rasheid tribesman had been shot by an Al Zagheib. He was wounded in the shoulder and we could see his bloodstains on the path along which he had staggered to Al 'Asala. The Al Zagheib had fled but his relations were as anxious to give him up to justice as anyone else for he had broken the truce.

We halted for coffee near Al Qeima and an old man showed us the small fish he had caught in the seil, which afford a welcome change of diet. The news of our return, became quickly known and the Subian who was to pay the $8 came again, denying that he had ever insisted that his sister should be taken to Mukalla. He also assured me that she was living quietly with him, which was confirmed by others, and that he had never thought of killing her. Other complainants came too, and the Yafa'i soldier stationed at Al Qeima said that if their free supply of wood and water, etc., was to be stopped none of them would want to stay in the country, but would return to their mountains in Yafa'. Salih looked at me and grinned, knowing well that it would be small loss to the Mukalla Government.

After an hour's rest we rode on, passing under the perpendicular cliff that juts out into the wadi before Al Qeima and is known as Masna'a. There had once been a fort and a well built on it, long since fallen into ruins, but these Masna'as are frequent from Sidara all down the wadi and when the forts were in existence they must have had a wonderful command over a great area. We wound among date palms, crossed the mouth of Wadi Mazrab down which we had ridden the day before, and rode on along the left bank of the Wadi Hajr to Hussein Bin Daghar, where the highmost dar perched on a rock is also called Masna'a. It houses the head man of the Bin Daghar, once a large tribe after whom this wadi was called Wadi Hajr Bin Daghar, but now the tribe numbers only some 30 men. It was nearing sunset and a long line of goats and sheep and cows were wending their way up the hill towards the houses, urged on by small girls armed with pebbles.

Wadi Hajr is unlike other Hadhrami wadis. It is not bounded by perpendicular cliffs but is wide and the cliffs either slope gently, or are all broken up and form spurs. The line of water runs through acres of date palms and cultivation and it is the most beautiful wadi I have yet seen. Dates are the principal produce together with bullrush millet and another grain called tahūf, and a fair amount of sesame. The wadi must present an extraordinary sight during the kharif. On the outskirts of every village there are open spaces covered with pebbles from the seil bed on which the dates are exposed. Murabba'as, shaped like tunnels, are built near them and there the people who own the dates go and live for a few weeks to barter their crop. The banks are lined with the camps of those who come from Yemen, Aden, and all parts of the country and bring goods to exchange for the dates.

As we approached Jol Ba Hawa we rode among the Government date groves. A very extensive area in this neighbourhood belongs to the Government. We stayed for the night in the husn occupied by a Yafa'i soldier in Jol Ba Hawa and I was given a most airy room for it had huge gaps in the stone walls but no shutters. Salih and I and the two Beduins dined together off Muhammad's excellent cooking and they were all talking of the Baheith and 'Abd al Mani's insincerity. Yeslem said, too, " Look how many people came with complaints to-day, and they were only those whom we met on the road. How many more there must be whom we did not meet."

On Sunday, 2nd April, we left before six as we had arranged to visit some ruins and an inscription that a Beduin had declared existed at Wadi Bana some five hours' away. Soon after leaving the date palms of Jol Ba Hawa the wadi narrowed and we had to leave it to climb 'Aqaba Sufeiya and wind down again to that part of the Wadi Hajr known as 'Atf. We met a small caravan on the 'aqaba bringing dried fish from

Meifa and a wild-eyed camel that had lost its senses and was careering round the hillside chased by a distracted Beduin. The wadi was still narrow and the water wound from side to side so that we should have had to wade through it ten times but we avoided four of these crossings by climbing a short 'aqaba on the right bank. The water was still flowing with considerable force and still from three to five feet deep; however these fordings were very refreshing as the day was hot!

After more than four hours we turned towards Wadi Nu'ba which comes into Wadi Hajr from the west, and riding over a long stretch of jol came down into the narrow wadi and halted for lunch near the few huts of Nakhla. Our guide had told us it would take three hours to reach this place and two hours from here to the ruins, and we had intended to leave Muhammad with one donkey and all the luggage and ride on to see what was to be seen, then return to camp for the night at Nakhla. However we had taken so much longer than had been expected that I said it would be better if we all remained together, for if there was anything worth seeing I should prefer to stay the night at the ruins. So after a light lunch of bread and dates we left at 1.15 and had much tedious climbing, but we did see some beautiful views over Wadi Hajr and the mountains. The going was very rough and winding and we did more walking than riding. As we were passing along the boulder-strewn Wadi Kharash haqq an Nu'ab, Salih suddenly spotted an inscription. It was somewhat similar to that which the Bents and we had seen in Wadi Ser, thought to be a caravan signpost. I was taking it down when there were cries from Salih and Yeslem and Muhammad " Here's another " "And another " "And another!" The wadi was littered with inscriptions, many of them too weathered to be legible and sometimes only a letter or two on a boulder. But I copied all that we found, though the best of them was the first we had found on a large boulder just beside the track. The most interesting seemed to me to be those letters in cartouches, like those seen in Wadi Mardaha.

From Wadi Kharash we climbed an 'aqaba and found a few more inscriptions, then came to Jol Ar Rubeiya on which were several more. We climbed down to Wadi Rubeiya, with some inscriptions, and found still more 'aquabas confronting us. We were desperately tired and rather cross as our guide, 'Abdulla Ba Rajjash, had repeated " It's just here " for the last hour or more. In fact instead of five hours from Jol Ba Hawa we took ten. But it was worth it for on at last reaching the hillside overlooking Wadi Bana we saw a massive stone wall barring the way with an opening in the centre towards which the track led.

It was after sunset so I could do no more that evening than take a general look round and copy down a part of the long, well cut Himyaritic inscription on one of the stones in the passage way. I did not know at the time that Von Wrede had been there and that this inscription had been published or I might have saved myself the trouble! That night I slept just within the passage way in the vain hope of dreaming of the ancient caravans that passed this way.

Early the next morning I got up to copy the rest of the inscription and examine the wall more closely. It covers about 200 yards from the steep hill on the west to the very edge of the perpendicular cliff leading down to Wadi Bana on the east. At the opening the wall is 16 feet high but it rises several feet more at various points, though the top had been so broken up by Beduins hoping to find treasure that it is no longer possible to judge its original height. The wall is about 6 feet thick but widens to 17 feet on each side of the opening, where, possibly, there had been guard rooms on top of the wall. It was built of long well shaped stones filled round with cement.

Salih and I went down into the wadi and walked some way along the seil bed. The cliffs were very steep but where there were shabs on the east bank which would have enabled a caravan to climb up out of the wadi and escape the wall, they had been blocked by stone walls. Thus the only possible route was through the opening in the wall. The wadi has permanent pools of water and it is usual for caravans to halt near here. As we were walking in the wadi we heard voices and a number of unarmed Beduins carrying empty water skins appeared round a corner. They stopped dead in surprise at seeing us but quickly came forward as Salih called out "As salaam aleikum ". They were Ba Ras Sheikhs and Ba Rajjash tribesmen bringing rice and sugar from Balhaf for sale in Du'an, and had been nighting not far from us but hidden by the winding hill.

They came back to the wall with us and sat talking while some of them fetched the water. Presently their long line of camels came over the brow of the hill led by a small boy. This road is the direct route from Bir 'Ali and Bal af to Hajr and thence to Du'an, though some caravans go by Wadi 'Arus and Neqeb. To-day the wall is considered a boundary of the Nuwah and the Ba Qutmi, but the Beduins knew little or nothing about its history. Some said it was built by Kaffirs for defence, but one of them, whose father was something of an historian, said he had been told by him that it was a king of Sabota (he used this word) who had built it. I would hazard a guess that it was once used as a

customs post and was perhaps the boundary between two states. Incense trees, I was told, are still plentiful in the hills around and it seems more than probable that this was one of the ancient highways for carrying the incense from Cana to Sabota.

Our new friends came some way with us along the road on our return trek. They told me that they had rifles with them, now parked on the camels, because they were afraid of being attacked in Wahidi territory, but they never carried them once they were in Hajr. They branched off to take their camels by an easier but longer route and we made somewhat better progress than the day before as we were going downhill most of the way. We did not go back to Nakhla but took a right fork shortly before that settlement and, passing Husn Nu'ab, crossed a long stretch of jol and once more came into Wadi Hajr. There we chose a shady spot and I went off to bathe in the river, muddy but refreshing.

We had a pleasant addition for lunch, sweet potatoes which are so plentiful in this district that about 150 lb. can be bought for a dollar. An old woman, whom we had met first at Nakhla, appeared once more and helped to gather firewood. She was given some lunch for her pains and my irrevocably torn dress. She had told us she only possessed the one disgusting looking garment she was wearing and though she would not be seen about in mine in the day time, as it was not fashionable, she did say she would wear it in the house and wash the other.

We left at three o'clock and crossed the water to the left bank when we rode, passing a number of stone heaps, again said to be ancient. A group of women herding cows in a field ran out to look at us. One called out " Is that a weli?" " Yes ", said Yeslem (she was referring to me). " Where from?" " From the sea ", cried Yeslem more or less truthfully. We kept well to the left of the cultivation and the seil bed and presently saw the few small dars of Jizwil on a hill overlooking the date palms.

We dismounted to look at some huge mounds of stones and earth on the top of which were some long, broad piles of stones about three feet high filled in with pebbles. These appeared to be graves and the place is called Qubur al Kufar (the infidels' graves). It seems likely that the mounds on which these graves were built are ruins, for they bear a resemblance to the mounds near Hajarein, Meshhed and Hureidha.

We left Wadi Hajr and the still distant village of Jizwil on our right and bore away to the north-east over a jol. Here we were able to trot and cover the ground fairly quickly. To the east we caught a glimpse of the fields and dars of Husn Ba Qarwan, showing up very green among the darkening mountains. It was a long ride before we came to Wadi Muhammada and could see the houses of Gheidha Ba Musatr on a spur where the wadi takes a sharp bend eastwards. The sun had set when we rode along the wadi bed below the village but most of the Ba Musatr men were waiting for us to invite us to stay the night with them. But we were expected at Muhammada so begged to be excused and rode on.

The wadi narrowed considerably and we took a short cut over the left bank and then rejoined the seil bed. It was soon dark but we had the light of a nearly full moon to guide us and when, nearly four hours after we had left our lunch halt, we came to the date groves of Muhammada, they looked most beautiful in the moonlight which threw up sharp corners of the hill sides into most fantastic shapes.

Muhammada is a small town of large houses, second only in importance to Kanina, the capital and main market town of Hajr Province. The Naib spends his time between the two towns and we renewed acquaintance with him here, but as the government husn was rather small the Qadhi very kindly put us up for the night.

The next morning after breakfasting with Seiyid Ahmed Al Beiti, the Qadhi, we received many visitors, among them an older brother of the Beduin we had met at Bana who had told us the wall was built by a king of Sabota. The brother agreed with this and said that it was constructed as a customs post. He said, too, that there was a broken-down wall in Wadi 'Arus, another route from the coast, and that its foundations were similar to Bana but that it had been remodelled to serve as a barricade when the Qu'aitis were fighting the Wahidis. He told me also that the inscriptions painted in red were known as Himyar al Masnad.

A number of Subians, whom we had met on the road last night and who had returned to Muhammada with us, came in about a murder of one of their relations some years ago, and several locals came with complaints that they had to give bread to the Yafa'i soldiers. They were particularly annoyed about it as they said the Seiyids were exempted. I also heard the tale of the local murder which had occurred in Ramadhan. A certain Seiyid tried to make his sister-in-law give up some of the property that would come to him after her death. She refused and some time later fell ill. One night in Ramadhan when the men were nearly all in the mosque, news was brought that the woman had died. The old woman who washed the corpse whispered that her neck bore marks of strangulation, and women in the neighbouring houses murmured that they had heard cries. But no one

would speak aloud for they were afraid of being murdered. A child of eleven who lived with the woman said that the Seiyid had come in and seized the woman by the throat. The child cried out and the Seiyid sent her out of the room. The Qadhi could do nothing without adult witnesses so the Seiyid, who protested that he had been asleep in his house, was sent to Mukalla for trial. I was told that he had been released on condition he did not leave Mukalla, until definite proof could be obtained.

We had a short walk down the wadi to see the bituminous deposits and returned through the town. It was extremely hot as Muhammad is closely enclosed by hills. We thought we would leave about three o'clock but shortly after noon there were loud thunder claps and the rain poured down. The people were pleased as they had not had a seil this year, but we were told that we should probably not be able to leave till the next day as our road went along the narrow seil bed of the wadi. However the rain proved to be light and having been assured that there would be no seil we set out at 3.30. We had straight away a very long climb to the head of Wadi Muhammada and then descended into Wadi Muslema, which was narrow and full of boulders. Salih and I were well ahead of the donkeys and walked a considerable distance. Almost from our first day after leaving Mukalla Salih had left off wearing his bandolier and carrying his rifle, which I had suggested he should not bother to bring, but he said he was a soldier and as such he should carry his arms. He told me now, as we walked over and round the boulders, how different it felt to travel in complete security. The most striking change was, perhaps, that we had been able to engage Muhammad as Samuh for the whole trip. Before we would have had to have changed our donkeys and donkey men several times and paid someone to be our tribal protector. Not only Muhammad but Yeslem too could not have travelled throughout the Province before the peace. They frequently met and talked to those with whom in old days they would have exchanged shots.

At sunset we were still in Wadi Muslema and saw a group of three monkeys watching us from high up on the cliff side. We went on riding by moonlight till at 8 o'clock we settled down for the night in the wadi bed. Salih turned cook and made us some sweet potato cakes.

For many miles the next day the wadi curved and twisted in all directions and the cliffs obscured all view of the surrounding country. We had started at half past six but halted again two hours later as we came to a water pool and the donkeys had had nothing to drink since leaving Muhammada. We decided to have lunch now and then ride till noon, rest, and ride on till night. We all helped to prepare the meal. Salih and I pounded up the dried fish with stones, Yeslem cut up onions and Muhammad poured the ghee into the saucepan to which he added a few pinches of pounded up spices, the onions and a tin of tomato juice. The fish went in too, and this mixture was allowed to cook for a short while before the rice was thrown in and water added. Salih and I watched the pot while the Beduins took the donkeys and water skins to the pool.

We left at half past ten and turned into Wadi Ras al Kharif. Again we had no views until the flat back of Ras al Qullih rose above the wadi walls. We then had about two and a half miles through bushes to the head of Wadi Ras al Kharif when we had a long descent on foot to Wadi Dhirra. From the top of the narrow watershed we had a splendid view of the peaks towards Burum, but no sight of the sea.

Wadi Dhirra changed its name to Wadi Laqadh and we found a shady place to rest in the seil bed. Some Muhammadiyin tribesmen appeared from the rocks and shared our coffee and dates. They were very unlike any of the other Beduins being extremely Jewish looking and somewhat darker skinned.

Soon after three we rode off down Wadi Laqadh and presently had a good view of the massive Kor al Muhammadiyin, towering above the hills around it. We left the wadi and bore south east across Jol Hadhana which was scattered with stone heaps and at the first one we examined we found a stone similar to that which we had sent to Mukalla from Qarif Ba Dhalā. There was the rough carving of a face with lines below it which were probably meant to depict a beard, the symbol like an ankh, which we also found on several other much weathered stones, and the wavy line water symbols. As we rode on we frequently stopped to take down letters scrawled on the stones, similar to the Himyar al masnad found at Wadi Mardaha.

We crossed a track that led to Burum and continued almost due east until after sunset when feeling hungry, and the moon not yet risen, we halted for dinner. We moved on afterwards by moonlight and climbed 'Aqabat al 'Adhub, descending the other side into Wadi al 'Adhub along which we rode until 11 o'clock when we decided we needed some sleep.

I was the first to wake on our last morning (Thursday, 6th April) and called out to Yeslem " Subh, subh." He started up at once and so did Muhammad, but Salih only roused himself with difficulty. We did not delay for breakfast but as soon as we had packed up we rode on, meaning to stop at Al Gholub where there is water. Not far along

the wadi we came upon the first of two Ba Dubian Beduin encampments. The families were each in their own caves or shelters preparing breakfast. Men, women and children sat round the fires. Some were baking bread in the embers and some were cooking bread in goats milk. They invited us to eat with them but we were pressed for time. They had come here from their own territory as there had recently been rain and the hills were so green with bushes that in the distance they looked like the wooded hills of England. Here the herds found plenty of grazing and the Beduins would only move on when they saw by the clouds that rain was falling elsewhere.

We reached the part of the wadi called Al Gholub at 8 o'clock and halted for coffee. The wadi had now become Wadi Nequb and it ran to the sea between Burum and Heru. At ten we went on accompanied for a short way by an 'Amudi Sheikh and some Beduins. The former was a poor old man travelling round among the nomads giving advice and receiving food in exchange. The Beduins, as others had done before them, asked me if the " Fear " would come again at the end of the truce period. I asked them if they wanted to renew their old feuds and there was a chorus of " No." I assured them that Ingrāms and the Government did not intend to let them go back to days of fear again.

We left Wadi Nequb and climbed east to Jol Al Qudara on which were more of the stone heaps and inscriptions on stones by the wayside. The jol led down to Wadi Qudara which we crossed and continued in an easterly direction till we came to Wadi Ba'ir when we turned south towards the sea. We found some scant shade under a boulder for our mid-day halt and here we settled up accounts before coffee. I had started off with a bag of dollars and at Al Qarn I told Salih that these were in my unlocked despatch case. " Give them to me," he said, " and I will hand them over to Muhammad who will hide them amongst the rice in the saddle bags." From that moment I never had to think of them again. Salih took what money was necessary to buy more food in Kanina and Yeslem produced a written statement of the expenses and Muhammad produced the bag of dollars. I settled up there and then for the donkeys and found that the inclusive cost of the whole trip had been under £5.

We left the boulder at three and had a somewhat tedious ride over jols. As we were approaching the wadi across which we could see Fuwa I saw two cars moving down the slopes on the far side. I had sent a letter asking to be met here and, fearing that the cars might not see us, Salih fired his rifle. They stopped abruptly and as we rode towards them I saw H. and Sultan 'Awadh walking over to meet us. We took Yeslem to Mukalla in the car with us, but Muhammad stayed the night in Fuwa and brought in the donkeys the next day. He took two hours along the beach. We took twenty minutes.

Observations on Hajr Province.

As less than ten days were actually spent in Hajr Province the following observations may be taken as tentative and approximate.

2. General.—Hajr Province should be one of the most prosperous areas of the Qu'aiti State. The fact that it is not so is probably due to (i) the continual insecurity until the peace, (ii) the backward state of the inhabitants who are principally Beduins and Subians, and (iii) the fact that those who have emigrated (and they form a large proportion of the population) have gone principally to East Africa where but few of them have ever made more than is sufficient to bring them home again to live a few years on their savings. There is, therefore, no prosperous mercantile community as in Du'an or Shibam. Nevertheless they would be much worse off if nature had not been benevolent and given them an excellent supply of water (permanent river in Wadi Hajr, hot springs, etc.) and an extensive area of cultivable land. The population has not suffered from having to scratch a living but from having to guard crops and palms from the raids of neighbouring tribes.

3. The Wadis Hajr, Kanina, Yuwan and Muhammada have settlements ranging from a dar or two to large villages. Kanina is the main market town and the only place where such luxuries as cigarettes, tins of pineapple, etc., can be bought. The other towns or villages deal only in such goods as are essential to the local community, e.g., grains, rice, coffee beans, dates, etc., and a certain amount of piece goods, though these are mostly bought in Mukalla.

4. Agriculture.—Practically everyone of any means at all owns date palms (the best of which only cost $25) and possibly a plot of land on which he grows bullrush millet or some other grain. Irrigation in Wadi Hajr is by channels from the river, but there are wells in Wadis Yuwan, Kanina and Muhammada where running water is not permanent. Consequently the cultivated lands in Wadi Hajr lie close to the river but there appeared to be many more acres which could be cultivated that I was told were " too far from the

water." In particular there was an extensive area not far from Sidara and close to hot springs which was uncultivated but thickly scattered with the 'asaf palm, from which the inhabitants take their nebidh.

5. There are acres of land farmed by Government at Ghoul (Sidara district) and Jol Ba Hawa. The former produces much grain as well as dates and the latter principally dates. I was not able to ascertain the exact extent of these lands but saw that they covered a very large area. I was told, but without any confirmation, that Government got a clear profit of one-tenth. The rest was said to go to field workers, rent (some at least of the land is said to belong to Bil Buheith tribesmen) and those who irrigate it. I have no doubt that a survey of the true position would ultimately result in an increase of of revenue for Government.

6. I was informed by a great number of people that there had never been so much cultivation in the Province as existed at present and that the people were more contented than they had ever been before. This was, of course, entirely due to the peace.

7. Population.—The Province did not appear to me to be at all thickly populated. The following figures given me for the villages in the Yuwan area, which are for men only, can probably be taken as an approximate estimate for villages elsewhere: Al Qarn, 50; Al Qar, 60; Al 'Arum, 35; Al Jinein, 50; Al Kuteifa, 65; Al Quzeim, 60; Mahruah, 40; Al Qari (2 or 3 dars only), 4; and Gheil al Ma'amila (in the wadi of that name), 20.

8. Wadi Kanina, besides the town of Kanina has only two villages, Sherij Ba Jamum and Sherij Ar Rakh. These latter have probably no more than 40 to 50 men each. I would not estimate the total population of Kanina at more than 600 or 700. It is said to have some 300 houses, but this seemed to me an over estimate though it is difficult to judge as they are close packed on a hill, somewhat similar to Hajarein.

9. From Sidara to Jol Ba Hawa the Wadi Hajr is fairly thickly strewn with villages, the largest of which are Sidara, Hauta, Al Qeima, Al Qusheim, Al Hussein and Jol Ba Hawa. These have probably not more than a few hundred inhabitants and the population of most of the other villages is probably under 100.

10. The Muhammada area contains the town of that name, Gheidha Ba Musatr and Husn Ba Qarwan. Muhammada is comparatively large and probably has a population of 200 or 300, perhaps more. Gheidha Ba Musatr is said to have 40 men and Husn Ba Qarwan about 100. The last named village was too far off the route to see.

11. An appendix gives the principal Hajr tribes, their villages and approximate numbers. For the rest the inhabitants are Seiyids, Sheikhs and Subians. The latter are more in evidence in Wadi Hajr than in any other part of the Hadhramaut I have visited and there are many villages occupied only by them.

12. Administration.—A glance at the map will show that the centre of Government (Kanina) is by no means as well situated as it might be. It presumably became important as (*a*) it is more or less on the route to Du'an from Meifa or Wahidi ports, and (*b*) because the political situation in Wadi Hajr was too insecure with constant tribal raids and wars between Qu'aiti and Wahidi for a capital town to have grown up there. Probably a much better seat of Government would be at Hauta or Jol Ba Hawa. As it is the Naib of the Province moves frequently from Kanina to Muhammada and principally exercises his functions over those areas and Yuwan, but the inhabitants of Wadi Hajr itself seemed to deal more frequently with the Government representative at Sidara. 'Atif Hussein was a great deal more in evidence in cases than Sheikh Ahmed Al 'Alawi and it appeared to me that more often than not the former was usurping the functions that more properly belonged to the latter or the Naib himself. 'Ubeid Miftah is considered honest but ineffectual. I heard no word of complaint against him but on the other hand I got a general impression that he did not inspire respect. The Qaim of Sidara and 'Atif Hussein are hand in glove and neither of them appeared to be popular. I have no doubt that any Qaim chosen from the local inhabitants would always be dishonest.

13. In the present circumstances it is obviously not possible to do much to change the situation, but I would tentatively suggest that instead of having a Qaim at Sidara there should be one at Hauta, which is more central, and that the Muqaddam in charge of the soldiers (with headquarters at Sidara) should exercise police functions only and not magisterial, and should not stay longer in the Province than four months. His functions do not necessitate such an intimate knowledge of local conditions as do those of the Naib or Qaims, who should, therefore, remain for a term of years, but on the understanding that if they acquire land or property they shall be dismissed and forfeit it.

14. Perhaps the most pressing need is the proper keeping of accounts. I believe a newly trained clerk has left for Hajr, but as I am told he is a son of 'Atif Hussein I fear he may be influenced when accounting for the sale of Government produce, etc. I would suggest that particular attention be paid to the finance of the Province during the kharif. It is said that many people then come from Yemen and Aden, bringing goods to barter for dates. As these visitors probably come via Wahidi ports there has in the past no doubt, been a good deal of evasion of customs dues, which may in part be stopped by the clerk at Balhaf, but it seems worth while making further investigations into this matter.

15. I was informed that the principal merchants who import goods from Wahidi ports are Ba Suweid, Ba Hakim, 'Ubeid Ba Hasan Ba Hamish and Ahmed bin Yeslem Ba Hamish, all of Du'an. Many goods are, however, bought in Balhaf or Bir 'Ali by the camel men on credit. They then sell them in Du'an or elsewhere and return to the ports to pay up and buy more. The clans chiefly concerned in this traffic are Al Ba Rasheid, Al Ba Rajjash, and Sheikhs of Al Ba Ras. Their routes are roughly as follows:—Wahidi ports—Wadi Bana or Wadi 'Arus or Qantul Kanina—Du'an. Wahidi ports—Yeb'eth —Reidat ad Deiyin—Du'an.

In this connection it may be mentioned that 'Atif Hussein considered Yeb'eth was a better place in which to catch Bir 'Ali caravans than Sidara. But those tribesmen who had brought goods from Bir 'Ali whom I met had come via the Wadi Bana or Wadi 'Arus routes.

Appendix.

Hajr Tribes.

Nuwah—Al Ba Subarra.

Clan.	*Section.*	*Sub-Section.*	*Muqaddams.*	*Places.*	*No. Men.*
Al Ba Mas'ud ..	Al Ba Rajāsh ..	—	'Ali Ba Rajash	Sherij Ba Jamum.	18
		Al Bal Aswad Ba Rajash.	'Abdulla Ba 'Ali Ba Rajash.	Sherij Ba Jamum.	15
		Al Ba Tum Ba Rajash.	'Abdulla Ba 'Awadh ash Shenna.	Sheerij Ar Rakh.	30
		Al Bal Qarshum Ba Rajash.	Suleiman bin 'Abdulla Bal Qarshum.	Sheerij Ar Rakh.	25
		Al Bal Rahma Ba Rajash.	'Amr Ba Rasheid Bal Qarshum Ba Rajash.	Sheerij Ar Rakh.	12
	Al Ba Dabeis ..	—	—	Kuteifa, Wadi Yuwan.	35
	Al Ba Sirra ..	—	—	Al Qari, Wadi Yuwan.	4
	Al Ba Qarwan Ba Musatr ..	—	Sa'id Bil Hāi ..	Husn Ba Qarwan	?100
		—	'Abud Ba Heitham Ba Musatr.	Gheidha Ba Musatr (Wadi Muhammada).	40
	Al Ba Faqqas..	—	Qarshum Ba Faqqas.*	Al Qazeim, Wadi Yuwan.	35
	Ba Tirs ..	—	Mahdi Ba 'Amr Ba Tirs.	Jizwil Qarat Ba Tirs.	15
Al Ba Dubian ..	Ba Samin ..	—	Quhun Ba Sa'id Ba Samin.	Bedu (around Muhammada).	45
	Al Mahādi ..	—	Hasan Ba Mahdi	Bedu (around Muhammada).	30
	Al Ba Zeid ..	—	Zeid Ba Wa'uz	Bedu (around Muhammada).	60
Al Ba Rasheid ..	—	—	Ba Deris Ba Rasheid.	Bedu (around Libna).	—
	Al Ba Sheiba ..	—	—	Bedu (around Libna).	150
	'Ayal Sa'id ..	—	—	Bedu (around Libna).	60
	Al Ba Shuqār..	—	—	Bedu (around Libna).	30
	Al Ba Sa'd ..	—	—	Bedu (around Libna).	25
	Ba Darūs ..	—	—	Bedu (around Libna) and Husa.	50

*This Muqaddam is the chief and known as the father of all Al Ba Subārra.

Bin Daghar*.

Tribe.	*Muqadda.*	*Place.*	*No. Men.*
Bin Daghar	Barghash bin Sa'id ..	Hussein bin Daghar ..	30

* Once the largest tribe of Hajr.

Mesnajir†.

Clan.	*Muqaddam.*	*Places.*	*No. Men.*
Al Ba Hanaf	Salim bin 'Abdulla ..	Kelab near Yeb'eth ..	50
Ba 'Ali	Salim bin 'Abdulla ..	Seik	60
Ba Hakām	Nasir bin Salih	Yeb'eth	80
Al Bal Meih	Yeslem Ba 'Umar ..	Yeb'eth	60
Al Ghabara	'Umar bin Muhammad bin Nuqeis.	Yeb'eth	60
Bal Tureir	Salim bin Salih	Yeb'eth	50

† This tribe is given as a clan of the Seibani in Col. No. 123, p. 112, but they are, I think, more properly a Hajr tribe and are separate from the Zei.

Al Dheiyeb‡.

Clan.	*Muqaddam.*	*Places.*	*No. Men.*
L Qasha'ir	Quseiba 'Umar	Heitha, Wadi Meifa'a ..	40
Baudha	—	Quleitha, Wadi Meifa'a ..	350
Al Suleiman	—	Haura, west of Hajr ..	60
Al 'Abdulla	—	Between Hajr and Balhaf	50
Al 'Adhm	Bin Qus	Hamir, Balhaf	200
Ba Kharkhar	—	Haura, west of W. Hajr ..	40

‡ This tribe is more connected with Wahidi country, but is included in Hajr Province in Col. No. 123, so I give here what details I could obtain.

Al Ba Behar§.

Clan.	*Muqaddam.*	*Places.*	*No. Men.*
Al Ba Rasheid	Muhammad bin Salih ..	Gheidhat Ba Rasheid, Wadi Meifa'.	100
Al Ba Qutmi	'Abdulla bin Mehdi ..	Al Musfila and Hadhana ..	200
Ba Faqir	'Awadh bin Humeid ..	Al Jer'a, Hara, Rajja Wadi Meifa'.	100
Ba Bureish	Bin Sa'd	Hauta, west of W. Hajr ..	125
Ba Deiyan	Salim b. Nasir b. Samrus..	Al Hadhana and Qulqul west of W. Hajr.	100
Ba Zagheib	'Abdulla b. Ahmed ..	Hajr	30

§ This tribe is connected with both Hajr and Wahidi country.

AL NU'MAN.

Clan.	Section.	Muqaddams.	Places.	No. Men.
Al Buheith	Bin Sa'id bin Suleiman Bin Salim bin Suleiman BinAhmed bin Suleiman Bin 'Umar bin Suleiman	Bin Sa'id b. Suleiman Bil Buheith.	Yeb'eth, Sidara ..	100
Al Bejenef Al Ahmed	—	Salim b. 'Umar, Mehdi b. 'Abdulla, 'Abud b. Hajri.	Bedu, Wadi Salmun	280
Al Salim	—	Bil Masdus Al Salim.	Amaqim	100
Ayal Sa'id	—	Mehdi b. 'Abdulla Bil Heitha.	Wadi Jerdan ..	30
Ba Keili	—	Deiyan bin 'Ali ..	Reidat Ba Keili Jebeel Nu'man.	50
Ba Teis	—	'Umar bin Salim ..	Bedu, source of Wadi 'Amd.	80
Al 'Ali	—	Bin Sumeida ..	Bedu, source of Wadi 'Amd.	300

The Beduins of Ash Shaula (see Col. No. 123, p. 117) are said to be a small nomadic tribe now living to the west of Jerdan, though there are still some in Hajr Province.

An Namarra Beni Hilal (see Col. No. 123, p. 117) are said to live in Wadi Jerdan as well as Wadi Yeb'eth.

AS SUMUH*.

Clan.	Muqaddams.	Places.	No. Men.
Ba Wasim	Yezid Ba Muhammad ..	Roba	50
Shaka'i	Hasan Ba 'Umar	Henar	50
Ghueithi	Sa'id Ba 'Ali	Bedu around Wadi Yuwan	12
Jodani	'Ali Ba Thabit	Ghadhiyun	12
Ba Mansur	'Abdulla Ba 'Awadh ..	Bedu around W. Yuwan ..	5
Jahdhani	Ahmed Ba Salim	Burreyira, Du'an Province	50
Al Hanasiyin	'Umar Ba Barkat	Bedu around W. Yuwan ..	25
Ba Buteiyin	'Ali Ba Sa'id Ba Buteiyin	Bedu around W. Yuwan ..	15

* This tribe is connected with both Du'an and Hajr Provinces.

MUHAMMADIYIN*.

Clan.	Section.	Muqaddams.	No. Men.
Ba 'Awadh	Ba 'Eibi	'Umar Ta'am, Ba Med ..	50
	Ba Qashā'a	Yeslem Ba 'Abdulla ..	30
	Ba Dha'ān	Hasan Ba Muhammad ..	30
	Bubār	An Neimi	40
Ba Baheith	Al Laktar	Ham id Ba Maqsur, Ba Qeshaqish 'Ali.	25
	'Ayal Hamid Ba Muhammad	Ba Maqsur	20
	Ba Kheish	'Ali Ba Kheish	12
	Ba Hedeili	Sa'id Ba Hedeili	20
Al Mahdi	Al Hejlan	Ba Hādish	40
	—	—	15
Al Baheishi	—	Salim Ba Mahdi	30
Ba Subar	Al Mahdi Al Baheishi ..	—	18
	Ba Hamran Al Baheishi ..	Barqat	30
Ash Shamasi	—	Muhammad Ba 'Ali BaNush	20

* This tribe is connected with both Mukalla and Hajr Provinces.

BENI HASAN*.

Clan.	Section.	Muqaddams.	Places.	No. Men.
Al Ba Haj ..	Ba Dhalā ..	Hasan Ba Ahmed Najab Ja'far Ahmed Ba Hasan.	Medheineb	100
	Ba 'Ubud ..		Medheineb	40
	Ba 'Abdur Rahim	—	Medheineb	—
	Hal Ba 'Amr ..	—	Medheineb	—
	Hal Ba Hamhan	—	Medheineb	—
	Ba 'Asas ..	—	Asfal al 'Ain ..	—
	Ba Dreib ..	—	Asfal al 'Ain ..	—
Ba Ra'ida ..	—	'Abdulla Ba Yeslem Ba Fas	Kelbut	40
Ba Adhad ..	Ba Dalhus ..	Ba 'Adhad 'Ali Ba Hadanan	'Adhud	20
	Ba Daqeil ..	—	—	—
Ba Kadīm ..	—	'Umar Ba 'Abdulla Ba Kadim.	Hauta, Lubeib ..	30
Rahbani	—	'Ali Ba Qasim	Shuhura	20
Al Ba Wādi ..	—	Salim Ba 'Areiq	Lusb, Ma'oz ..	30

* This tribe is connected with both Mukalla and Hajr Provinces.

15. HADHRAMAUT—ITALIAN ACTIVITIES

78180/37 [No. 5].

No. 173.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE RESIDENT.

[*Answered by No. 174.*]

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, 6th March, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch No. 7 of the 13th of January† and in particular to paragraph 3, from which it appears that in the course of your conversation with Dr. Fabiani on the 1st January you made reference to the Hadhramaut and the Aden Protectorate in a way which might give the impression that some distinction exists between the two.

2. I would invite your attention to the confidential despatch of the 15th of February, 1933‡, from Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (now Viscount Swinton) in which it was decided to adopt your recommendation that thenceforward the Aden Protectorate should definitely be regarded as including the Hadhramaut.

3. It is important that no impression should be given, particularly to representatives of foreign powers, that any distinction between the Aden Protectorate and the Hadhramaut is recognised by His Majesty's Government, particularly in view of the more forward policy recently under consideration in the latter area.

4. It appears to me that it would perhaps be desirable gradually in future to abandon the use of the term "Hadhramaut" and to refer instead, whenever possible, to the "Aden Protectorate." I shall be obliged if you will inform me whether you see any objection to this proposal.

I have, &c.,
W. ORMSBY-GORE.

78180/37 [No. 8].

No. 174.

THE RESIDENT
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13th April, 1937.)

(Secret.)

(No. 137.)

SIR, The Residency, Aden, 31st March, 1937.

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch dated 6th March, 1937§, in which you state that it appears that in the course of my conversation with Dr. Fabiani, reported in my secret despatch No. 7 of 13th January, 1937†, I made a reference to the Hadhramaut and the Aden

† 78180/37 [No. 2]: not printed. ‡ 17954/33 [No. 3]: not printed. § No. 173.

Protectorate in a way which might give the impression that some distinction exists between the two. I did not intend to make such a distinction and I regret that the wording of my report implied that I did so. The meaning that I wished to convey (and that I think was understood by Dr. Fabiani) was that Shabwa is within the limits of the Aden Protectorate, but does not belong to one of the Hadhramaut Sultanates: I did not mean that these Sultanates are outside the Protectorate.

2. With regard to the proposal made in paragraph 4 of your despatch, it appears to me to be difficult to abandon the use of the term "Hadhramaut," which is a geographical expression in general use from ancient times. It is sometimes applied to the Hadhramaut Valley and sometimes is regarded as including country near that valley and country south of it down to the sea. The question of its proper significance is discussed at length in Chapter I of Mr. Ingrams's report on the Hadhramaut*. He states that politically it includes only the country of the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultans. That is the sense in which he has used it in his report, and it is the sense that should, in my opinion, be adopted for general official use. Its employment should not, however, imply that it is distinct from the rest of the Protectorate: it is, on the contrary, a geographical portion of the Protectorate in the same way that, for instance, Yafa and Mahra are so. I agree that it is preferable, when possible, to speak generally of the Aden Protectorate rather than of its component geographical parts, and I shall endeavour to conform to this practice when speaking of the area as a whole.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Resident.

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16. YEMENI FRONTIERS—SHABWA TERRITORY

78462/39 [No. 2]. No. 175.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 10.43 p.m., 26th October, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 176.*]

Following is repetition of my telegram No. 289. Following is summary of secret despatch of 26th September† lost at sea, copy of which is being sent to you. *Begins*:—

Reference your telegram secret of 16th September‡ I recommend appointment of special officer to make impartial study of boundary questions viewing interests of the two Governments and of the tribes. Objection to this is firstly the delay during which hostile foreign influences might intrigue at Sana and secondly the difficulty of finding suitable officer.

Alternatively suggest officers of Aden Protectorate Service, Lake or Seager for western. Ingrams or Figgis for eastern. Imam would appoint representatives to collaborate.

Shabwa and Alabr are the crux of the whole problem and unless settlement reached I am not hopeful of agreement on frontier as a whole. I suggest therefore visit to Sana'á by Ingrams in attempt to arrive at preliminary understanding Shabwa and Alabr. Ingrams could repeat offer neutralization of Shabwa on certain conditions and endeavour to induce Imam to accept the situation in Alabr. Should agreement be found impossible on this basis I propose non-exclusion of neutralization of Alabr as possible settlement. Imam might agree to neutralization of both but even so new difficulties arise regarding the interpretation of both places as Imam will consider that they include tribal areas of Kurab and Balobeid south-east of Shabwa and Seiar and Maded in Abr locality. Such a claim on his part must be explicit and narrower interpretation must be upheld by His Majesty's Government. Government guard garrison already withdrawn from Shabwa locality and if Abr similarly abandoned wound to Imam's pride might be healed.

Second difficulty in neutralization is the abandonment of control in both places and if patrolling was undertaken patrol should be joint involving difficulty in execution. I dislike to withdraw from Abr but consider it should not be ruled out provided that it is neutralized and not occupied by Yemen and provided adequate safeguard are obtained. In reaching this conclusion I am bearing in mind broader issue and resultant probable improvements of relations between the two Governments at a time when this is most desirable.

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* Colonial No. 123. † No. 178. ‡ No. 155.

78462/39 [No. 3]. No. 176.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.30 p.m., 3rd November, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 177.*]

No. 257. Secret. Your telegram No. 289*. Presume you have received no further information of Imam's intentions in matter of frontier negotiations since your telegram No. 265†. It remains policy of His Majesty's Government not to take initiative in making proposals to Yemen Government. I will consider your suggestions in consultation with other Departments concerned as soon as I receive your secret despatch of 26th September‡.

78462/39 [No. 11]. No. 177.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.31 p.m., 8th November, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 180.*]

No. 302. 8th November. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre No. 19. Reference to your telegram No. 257§, Quadhi Muhammad Asshami, Yemen Frontier Officer who arrived at Aden with Seif Al Islam Hussein had an interview with me on instructions from the Imam to open the frontier discussions. He has also had several interviews with Seager. It is difficult to obtain precise indication of the aims from any Yemen negotiator and it is not yet clear whether the Imam wishes final delimitation of the whole frontier according to Article 3. It seems that he wishes to maintain the *status quo* accepted by the treaty of Sana'á but desires consideration of his claims in places where we had no contact at the time of the treaty. Shami urged that theoretically any territory not left under British protection by the treaty of Sana'á must be Yemen but said the Iman might accept neutralisation of both Shabwa and Al 'Abr as a temporary soution pending negotiation at a later unspecified date. Although I must dislike retirement from Al 'Abr I have already recommended that we should be prepared to accept neutralisation in principle of both Shawba and Al 'Abr provided adequate safeguards (corrupt group) upon for the interests of both governments, and the security of adjacent territories. This would conform to the principle of *status quo* which is (corrupt group) our frontier relations with Yemen inasmuch as neither Government was in effective control of these districts in 1934 and might provide the solution of the present difficulties though the Imam is not likely to accept it as a permanent settlement, just as he is not likely to accept the present boundary as a permanent settlement of his claims in the rest of the Protectorate. If accepted by both sides as a *modus vivendi* it might however be made to last for an indefinite period. As regards interpretation of these two districts Shami has suggested to Seager that they should be defined as village Shabwa and post village Abr together with tribes known to be connected with them. This raises the points mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of my despatch of 26th September‡, which would have to be discussed and acceptance of neutralisation should be contingent on their satisfactory settlement.

As regards the western protectorate frontier it is thought that the Imam wishes discussions only in areas where *status quo* line is in doubt or dispute such as Bunder Abbas Markha. Mussi asked me to obtain early decision especially regarding Shabwa and Abr to enable him to communicate at once to the Imam but I pointed out the impossibility of such rapid action and reminded him that the Imam had taken two months to act on the ? Government's (corrupt group) proposal.

I still think Ingrams' visit to San Sana would be advantageous but if the Imam refuses it discussions could take place in Aden with Ingrams representing Hadhramaut interests. Agreement on Shabwa-Abr having been reached *status quo* line in disputed districts of the western protectorate frontier can be examined in detail based on the knowledge of conditions at the time of the treaty. For this work Lake and Seager are fortunately experts.

Shami is in political correspondence with the Imam and states he is awaiting further communication from him.

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* No. 175. † 78420/39 [No. 14]: not printed. ‡ No. 178. § No. 176.

78462/39 [No. 12]. No. 178.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 13th November, 1939.)

[*Answered by No. 180.*]

(Secret) (3).

SIR, The Governor's House, Aden, 26th September, 1939.

I have the honour to refer to your secret telegram No. 194, dated 16th September, 1939*, in which you have asked me to consider what procedure should be contemplated for negotiations with the Yemen which would serve our own interests and also be acceptable to the Imam.

2. The procedure that I have for some time had in mind is the appointment by His Majesty's Government of a special officer to make an impartial study of the questions affecting the boundary between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, keeping in view the interests and responsibilities of both the Governments and the interests of the tribes concerned. The Imam would be invited to appoint a representative to collaborate with this officer, and the assistance of the Aden Protectorate Political Staff would, of course, be at his disposal. The fact that he would be sent from England as an independent investigator without any preconceived views or prejudices, which previous service in the Aden Protectorate might be thought to engender, would, I hope, make the Imam more ready to accept his conclusions. The officer should visit Sana'á both before and after the enquiries on the frontier, and it is to be hoped that he and his Yemen colleague would be able to arrive at agreed conclusions to place before His Majesty's Government and the Imam. This procedure would be open to the objection that it would take a considerable time, during which hostile foreign influences would have opportunities of prejudicing its chances of success by intriguing at Sana'á and encouraging the Imam to increase his demands. I realise also that at the present time it may be difficult, or even impossible, to find an officer of suitable seniority and experience to undertake the task. If no such officer can be deputed, an alternative course would be for His Majesty's Government to be represented by officers already in the Aden Protectorate Service. In that case I recommend that questions affecting the frontier of the Western Aden Protectorate should be dealt with by Colonel Lake or Captain Seager, both of whom know the country well, and are thoroughly acquainted with the history, politics and predilections of the local tribes. Similarly, I should recommend that Mr. Ingrams or Mr. Figgis should be appointed to represent His Majesty's Government with regard to the eastern part of the frontier, which vitally concerns the Eastern Aden Protectorate. The Imam should be invited to appoint one or more representatives to collaborate with the British Officers, and to meet them at agreed points at or near the boundary. This procedure is also likely to be slow, and to be complicated by the Imam seizing the opportunity to revive some of his old claims on the Western Protectorate which have been more or less dormant since the signature of the Treaty of Sana'á, in addition to pressing his demands for Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

3. Shabwa and Al 'Abr are for the moment the crux of the whole problem, and unless some settlement can be reached about them I am not hopeful of any agreement with regard to the frontier as a whole, and I think that, whatever procedure may be adopted, there will be considerable risk that the negotiations will end in a deadlock. I, therefore, think it worth while to consider the possibility of arriving at a preliminary understanding with regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr, and for this purpose I suggest that the King of the Yemen be asked to agree to a visit to him by Mr. Ingrams. It is possible that the Imam will refuse, for he regards Mr. Ingrams as the principal author of the occupation of Al 'Abr which he so much resents. On the other hand it should be as interesting to the Imam to meet Mr. Ingrams as it may be to Mr. Ingrams to meet the Imam, and a personal encounter between these two stout protagonists of apparently irreconcilable views may produce a mutual understanding and respect which will have useful results. The primary object of Mr. Ingrams' visit would be to endeavour to make the King understand the reasons that have prompted our action with regard to both Al 'Abr and Shabwa and to convince him that His Majesty's Government have no designs on the independence or rights of the Yemen in that or any quarter. Mr. Ingrams would also have an opportunity of gaining a fuller understanding of the Imam's outlook and the reasons for his insistence on his claims in those regions.

4. Mr. Ingrams could repeat the offer that His Majesty's Government have already made to neutralise Shabwa upon certain conditions, and he should endeavour to induce the Imam to accept the present situation at Al 'Abr. It is possible, however, that he may find it quite impossible to reach any agreement on this basis, and I, therefore, propose that neutralisation of Al 'Abr as well as Shabwa should not be excluded as a possible basis for a settlement. Captain Seager is of the opinion that the Imam would accept the neutralisation of both places as a satisfactory solution, and in support of his view he quotes the Imam's letter of 7th November, 1938, in which he states "..... and in order to prove again our good intentions towards His Majesty's Government, we suggest the removal of the forts and the withdrawal of troops from Al 'Abr. We shall then be prepared to recall Al Cardai and strictly refrain from hostility ....."

5. If neutralisation of both Shabwa and Al 'Abr is accepted as a basis for a compromise, new and possibly insuperable difficulties would immediately present themselves. In the first place, what is meant by Shabwa and Al 'Abr? Do these terms indicate merely the partially ruined village of Shabwa and the group of wells at Al 'Abr and the country in their immediate vicinity, or do they cover the tribal areas of which they are outposts, involving the Kurab, Bal Obeid to the south-east of Shabwa and the Sei'ar and Nahd, who inhabit the country east and south-east of Al 'Abr? It is suspected that the Imam will place the latter interpretation upon the terms, but it would be inadmissible from the point of view of His Majesty's Government to extend the proposed neutral area to

* No. 155.

tribes which we are clearly committed to retain within the Protectorate. If neutralisation is to offer a solution, the names of Shabwa and Al 'Abr must be interpreted in a narrow sense. In the case of the former our garrison of Government Guards has already been withdrawn first to Iyad, about 20 miles to the south of Shabwa and then to Beihan. These movements have been due mainly to difficulties connected with water and rations, but there has also been a hope that the tension with the Yemen might be lessened if Shabwa itself were no longer occupied, although the presence of a garrison in its neighbourhood will enable the British authorities to watch the Shabwa district, and, if necessary, to prevent any further Yemeni attempts of infiltration into it. If a similar step could be taken in respect of Al 'Abr, the wound to the Imam's pride might be healed.

6. The second difficulty involved in neutralisation is that both Shabwa and Al 'Abr would be left without any immediate form of control, and some measure will be required to ensure that they do not become centres of disorder. It would be difficult to reconcile any system of regular patrolling in these areas with real neutralisation, unless the patrol were a joint one, an arrangement which would be extremely difficult to work satisfactorily. Nevertheless some device may be found for overcoming this difficulty if the principle of neutralisation is once accepted by both sides.

7. Although the difficulties involved are serious, I feel that an attempt should be made to solve them. Captain Seager is convinced that the elimination of the Shabwa and Al 'Abr dispute will result in an immediate and marked improvement in the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Yemen, and that there will be far less likelihood of the Imam being induced to take advantage of British preoccupations elsewhere, or of possible hostilities between Great Britain and Italy, to make any serious attack on the Aden Protectorate. It is obvious that good relations with all our Arab neighbours are most desirable, and that it is particularly important to establish and to maintain them at the present time. Although I dislike the withdrawal from Al 'Abr and still hope that it may be unnecessary, I have come to the conclusion that it should not be ruled out, provided that it results in neutralisation and not Yemeni occupation, and provided that adequate safeguards can be obtained with regard to the points that have been discussed.

8. In conclusion, I summarise my recommendations as follows:—

(1) that an officer at present unconnected with the Aden Protectorate should be appointed on special duty to represent His Majesty's Government as a Boundary Commissioner to work in conjunction with a similar representative of the Yemen Government;

(2) if (1) is impracticable, that two officers of the Aden Protectorate be appointed as Boundary Commissioners to deal with the Western and Eastern Protectorate frontiers respectively in collaboration with one or more Yemeni representatives;

(3) that in either case an attempt be made to initiate a preliminary discussion with regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr and that for this purpose Mr. Ingrams be selected as His Majesty's Government's representative to go to Sana'á if the Imam will accept him.

(4) that the offer to neutralise Shabwa should remain open and that the neutralisation of Al 'Abr subject to adequate safeguards should not be excluded if it is found impossible to obtain the Imam's agreement to our retention of it.

9. I have discussed the subject matter of this despatch personally with Mr. Ingrams, who is willing to undertake the task I have proposed, if you approve this course. In that case I trust that the strengthening of the staff in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, for which I am asking separately, will have been approved, for it is essential if Mr. Ingrams is to absent himself for any length of time, and it is known from experience that negotiations with the Imam cannot be hurried.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY,

Governor.

78462/39 [No. 13]. No. 179.

Note by Colonial Office.

The question of the Aden Protectorate. Yemen Frontier in the Shabwa and Al 'Abr areas was last considered at the 69th meeting of the Middle East Sub-Committee held on the 14th of August.

2. The developments in the situation since that date are shown in the accompanying copies of further correspondence with the Governor of Aden. The telegram of the 18th August* was sent following the decision taken at the 69th meeting of the Middle East Committee. This was followed by a telegram on the 16th of September†, informing the Governor that in a telegram from His Majesty the King to the Imam the suggestion had been made that the latter should approach the Governor of Aden with a view to the initiation of frontier discussions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Sana'á. The Governor was told that he should not take the initiative with the Imam in the matter, but that he should consider what procedure should be contemplated for the conduct of any negotiations on the question. To this the Governor replied in a despatch of the 26th of September‡ setting out his recommendations. Since that despatch was sent a further telegram has been received from the Governor reporting that a representative of the Iman has had preliminary discussions at Aden with the Aden authorities.

* No. 154. † No. 155. ‡ No. 178.

3. It must presumably now be accepted that the Imam has made the necessary move to open the negotiations, and His Majesty's Government can hardly refuse to proceed with discussions on the question. It is therefore now necessary to consider what instructions should be given to Sir Bernard Reilly in answer to his despatch of the 26th September and his telegram of the 8th November*, and the Committee are asked to advice upon this matter.

November, 1939.

78462/39 [No. 28]. No. 180.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 9.45 p.m., 7th December, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 181.*]

No. 295. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 879. I have considered in consultation with other interested Departments proposals submitted in your despatch secret No. 3 of 26th September† and your telegram No. 302 of 8th November*. Following conclusions have been reached:—

(1) It is considered preferable that negotiations should not be conducted by Aden officials. Possibility of deadlock cannot be overlooked, and in that event result might be to prejudice future relations between officials concerned and Yemen Government. I propose, subject to your concurrence, to invite Palestine Government to release Champion for this purpose. His association with you in negotiation of 1934 Treaty should make him very suitable and likely to be acceptable to Imam.

(2) His Majesty's Government as at present advised are not prepared to contemplate actual cession either now or in the future of either Shabwa or Al 'Abr, but they would be ready to accept, in last resort, neutralization of both places. What they have in mind is a *modus vivendi* of indeterminate duration, or at any rate not permanently binding, by which each side would refrain until further notice from maintaining forces, collecting dues, etc., in the village of Shabwa or at the wells of Al 'Abr. It may be doubted whether Imam would himself accept neutralization as permanent settlement, and if *modus vivendi* is reached with him on that basis, permanent delimitation of frontier as a whole may have to be postponed indefinitely. But that would not appear to be important objection.

(3) It is proposed that Champion (if you agree to his being asked for and he can be made available) should be instructed to attempt in first instance to persuade Imam to accept a frontier settlement embodying *status quo* of to-day in neighbourhood of Shabwa and Al 'Abr as elsewhere, *i.e.* a *status quo* under which it is open to His Majesty's Government, if they so desire, to extend their influence up to violet line except in so far as it was modified by agreement of 1934. Should he fail in this attempt or should he find that no progress can be made with negotiations until preliminary arrangement has been reached regarding Shabwa and Al 'Abr then he should proceed with endeavour to negotiate an agreement for neutralization of Shabwa and if necessary of Al 'Abr also.

(4) An arrangement on these lines need not take the form of a formal agreement or treaty, but might be brought into effect by exchange of letters between Governments of Aden and Yemen. I contemplate that Champion should be furnished with suitable letter of authority from you empowering him to negotiate. No question of furnishing him with full powers would arise unless formal treaty were in contemplation. If Champion unable to reach agreement even on basis of neutralization, then he would have to report for further instructions.

(5) It will be necessary throughout to bear in mind interests of Qu'aiti Sultan in Al 'Abr and to keep him informed, and, if possible, to obtain his acquiescence in any arrangements proposed.

(6) Please telegraph whether you agree to these proposals or whether you have any further comments to offer.

78462/39 [No. 37]. No. 181.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(Received 4.58 p.m., 11th December, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 183.*]

No. 337. 11th December. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram No. 295*. I welcome proposal to appoint Champion to conduct negotiations, and I agree throughout with policy indicated in your telegram except that I advise omission of reference Violet line which Imam will certainly not accept. It is improbable that he will now agree to anything less than neutrality of both Shabwa and Al 'Abr and suggestion that His Majesty's Government may further extend their influence in that area will make Champion's task more difficult than it will in any case be.

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* No. 177. † No. 178. ‡ No. 180.

78462/39 [No. 58]. No. 182.

THE GOVERNOR
to
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 9.4 a.m., 20th December, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 347. Secret. 20th December. Miss Stark has informed me that she recently met the Imam's former Syrian Private Secretary in Syria, and that he expressed the opinion that the Imam's real reason for persisting in his claim for Shabwa and Al 'Abr is his belief that we know that there is oil in the neighbourhood. As far as we know there is no oil there, and Ingrams has suggested that when negotiations are begun it should be made plain to the Imam that our interest in these places is for security only, and that His Majesty's Government would be willing to leave oil and other mineral rights in the vicinity to Yemen. I do not myself think this is Imam's sole or even principal motive, but I pass this suggestion to you for your consideration. Copy to M.I.C.E. by post.

78462/39 [No. 41]. No. 183.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
to
THE GOVERNOR.

[*Answered by No. 188.*]

(Secret.)

SIR, Downing Street, 2nd January, 1940.

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 337, of the 11th December* on the subject of the proposed frontier discussions with the King of the Yemen, and to transmit to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a despatch† which has been addressed to the High Commissioner of Palestine, together with a copy of a letter‡ to the Treasury seeking approval of the temporary appointment of Mr. R. S. Champion to conduct negotiations with the Yemeni Government.

2. You will observe that it is proposed that Mr. Champion shall continue to receive his present salary and allowance in respect of the period of his secondment and additional remuneration in the form of a lump sum gratuity of £150, to be paid to him at the expiration of his mission. Provision for the expenditure will be made in the Colonial and Middle Eastern Services Vote. Mr. Champion will also be granted the usual subsistence allowance at the rate of 5s. 0d. per diem for the period of the voyages to and from Aden. As regards the rate of subsistence allowance to be paid to him on land, however, I shall be glad if you will furnish me with your recommendation in the light of the conditions under which he will be required to live while in the Yemen. In this connection I would invite attention to your despatch No. 274 of the 15th November, 1933§, and subsequent correspondence regarding the cost of your mission to Sana'á in 1934.

3. I shall also be glad if you will consider the subordinate staff which should accompany Mr. Champion to Sana'á and will furnish me with your recommendations on this point, together with a detailed estimate of their cost. It has been suggested here that Salih Jafar, the Assistant Frontier Officer at Hodeida, who accompanied Lieutenant Colonel Lake as interpreter on his visit to Sana'á to ratify the Sana'á Treaty in 1934, would, if he could be spared, be an equally suitable choice on this occasion. Finally, I shall be grateful if you will give an estimate of the cost of transport for the mission from Aden to Sana'á and back, and of any other incidental expenses, together with your recommendation as to any special provision which should be made to meet the cost of presents to Yemeni officials.

4. I shall be glad also to have your views as to the precise meaning which you consider should be attached to the term "neutralization," of Shabwa and Al 'Abr, bearing in mind that His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate, either now or in the future, the cession of either place to the Yemen. It has been suggested that the term might be used to mean that neither party should maintain troops or officials within a number of miles of these two places, the number of miles being sufficient to keep the Yemenis to the far sides of the desert barrier. On the other hand it might merely provide that neither party should maintain troops or officials or exercise any of the normal functions of Government at the village of Shabwa or the wells of Al 'Abr. It is important that a decision should be reached on this point before instructions are issued to Mr. Champion, and it is clearly necessary that sufficient liberty of action should be retained to ensure that adequate steps can be taken to protect the Hadhramaut and its trade from interference by tribes living in the disputed area.

I have, &c.,
MALCOLM MACDONALD.

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* No. 181. † 78462/39 [No. 40]: not printed. ‡ 78462/39 [No. 38]: not printed.
§ 17922/33 [No. 16]: not printed.

78462/39 [No. 51]. No. 184.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 4.48 p.m., 5th January 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 185.*]

No. 5. Secret. 5th January. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 41. My telegram No. 337, of the 11th December*. Grateful for decision regarding Champion as soon as possible as I am sending presents to Sana'á for the Imam and relations and officials on the occasion of the Id festival (21st January), and it would be useful for the official taking them to be able to inform the King of the name of the officer whom His Majesty's Government intend sending to conduct negotiations.

In view of recent inaccurate reports on Rome Arabic Radio about coming negotiations with the Yemen Government it would be desirable to publish the true facts, and I request your sanction to do so when the name of the official proceeding to Sana'á is known and the official has been accepted by the King.

78462/39 [No. 53]. No. 185.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 12 noon, 11th January, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 11. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram. No. 5 secret, of 5th January†. Please see my secret despatch of the 2nd January‡.

Question of best means of informing Imam of Champion's mission has been under consideration here. It so happens that Imam sent a further telegram to His Majesty the King late in November, of which a copy goes to you in Shuckburgh's semi-official letter of 10th January§. No advice has yet been tendered to His Majesty as to reply, matter having been held over with the intention that, if His Majesty approved, announcement in regard to Champion's visit should be included in his answering telegram to Imam. Question will be taken up as soon as information is received from High Commissioner, Palestine, that Champion's release for this duty can be arranged, and I will repeat to you any telegram that His Majesty may be pleased to send to Imam.

I am consulting the Foreign Office on wording of suitable announcement regarding proposed negotiations and will telegraph proposed text to you shortly.

78462/39 [No. 63]. No. 186.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.15 p.m., 12th January, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 15. 12th January. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. My telegram 5 of the 5th January†. Imam has replied welcoming Lake, but prefers him to arrived after the Festival. Lake will not, therefore, leave until end of January. In the circumstances I consider announcement of appointment of official to conduct negotiations at Sana'á should be made to Imam at once, more especially as a recent telegram from Imam to the Crown (? Prince), copy of which has been received from Seager (indicative of Gear's) (? indicates Imam's) growing impatience at the delay in negotiating.

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* No. 181. † No. 184. ‡ No. 183. § 78462/39 [No. 52]: not printed.

78462/39 [No. 72]. No. 187.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 9 p.m., 23rd January, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 189.*]

No. 25. Your telegram No. 27*. Champion's proposed mission to Yemen. Matter still remains as stated in my telegram No. 11 of 11th January†. I am reminding High Commissioner, Palestine.

As soon as I am able to inform you that arrangements are complete and that King of Yemen's agreement has been obtained to Champion's visit you may issue following announcement. *Begins:*— It has been arranged between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Yemen that the two Governments shall now proceed to negotiations in accordance with the Terms of Article 3 of the Treaty of Sana'á of 11th February, 1934, for the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen. The representative of His Majesty's Government for these negotiations will be Mr. R. S. Champion, at present in the service of the Palestine Government who was Political Secretary at Aden at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of 1934 and who took part in the negotiation of that treaty. *Ends.* Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre.

78462/39 [No. 85]. No. 188.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.44 p.m., 1st February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 194.*]

Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your despatch 2nd January, 1940‡. Secret.

2. I recommend subsistence allowance on land of 15 rupees per diem.

3. Assistant Frontier Officer should certainly accompany Champion and he should also have stenographer or interpreter clerk, a small personal escort from Aden Protectorate Levies or Government Guards, cook and two other servants. A W/T depôt ship would be useful but not essential. I recommend that Champion travels from Aden by land which will incidentally enable him to meet Yemeni Crown Prince at Taiz. I therefore propose £170 for hire of small car and a lorry for double journey plus detention allowance. I recommend £200 for presents to Yemen officials, guests and local charities. These increases together with payments for cook, two servants, escort and firearms raises total cost from £1,043 to £1,265.

4. Neutralization of Shabwa and Al Abr intimately affect Eastern Aden Protectorate and I have consulted Ingrams regarding this question. As regards Shabwa he considers that it can be left empty provided that it is not occupied by Yemenis and can be visited when occasion arises and he points out that he has established post about 30 miles from Shabwa at Bir Asakir, an important well giving him control over Kurab. Regarding Al Abr, Ingrams is still opposed to neutralization as he considers it key to Hadhramaut and control of its wells vital to control of itinerant Seiyar and other tribes who frequent it. He points out that a distance from it that would keep Yemenis to the far side of the desert barrier would probably take us most of the way back to Shibam, and that he believes, if evacuated, it will be necessary to maintain an armed car post at Akeban or Rakban if water suitable and site dependable and retaking Al Abr temporarily whenever necessary to deal with miscreants. Akeban is about 40 miles east-south-east of Al Abr and Rakban about 12 west of Akeban, both on road to Al Abr. Alternatively under certain safeguards Ingrams would be prepared to have joint garrison at Al Abr. In any case he considers Champion should not discuss the matter until he and Yemeni delegates have visited the area concerned. I have also consulted Seager who is in close touch with the Yemeni stand point. He believes Imam now regards neutralization of these two places as synonymous with restoration of *status quo* in that area as it existed at signature of Treaty of Sana'á in 1934. That is to say it would involve the withdrawal not only from these two localities but also from any adjacent districts with which His Majesty's Government were not in effective contact in 1934. This would embrace Kurab Bal Obeid Seiar and Nahd, and I indicated this possibility in paragraph 5 of my despatch, secret, of 26th September, 1939§. In my opinion H.M. Government cannot accept neutralization of these tribes which must be kept under our control for safety of Hadhramaut and other parts of the Protectorate and I consider the offer of neutralization must be limited to areas which will permit of our maintenance of posts for this purpose. In the case of Shabwa, Bir Asakir must be retained for control over Kurab, and

* 78462/39 [No. 71]: not printed. † No. 185. ‡ No. 183. § No. 178.

south and south-west of Shabwa we must retain the right to occupy Iyad and to protect Beihan. I therefore suggest that neutralization should mean that neither party should maintain troops or officials within say 25 miles of Shabwa. In the event of trouble in neutralized area the two Governments should consult regarding measures necessary to penetrate it. I agree with Ingrams that Al Abr is more difficult and, as previously stated, I dislike withdrawal from it, but have recommended that neutralization should not be excluded only because it appears most unlikely that anything less will settle controversy with Yemen. If it is neutralized I consider it should be on the basis similar to Shabwa, that is, neither party should maintain troops or officials within about 25 miles of it and in that case Ingrams' proposal regarding Akeban or Rakban should be approved, and there should be similar proviso regarding consultation between two Governments in the event of trouble requiring intervention. This should not preclude us in practice from taking temporary action without Yemeni co-operation when necessary. Seager thinks Yemenis, might accept Ingrams' alternative of joint occupation of Al Aba and in spite of the views expressed in your telegram No. 148 of 6th December, 1938*, I suggest, if this appears likely to provide solution and if adequate safeguards can be found, Champion should be allowed to explore the possibilities of such a plan in consultation with Ingrams and Yemenis. I am not, however, in favour of applying it to Shabwa. I agree with Ingrams' suggestion that Champion and Yemen representative should visit areas in question before the conclusion of any agreement, and I strongly recommend that this be arranged with Yemen Government at early stage of negotiations.

78462/39 [No. 86]. No. 189.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.34 p.m., 6th February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 47. Secret. 6th February. Your telegram No. 25†. Champion. In view of misleading statements appearing in Egyptian and other presses would urge importance of making official announcements at earliest possible moment.

78462/39 [No. 95]. No. 190.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 9.0 p.m., 9th February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 192.]

No. 50. Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre. My telegram No. 11 of 11th January‡. Following is telegram sent by His Majesty to King of Yemen on 8th February. *Begins*:—

In your telegram of the 21st November Your Majesty expressed the wish that further delay should be avoided in opening the proposed negotiations for reaching an equitable and mutually acceptable settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Sana'á.

I share your Majesty's wish and my Government have thought it desirable to appoint as their representative in the negotiations an officer well versed in the intricacies of the matter under dispute who will be able to devote his whole time to these negotiations.

I am happy to inform Your Majesty that as a result Mr. R. S. Champion, who accompanied Sir Bernard Reilly to Sana'á at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of 1934, has been selected to represent My Government in the negotiations and, if acceptable to Your Majesty, the Government of Aden will make arrangements for him to open discussions with Your Majesty's representatives at Sana'á.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Majesty my best wishes for your long life and happiness and the prosperity of Your Kingdom. George R.I. *Ends.*

Your telegram No. 47, Secret§. As soon as I am able to inform you that King of Yemen has replied agreeing to Champion's visit announcement given in my telegram No. 25† may be made.

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* No. 121. † No. 187. ‡ No. 188. § No. 189.

78462/40 [No. 4]. No. 191.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.28 p.m., 13th February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 57. 15th February. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, my telegram No. 27*.

Paragraph 1. Lake received warm welcome Sana'á and Imam and his minister were much gratified by the gifts from His Majesty's Government and pleased by Lake's visit of courtesy which they hoped would be repeated. Imam appeared in very good health and as vigorous as ever. Although hurt by His Majesty's Government's refusal to help him with armaments for the protection of Sheik Said continues to regard British occupation of Shabwa and Al Abr as breaches of the Treaty of Sana'á, he seemed very genuine friend to His Majesty's Government. Lake gained the impression that there was not much intention to press extreme claims in connection with Shawba and Al Abr and settlement of these questions might probably be limited to places themselves and small surrounding areas, but he did not engage in any official discussion of these problems. It was evident, however, that Imam does not at present desire final settlement of his Southern frontier which would involve permanent renunciation of his latent claims in Aden Protectorate. In this respect his attitude is still that which made the adoption of dilatory tactics advisable in the Treaty of Sana'á, and it confirms the opinion expressed in telegram No. 302 of the 8th November, 1939†. He wants to prolong the status quo of 1934 and the inclusion of Shabwa and Al Abr in this arrangement. On the other hand he considers that the *status quo* line should be more clearly defined. His foreign minister Ragheb Bey agreed with Lake that most recent frontier incidents were due to the lack of agreement or the knowledge regarding the precise position of this line in certain parts of the frontier, and he suggested that more detailed examination of it than has hitherto been made by the frontier officers, to be followed by the erection of boundary pillars along the whole length. He thought that this work might be entrusted to officers specially appointed by the two governments. I suggest Champion be authorised to discuss this proposal.

2. A point of interest is the dissatisfaction expressed by Yemeni Minister with the present British doctors at Sana'á. They have unfortunate impression that these are not well qualified, and although Lake believes this opinion to be unjust I think this question merits careful consideration. It is possible an older and more experienced doctor would gain more confidence and be better able to hold his own against prejudices and intrigues that are rife in the capital. The British dispensary should also be better equipped. The medical field is obviously important and provides some of the best opportunities for promoting good reputation of the British. I have hoped that the British Council would help in this matter and on this account particularly I favoured visit of Dundas.

3. Lake adds that European events are followed with much interest in the Yemen and there is universal admiration for the Finns as (? group omitted) ing successful resistance by small country to aggression by powerful neighbour.

78462/40 [No. 7]. No. 192.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 2.31 p.m., 20th February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[Answered by No. 193.]

No. 65, 20th February, repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre No. 482. Reference your No. 50, 9th February‡, King of Yemen has informed me that he is agreeable to Champion's visit and I assume that he has intimated this to you in reply to His Majesty's telegram to your government of 8th February. I hope therefore that Champion will be released at once as King who is most anxious for the negotiations may become impatient if there is delay and it is advisable to follow up Lake's visit as soon as possible during which he found the King and his Foreign Minister reasonable.

78462/40 [No. 8]. No. 193.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 9.30 p.m., 21st February, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

Confidential. No. 63. Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre. My telegram No. 50 of 9th February‡. Your telegram, No. 65, 29th February§. Following is reply received from King of Yemen. *Begins.* With a confirmation of my friendship and affection which are unshaken, I thank Your Majesty for his communication and I declare that, in accordance with the promise

* 78462/39 [No. 71]: not printed. † No. 177. ‡ No. 190. § No. 192.

made to Your Majesty in my telegraphic petition dated 20th July, 1939, I shall await, from your Exalted and Mighty Government, a declaration and a confirmation of its justice and equity regarding the removal of the present encroachment of Shabwa and Al Abr six years after the drawing up and ratification of the Treaty between the two States. Nevertheless, we accept the representative of your State, Mr. Champion, with thanks and respect and we shall treat with him and show him every mark of sincerity on the understanding that with the good intentions of the two States, it is inevitable that we shall arrive at the best solution for the good of the two kingdoms for the present and for the future. I beg Your Majesty and the Royal Family to accept my respect and sincerest wishes. *Ends.*

High Commissioner for Palestine has been asked by telegram to arrange for Champion to proceed to Aden as soon as possible and to notify you direct of date of expected arrival. Announcement given in my telegram No. 25* may now be made. A further telegram will be sent in reply to your unnumbered telegram of the 1st February†, regarding subordinate staff to accompany Champion to Sana'á and final terms of instructions to be issued to him.

78462/40 [No. 42].

No. 194.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4 a.m., 16th March, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 198.*]

No. 90. Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram of 1st February†. I have considered in consultation with other interested departments your observations on provisional instructions set out in my telegram No. 295 of 7th December‡ and I now send you revised instructions for Champion. These must be regarded as superseding the provisional instructions set out in my telegram of the 7th December in so far as they differ from them.

1. Champion should in the first place endeavour to reach a final settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty of Sana'á. The frontier which we desire would be the frontier laid down in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, save (*a*) in so far as it has been modified by the *status quo* line of 1934 and (*b*) in so far as it may be agreed to make any further small rectifications of the frontier acceptable to both parties.

2. In this connexion Champion should remember that His Majesty's Government do not admit that anything which they may have done to the south of the 1914 line since the Treaty of Sana'á came into force has been or could have been in conflict with the undertaking which they gave in that treaty to maintain the *status quo* (see in particular Colonial Office Secret despatch of 9th March, 1938)§.

3. If it is found impossible to reach a final settlement of the kind desired and the Yemeni Government raise the question of Shabwa and Al Abr, it should be made clear that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the *cession* of either of these places. Consideration has been given to the proposal for joint occupation as a possible solution, but His Majesty's Government see serious objections to this and are not prepared to agree to it.

4. " Neutralisation " in some appropriate form appears therefore to be the alternative possibility but there are more serious objections to the neutralisation of Al Abr than of Shabwa. Neutralisation of Shabwa only should, therefore, be at present contemplated if negotiations require it, and possibility of any concession in respect of Al Abr should not be mentioned to Yemeni representatives.

5. In the last resort, it may be desirable to contemplate some form of " neutralisation " of Al Abr also, but Champion should not take initiative in raising question and if it is raised by Yemenis he should resist proposal and if pressed should refer for further instructions. As you know importance is attached to carrying Quaiti Sultan with us in any proposal respecting Al Abr.

6. It will be desirable that the term " neutralisation " should be avoided in view of probable obscurity of interpretation in Arabic. In any case it is not a correct term in this connexion because it has a definite legal significance which is quite different from what is meant here (e.g., the neutralisation of Switzerland). In my immediately following telegram I send texts of two notes which failing any final settlement under Article 3 of 1934 Treaty represent possible lines on which notes might be exchanged with Yemeni representative on results of negotiations. It is possible of course to devise various formulæ which might suit the position and these texts are sent only as a general guide. You will see however that they provide for a unilateral undertaking by His Majesty's Government not to exercise ordinary administrative functions in the area concerned. If at all possible it is preferable to avoid any similar undertaking from Yemeni Government since we stand upon legal claim that Shabwa and Al Abr are in the Aden Protectorate and areas are therefore not within the purview of Yemeni Government for such or any other purpose. To admit Yemeni Government to give undertakings about any area south of 1914 line exactly corresponding to those we give ourselves might seriously prejudice legal position.

7. It is necessary to avoid appearance of abandoning legal position, since, if this is done, our task of preserving as against Ibn Saud what are regarded as rights of Sheikhs under our protection in neighbourhood of Persian Gulf will become yet more difficult, and Ibn Saud may anyhow complain that His Majesty's Government are adopting more accommodating attitude with Yemen than in negotiations with himself with possibly embarrassing consequences, particularly in Persian Gulf area.

* No. 187. † 188. ‡ No. 180. § No. 58.

8. Too precise a definition of the area to be " neutralised " should be avoided, but intention should be to confine it to village alone and not to include surrounding district within any specified radius.

9. This is important from two points of view. First, an arbitrary radius based at the best upon an imperfect knowledge of local topography might prove source of difficulty in years to come. Second point (which may not however arise unless Yemeni Government are astute enough to insist on giving a " neutralisation " undertaking more nearly corresponding to that of His Majesty's Government) is that if Yemeni Government are debarred from coming within say 25 miles of Shabwa, this would imply they might come within 26 miles (in any direction), whereas our view is that although we do not require them specifically to accept 1914 line, or indeed to mention it at all, we do nevertheless expect them to observe it in practice, as a matter of ordinary neighbourly behaviour.

10. The question of oil rights should not be mentioned (your telegram No. 347 of the 20th December* refers) unless it is specifically raised by The King. In that event Champion should take line that, according to such information as is available, indications of presence of oil are unfavourable and that, in view of His Majesty's Government, this aspect of question need not be taken into account.

78462/40 [No. 43].

No. 195.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.0 a.m., 16th March, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 196.*]

No. 91. Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre. My immediately preceding telegram of 16th March†, Aden-Yemeni frontier negotiations.

Following is draft of one of the Notes (to be signed by the United Kingdom representative) referred to in paragraph 6. *Begins:*—

" Your Excellency,

" Under instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, I have the honour to make to Your Excellency the following declaration.

" In order to give effect to the agreement which has been reached between us concerning the village of Shabwa, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will not, without giving adequate notice of their intentions to the Yemeni Government, occupy Shabwa with armed forces or bring it within their administrative system.

" I have the honour to suggest that this Note and Your Excellency's reply shall be regarded as constituting an agreement to this effect between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Yemeni Government as from this day's date." *Ends.*

2. To this the reply of the Yemeni representatives should be as follows. *Begins:*—

" Sir,

" I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of this day's date in the folowing terms.

(Here would follow the full text of the British Note.)

" I have the honour to inform you that Yemeni Government have taken note of this declaration and agree that your Note and this reply may be regarded as constituting an agreement to this effect between the Yemeni Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as from this date." *Ends.*

3. These drafts could naturally be modified in various ways. For instance it would be possible to substitute the following words for the words " concerning the village of Shabwa " in the British Note. *Begins:*—

" . . . , whereby neither His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom nor the Yemeni Government will occupy or administer the village of Shabwa ". *Ends.*

4. For the reasons explained in my immediately preceding telegram, it is desirable at the least to use different language to describe the obligations undertaken by the Yemeni Government regarding Shabwa (or if necessary Al Abr) and those undertaken by His Majesty's Government. The substitution of the words in the preceding paragraph would not compromise the legal position and might prove useful if the Yemeni Government tried to argue at any future time that they had never said they would refrain from interfering with Shabwa.

5. If the Yemeni Government were insistent it might be possible in the last resort to agree but their note should insert after the words " have taken note of this declaration " words to the effect that they " will also refrain from occupying Shabwa with armed forces or attempting to bring it within their administrative system ". In that case the word " attempt " would have to be inserted in the

* No. 182. † No. 194.

British Note, though it is otherwise better omitted. Anyhow the Yemeni Government must not be allowed to say without qualification that they " will not bring Shabwa within their administrative system ". Nor must they say that they will refrain from doing certain things " without previous notice ". In view of the rights of His Majesty's Government under the 1914 Agreement it is quite proper that they should use these phrases, the second of which will prevent them from being tied by the prospective Agreement even if the circumstances change, but the phrases would be quite inappropriate for use by the Yemeni Government, who have no rights at Shabwa anyhow.

6. It would also be possible to specify in greater detail the things which His Majesty's Government would refrain from doing. Champion could add, if pressed, that they would refrain from, for example, collecting taxes or attempting to enter into any agreement with the people of Shabwa whereby the latter acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of His Majesty's Government.

7. Champion should however endeavour to avoid saying that His Majesty's Government would refrain from " exercising authority " or " exercising sovereignty " over Shabwa; and should always bear in mind the possibility that in a special emergency the Aden authorities might wish to send a patrol to Shabwa for the purpose of apprehending a serious offender or breaking up a hostile concentration, and that for this reason every effort should be made to define what His Majesty's Government will not do in the most general terms possible.

78462/40 [No. 55]. No. 196.

MR. CHAMPION

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.30 a.m., 20th April, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 1. 19th April. Repeated to Aden. Your telegram of 16th March*. Yemeni Government are no more willing to reach final settlement of the frontier than they were during the treaty given in 1934 and I have abandoned attempt to persuade them.

I am now trying to obtain agreement on a definition of the *status quo* line as far as Beihan inclusive which will be that set out in the second sentence of the second paragraph of your telegram under reference. This will involve later appointment of the Joint Commission of demarcation.

Yemeni Government are firmly insistent on satisfaction regarding Shabwa and Abr before reaching any agreement and I have firmly resisted their impractical suggestions for neutralisation. But I may be able to obtain definition of *status quo* line also beyond Beihan sited so as to preserve " North Eastern " principle and to include the two places in the Protectorate if I am authorised to cause Yemenis to initiate exchange of notes " reserving their rights " to them either in manner analogous to that in certain former proposals before the treaty or on lines of annexure 5 of Colonel Reilly's report† on his mission to Sana'á (referring to Islands).

78462/40 [No. 58]. No. 197.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 5.55 p.m., 23rd April, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 198.*]

No. 175. 23rd April. Your telegram 145‡. Unwillingness of the Yemen government to agree with final settlement of the frontier confirms my anticipation reported to you in my telegram No. 302 of 8th November, 1939§. The reason is that Imam will not (repeat not) agree to the final abandonment of his claims in the Protectorate which such a settlement would entail. This difficulty was solved in 1934 by adoption of dilatory clause and establishment of *status quo* line, and in my opinion it is better to retain these than to insist final settlement of boundary at present time, which would probably break down negotiations. At the same time I am in favour of clearer definition of the *status quo* line both on paper and on the ground, and I, therefore, support efforts Champion is making to obtain this, and I have already in my secret despatch of 28th February, 1940‖, advocated appointment of Joint Boundary Commission after conclusion of Champion's mission.

2. Yemeni insistence on satisfaction regarding Shabwa and Abr before reaching any agreement confirms view expressed in paragraph 3 of my secret despatch of 26th September, 1939¶. I note that Champion hopes to obtain *status quo* line beyond Beihan, which will leave these two places within the Protectorate, subject to the Imam reserving his claims to them as he did in the case of

* No. 195. † No. 138 in the Middle East No. 52. ‡ 78462/40 [No. 57]: not printed
§ No. 77. ‖ 78487/40 [No. 1]: not printed. ¶ Untraceable.

Red Sea Island(s) in 1934. This would, in my opinion, be satisfactory solution and be repetition of method whereby other difficulties have been overcome. I am not however hopeful that the Imam will accept it. I believe that he genuinely thinks our occupation of Shabwa and Abr was breach of *status quo*, and that his prestige is involved. It will be very difficult to persuade him to take any other view, and I, therefore, still think neutralisation of both places with adequate safeguards may be only means of reaching agreement. I nevertheless consider Champion's proposal is worth trying as it would, from our point of view, be much better than neutralisation, and I, therefore advise that he be given authority for which he asks.

78462/40 [No. 61]. No. 198.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 2.30 p.m., 1st May, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 199.*]

No. 171. Copy to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Please repeat to Champion. Your telegram No. 175 of 23rd April*. Yemen frontier negotiations. I note that Champion considers it impossible to reach final settlement of frontier, and that he is now endeavouring to obtain agreement on definition of *status quo* line as far as Beihan which will be that set out in second sentence of first instruction in my telegram No. 90†.

If Champion is also able to obtain definition of *status quo* line beyond Beihan sited so as to preserve North-Eastern principle and to include Shabwa and Al Abr in Protectorate, I consider that would be good solution, and I authorize Champion to proceed accordingly. Terms of exchange of notes will, however, need careful consideration, and I request that if time allows draft terms of proposed Yemeni reservation and of Champion's reply may be submitted for my prior approval. Red Sea islands exchange of notes is not entirely suitable model in present case. It is important that nothing should be said in response to Imam's note of reservation of rights to Shabwa and Al Abr which would convey any impression of our acceptance or recognition of such rights.

I note proposal that after conclusion of negotiations joint boundary commission should mark *status quo* line on the ground. I accept this proposal and assume that intention is that small local joint party should undertake this, aiming at completion of work within a few months.

78462/40 [No. 73]. No. 199.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.20 p.m., 14th May, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 201.*]

No. 215. 14th May.—Following to you from Champion. *Begins.* Yemeni representatives have concealed from me the fact of Imam's telegram of 9th May to London repeated to Bagdad and Riyadh, but I have succeeded in obtaining its substance. As you will realise it is seriously misleading. Present position is that Imam on 8th May insisted on our relinquishment of not only Shabwa and Abr, but also of the whole of Seiar and Bal Ubeid tribal areas. I firmly rejected this and advanced counter proposals of the kind authorised by your telegram of 1st May‡. Imam's telegrams of the following day were the result. I am convinced that Imam is employing these tactics because he believes from exaggerated German and Italian radio reports of recent apparent Allied reverses that we are in difficulties. I am equally sure from my knowledge of Imam's mentality that this is the very moment when we should on the contrary stiffen our attitude in order to give colour to his belief in our embarrassment.

Before the latest extreme demand of Imam was advanced Yemeni representatives had suggested our relinquishment of the two places, together with limited areas in their vicinity, but I could not get them to specify what areas. Imam reprimanded them sternly for being so accommodating and instructed them to insist on relinquishment of tribal areas also. With strong effect of the war situation on Imam's mind I consider that it would be most impolitic now to make any concession in regard to either of the two places, and I recommend that I should be instructed to say that my latest offer involving the exchange of notes is the very last that His Majesty's Government can entertain, and that if it is rejected I must withdraw. *Ends.*

Following are my comments which I have communicated to Champion. My views remain unchanged. In my despatch secret I recommended to you that neutralisation of both Abr and Shabwa should not be excluded as possible solution; and I am still of this opinion. This could I said

* No. 197. † No. 194. ‡ No. 198.

occur whilst neutralised areas should not include the whole of Seiar and Bal Ubeid, and this is still my opinion. Although the solution Champion has proposed is much preferable from our point of view, I have throughout been very doubtful that Imam would accept it, and I cannot advise that it should be our last word.

In the present circumstances Imam's goodwill is of real importance to us, unpromising deadlock in negotiations is already resulting in minor but troublesome frontier incidents. On the Protectorate frontier our post at Tol El Baba having been attacked by Yemeni tribesmen on 13th May and Yemen concentration being reported at Kataba a settlement of this dispute and improvement of Anglo Yemen relations are, in my opinion, very desirable both for local and general reasons, and I hope, therefore, that breakdown of negotiations can be avoided.

78462/40 [No. 92]. No. 200.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.55 p.m., 29th May, 1939.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 203.*]

No. 246. 29th May. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 1516. Following appreciation of present position at Sana received from Champion for your information. Some portions are corrupt owing to difficulty in transmission from Sana. *Begins.* I have been unable to obtain Imam's agreement to treat Shabwa separately or differently from Abr, which he, in my opinion, and His Majesty's Government's, considers the more important of the two. He insists on equal satisfaction for both. In accordance with paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 90*, I therefore request your instructions.

Imam still insists that any compromise must include the whole of Sei'ar and Karab, but I may yet succeed in narrowing his demand somewhat. I am, however, satisfied from our discussions hitherto that it will be impossible to confine solution to each place alone as required by paragraphs 8 and 9 of your telegram under reference, and that some surrounding area must be conceded. I would, of course, make it as small as possible.

Referring to your telegram No. 91†, best terms that I shall be able to obtain will be bilateral agreement that neither Government will occupy either enclave with armed forces or attempt to bring it within their Administrative system; but I suggest that if agreement is made " without prejudice to the settlement of the question of Southern frontier of Yemen which was deferred by Article 3 of the Treaty," your legalistic objections would be sufficiently met.

Acceptance by Imam of position that we unilaterally reserve right to re-enter either enclave " after giving adequate notice " is quite out of the question, having regard to his persistent and obstinate claims that we have no right to be anywhere in the neighbourhood (even anywhere in the Protectorate).

Nothing short of complete mutuality will satisfy the Imam. We must be prepared to forego safeguards as to legal position and to risk assumption of his future good behaviour on frontier if we decide that the consequential prospect of obtaining his goodwill is worth the sacrifice. But as I have suggested in paragraph 3, conditional clause may serve to cover our retreat.

Compromise on the above lines will obviate possibility of any definition of the *status quo* line north-east from Beihan, but if you so direct I will continue to press for definition, thence south-west to Husnmurad. In that case terms of settlement would be contained presumably more appropriately in the form of an agreement than in an exchange of notes. *Ends.* Champion is awaiting your instructions on his message communicated to you in my telegram No. 215 of 14th May‡. My views are as stated in that telegram, and I attach the greatest importance to regaining and retaining Yemen friendship. Unfortunate(ly) recent war developments are probably encouraging the Imam to stiffen his attitude, and this will increase Champion's difficulties in limiting the areas to be neutralized. In any case Champion is undoubtedly right in believing that any arrangements about neutralized areas must be reciprocal if they are to be acceptable to the Imam. I now strongly recommend that Champion be authorized at once to proceed with negotiations on basis of neutralization of both places, but excluding Sei'ar, Bal Ubeid and Karab.

G.O.C. (? A.O.C.) also urges from the military aspect great desirability of adjusting our relations with Yemen as soon as possible in view of uses to which Italians may turn Yemeni hostility to us.

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* No. 194. † No. 195. ‡ No. 199.

78462/40 [No. 102]. No. 201.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 2 a.m., 2nd June, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 241. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 378. Your telegram No. 215* I regret to hear of extravagant demands now made by Imam, and I appreciate that further negotiations may not be promising, but I agree that present is inopportune time to lose patience and break off further attempt to secure agreed *modus vivendi*.

In my telegram No. 90 of 16th March† instructions to Champion provided for agreement on our part if necessary to neutralise Shabwa village and close environs, and in last resort Al Abr also. Copy of telegram from King of Yemen of 10th May is being telegraphed to you in my immediately following telegram. You will see that he refers to mutual agreement in Treaty of Sanaa that neither side should encroach or transgress on certain defined areas. This may present suitable basis for Champion to propose neutralisation of Shabwa by both sides, and in consideration of such offer on our part it might be possible to persuade Yemen Government to accept *status quo* at Al Abr, where Qu'aiti authority is claimed. In last resort, however, as stated, we should be prepared with consent of Qu'aiti Sultan to include Al Abr in neutralisation arrangement. But such neutralisation must be confined to two villages mentioned and to close environs, as already stated in instructions in my telegram No. 90.

Should Champion still fail to secure agreement to *modus vivendi* within these limits, it will be desirable that he should refer for further instructions.

Text of His Majesty's reply to Imam is being telegraphed to you separately.

78462/40 [No. 103]. No. 202.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3.30 a.m., 2nd June, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 242. My immediately preceding telegram‡. Following is translation of Imam's telegram to His Majesty the King. *Begins:—*

After the presentation of my sincerest, deepest, and most friendly greetings to Your Majesty, I very much regret that I am compelled to encroach upon your great kindness at a time of such preoccupation and problems as those you have at present. But, referring to my previous communications and to the urgency of the matter, I hope Your Majesty will consider my important applications with your sound and firm judgement which you have inherited and with which you were created.

It is known to Your Majesty that after the signing of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty, in which the two Governments, the English and the Yemeni, mutually agreed that neither side should encroach or transgress on certain defined areas, the limits of which have been agreed upon by the two countries concerned, the conditions of which actually came into force on the day and date of the signature of the above-mentioned Treaty seven years ago.

It is known to Your Majesty that after the signing of the Treaty, in which the two contracting nations guaranteed to carry out the conditions thereof with honour, fidelity and honesty. After the Treaty had been adhered to for a period of five years, the Government of Aden, two years ago, became the instigators of a quarrel and have brought about enmity. They have caused the country in question to be attacked with aeroplanes; they have bombarded it from the air with bombs and have spread panic, and have taken possession of the central territories near Shabwa and the country around Al Abr. They have put to flight our military and national forces which we had posted in these areas to protect them. They have imprisoned others, and all this has been done in a most frightful manner as though the English Government was actually at war with us and as though she has not the slightest consideration for the results of her behaviour and the harm it does to her honour and to the cause of justice which is always upheld by mighty England.

It is known to Your Majesty and to your Exalted Government that the central territories of al-Yemen do not belong to any other country in any way whatsoever, and they are tied to al-Yemen and are connected with al-Yemen from the beginning of the world when God created the world. There has never set foot on these territories a single foreigner; they have never been conquered, nor were they ever ruled by any other Government other than that of al-Yemen.

In view of these violent acts of aggression on the part of the Government of Aden, your sincere friend has taken upon himself to put the matter before Your Majesty in order to seek his protection. I have made the case abundantly clear in every detail and I present to Your Exalted Majesty all my sincerest wishes, my consideration and my respect so that Your Majesty will issue his commands in order to have this most regrettable, painful and severe warlike aggression terminated.

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* No. 199. † No. 194. ‡ No. 201.

Recently, you honoured us with the despatch of a special envoy to us, namely Mr. Champion (Chebion in text), and we were very satisfied with this mark of justice and chivalry, but the above-mentioned envoy, for a month or more, did nothing but tell us pleasant stories, inventions and kind words and acts as if he admits the actual acts of violation of the text of the Treaty, but this is in accordance with the requirements of the Government of Aden and the administration of Hadramuat (Hadhzamot in text) and the completion of the dealings with her, for she cannot abandon the occupations and domination over our territory which have already been mentioned.

Recently, a suggestion was made to us claiming the inclusion of the territories as a right and claiming for us other lands which would be made over to us; it appears, therefore, that the lands taken away by force will not possibly be returned to us, although we are the owners of them from the beginning of the world. (First part of this sentence is not clear.)

This state of affairs is not compatible with truth, honesty and justice for the above-mentioned territories are the fortresses of al-Yemen and are her absolute possessions. They are of vital importance to the very life of al-Yemen, therefore it is impossible for us to forego our rights.

We shall never allow anyone or anything to come between the friendship and good relationship of the two friendly countries bound together by treaty, and I hasten to send my best hopes to Your Majesty repeatedly relying fully on the justice of Your Majesty for the elimination of the transgression which has taken place on the part of the Aden Government. I again request you to issue your high commands, and I present to you my sincerest, truest and highest respects which will never change towards Your Majesty and to Your Royal Family. *Ends.*

78462/40 [No. 104]. No. 203.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3.30 a.m., 2nd June, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 243. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 379. Your telegram No. 246 of 29th May*. See my telegram No. 241†.

1. Champion should negotiate for limits of neutralised areas of Shabwa and Al Abr as restricted as possible, and should report for approval before finally committing himself.

2. The tribal areas of Seiar, Bal Ubeid and Kurab cannot be admitted to be in question. It is only a matter of certain distances surrounding two villages mentioned.

3. You should obtain Quaiti Sultan's concurrence to negotiations on this basis in case of Al Abr explaining advantages to him and His Majesty's Government of reaching agreement with Imam on this vexed problem.

4. If satisfactory arrangement is in sight on this basis it would be possible to proceed by way of bilateral agreement for neutralisation " without prejudice " as suggested by Champion.

5. As part of general arrangement for settlement of boundary, Champion should expect to obtain satisfactory definition of present position between Beihan and Husn Murad.

78462/40 [No. 105]. No. 204.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 3.30 a.m., 2nd June, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 244. Following is text of telegram from His Majesty the King to the Imam. *Begins:—*

I have received Your Majesty's telegram of 10th May, and hasten to thank you for the kind assurances of friendship which your message contains, and which I heartily reciprocate.

I have studied Your Majesty's observations on the matters which by our mutual direction are being considered by our appointed representatives at Sana'a, and I regret that those negotiations have not yet resulted in full agreement, bdt my wish and hope is that they may lead to a mutual understanding and arrangement satisfactory to both Governments

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* No. 200. † No. 201.

Mr. Champion is in full possession of the views of my Government on this subject and has received instructions which in their opinion are well calculated to facilitate the happy settlement of the whole question. I trust that Your Majesty will instruct your representatives to continue their discussions with him in a spirit of goodwill until final agreement is reached.

Compliments etc. *Ends.*

78462/40 [No. 118]. No. 205.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5.30 a.m., 1st July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 206.*]

No. 298. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 546. My telegram No. 243 of 2nd June*. Please telegraph how proposals for neutralization have been received by Imam and what is general attitude at Sanaá to present war situation.

78462/40 [No. 126A]. No. 206.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 6.12 p.m., 3rd July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 208.*]

No. 312. Part I. 3rd July. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram No. 298†. Following telegram has been received from Champion. *Begins:—*

No. 19. Your telegram of 3rd June following for the Secretary of State for the Colonies. *Begins:—* After the receipt of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 243* I suggested neutralisation of following restricted areas: enclosing the Shabwa triangle formed of straight lines joining Abu Peod, Kh Musetiehib and Nasr Balbasubli the sides being approximately 25 kilometres long, and enclosing Al Abr a similar triangle bounded by Keysir, Barura and Hadhi (*vide* Philby's map 1936).

Imam's reply was in the shape of formal instruction to his representatives in his own handwriting rejecting my proposal as " illogical unreasonable unjust and contrary to the treaty and to sound sense," insisting that he " would not give up one inch of either Seiar or of Karab or of Bal Ubeid tribes," and ordering his delegates to " demand surrender of those places to my territory finally and without interference and that they should be entirely under my indisputable administration and rule."

I did not accept even this very uncompromising demand as final, I thereupon proposed a single larger four-sided area for neutralisation, including Shabwa and Al Abr and bounded by (*a*) joining Peod, Keysir and Barura; (*b*) due West from Peod; (*c*) due North East from Penahan Al Marchsab, and (*d*) due North from Barura.

Yemeni representative declined to discuss this because of the Imam's latest categorical commands to them to which I have referred, but suggested that I should approach the Imam direct. On 23rd June I made a specific proposal direct to the Imam that " without prejudice to the settlement of the question of the Southern frontier of the Yemen which was deferred by Article 3 area hereinafter described and containing the village of Shabwa and Abr should not be brought within the administration system nor be occupied by armed forces either of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or by the Government of the Yemen." Then followed the exact statement of the boundary area as outlined above. I also provided illustration sketch map. I moreover explained my proposal (which was subject to confirmation by His Majesty's Government) would not constitute permanent disposal of the territory to be neutralised but only temporary disposal during the term of the Treaty.

My letter, which was couched in most sincerely persuasive terms, expressed fear that negotiations would fail unless the Imam would graciously consent to modify his last uncompromising decision and permit his representatives to discuss with me my latest proposal. I said that His Majesty's Government had come halfway to meet him in reaching compromise between the two sets of mutually incompatible claims by offering to relax their own in such a degree as to forego exercise of control by them in certain parts of the territory concerned; and I asked " will not Your Majesty in illustrating sincere friendship that I know you have for my King and my Government and in the interests of goodwill also relax your own claims in that small degree sufficient to meet the proffered gesture of my Government? "

Imam's reply received 27th June was nearly all taken up with an apprehended bitter repetition of all his alleged injuries at the hands of the Aden Government and concluded with a brief request to me for the Secretary of State for the Colonies version of the regrettable ocurrences and assurance

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* No. 203. † No. 205.

and hastening of restoration " and surrender to us of our forcibly seized territory." He added a rather obscure phrase implying that his demand did not involve any territory that was not already his own, and that all the long negotiations for any other detention had been waste of time.

To summarise the Imam stubbornly refuses to neutralise any area whatever and insists on complete relinquishment of our control over the whole Seiar Keysir and Barura tribal areas which have been specified in a statement of boundaries communicated to me showing them as extending as far as Awamir tribe and Nahd tribe at Wadi Amd on the East and to Fesher Nisbouin and tribes on the South (possibly including Aiyadh Wells). He will accept no compromise because he absolutely rejects our right to offer one. I am quite satisfied that I should be wasting my time in making any further attempt in persuading him to relax his adamant attitude.

I am of opinion that the time has now come for me to withdraw, for even if it should be decided to agree to Imam's demands surrender of tribal areas would not require my presence here; and while unless that is done the Imam will agree to no definition of the present commerce on rest of the frontier; if it is done that definition can be undertaken by Boundary Commission already envisaged. *Ends.*

Had a long private talk with Minister of Foreign Affairs yesterday who maintained that the Imam's letter to me represented his hysterical attitude. I suggest that you should await my private letter despatched from here 25th June before sending to London with your comments. *Ends.* My comments follow.

78462/40 [No. 126B]. No. 207.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 8.32 p.m., 3rd July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 208 and 209.*]

No. 312. Part II. 3rd July. My comments. Possibility that Imam might seek to place wide geographical interpretation on Shabwa and Al Abr has been foreseen (paragraph 5 of my despatch Secret 3 of 26th September, 1939*) but there can be little doubt that his present extremely uncompromising demands, which include rejection of neutralization, are prompted by recent course of war in Europe. I cannot recommend further concessions and suggest Champion be authorized to say that H.M. Government cannot go beyond proposal to neutralize two places named in such manner as will not affect tribes on Hadhramaut border, whose preservation in present position is necessary to safety and internal security of the Hadhramaut. At same time Champion might point out that both British and Yemen Governments have declared their wish to respect and maintain Treaty of Sana which provides for the maintenance of *status quo* pending final settlement of boundaries. The two Governments differ only regarding interpretation of Treaty in so far as it affects districts north-east of and east of Beihan. This is largely due to fact that at the time of Treaty neither Government had effective control in most of those districts and they were not discussed or even mentioned during Treaty negotiations. H.M. Government maintain their view regarding their *status quo* position, but have gone as far as possible to meet Imam's contrary view by proposing neutralization pending final settlement which does not entail surrender of claims by either side. They hope that Imam will reconsider question and agree to an amicable settlement on this basis, which would preserve the honour and interests of both Governments at a time when maintenance of friendly relations must be of special importance to both owing to disturbed conditions in other parts of the world.

Possibility must not be overlooked that Imam may take advantage of present situation to send troops into disputed areas or to infiltrate into them as he did at Shabwa in 1938. This would raise question of steps advisable to prevent such advance which would be regarded in Hadhramaut as threat to its security. Question of strengthening Quaiti irregulars garrisons is being examined, but care will (group omitted) taken to make these measures purely defensive.

78462/40 [No. 139]. No. 208.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 4.15 a.m., 12th July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 331. Your telegram No. 312†. Champion's mission. I hope to send you instructions shortly. Meantime following telegram from Imam to His Majesty the King dated 25th June is repeated to you for information. *Begins:—*

Compliments, etc.

I, your sincere servant in the depths of his sorrow and suffering, protest and affirm to your Imperial and Glorious person that your representative Mr. Champion is very far from carrying out your high royal commands and will not do justice and restore our right and property which is now

* No. 178. † Nos. 206 and 207.

(or openly) attacked both by aggressive baseness on the part of the government of Aden and also without cause or right; and Mr. Champion arrogates to himself the office of advocate for the Government of Aden only. I hope from nobility, kindness, and carefulness of Your Majesty that you will turn your noble eye on the rights of my kingdom which are firm, clear, and well established, and will order the return of the possessions of my fathers and ancestors which the Government of Aden took by superior force, by armed aggression five years after the making of the treaty of loving alliance and friendship between the two countries. Your sincere servant cannot keep his people and his conscience quiet: Your Majesty never wishes the terms of the treaty of love and friendship to lead to seizing by force and hostility to us by some officers at the direction of those who are greedy for personal fame and who aim at causing bad blood and strife between the two countries.

I again protest to your respected, honoured and glorious person, and I expect from Your Majesty only the restoration of the right of my country which has been taken from it; I cannot let my claim be disregarded now two years have passed and I am still waiting.

Your Majesty accept my most sincere and true respects to your beloved royal person and your noble and glorious family (wife). I hope for pardon for my claim: I am under compulsion and constraint. *Ends.*

78462/40 [No. 145]. No. 209.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 5.30 p.m., 14th July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by Nos. 212 and 213.*]

No. 334. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre, No. 626. Your telegram No. 312*. Champion's report on present position of negotiations and your comments have been carefully considered and conclusion has been reached that no useful purpose will be served by continuation by Champion of present discussions with Yemeni Government. Champion should therefore after delivering message referred to in following paragraph return to Aden and in due course resume his duties with Palestine Government.

2. Message to Imam, though actually delivered by Champion, should be in form of communication from yourself acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government. It should be on following lines. *Begins:—*

His Majesty's Government have made what they considered, and still consider, to be a generous offer as basis for negotiation with a view to reaching compromise on question at issue and they learn with regret that the King has not been able to regard this offer as satisfactory basis for continuation of discussions. His Majesty's Government regret too that they are unable to consider cession to the Yemen of territories which the King desires and they feel sure that the King will agree that since it has proved impossible to reach agreement it will be best to continue to regard whole question as standing on basis of Treaty of Sana'a until such time as Imam should wish to reopen negotiations as provided in the Treaty for a final demarcation of boundary. In these circumstances Champion is being instructed to return to Aden but His Majesty's Government will be willing to send another representative to Sana'a at any time should the King desire to reopen discussions on the basis of the offer which His Majesty's Government have made. *Ends.* You should instruct Champion accordingly.

3. I note you are examining question of strengthening garrisons in disputed area. It seems to me essential in present circumstances that requisite military dispositions should be made so as to avoid any risk of successful surprise aggression in these areas by Yemeni forces. You should therefore as a matter of urgency consider advisability of reoccupying Shabwa with adequate party of Protectorate forces and of strengthening Qu'aiti garrison at Al Abr. I am prepared to leave you to make these arrangements without further reference to me unless you specifically wish to consult me further. You should report by telegram action taken.

4. Any attacks on the Protectorate by forces from Yemeni territory should be resisted by all available means and there need be no hesitation in present circumstances about taking air action against military objectives in Yemeni territory.

5. Terms of reply† by His Majesty the King to Imam's telegram of 25th June‡ will be repeated to you in separate telegram.

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* Nos. 206 and 207. † No. 210 ‡ No. 208.

78462/40 [No. 146]. No. 210.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 7.30 a.m., 16th July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 336. My telegram No. 334 of 14th July*. Following is text of telegram from His Majesty the King of Imam. *Begins*:—

I thank Your Majesty for your telegram of the 25th June†, and much appreciate the friendly sentiments expressed therein.

I am sorry to learn that Your Majesty should have gained the impression that Mr. Champion is ignoring the instructions of My Government. It is also with deep regret that I note that it has not been possible to reach a settlement of the questions which he was sent to Sana'á to discuss. I can assure Your Majesty that both the Governor of Aden and Mr. Champion have carried out faithfully and punctiliously the policy laid down by My Government in all that they have said on the subject of the frontier to Your Majesty's Ministers. My Government believed that their generous proposals would at once be recognised by Your Majesty as satisfying the honour and the interests of both sides, and it is a disappointment to them as well as to me that this has not proved to be the case.

In the circumstances Your Majesty will, I am sure, agree that the best course will be to suspend the negotiations in order that they may be resumed at a more propitious moment and Mr. Champion is being instructed to make a communication accordingly to Your Majesty's Ministers. Compliments, etc. *Ends.*

78462/40 [No. 159]. No. 211.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR.

(Sent 2.30 a.m., 20th July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

[*Answered by No. 212.*]

No. 349. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram No. 330‡. With reference to telegram to War Office from C.-in-C., Middle East, No. 0/13842, dated 15th July§, telegram from His Majesty to Imam repeated to you in my telegram No. 336‖ will have already reached Sana'a but I assume you have not yet acted on my telegram No. 334*.

The questions covered in C.-in-C's. telegram have been further considered and following points emerge:—

(1) Imam is aware from His Majesty's telegram of decision to break off Champion's negotiations.

(2) Obstacle to satisfactory settlement with Imam is not merely " quibble over comparatively unimportant tribal area " as Imam is claiming unqualified cession to him of very large area of Eastern Protectorate.

(3) Decision not to accept that claim has taken into account following considerations:—

(*a*) Repeated advice that such cession would seriously jeopardize our whole position and authority in Hadhramaut.

(*b*) Belief that at this juncture particularly it would be more likely to provoke further Yemeni demands or aggression if we now abandon to Imam large tribal areas he demands at expense of Qua'iti and other Arab rulers under our protection by Treaty and in that event our defensive position would be so weakened that C.-in-C's. commitments would be increased rather than diminished.

(*c*) Italian influence with Imam would gain strength from our giving way at this time to Imam's demands which may be supposed to have been supported by Italian propaganda.

(*d*) Imam's policy in event of aggression of Italian forces on Yemen territory is likely to be decided in favour of party he considers to be the stronger and not on our acceptance or rejection of his frontier demands.

Unless strong objections are maintained by C.-in-C. (to whom War Office are telegraphing separately with request that he repeat to you his reply on that point) I consider that you should take action on my telegram No. 334*.

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* No. 209. † No. 208. ‡ 13027/7/40 [No. 15]: not printed. § 13027/40 [No. 23]: not printed. ‖ No. 210.

78462/40 [No. 160]. No. 212.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.3 p.m., 20th July, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 342. 20th July. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre C/2125 and General Headquarters, Middle East C/2126.

Contents of your telegram No. 334* were communicated to Champion by telegraph on 16th July before receipt of request from the Commander-in-Chief to suspend action, and as telegram from His Majesty to the Imam had presumably already reached Sana'á, I asked the Political Resident in Aden (? Air Officer Commanding) to inform the Commander-in-Chief that I could not now delay action. Position was discussed with Colonel Price, Staff Officer, General Headquarters, Middle East, who was in Aden and has since returned to Cairo, and the situation was explained to him as seen at Aden, views held here being similar to those expressed in your telegram No. 349†.

78462/40 [No. 173]. No. 213.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 1.0 p.m., 10th August, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 373. Your telegram No. 334*. Champion arrived Aden 7th August.

78462/40 [No. 174]. No. 214.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, PALESTINE.

(Sent 5.45 p.m., 17th August, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 734. Repeated to Aden No. 402. My telegram No. 145‡. It has been decided that no useful purpose will be served by continuation by Champion of present discussions with Yemen Government, and he has now returned to Aden. You will no doubt send instructions regarding resumption of duty to him through Governor.

78462/40 [No. 182]. No. 215.

THE OFFICER ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 7.15 p.m., 21st August, 1940.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 396. Repeated to Middle East Intelligence Centre. Your telegram No. 334*. With reference to paragraph 3. Frontier Defences.

No immediate aggression is expected, and I consider it important not to attract attention to troop movements which would appear provocative to Imam. Garrisons at Al Abr and Bir Asakar are being increased to 35 and 15 by the end of August and will gradually be raised to full strength of 60 and 30 by the end of September.

Defence frontiers at places are also being improved.

As movement would appear to provoke, I do not think it would be wise to occupy Shabwa at present, but local force of 10 mounted men will maintain communication and provide intelligence between Shabwa and post concerned.

Detachment of 11 Government Guards has also been sent to Beihan from where they could be moved to Shabwa if necessary, as could detachment at Bir Asakar.

There are wireless telegraphy sets at Al Abr and Beihan.

Arrangements for reinforcing Mukalla Government Post from Shiban and Mukalla have also been made.

Movements of Mukalla Government Troops have been unanimously approved by Quaiti State Council.

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* No. 209. † No. 211. ‡ 78462/40 [No. 57]: not printed.

78462/40 [No. 197].

No. 216

THE ACTING GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 18th December, 1940.)

[Answered by No. 217.]

(Secret.)

My Lord, Governor's Office, Aden, 26th October, 1940.

I have the honour to forward herewith copies of Mr. Champion's report on his mission to the Yemen, which he has requested me to transmit to Your Lordship with my comments and criticisms.

2. Your Lordship has already received much of this report (transmitted in Sir Bernard Reilly's secret despatches of the 22nd* and 26th June† and 9th July‡) in the form of the records of his meetings with the Imamic delegates. They are here embodied with the necessary commentary in a continuous narrative. I have ventured to re-arrange one copy of Mr. Champion's report so as to leave the annexures at the end, as I found personally that it was difficult to follow the thread of the story with such long breaks.

3. I myself have had no personal experience of the Imamic Court, but I know enough about it to marvel, as I think Your Lordship will, at the sustained tact and patience with which Mr. Champion has conducted his mission, enduring at the same time for nearly four months the atmosphere of fanaticism, narrow mindedness and suspicion which pervades the town of San'a, in which even on the most ordinary occasions the visitor is followed by a Yemeni escort charged with reporting on his every movement. I admire no less the manner of his careful marshalling of irrefutable arguments as to the rightness of the case he was presenting (pages 4 and 5), and his skilful handling of the Yemeni counter attack, evidence of which appears throughout the report.

4. I should like to take this opportunity of recording my deep personal satisfaction at Mr. Champion's findings. As Your Lordship is no doubt aware I have, ever since the controversy over Al 'Abr, and to a lesser degree Shabwa, started, felt it my duty to resist any proposal that the Qu'aitis should leave Al 'Abr, using, only far less effectively, the very arguments that Mr. Champion has used. I have no doubt that in the eyes of the Imam it is myself who is the villain of the piece as it was I who first occupied the place. I have felt at times in the face of the often contrary views of some of my colleagues in Aden that I was perhaps being unreasonably insistent and have constantly reviewed my opinions, and although I came to no other conclusion I felt constrained to acquiesce in the neutrality proposal and to try to find some other alternative to Shabwa and Al 'Abr which would maintain the security of the Hadhramaut. I cannot regret my desire to help in a compromise as it has to some extent resulted in this impartial examination of the question by Mr. Champion. I should like to testify to the judicial way in which he examined me on the matter during his visit to Mukalla in the course of which I was able to produce the documents which he used so skilfully to support his case. I only regret that it was not possible to secure a Yemeni delegate to accompany him on his flight over the area to see the geographical argument which made the impression I felt it was bound to make on Mr. Champion.

5. It is clear, however, that such a flight would not have caused the negotiations to end otherwise, nor indeed would it have been any use from that point of view to have gone into the rights and wrongs of the present situation (paragraph 11 (ii)), and it is only because the exposition of the case to the Yemenis is so complete that I could wish it had been explained that the immediate cause of the Qu'aiti going to Al 'Abr was a loot by the Sei'ar of 40 camels and that the idea of acquiring Yemeni territory (which is the motive imputed to us) had never even remotely entered our minds.

6. I should go further than Mr. Champion in paragraph 31 and should attribute a good deal of the troubles we have had over Al 'Abr and Shabwa to Italian intrigue. It is universally admitted that Raghib Bey has been heavily subsidised by them for some years, and apart from the fact that the Imam has always been touchy over any mention of the Anglo-Turkish line, the only result of keeping secret the agreement with the Italians to consider that as the boundary between the Yemen and the Protectorate was to give them the opportunity of instigating the Imam to protest without his knowing that they themselves had agreed to it.

7. But whatever stimulus there may have been to him to protest, and however much emphasis is put on his ineradicable belief that we had broken the treaty of 1934, the real key to the matter is the proposition made in paragraph 15 (vi) (*a*) and (*b*) and referred to again in paragraph 19 (xiii), namely, the divine right of the Imams of the Yemen. The Imam is a Priest King such as has existed in South Arabia since pagan times. To the Zeidis this concept is a matter of faith which admits of no argument any more than does the existence of the sun and the moon, but while the existence of the sun and the moon is equally evident to the rest of the Arabs of South Arabia, the divine right of the Imam is not, and Mr. Champion (paragraph 11 (ix)) might, if he had not been the model of tact, equally well have answered Qadhi Raghib that Sunnis would prefer a Christian power to a heretic. An orthodox Muslim much prefers someone who honestly follows another religion to one who perverts Islam, and although the Sei'ar never pray and never fast and are therefore imperfect Muslims (nāqus), I know very well that none of the Hadhramis would willingly own allegiance to the Imam. If any real solution is to be found to this question it must, I think, lie either in some such clause as that which was embodied in the Treaty of San'a (referred to by Mr. Champion in paragraph 15 (vi) (c)) or in some other device which secures to the Imam a recognition of his divine right.

* 78462/40 [No. 190] : Not printed. † 78462/40 [No. 191] : Not printed. ‡ 78462/40 [No. 195] : Not printed.

8. Your Lordship will probably notice a parallel between the Imamic attitude and that of the Papacy. The Pope claims jurisdiction over the whole of Christendom, but that jurisdiction is largely in abeyance in Protestant countries or amongst other Christians who have temporarily alienated themselves from obedience to the See of Rome. Whether it would be possible to devise some recognition of the Imam's claim to spiritual rule over the whole of the Yemen in its wider significance while not implying any duty of non-Zeidi Muslims to recognise it, and at the same time to secure some tacit understanding that his secular rule was indefinitely in abeyance, I do not know, but it may be worth while for us to examine that point at leisure and as opportunity for enquiry arises, in case the occasion occurs for resumption of the negotiations at a more favourable season.

9. It is plain that no man could have done more than Mr. Champion did to obtain a settlement of our difficulties with the Imam, and I for one feel certain that the only method in the future will be to find some such formula as I have suggested or as Mr. Champion says to hope that time and events will result in a more negative mood of acquiescence on his part.

10. I deeply regret the delay in sending this despatch, which I have drafted some time, but various consultations were necessary which have taken time in these days of constant pressure of work.

I have, etc.,

W. H. INGRAMS,

Acting Governor.

Enclosure in No. 216.

(Secret.)

My Lord, The Secretariat, Aden, 22nd August, 1940.

I have the honour to submit the following report on my Mission to His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam.

I. PRELIMINARY.

2. Having handed over my charge at Nazareth on the 27th February, 1940, and left Palestine on the following day, I arrived at Aden on the 4th March. During the ensuing three weeks I made a close examination of the local records of the controversy, the settlement of which was the purpose of my Mission, and was able in the course of frank conversations with His Excellency the Governor and his Political Staff to acquaint myself fully with all the events relating to the affair. I was also given the opportunity of a visit by air to the Resident Adviser at Mukalla, who contributed valuable facts and views during my two days' stay with him; and on my flight back to Aden over Al'Abr and Shabwa and the surrounding country on the 15th March I was able to make an adequate study from the air of the geographical aspects of the problem, of which Mr. Philby's "Sheba's Daughters" had already given me a very clear mental picture. The map published with that book should be referred to in connection with this Report.

3. Shortly after reaching Aden I had notified my arrival by telegraph to the Imam, and expressed my pleasure at the prospect of visiting him at San'a; and I received a most cordial welcome in his prompt reply.

4. My formal instructions from London (Annexures "Q"* and "R"†) having reached Aden on the 16th March and been subjected to the necessary study and discussion during the early part of that week, I was ready to proceed immediately after the Easter holidays. I accordingly left Aden on the 26th March by car by the overland route via Lahej, Ta'iz and Hodeidah accompanied by Mr. Saleh Ja'far, M.B.E., Assistant Frontier Officer, a N.C.O. and two military orderlies from the Aden Protectorate Levies, and a small domestic staff.

5. At Ta'iz I was received in audience by the Crown Prince, Seif al Islam Ahmed who, after exchanging speculations about the course of the war, somewhat discursively expressed his hopes for a settlement of the frontier questions between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. He described them as the outcome of misunderstandings fostered by ambitious young Political Officers at Aden (a loose and unsubstantiated idea which I later found to be only too firmly fixed in the minds of the Imam and of his Foreign Minister); but I formed the impression that he had no real understanding of the nature of the problem, and was merely repeating borrowed opinions. By contrast with Seif al Islam Ahmed's explosive manner and appearance, I found the quiet wisdom of his Personal Assistant, Qadhi Hussein al Halali, refreshing and helpful. The Qadhi, a learned and elderly man who has considerable influence along the south-western frontier from his former charge of the Hujariya District, visited me twice, to discuss the necessity of border peace in general, and certain allegedly unsatisfactory aspects of the present position on the south-western section of the frontier in particular.

6. At Hodeidah, which we reached on the 1st April, I paid a courtesy call on the Governor, Seif al Islam 'Abdullah, with whom I found also Seif al Islam al Hussein, who was on his way by stages to San'a from Ta'iz where he had been staying for some weeks with his elder brother. Mr. C. A. F. Dundas, the representative of the British Council who had been deputed to visit the Imam, landed at Hodeidah on the 3rd April and joined me; and on the same afternoon we proceeded onwards together. We spent the night of the 4th April at Ma'bar (at the head of the Masna' Pass to the central Yemen plateau), where we were hospitably welcomed by the 'Amil of Dhoran, Seyyid Yehia al Kibsi; and we reached San'a on the following day in the afternoon. The whole journey had been very much obstructed and delayed by floods and continual boggings and mechanical breakdowns, during which

* No. 194. † No. 195.

the cheerful patience, untiring energy and unfailing resource of the drivers and other personnel were most praiseworthy. On our arrival we were directed to a small but comfortable guest-house by two mounted guards, but were given no formal reception—fortunately for us in our state of travel-worn fatigue. A junior official brought us the Foreign Minister's oral message of welcome that evening.

7. On the next morning the Foreign Minister, Qadhi Mohamed Ragheb, followed up his earlier courteous enquiries by a formal call, which I returned in due course; and on the 7th April, accompanied by Mr. Dundas, I paid my official visit to the Imam at the Palace, being received ceremonially with a guard of honour. The Imam was most friendly and cordial,—indeed almost jolly—and kept me for about half an hour in conversation on general topics. He made no specific mention of the events that had led to his present differences with His Majesty's Government, but made it very clear that he felt the Aden authorities to be out of sympathy with him. He spoke of "enemies" among the political staff, and of "hostile acts" on their part. I assured him that the Aden authorities, like His Majesty's Government, had nothing but the most sincerely friendly motives and intentions towards him and the Yemen, and expressed my confidence that our present negotiations would completely clear his mind of such unhappy notions. He nominated Qadhi Ragheb and Qadhi Abdel Karim al Mutahhar, his Chief Secretary, as his representatives.

II. The Negotiations.

8. After a slight delay occasioned by Qadhi Ragheb's exclusive preoccupations with the farewells and departure of the large Sa'udi Mission, headed by Amir Muhammad bin 'Abdel 'Aziz, which left San'a on the 10th April, the negotiations began on the 11th April. All the ensuing formal meetings, of which there were ten, were held by arrangement and for convenience in Qadhi Ragheb's house, and were attended also by his colleague, Qadhi 'Abdel Karim (save on one occasion), and by my assistant, Mr. Saleh Ja'far.

9. It is with sincere disappointment and regret that I have to report that it proved impossible to bring our conversations to a successful conclusion. Had the outcome been otherwise, it would have been sufficient for me now to record little more than the satisfactory terms of settlement. As matters stand, however, I have decided to embody in my Report the very record of our discussions, in order that the course of our descent into the present impasse may be followed and understood step by step, and that future and I hope more successful negotiators, in happier and more stable times, may have before them a complete picture of the present Yemeni attitude, at this time which has proved so inopportune for compromise.

10. The following paragraphs contain the rescript of my notes of the discussions at each meeting, recorded either on the same or on the next day, while the memory was still fresh and the mind still busy with the arguments exchanged. Documents relating to certain of the meetings are interspersed in their logical and convenient places in these records.

III. Records of the Negotiations.

11. *1st Meeting, Thursday, 11th April.*—(i) After the appropriate pious expressions, I opened the proceedings with a brief statement of the purposes of the Treaty in general and of Art. III in particular, and referred to the intention that during its term there should be a permanent settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen. In the years following the conclusion of the Treaty, certain incidents had occurred which had effected the good relations between the parties, and the Imam had appealed to H.M. King George personally for an intermediary to be sent. His Majesty had replied that he had entrusted me with the task of "negotiating for reaching an equitable and mutually acceptable settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of San'a"; and the Imam had been good enough to agree to my appointment.

(ii) I therefore suggested that without going into the rights or wrongs of any of the incidents that had led to the present situation—an investigation that would lead us nowhere—we should take the fixation of the southern frontier of the Yemen as a whole as our objective. I proposed that we should attempt to reach agreement on a definition of a frontier line in principle, using physical features in the section between Sheikh Said and the Wadi Bana, then traditional inter-tribal boundaries, thence to the eastern limit of the Beihan enclave, and finally, distant physical features, thence through the broad sandy waste of Ramlet es Sabatein into the Rub' al Khali. It would then be for the two parties to agree upon the appointment of an expert joint Boundary Commission to demarcate upon the ground the frontier thus provisionally fixed, having power to make agreed minor adjustments thereof when necessary, as they proceeded.

(iii) Qadhi Ragheb at once shied off so precise a proposal and entered upon a rambling objection of which it is necessary to record only the main points and my replies :—

(*a*) That it was useless to suggest a return to the Anglo-Turkish Line, which had been so repeatedly, so categorically, and for so long repudiated by the Imam, which repudiation we had impliedly accepted during the Treaty negotiations. I replied that out of regard for the Imam's susceptibilities I had deliberately refrained from any reference to the Anglo-Turkish Line, but that I had in mind the use of the valuable detailed information contained in the recorded definition of that line and the adoption of its features.

(*b*) That it was he himself who had years ago proposed an inter-tribal line, and that we had put forward detailed proposals to that end; but that we had later retracted them in favour of the "dilatory clause." It was therefore not logical for us now to return to that charge. I did not trouble to correct this distortion of the facts.

(*c*) It was all very well for me to propose the final demarcation of a frontier. But how could he agree so long as the disposal of Shabwa and Al 'Abr remained in doubt? What was our intention in regard to those places? I replied that that question among a number of others would fall for discussion during the course of our negotiations for such a frontier; and I could not accept a position in which his agreement to my proposal was to be conditional upon our prior surrender of Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

(iv) At this stage Qadhi Ragheb went off at a tangent with a stream of complaint about the behaviour of the subordinate staff of the Government of Aden, the scandalous and dishonouring indignities that the Imam had had to suffer at their hands, the lack of confidence that the people of the Yemen had in the intentions of His Majesty's Government in regard to that country, and the justified fear which they had that unlawful British encroachments would continue and increase. When I could with reasonable politeness break in upon this noisy and undignified outburst, I sternly protested against both the manner and the matter of his assertions, none of which had any basis in reality or reason, and charged him with listening to irresponsible talebearers who sought to disturb Anglo-Yemeni relations. This cooled him down, and I asked him again to keep past incidents out of the picture and to let us concentrate upon a positive settlement that would prevent their recurrence.

(v) This brought us back to where we started, and I repeated my proposal, now in somewhat greater detail, for an agreement in principle on the whole frontier, which would later be implemented by demarcation by a joint Boundary Commission. The greater detail to which I refer included a suggestion of a line to be drawn in a north-easterly direction from the accepted confines of Beihan, based on physical features, in a manner to divide the natural barrier of the Ramlet es Sabatein roughly in half.

(vi) Qadhi Ragheb thereupon went off again like a squib, this time with a more definite accusation that the Aden authorities with bad faith and evil intent had forcibly seized Shabwa and Al 'Abr, which were positively within the territories and under the Sovereignty of the Imam. I at once rejected the accusation, asserting forcibly that both places were incontrovertibly within the Protectorate (upon arguments provided by the Secretary of State's despatch of May 9th, 1938*) and that the Aden authorities had done nothing in regard to either place—or indeed anywhere else in the Protectorate—which was in conflict either with their right of access and control there or with Article III of the Treaty.

(vii) I said that, nevertheless, and aside from considerations of legal rights, the proposal that I had made for the division of the Ramlet es Sabatein was eminently sane and practical in that it made use of the natural barrier, provided as it were by the All-Knowing, that already separated the settlements in the Harib-Marib-Jauf areas from those on the south side of the upper catchment basin of the Wadi Hadhramaut. This provided me with an opportunity for a detailed lecture on the geography and physical peculiarities of the whole region, and for the expression of a wish that it might have been possible for either of my fellow negotiators to have studied the area minutely (as I had done) both from the air and from close examination of recent and extremely accurate maps and reconnaissance records. They laughingly acknowledged the aptness of my quotation from the Qur'an,—"You have no patience with me. How should you have patience with me while you have not the knowledge?"

(viii) The appeal to reason had no effect, and Qadhi Ragheb returned again and again to the charge that we had taken Yemeni territory at Shabwa and Al 'Abr, still using well-known arguments, among them that the well at Al 'Abr had been dug by the orders of the Imam's predecessor (countered by my statement that on the contrary the Sei'are tribe had given evidence that they had done the work: the well being indisputably the property of that tribe) and that the tribes had "submitted" to the Imam.

Note.—I still held in reserve the original of a letter of summons by the Imam to the Sei'ar, Nahd, and other tribes in and near the disputed area to submit to his rule: it is dated 2nd Ramadhan, 1355, only 2 years after the Treaty of San'a.

(ix) Qadhi Ragheb produced here a new argument, in an appeal to me as a man of perception and honesty to acknowledge that the Sei'ar round Al 'Abr owed allegiance rather to a Moslem Imam than to a Christian Power. This gave me a useful chance of explaining how very wrong he was in his conception of our relations with the Treaty Chiefs generally, and with the Qu'aiti Sultan in particular, as the rightful suzerain of the Sei'ar. Both Qadhis jumped on that phrase and demanded what proof there was that the Sei'ar owed any such allegiance. Production at once from my file of an agreement, 38 years old, between the tribe and the Qu'aiti Sultan, acknowledging that allegiance, visibly shook Qadhi 'Abdel Karim, who read it carefully through; but Qadhi Ragheb loudly protested that scraps of paper between tribes were "two a penny." He also contended that the tribe had no right to dispose of their allegiance, which was the Imam's.

Note.—I still had available for exhibition a 45-year old agreement of alliance between certain of the Sei'ar and the Qu'aiti Sultan, and also a much older and more important document dating back about 90 years, clearly acknowledging allegiance to the Qu'aiti.

(x) As we rose to close the meeting, Qadhi Ragheb could only vaguely advise me to "think over it." I begged him and his colleague seriously to consider the one positive proposal that had emerged from the discussion, viz., that which I had made and explained, and in particular the suggested practical common-sense solution of the problem in the north-eastern zone.

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* Untraceable.

12. *Second Meeting, Monday, 15th April,* 1940.—(i) I opened the meeting with a precise recapitulation of the British position on the lines briefly set out below :—

We should agree to arrive at a final settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen in the manner that I had proposed at the first meeting. Such a settlement was clearly provided for by Art. III of the Treaty, and the time was now ripe to consider it ; for it was highly undesirable that two such prominent States, in acknowledged friendly relations, should still lack a proper frontier to divide their respective territories. Furthermore, for whatever reason the " dilatory clause " in the Treaty has been devised, it must be quite clear to the Qadhis, as it was to me and to all the world besides, that the Aden Protectorate would remain under the British aegis indefinitely ; and it would be wise of them to face the realities instead of keeping the matter open and perpetuating the very situation that was causing all the trouble.

(ii) I said that they must be under no misapprehension about His Majesty's Government's unshakeable contention regarding Shabwa and Al 'Abr, which was that they were definitely and unmistakably within the Protectorate ; there could be no further argument about this. I repeated all the various geographical and political arguments for that contention and added that I had shown them at the first meeting the document containing the Sei'ar-Qu'aiti agreement of 1322 A.H., and that if the Qadhis were in any doubt about this I would produce another more important agreement of the same kind dated as far back as 1272 A.H. or nearly 90 years ago.

(iii) I went on to explain that the north-eastern end of the " *status quo* frontier " which had received any detailed attention at the time of the Treaty negotiations was at the north-eastern confines of the Beihan area. No specific line had been negotiated beyond that point, because Yemeni tribes and administration were not in contact with the Protectorate tribes and administration thereafter, being divided from each other by the natural barrier of the Ramlet es Sabatein. But lack of precise agreement as to the further line did not mean that we had ceased to consider the Anglo-Turkish " north-east " line as binding, and if Qadhi Ragheb would refer to the map that I had handed to him at the time of the Treaty negotiations (*vide* para. 19 of Sir Bernard Reilly's Report* thereon, dated the 28th February, 1934) I thought he would find the " north-east " line described thereon, as part of the line which had to be established as the *status quo* before the signature of the Treaty.

(iv) But apart from the questions of legal right, I begged the Qadhis to consider that whereas Shabwa and Al 'Abr were integral parts of the Hadhramaut administrative system, they were virtually useless to the Yemen. They were both 6 or 7 days' journey distant from the nearest Yemeni administrative station at Mareb across an utterly empty and barren stretch of sand desert, while on the contrary they were within easy touch of the Qu'aiti posts in the upper Hadhramaut valley. I asked the Qadhis to bear in mind the significant comparison between such a journey and the comparable route from, say, San'a to Zebid, which was of equal length but passed wholly through inhabited, cultivated, developed and administered country.

(v) In conclusion, I begged them to have the courage to cut the Gordian Knot by a permanent settlement which could if necessary make no mention of the controversial places Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

(vi) In reply, Qadhi Ragheb referred back to one of the former proposals, made before the Treaty was concluded, in which each party professed to recognise that the other has certain claims to the Protectorate. That formula had later been dropped and did not appear in the final Treaty ; but none the less the Imam clearly retained his claims in the Protectorate, and the suggestion made that the Protectorate was a permanency was quite unacceptable. It had indeed been his (Qadhi Ragheb's) earnest wish and hope that at some later stage, when the two Governments had really come together in complete and unreserved mutual understanding, it would have been appropriate for His Majesty's Government to have voluntarily surrendered some part of the Protectorate to the Imam, " though of course it was recognised that the return of Aden itself would not be in the best interests of the Yemen, because of the rapid deterioration of the port and town that would ensue." I assured the Qadhi that his hopes were completely groundless and that the permanence of the Protectorate under British control was not open to the least question.

(vii) Qadhi Ragheb agreed that it would be an excellent thing to define the whole extent of the *status quo* line as at the date of the Treaty, and to cause it to be demarcated by an expert commission consisting of an important Yemeni representative high in the confidence of the Imam and, say, Colonel Lake.

(viii) But, insisted Qadhi Ragheb, there could be no question of any boundary discussion or definition until the question of Shabwa and Al 'Abr should first be solved. That point had been made clear in the Imam's reply to His Majesty (*vide* the Secretary of State's telegram, Confidential No. 63 of the 21st February, 1940)† in which the " removal of the present encroachments " at the two places had been put in the foreground ; but that " nevertheless " Mr. Champion's coming visit was accepted.

(ix) But Qadhi Ragheb, in order to demonstrate his willingness to compromise, would agree that Shabwa and Al 'Abr should be occupied and used by neither party (as had been the case at the time of the Treaty), and that if at any time we required it the Yemeni Government would give a solemn undertaking not in any circumstances to send forces there. I replied that any such undertaking would be quite out of place, and that we should certainly not seek it, since both Shabwa and Al 'Abr were within the Protectorate.

(x) I went on to explain again how important to us the two places were for the purposes of the proper administration of the Hadhramaut, of which they were geographically and politically a part. They lay at the very gates of the Wadi and were essential for our legitimate purposes ; whereas they were very remote from the nearest Yemeni control centre and could serve no useful function in the

* No. 138, in Middle East No. 82. † No. 193.]

Yemeni administrative system. Qadhi Ragheb replied that if both parties vacated them and we were at any time thereby at a disadvantage in our control of the tribes, the Yemeni Government would most willingly come to our help with men, transport animals, material, or in any other way. I politely but firmly declined in advance any such suggested assistance, and stressed our right and determination to retain Shabwa and Al 'Abr. Whereupon Qadhi Ragheb replied that our holding of Al 'Abr was tantamount to our holding the Yemen itself !

(xi) In concluding the meeting I begged the Qadhis to recognize that if we could agree to a definition of the *status quo* that would (rightly) include Shabwa and Al 'Abr in the Protectorate, it would not prejudice the ultimate Yemeni claim to these places, any more than their acceptance of a *status quo* line elsewhere had prejudiced their claims to other places in the Protectorate.

There was no difference in my mind between Shabwa and Al 'Abr and other parts of the Protectorate in this respect ; and it seemed to me obvious that there was no valid objection to our agreeing, *e.g.* to the " 1934 " *status quo* line as far as the confines of the Beihan enclave, and to a " 1940 " *status quo* line thence into the Rub' el Khali. Qadhi Ragheb said that they could not acquiesce in this way in our infringement of the old *status quo* : I denied that we had infringed it. And sensing a centrifugal tendency in our conversation, I concluded the meeting for the day.

(xii) As I left I reminded Qadhi Ragheb that I had asked him to table the " *status quo* map " that I have referred to. He hedged, that it was of no cogency, but agreed that he would search for it among his papers, and produce it.

13. *Third Meeting, Thursday, 18th April,* 1940.—(i) I began by asking to see the map, purporting to depict the *status quo* line, which at the second meeting I had asked Qadhi Ragheb to produce. They had not brought it, nor I think had any steps been taken to find it. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim is in charge of the papers, as the Imam's Chief Secretary ; and he was out of countenance when he saw that I attached importance to the document. I pressed for it to be tabled at the next meeting and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim promised to search for it.

(ii) I opened the discussion by saying that the Treaty had settled temporarily the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen by the device of the *status quo*, along the line between Husn Murad and Beihan. Either the Treaty had likewise settled matters beyond Beihan or it had not. Did they consider that the *status quo* covered that further area ?

(iii) Qadhi Regheb replied that the *status quo* covered the whole, and included Shabwa and Al 'Abr ; and it had been repeatedly contended by the Yemeni Government that we had infringed the *status quo* by our action at these two places. " Then," I said, " I stand by the map I handed to Qadhi Ragheb at the time of the Treaty negotiations." Qadhi Ragheb replied that while admitting that it was at his own suggestion that the map had been given to him, it was never intended that it should be binding in any way as a pendant to the Treaty ; and he declined so to accept it now. I reserved my further argument on that point until the map should be before me.

(iv) To revert to Qadhi Ragheb's reference to our having infringed the *status quo* at Shabwa and Al 'Abr, I produced the Imam's letter to the Sei'ar, Nahd, and other Chiefs, dated Ramadhan, 1355, only two years after the signature of the Treaty. I took pains to explain that I did not lay it before them in the manner of a complaint—I was only too anxious to let bygones be bygones—but merely to indicate that the Imam himself could reasonably be held to have infringed the *status quo, before* our action, and at least as seriously. The Qadhis then went into a long explanation why the letter had been written, and argued that however incorrect the writing of it might appear to be, in relation with the *status quo*, it was morally unobjectionable, as a proper exhortation to the tribes to compose their differences and to accept true mediators for the settlement of their disputes.

(v) Qadhi 'Abdel Karim said that it was all very well our making these claims to Shabwa and Al 'Abr now, as it were in belated extenuation of our actions when we had been caught out in improprieties there ; but why had we made no such claims to them when in 1934 we laid claims to the 'Audhali Dhaher and Sanah, which the Iman had evacuated at our express request ? I replied that the cases were absolutely different, in that the latter places were at the time in the effective occupation of the Imam, whereas Shabwa and Al 'Abr were not and had never been in his occupation and we had therefore no reason to mention them at all.

(vi) Qadhi 'Abdel Karim then said quietly that there had indeed been no mention of them at all until Philby's visit ; and after that Ibn Sa'ud had sent a representative to San'a to discuss them with the Imam. He then nodded to himself and murmured, " Of course you were obliged to occupy Al 'Abr."

(vii) Qadhi Ragheb interposed with a long involved speech on the moral issues of the case in relation with the real purposes of the Treaty, which had been to establish cordial relations between us. We were at the parting of the ways. Were we to accept the reasonable contentions of the Yemeni Government, or could it possibly be that His Majesty's Government would insist on the uncompromising position that what they had taken they would hold ? It was for us to find a way of settlement that would satisfy both parties. I asked him to make a concrete and precise proposal to that end, if only that up to the present all the constructive suggestions seemed to have come from me !

(viii) After another long and pointless sermon, in which he and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim swopped arguments over my head, as if they were talking to persuade each other, Qadhi Ragheb said, " I propose that we should both go back to the position of the *status quo* at the date of the Treaty in respect of Shabwa and Al 'Abr : in other words that neither party should occupy these places." I said that such a solution would be no solution at all. Nature abhorred a vacuum, and the removal of control from these two places would immediately give rise to a crop of administrative difficulties, and inevitable trouble between us. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim smilingly quoted a proverb to the effect that an empty house was a sore temptation to thieves.

(ix) Qadhi Ragheb then said that it was only right that we should " give up " Shabwa and Al 'Abr. Whereupon I replied that since he had raised the point by making a specific demand I was authorised by His Majesty's Government to say that the cession of either place would positively not be agreed to. Qadhi Ragheb immediately corrected himself, saying that he had not meant more than mere evacuation.

(x) Qadhi 'Abdel Karim here said to his colleague that it was clear to see that Mr. Champion's mind had been poisoned by the biased promptings of junior officials at Aden, and that he had come to San'a with a prejudiced outlook. Qadhi Ragheb corrected him sharply, saying that the British representative was only doing his duty by putting forward the strongest case in his power. " We are all advocates," he said.

(xi) To conclude the meeting I again pressed the point that there was no essential difference as regards Yemeni claims between Shabwa and Al 'Abr and, say, Dhala'. As in the case of the *status quo* position in other parts of the frontier the Yemeni Government were free to advance their claims at the time of the future negotiations for a final settlement, so also in regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr. I therefore proposed that, since they had made it clear that my first suggestion for a final settlement of the frontier was unacceptable, they should agree to a definition of the *status quo* line along the whole frontier from Husn Murad to the Rub' al Khali.

(xii) Qadhi Ragheb replied heartily that there was nothing that he wanted more than a definitive *status quo* line, and that we were agreed upon that at least, and so had moved a step forward. I knew well that he said this with a mental reservation regarding the two controversial places, but the time had come for an adjournment, and I did not return to that point.

(xiii) Qadhi Ragheb agreed that in the interval until our next meeting I should prepare for discussion a draft skeleton agreement, " without prejudice," embodying the plan for the definition of the *status quo* line.

Note.—I here insert (Annexures "A*" and "B†") copies of my telegraphic request for authority to attempt a solution based upon an Exchange of Notes admitting Shabwa and Al 'Abr to the Protectorate, while reserving Yemeni claims to them.

14. *4th Meeting, Monday 29th April, 1940.*—(i) It had been agreed at our last meeting that I should prepare for future discussion a draft of an agreement that would embody a plan for the definition of the *status quo* line. In the interval since the last meeting there had been so much mysterious searchings among the Yemeni archives, and so much unexplained delay, that I hoped that the Qadhis might have evolved some new constructive proposal. I therefore withheld my draft, and opened the meeting by asking what new suggestions they had. They smilingly said that they had no new suggestions.

(ii) I then asked them to produce the map. They could not do so, and pretended that they had not deemed it important enough to search for seriously. They lightly passed it off as an unimportant exhibit upon which no reliance could be placed. I said that, nevertheless, I had repeatedly asked them to be good enough to table it, and I was most surprised that they had not done so. I also went so far as to suggest that they realised that its production would be embarrassing to them. That of course they heartily denied.

Note.—From separate information that had reached me I had the strong impression that the map had in fact been frantically searched for, and either not found (no doubt to their great relief), or found and withheld as being compromising.

(iii) I then tried the approach to the question of the controversial area, with the following arguments :—

(*a*) " Boundaries were mentioned four separate times in Article III of the Treaty, and on the fourth occasion references were made to acts to be prevented from either ' side ' of the boundary against people on the other ' side ' thereof.

(*b*) The whole wording of the Article clearly implied that the *status quo* was to be applied to a line, although perhaps not hitherto demarcated, for

(*c*) Mention of two ' sides ' of a boundary necessitated the existence of a dividing line, and it was a geometrical property of a line to have two ' sides.'

(*d*) Therefore where no line existed it could be argued that no *status quo* existed within the meaning of the Article.

It was acknowledged that there was an effective but as yet undemarcated *status quo* line between Husn Murad and eastern Beihan.

There was no such line eastwards thereafter, and it could be argued that the *status quo* did not apply there.

(*e*) But if they held that the *status quo* did apply there, then the line on Qadhi Ragheb's map (however unofficial), was an indicative factor ; and if that contention was rejected, still His Majesty's Government considered the ' 1914 north-east line ' as binding in respect of British activities."

(iv) Qadhi Ragheb tried unconvincingly to show that the words " sides " in Article III meant the two sides or parties who had entered into treaty relations ; and he was on the point of falling into the (from his point of view) contradictory position that the *status quo* did not apply east of Beihan, when he caught himself up and repeated the former accusations that we had taken Shabwa and Al 'Abr by force and without right. He also protested that the argument based on the map was fallacious and unacceptable.

* No. 196. † See No. 198.

(v) I asked him where Shabwa and Al 'Abr were. He said, " In the north-east of the Yemen." I said, " Surely Article III of the Treaty dealt with the southern frontier of the Yemen ? " Of course he had to answer that his description was relative and figurative, and that my point was frivolous. It was indeed one which I did not think it proper to press.

(vi) He went on to give a somewhat closer precision to the Yemeni case by stating that the matter under discussion was two-fold : firstly the delimitation of a *status quo* line, to which we had both agreed ; and secondly the question of Shabwa and Al 'Abr, upon which the Yemeni Government insisted on getting prior satisfaction. I protested that that prior condition was unreasonable and constituted the stumbling-block to agreement.

(vii) Qadhi then said clearly, emphatically and precisely that Shabwa and Al 'Abr " *must be surrendered* " to the Yemen before any further negotiation could proceed. I replied, as clearly, emphatically and precisely that His Majesty's Government had authorised me to declare that " *they would not agree to cede those places.*" " Then," he said, " there is no need for any further discussion."

(viii) I said that I should regret such a conclusion to our friendly talks most sincerely ; and I asked to be allowed to read a draft précis of my case that I had tentatively prepared for submission (if necessary) to the Secretary of State, and which I had translated for their benefit lest they might be in any misapprehension as to the points that I had raised and explained during the discussions, and so that they might have a clear picture to convey to the Imam.

(ix) Qadhi Ragheb declined to hear my statement, saying that it was no business of theirs what I might say to the Secretary of State, but that if I put in the statement they would take cognizance of it. I explained that that was not my intention, but merely to clear their minds, in a more precise way than by diffuse discussions, but still informally.

(x) Qadhi Ragheb then told Qadhi 'Abdel Karim to take pen and paper, and write to his dictation a summary of the position which the negotiations had reached, for submission to the Imam.

The summary, dictated before me, was briefly to the following effect :—

(*a*) that the matter under discussion was two-fold ; the incidents of Shabwa and Al 'Abr, and the delimitation of a *status quo* line ;

(*b*) that in the telegrams exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the Yemeni Government the Imam had made it very clear that the solution of the question of Shabwa and Al 'Abr was paramount ;

(*c*) therefore it was essential that Shabwa and Al 'Abr, which had been occupied by the Aden authorities in contravention of the Treaty, and which were the inalienable property of the Yemen, should be surrendered to the Yemeni Government before the question of the *status quo* line could be further considered.

(xi) Thereupon I said that I understood the position as described, and would be able to consider it during the next few days. But I was equally most anxious that they should clearly understand and remember all my arguments ; and I begged them to allow me to read (as I had heard *their* statement), the draft précis to which I had already referred. They protested that it was quite unnecessary ; but I felt myself obliged seriously to request them (short of insistence) to listen ; and at last they reluctantly consented, but as if it were a waste of time. Mr. Saleh Ja'far then read to them slowly the translation of the statement attached as Annexure " C " to these Notes.

(xii) At the end of the reading Qadhi Ragheb, who had been fidgeting and muttering, burst out with a loud and violent protest against my untruths, and my attempts to bring him into contempt and discredit, in connection with the map. He shouted that I had made a dead set at him out of bad-will and hatred, that I had slandered him, that my holding him to a casual and unofficial document was improper, deceitful, and ill-intended, and that he rejected utterly all my arguments and imputations.

I begged him to be calm and to remember my repeated admissions that the map was not official, but had been cited as a mere guide in the absence of any other documentary evidence as to a line in the region concerned. And I earnestly besought him to read my motives aright and to believe in my sincerity and goodwill. I appealed to Qadhi 'Abdel Karim to intervene to calm the old man's excitement ; but the more I begged the more infuriated Qadhi Ragheb became, until he suddenly turned quite beside himself and thumped the table, shrill with passion, and screaming abusive accusations at me at the top of his voice.

(xiii) It was quite impossible to continue our discussions, for it was abundantly clear that Qadhi Ragheb was for the moment not in his proper mind, and I knew him well enough to be certain that it would take him time to recover even his equanimity, apart from his usual friendly courtesy. I therefore took leave, abruptly preceded by Qadhi Ragheb ; but before leaving the room I turned back and begged Qadhi 'Abdel Karim privately to do his utmost to calm our host down. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim seemed ashamed by his colleague's outburst, and I thought that he would be able to pour oil on the troubled water, but I was mistaken, as the sequel showed. At the house entrance Qadhi Ragheb saw us out, stiff and pale with rage, and received my warm protestations of friendship and goodwill with stony decorum ; but the door slammed violently behind us before we had left the steps.

(xiv) Two hours after our parting I received an official and formal communication, signed jointly by the two Yemeni representatives, and bearing the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a translation of which is attached hereto as Annexure " D." My reply is at Annexure " E."

Note.—I have recorded this unpleasant incident at some length, because it will afford a picture of the difficulties inherent in these discussions. I was afraid that it might be impossible to continue them profitably so long as Qadhi Ragheb was retained as a delegate : his mental explosion had been too violent. Whether his indignation was in the least justified I can leave it to the papers to show. Nothing in the translation of my statement can be held to excuse it any more than the English words

and phrasing. I need hardly say that my own demeanour was throughout calm, conciliatory and courteous. As to the impropriety of Qadhi Ragheb's manner and language, and of the letter which he and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim have sent me, I can readily condone them, having regard to his advanced age, his uncertain health (he was suffering severely from lumbago during the meeting, but insisted on continuing), and his notoriously violent temper—and perhaps his shaky conscience and fear for his reputation.

15. *5th Meeting, Wednesday, 1st May*, 1940.—(i) Before describing the business of this meeting, I must report the sequel to the events of the last. I had the best reason to believe that immediately after Qadhi 'Abdel Karim had reluctantly signed the joint letter that formed Annexure " D " to these Notes, he reported the affair to the Prime Minister, Qadhi 'Abdullah el 'Amri. The next morning (30th April), Qadhi 'Abdullah spent an hour with Qadhi Ragheb, whom he sternly reproached for his behaviour, and he also expressed strong displeasure at the ill-considered, undiplomatic tone of the letter. Soon after the Prime Minister left Qadhi Ragheb, Qadhi 'Abdel Karim arrived and stayed with him for more than one hour. On his departure, Mr. Saleh Ja'far visited Qadhi Ragheb on business unconnected with the negotiations; but I had taken the opportunity to send with him for personal delivery my letter, that formed Annexure " C " to my preceding Notes. Qadhi Ragheb read it with care several times, and then sent me a warm and sincere oral message of regret and apology, and an assurance of his strong personal good-will. I was most relieved at this very satisfactory turn, and at the happy restoration of the Qadhi's temper and of our friendly relations; and at our subsequent talks the breach was positively healed. I have no doubt that this sudden and unexpected result was attributable to the Prime Minister's timely intervention.

(ii) After a more than usually light and pleasant exchange of social and meteorological chat, I opened proceedings with a proverb. We had before us a fertile field to till. They had brought their plough and yoke of oxen and I had brought mine and we had set to work. But in spite of all our skill our furrows had crossed and recrossed each other until they had become badly tangled and in the evening we had left out work botched and confused. That night Allah sent rain that soaked the earth and levelled all the conflicting furrows; and after a day's beneficient sunshine, the field was again ready for us to work upon anew, this time with sharper coulter, steadier oxen, and straighter eye.

They were delighted with the simple parable, and after Qadhi Ragheb had made me (in both me personal and my official capacity) a handsome, unconditional, warm,—one could almost say affectionaty —apology, he asked me to " teach and lead them both by the cleanness of my first furrow."

(iii) I said that out field was now the north-eastern region beyond Beihan, containing Shabwa and Al 'Abr. They had contended that the *status quo* applied there; for the sake of argument and for the moment I would accept that. Each party had said that the other had infringed the *status quo*. There were two obvious ways of infringement, both clearly specified in Article III of the Treaty—encroachment and interference. I had alleged that there had been infringement by them of the latter kind, by the Imam's letter to the Chiefs of the Sei'ar, Nahd, Karab and other tribes, and to " the Sheikhs, 'Aqils, and notables of the eastern tribes." They had alleged that there had been infringement by us of the former kind, by our occupation of Shabwa and Al 'Abr.

(iv) But we were not an International Court of Law to give judgment between the parties; nor indeed could we possibly decide jointly upon the rights of the two cases, because each of us was both plaintiff and also defendant. Since, therefore, we could not solve the tangle of right and wrong, we ought to turn aside from consideration of the incidents themselves and devote our whole energy to finding an agreed plan that would prevent any further occurrences and misunderstandings of the kind, a plan that would relieve them of suspicions that we had any intentions against the integrity of Yemeni territory, and that would satisfy us that the Yemeni Government would not again interfere in the affairs of Protectorate tribes.

(v) Such a plan, I suggested, would provide for a " further *status quo* line," beyond Beihan, the delineation of which would not prejudice Imamic claims in the Protectorate generally or as to Shabwa and Al 'Abr in particular. That line could most profitably, easily and effectively be drawn through the middle of the Ramlet es Sabatein. And that line was my first furrow.

(vi) The Qadhis received this statement with calm and polite courtesy. Qadhi Ragheb said that it was a moderate and honest proposal, sincerely evolved and clearly made. But before he commented upon it he wished to present a comprehensive picture of the position of the Imamate in relation with foreign acts in the Yemen during the centuries. He then entered upon a long dissertation on the subject, the drift of which will be too well known and anticipated by any student of Anglo-Yemeni affairs to need detailed record here. It may be very briefly summarised as follows :—

(*a*) There is inherent in the Imamate the Divine Right of spiritual and secular rule over the whole of the Yemen, in its wider signification.

(*b*) While there have been interludes during which, for one reason or another but usually by the pressure of superior foreign strength, parts of the Yemen have not been effectively ruled by the then reigning or titular Imam, these were incidental and fortuitous, and did not affect or prejudice the pervasive and continuous Divine Right. For this reason, the Imamate had never recognised any foreign dominion over any part of the Yemen, including the whole of the Aden Protectorate.

(*c*) The insistence by the Imam on his fundamental rights in the Protectorate, and the strictness of His Majesty's Government's instructions, led to the breakdown of the Clayton negotiations. Qadhi Ragheb had later been in correspondence with Sir Gilbert on the subject of a compromise when the latter's death had intervened. Afterwards Sir Stewart Symes' statesmanship had reopened the door for a satisfactory settlement; and still later the Treaty had been concluded by Sir Bernard Reilly on the basis of a " dilatory clause," a cunning device of Qadhi Ragheb's that really burked the issue but enabled a ***modus vivendi*** to be established.

(vii) Qadhi Ragheb went on to elaborate a concrete proposal. The said device provided for the maintenance of the *status quo*. It was a good and reasonable device, because Qadhi Ragheb, while not retreating from his position in regard to Imamate claims, did recognize and fully appreciate that His Majesty's Government had real obligations in respect of their special position in the Protectorate, and that it was in fact impossible for them to relinquish it to the Yemen. Similarly in the present controversy, he fully appreciated that we had certain legitimate needs to fulfil in the eastern Protectorate and the Hadhramaut, and it might be impossible for us, both morally and practically, to cede Shabwa and Al 'Abr to the Yemen.

(viii) For this reason Qadhi Ragheb proposed that there should be a complete return to the position in the regions of Shabwa and Al 'Abr as it had existed at the time of the Treaty. If I would agree to this in principle, then we could proceed to the elaboration of a scheme that would also provide for the precise determination, by a special Boundary Commission, of what the position was at that time and for its demarcation.

(ix) I asked Qadhi Ragheb whether, in view of the very precise oral and written demands that they had made at the previous meeting for the " surrender " of Shabwa and Al 'Abr, I was to understand that they had now modified their attitude and were suggesting, not surrender, but something less, in the shape of mere evacuation. The Qadhis replied that they had indeed receded from their former extreme demands, and that I had rightly understood their new proposal as described.

(x) I then said that I could not possibly agree in principle to a restoration of the former position in the area in dispute in the absence of a precise constructive plan, to be advanced by them in the first place, that would satisfy me that the proposal was practical and not harmful to our interests. For instance, in what area was the *status quo* to be restored? At the time of the Treaty we had not yet developed effective Qu'aiti control in the upper Hadhramaut to the stage which it had now reached. Were we to cancel all our arrangements in that respect, and let affairs drift back to their former unproductive and unsatisfactory state?

(xi) Quadhi Ragheb immediately said, " Certainly not. I fully recognize and appreciate that you are doing valuable work in the Hadhramaut, and that you cannot and ought not to be asked to relinquish it. The Yemeni Government has no wish to interfere with your control in the Hadhramaut nor to seek to establish its own influence or rule there. We intended only the restoration of the status quo in respect of Shabwa and Al 'Abr."

(xii) I asked Qadhi Ragheb what he meant by Shabwa and Al 'Abr. I sincerely appreciated his assurance in regard to the Hadhramaut; but Shabwa and Al 'Abr were an integral part of the Hadhramaut system. How did he propose to limit the area containing the two places, in which the *status quo* was to be restored? For instance, we might evacuate Al 'Abr; but if, in order to maintain our control of the Sei'ar tribe, we dug another well and built another fort in its vicinity, the Yemeni Government, from their own point of view, could logically complain that we had infringed the *status quo* once more. And, similarly, if we continued to maintain control, through the Qu'aiti Sultan, over Bal 'Ubeid villages in, say, the Wadi 'Arma, which we had effectively re-established since the Treaty, the Yemeni Government could make a like complaint. I added that they must realise that, from the Hadhramaut side, Shabwa and Al 'Ab. were not isolated places, but were links in a continuous chain of administrative and political control, from which it would be not only unpractical but positively harmful to separate them.

(xiii) Qadhi Ragheb here quickly said to Qadhi 'Abdel Karim, " Where is that list of tribes and villages you had with you? " Qadhi 'Abdel Karim replied that he had not got it with him; but " if necessary it could be prepared."

(xiv) Qadhi Ragheb then said that my query was very reasonable and deserved serious consideration. He thought that it was logical that limits should be set to the area of restoration of the *status quo*. And he shot a quick question at me: " Would I please say what places in the vicinity of Shabwa and Al 'Abr I considered were really essential to us for our administration in the Hadhramaut? " He repeated that the Yemeni Government had no wish to put any avoidable obstacles in the way of that administration.

(xv) I said that it was unreasonable to ask me to answer such a question. For instance, Al 'Abr was essential to the Qu'aiti control of the Sei'ar and to the protection of the upper Hadhramaut: if we relinquished Al 'Abr and other places round it, it would be tantamount to relinquishing much of our control over the Sei'ar. We would not have taken these places under our control if we had not considered it to be necessary.

(xvi) Qadhi 'Abdel Karim then asked pointedly whether I really meant that, whatever compromise we might reach about Al 'Abr, our control over the whole of the Sei'ar would nevertheless be insisted on and continued. I replied positively that that was so, drawing the analogy of nomad tribes elsewhere who were recognized by one Goverment as their subjects, and by the neighbouring Government as having grazing rights of access into the territory of the latter. I said that in such cases it was the practice to determine nationality in accordance with the locality of the principal area of the tribal settlement or concentration,—as, for instance, Beni 'Atieh were a Sa'udi tribe having rights of access into Trans-Jordan, and Beni Sakhr were a Trans-Jordan tribe having rights of access into Nejd, and so on. In the present case the Sei'ar were a Hadhramaut tribe in consideration of the presence of the principal settlements in Reidat es Sei'ar, 40 or 50 miles east of Al 'Abr; but they had rights of access into the Yemen. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim made a serious mental note of my statement.

(xvii) I asked Qadhi Ragheb to clarify his proposals for the restoration of the *status quo*, by means of a tentative draft agreement which I could take away and consider at quiet leisure. He

said that that would not be in accordance with diplomatic practice (*sic*), and declined to commit himself to anything in writing so long as I declined to accept his proposal in principle. And he branched off here into a repetition of the illustrations he had already given of his good-will and real willingness to compromise in a reasonable manner; and from here he drifted back into our illegal occupation of Shabwa and Al 'Abr. I countered again with the Imam's interference with the affairs of the Nahd and other tribes, and quickly brought the discussion back to equilibrium.

(xviii) Qadhi Ragheb willingly following, saying, " Let us leave the question of rights, and return to the old *status quo*; but don't agree to evacuate any place that you feel you *can't* give up in the interests of Hadhramaut security and control. Please explain to us your minimum requirements."

(xix) I replied that it was not for me to do so, but for them to formulate a detailed proposal. Qadhi Ragheb said, thoughtfully and almost to himself, that of course there ought to be clear guarantees for the inviolability of an evacuated area, but the Yemeni Government could not logically give guarantees in respect of Yemeni territory, any more than His Majesty's Government could accept a guarantee in respect of Protectorate territory. And that in any case no guarantee could be given or accepted save in respect of a limited and delimited area.

(xx) On this I pointed to the extreme difficulty, amounting almost to impossibility, of dividing Shabwa and Al 'Abr by any " evacuation boundary " from the lands and settlements to their east and south without upsetting not only the tribal organisations but also the constructive administrative control of the Hadhramaut, whereas there was a gratuitous boundary to their west and north in the Ramlet es Sabatein that would divide the whole bloc of the Hadhramaut system from the Yemeni administration in the Mareb-Jauf area.

(xxi) Here we stuck, the Qadhis very thoughtful at the practical difficulties that they saw arising from their recognition of the reasonableness of our position, yet apparently being honest in their desire to meet us; and nevertheless under clear orders, probably reinforced by sincere conviction, to get us out of Shabwa and Al 'Abr at all costs.

(xxii) They said that they must now report the whole situation completely to the Imam, who was the only authority who could decide what next step to take; and I should be informed about our next meeting as soon as they received their instructions.

Note.—It was a measure of Qadhi Ragheb's charming and complete change of attitude that when we left the meeting he not only saw us to the lower door as usual, but took me, with my hand in his, as far as his outer gate.

16. *6th Meeting, Tuesday, May 7th*, 1940.—(i) The last meeting had closed with the decision of the Qadhis to refer to the Imam for his instructions. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim had on the 2nd May gone to Wadi Dhaher where the Imam had been in residence since the 18th April, and laid the position before him. The Imam had written a strong letter to Qadhi Ragheb in his own hand, condemning his too accommodating conduct and insisting that Shabwa and Al 'Abr should not be limited by geographical bounds for the purpose of compromise, but that they should be understood to comprise the whole of the two districts with which they were connected. Qadhi Ragheb had expressed to Mr. Saleh Ja'far privately on the 3rd May his keen personal disappointment at the Imam's intransigeance, and had said that he believed Qadhi 'Abdel Karim to have misrepresented the position to the Imam. He, Qadhi Ragheb, would do his utmost to put the matter in the proper light.

(ii) The present meeting opened with a statement by Qadhi 'Abdel Karim of the Imam's decision on the position reached at the last meeting. It was to be clearly understood that Al 'Abr comprised and included the Sei'ar tribe, and that Shabwa comprised and included the Karab tribe. The Imam required a return to the position as at the time of the Treaty, not only in respect of the two places, but also completely in respect of the tribal areas concerned. In other words, if we had not administered Al 'Abr and the Sei'ar tribe at the time of the Treaty we should relinquish the administration of them now; and similarly in regard to Shabwa and the Karab tribe.

(iii) In reply to my request for a more explicit statement in regard to the Karab tribe, Qadhi 'Abdel Karim said that the Karab tribe included the Bal 'Ubeid. I told him that he had got the sequence wrong, since the Karab, together with other sections, were part of the Bal 'Ubeid confederation. Did he really mean that our relinquishment of control of Shabwa was to include also the relinquishment of control of the whole of the Bal 'Ubeid confederation?

(iv) He replied that whatever might be my interpretation of the relations between the Karab and the Bal 'Ubeid the Imam considered the Bal 'Ubeid as part of the Karab, and in demanding our relinquishment of control over Shabwa and the Karab, he intended it to include also the Bal 'Ubeid.

(v) I asked him why, therefore, he did not demand equally our withdrawal from the Nahd tribal area, which we had not had under our control at the time of the Treaty. He replied that the Imam was ready to set a reasonable limit to his demands, in a manner to permit the Aden authorities to retain control of the Nahd tribe.

(vi) In reply to my repeated insistence on exact interpretation, lest any misunderstanding should remain, the Qadhis reiterated that the terms Shabwa and Al 'Abr must be understood to mean respectively Shabwa and the whole tribal area of the Karab and Bal 'Ubeid, and Al 'Abr and the whole tribal area of the Sei'ar. What we effectively administered at the time of the Treaty we might continue to administer: what we had not effectively administered we must relinquish.

(vii) I said that having now got an unmistakably exact picture of the Imam's requirements I must regretfully, but equally exactly, decline to entertain them. It was a positive requirement of His Majesty's Government that our control over the said tribes should remain intact. And I expressed

my disappointment that there had been any recession on the part of the Yemeni representatives from their suggestion at the last meeting in respect of the *places* Shabwa and Al 'Abr, to their present demands in respect of wide and undefined tribal territory also.

(viii) The Qadhis here pretended that the whole case of the Yemeni Government from the outset had centered round the Sei'ar and Karab tribes; but I protested that that was not so, and that until the very last meeting their case had been propounded in terms of Shabwa and Al 'Abr alone.

(ix) Qadhi 'Abdel Karim then began to refer to our alleged infringement of the *status quo* in the Wadha'iya area of the Subeihi country since the Treaty; but Qadhi Ragheb at once brought him back to first principles in the shape of Shabwa and Al 'Abr, saying that some decision must first be reached on this, and that details such as those of Wadha'iya, Wadi Shurjan, Masabein, etc., would be settled by the Boundary Commission that was to be appointed.

(x) I pressed the Qadhis to declare whether the Imam's present requirements were really his last word. They said that I must so understand them. I said that in that case it seemed that no further progress could be made, since I could not possibly concede the relinquishment of our control over the Sei'ar and Bal 'Ubeid tribes. I added that it would be most unfortunate if I should have to report this deadlock to the Secretary of State with the risk that it might lead to my withdrawal. And as a further resource, and to avoid such an unfortunate ending to our negotiations, I suggested for their careful consideration the combination of a " *status quo* line " north-eastwards from Beihan that would leave Shabwa and Al 'Abr inside the Protectorate, with an exchange of notes in qualification of our agreement to that effect, by which His Majesty's Government would recognize the reservation by the Yemeni Government of their claims to rights in those two places. I read to the Qadhis a tentative draft that I had prepared in Arabic (appended as Annexure " F ") and which I explained was only a personal draft of my own and could not be adopted without reference to London. They took a copy of my draft at my dictation, and promised to consider it in consultation with the Imam.

(xi) In taking note of it they asked me whether it would have the effect of placing Shabwa and Al 'Abr in the same position as the rest of the Protectorate during the validity of the Treaty only. I assured them that that was my intention. I also made it very clear that it was not any rights of the Yemeni Government anywhere that I proposed should be recognised, but only their claims to possess and preserve such rights.

(xii) At this point Qadhi 'Abdel Karim leaned across the table and asked Qadhi Ragheb whether he should now bring forward " the other claims (or perhaps proposals) of the Government." Qadhi Ragheb said, " No, no. We will deal with the present question only." My impression was that they were referring to matters concerning Wadi Merkha, which had not hitherto been specifically mentioned during our discussions, but in regard to which I believed the Yemeni Government to have recently received tales of alleged sinister intrigues by one of the Aden Political Officers.

17. *7th Meeting, Wednesday, 15th May*, 1940.—(i) Qadhi Ragheb produced and read aloud the written instructions that he and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim had received from the Imam, relating to the latest proposal which I had made at the end of the last meeting by which Shabwa and Al 'Abr would be left in our control but made the subject of an exchange of notes in reservation of Imamic claims thereto. Qadhi Ragheb invited me to take a copy of the document, which I subsequently did and returned him the original. A translation of it is attached hereto as Annexure " G."

(ii) I asked to be excused from discussing the instructions immediately at that time, and said that I would consider them most carefully and let the Qadhis know at an early date whether I could accept them as a basis for any further negotiations.

(iii) Upon first reading, the instructions appeared to have the following effect:—

(*a*) to reject my latest proposals;

(*b*) to link Al 'Abr and Shabwa with the Sei'ar and Karab tribes respectively, and

(*c*) to require me to agree to " remove the encroachment into the (Yemeni) Kingdom by restoring the Imam's country to him."

It was significant to see the gleeful self-satisfaction with which the Qadhis produced this document. I think they felt that they had won that round, while still leaving me the ability to stay in the ring. In fact, save for the apparent intransigeance of its matter, the letter was couched in the most conciliatory and friendly terms, and it exhorted the Qadhis to continue the discussions in the best interests of constructive friendship between the two Governments.

18. *8th Meeting, Monday, 10th June*, 1940.—(i) Before recording the conversations at this meeting, it is necessary briefly to describe events during the long interval since the last on the 15th May, at which had been formally read to me the Imam's decision, dated the 12th May, rejecting my latest proposal for compromise, and insisting on the restoration of the Sei'ar and Karab tribes as well as Shabwa and Al 'Abr to the Yemeni administration.

(ii) On the 11th May I had received secret information that the Imam had two days before telegraphed an appeal to H.M. the King, to the 'Iraqi Regent, and to Ibn Sa'ud, protesting against my attitude during negotiations. On the 12th May I sent a telegram to the Secretary of State (Annexure " H "*) with a copy to the Governor of Aden, expressing my conviction that the Imam was stiffening his resistance to a reasonable solution because of his belief that His Majesty's Government were in difficulties owing to recent German successes, and recommending that my latest proposals should be final.

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* *See* No. 199.

(iii) On the 16th May I had a long informal talk with Qadhi Ragheb, in the course of which I said that I had had to refer to London, in view of the impasse that we seemed to have reached. The Qadhi assured me that he personally was sincerely anxious that we should reach a compromise that would be satisfactory to both parties; and he felt confident that he would be able to move the Imam from his intransigeant attitude about the Sei'ar and Karab tribes.

(iv) On the 21st May I received the most reliable information that Qadhi Ragheb had, a day or two before, written to the Imam (still then at his country residence at Wadi Dhaher), suggesting to him that I was being unnecessarily "difficile," and advising him to stiffen his attitude still further against me. The Imam had consulted with the Chief Minister, Qadhi 'Abdullah el 'Amri, and had rejected Qadhi Ragheb's advice, with expressions of trust in Great Britain. I was also informed that in reply to an Italian enquiry as to his intentions in the event of Italy's entry into the war against the Allies, the Imam had asserted his strict neutrality and his determination to honour his Treaties with his neighbours.

(v) This clarification of the Imam's feelings (a matter for speculation at the most peaceful of times), and the fact that the delay in the replies to his appeals to Baghdad and London suggested that consultations were proceeding between the 'Iraqi and His Majesty's Governments, decided me to send an up-to-date appreciation of the position of the negotiations to the Secretary of State (Annexure "I"*). This I did on the 23rd May, but the message was unavoidably delayed at the San'a telegraph office until the 25th May, when it was despatched to the Governor of Aden for onward transmission.

(vi) From that date the time had been one of continued waiting. In the meanwhile, Qadhi 'Abdel Karim had been taken ill with a severe intestinal disorder on the day after our last meeting; and Qadhi Ragheb also took to his bed on the 18th May with a very sharp attack of piles, which kept him immobilised until the 10th June. The Imam, whose absence at his residence at Wadi Dhaher since the 18th April had also made for delay in the conduct of the negotiations, returned to San'a on the 27th May.

(vii) On the 4th June I received from the Governor of Aden the text of H.M. the King's reply to the Imam's appeal of the 9th May: on the following day arrived the Secretary of State's instructions contained in his telegram No. 421† and which appeared to have been given before the receipt of my "appreciation" of the 25th May; and on the 6th June I received the Secretary of State's latest instructions contained in his telegram No. 243 (Annexure "J"‡) and at once communicated to Qadhi Ragheb my readiness to resume our discussions as soon as he and his colleague should be well enough to do so. On the 10th June I received the expected invitation from Qadhi Ragheb for that afternoon, and when I attended at his house I found him alone (having only then risen from his bed for the first time since his painful and exhausting illness), and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim being still too unwell to join us. In fact Qadhi Ragheb said that that was just as well, because we should be able to conduct our business more freely and frankly without him.

(viii) Qadhi Ragheb began by referring to the telegraphic messages that had been exchanged between the Imam and His Majesty the King, and expressed deep satisfaction at the encouraging and conciliatory tone of His Majesty's communication. I said that I had received a copy of that, but that I did not know the precise terms of the Imam's telegram. The Qadhi gave me the gist of it. There was no mention of the copies to Baghdad and Riyadh.

(ix) He went on to say that now that His Majesty had so graciously consented to a restoration of the *status quo* by the removal of the encroachments [*sic*] the principal obstacle to complete accord had been happily removed, and we could proceed to the conclusion of a settlement; and he asked me the nature of the instructions that I had received and which had been referred to in His Majesty's message.

(x) I replied that I was now authorised to agree in principle to the neutralisation of Shabwa and Al 'Abr and their close environs. At the same time and without entering again upon old controversies, I wished to make it quite clear that in offering that concession to the Imam's susceptibilities in a generous spirit of conciliation His Majesty's Government in no wise thereby acknowledged that any improper encroachment had occurred. That being made plain, I was eagerly ready to discuss with the Qadhi the question of the limits within which neutralisation would be operative.

(xi) He hedged at this, and said that the Imam was so stubbornly insistent upon his inalienable rights that it would be impossible to persuade him to accept a geographical limitation that did not take account of tribal considerations. The Yemeni Government had complete lists of tribal social and geographical particulars relating to that area; and if I insisted on the definition of boundaries to the areas to be neutralised I should find—even if the Imam would agree— that I had made even more difficulties for the Aden authorities in the future. He proposed that he and I should confine ourselves to an agreement that "the Sei'ar and Karab tribes should be neutralised," and that the precise limits of the area thus involved should be determined later by the Boundary Commission, which would investigate the tribal circumstances on the spot.

(xii) I replied that I could not agree to that, not only because my instructions prevented me from allowing the disposal of the said tribes to be brought into question at all, but because his proposal would be tantamount to an agreement to transfer the task of reaching an agreement to other persons, less qualified than ourselves to represent our respective Governments "at first instance." In my opinion the necessities of the case demanded that he and I should first decide in principle upon the boundaries of the areas to be neutralised, and that the function of the Boundary Commission would be merely the execution of our agreement by demarcation of these boundaries on the ground, with any such minor rectifications as they might find necessary. As to the areas to be neutralised, they must be geographical and not tribal by definition, for His Majesty's Government's concession to the Imam would be territorial and not tribal; and it was obviously desirable that its limits should be

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* See No. 200. † 78515/40 [No. 3]: not printed. ‡ No. 203.

clearly defined in the first place by agreement between us. The solution on this basis was an arbitrary territorial solution which had the publicity value (from the Imam's point of view) of showing the two controversial places Shabwa and Al 'Abr to have been evacuated by us. To drag in tribal factors or to mention tribal names would merely complicate the issue.

(xiii) After long further arguments as to the relative merits of the two alternative methods, Qadhi Ragheb suddenly agreed that he would represent to the Imam, with all the persuasion he could command, the wisdom of adopting mine; though he added that he still felt his own to be more likely to suit the necessities of the situation. He protested that in fact he fully agreed with me, but "I would understand that the Imam had a peculiar mental twist over this affair; and we must suit our methods to his mind." He then more precisely defined our oral agreement, "that we should prescribe in respect of Shabwa and its environs and Al 'Abr and its environs the areas which should be neutralised, and that the boundaries of those areas should be demarcated on the ground by a Boundary Commission to be appointed." He said he would represent that formula to the Imam. I agreed that it was acceptable, and expressed my satisfaction at his desire and ability to persuade the Imam to accept it.

19. *Ninth Meeting, Tuesday, 18th June.*—(i) On the day before, Mr. Saleh Ja'far had received from Qadhi Ragheb a letter saying that he and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim were now fit to resume discussion, and inviting me to meet them. He added that the case "was now quite easy, since His Majesty King George had graciously been pleased to assure his sincere friend the Imam of the restoration of his proprietary rights without prejudice to the *status quo* referred to in the Treaty." And he hoped that I would facilitate an early settlement because neither he nor his colleague was in good health. He was waiting for the first opportunity to undergo an operation for piles, and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim was anxious to go out to the neighbouring town of Raudha to convalesce after his illness.

(ii) Qadhi Ragheb opened proceedings with an introductory speech, which too soon degenerated into the well-known diatribes against the Aden Government. I thought we had finished with all that, and found it difficult to remain patient; but at last he stopped and came to the point. This was that the Imam had (as it were in spite of all his injuries at Aden's hands) agreed to the restoration of the *status quo* at Shabwa and Al 'Abr and their environs (not, be it noted, the neutralisation which we had tentatively agreed upon at our last meeting); and had authorised the Qadhis to describe what those environs were to be. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim then produced and read a statement (a translated note of which is attached as Annexure "K"), which purported to be of the boundaries of the Bal 'Ubeid and Karab tribal areas on the one hand, and of the Sei'ar tribal area on the other. In short, the Imam proposed that the position in respect of all these areas, including Shabwa and Al 'Abr, should be restored completely to that at the time of the Treaty.

(iii) In order to clarify the whole implication of this proposal I said that I understood their intention to be that the restoration of the *status quo* in that whole region would involve our withdrawal from it because we were not administering it at the time of the Treaty. Nevertheless the Imam claimed continuous proprietary rights in it, whether exercised or not, but in his contention inherent in the nature of the *status quo*. Would the Imam, or perhaps his successor, later enter or attempt to administer the region by virtue of that contention? What guarantee could be given that he would not do so? This doubt, I said, illustrated the difference between neutralisation and a restoration of the *status quo*.

(iv) I could obtain no satisfactory answer, Qadhi Ragheb merely protesting that the Imam had no intentions hostile to the interests of His Majesty's Government.

(v) I asked whether some such guarantee would not properly be included in the Agreement or Exchange of Notes by which we were to record the settlement which we should later reach. Qadhi Ragheb hotly replied that it was quite inappropriate that *any* document should be prepared and executed by us. The position was abundantly clear: the Aden Government had carried out a violent encroachment on Yemeni territory and an unwarranted violation of the *status quo*: that territory must be evacuated and that infringement must be corrected: it was quite beyond necessity to record any kind of written agreement to that effect: the very fact of restoration would be sufficient record of its effect.

(vi) I replied that I greatly regretted that such a fundamental misunderstanding of His Majesty's Government's position still remained in the Qadhis' minds. This position was briefly as follows:—

(*a*) The Imam claimed that we had illegally seized Yemeni territory covered by the *status quo* arrangement. His Majesty's Government could not admit that claim.

(*b*) His Majesty's Government claimed that the territory in question was properly within the Aden Protectorate and not subject to the limitations of the *status quo* arrangement; and that nothing done by them there since the Treaty had in any way conflicted with the undertakings in the Treaty to maintain the *status quo*. The Imam for his part could not admit that contention.

(*c*) Since the Imam's recent telegraphic exchanges with His Majesty King George, His Majesty's Government had in deference to the Imam's susceptibilities and for the sake of goodwill agreed to forego certain of their rights in the region by offering the neutralisation of Shabwa and Al 'Abr and their close environs. His Majesty's Government did not admit that the Sei'ar, Karab and Bal 'Ubeid tribal areas were in question; and for these reasons I must decline to agree to the Qadhis' proposal that these areas should be restored to the position in which they were at the time of the Treaty, both because I was not empowered to discuss the disposal of these tribes, and because it was not admitted that the *status quo* had applied to those areas. Here the Qadhis said that the areas of which they had given me the boundaries were not the tribal areas, but represented the "environs of Shabwa and Al 'Abr." But, as I have stated, these boundaries enclose the whole of the tribal areas concerned.

(vii) I said that in accordance with His Majesty's Government's latest conciliatory offer I was authorised to propose the neutralisation of the two places and of small areas surrounding them. Asked by the Qadhis to make a suggestion as to the areas to be included, I proposed as follows, and drew a rough sketch map to illustrate the proposal :—

> " The village of Shabwa and an area surrounding it within a triangle formed of straight lines joining ABU SHADD, KHASHM MUSAIHIB and NASR QIBLI ; and the well of Al 'Abr and an area surrounding it within a triangle formed of straight lines joining the western peak of MISA'IR, the southern peak of BA'RURA and the south-western peak of HADHI."
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> (These places are to be found on Philby's map of 1936 ; the triangles—as I explained to Qadhi 'Abdel Karim in reply to his question—have sides about 20 to 25 kms. long.)

(viii) I said that the detail of this proposal was my personal suggestion and was not authoritative, and that I had made it in this form because it was simpler and more satisfactory to define the areas by known and recognisable physical features than vaguely, as bounded *e.g.* by the circumference of a circle of given radius.

(ix) Qadhi Ragheb asked me to say clearly whether the triangles represented areas within which the Aden authorities and the Yemeni Government would both forego right of entry and right of administration. I said that that was so.

(x) Qadhi Ragheb then asked me whether he was to understand that all the area round and about the triangles was to be always accessible to the Aden authorities, and not to the Yemeni Government. I said that that was so.

(xi) Qadhi Ragheb—seething with indignation—said, " These, then, are the terms dictated by you which His Majesty the Imam is to accept ? "

(xii) I begged him not to put so wrong and unhappy a construction on what was in effect a calm and conciliatory proposal by His Majesty's Government. Qadhi 'Abdel Karim also reasoned with him and said that I was doing my duty in a proper manner by putting forward a proposal, which it was for the Imam to reject or to accept. There was no question of dictated terms.

(xiii) Qadhi Ragheb said that he would lay my proposal before the Imam for his decision. But he was fumingly indignant, and I was quite sure that the proposal would be rejected, not at all because of the size of the area suggested, but because of the persistent and ineradicable conviction in their minds (in spite of every argument and persuasion that I had been able to devise) that by occupying these regions we had in fact invaded the Yemen and wilfully and maliciously usurped the Imam's Rights, which, as I have elsewhere explained, are Divine.

(xiv) Nothing will budge the Yemeni Government from that attitude, which constitutes the fundamental difference between them and His Majesty's Government. It is for this reason that no compromise can be expected from their side. From their point of view, any half-way step forward on our part is merely the thief's grudging and insincere restoration of the least part of his loot. They are quite unable to understand and believe in the honesty of our claim to the controversial territory as far as the " north-east line," or of the generosity of our offer to forego part of our rights in the region. As Qadhi Ragheb said at one point during this discussion, " It may rightly be said that restoration by an aggressor is the proper course of honour." It is perhaps hardly necessary for me to repeat that the successive reverses suffered by the Allies during recent weeks have done nothing to encourage the Imam to follow a more reasonable course in these negotiations.

20. *10th Meeting, Saturday, 22nd June, 1940.*—(i) Qadhi Ragheb said that my latest proposals for the neutralisation of triangular areas surrounding Shabwa and Al 'Abr respectively had been laid before the Imam with their full oral explanations ; and they had now received the Imam's considered instructions in the matter, which they would read. At my request they then handed me the original so that I could take a copy and translation of it ; this translation is attached hereto as Annexure " L ". I returned the original (which was in the Imam's own handwriting) to Qadhi Ragheb on the same day.

(ii) I said that although the Imam's instructions could not well have been more exact or less equivocal in rejection of my solution or indeed of any solution short of complete restoration of the Sei'ar and Karab tribes to the Yemen, yet there was still one that I had been thinking of since, at the last meeting, Qadhi Ragheb had asked me what would be the status of the territory lying round and between the proposed triangles. Would the Qadhis consider this solution ? It was that instead of isolating two separate little areas as previously suggested, we might neutralise one single larger quadrilateral area which would include Shabwa and Al 'Abr and would have its base on a line drawn north-east from Beihan el Qasab into the Rub' el Khali. I showed the Qadhis on the map how this proposal would affect the controversial territory, and said that I had prepared a detailed description of it for discussion.

(iii) The Qadhis regretted that having regard to the very precise and uncompromising orders they had now received from the Imam in the document handed to me, they felt that they could not properly recede from the position he had so clearly laid down. But there were elements in my suggestion that they had themselves considered together ; and they advised that if I wished the Imam to take cognizance of it I might submit it direct to him.

(iv) I was unable to get them to say whether in their opinion there was *any* chance of the proposal succeeding ; but from their demeanour, and from their having already allegedly had something of the kind in mind (which they said they had not laid before the Imam), I received the impression that there might still be a possibility that the Imam might agree to their discussing such a proposal with me. Moreover, while I was taking leave of Qadhi Ragheb after the meeting, Mr. Saleh Ja'far led Qadhi 'Abdel Karim aside and asked him whether he really thought the Imam would be insensitive to any further appeal of the kind suggested : the Qadhi replied that he thought not, and that I should be well advised to try it.

I therefore decided to address the Imam. A copy of my letter is attached as Annexure " M." It was despatched through Qadhi Ragheb on the 23rd June. The Imam's reply, dated the 27th June, is attached as Annexure " N."

21. With the receipt of the Imam's quite uncompromising letter, which not only repeated his strict demands for complete restitution but also pointedly ignored both my invitation for a gesture of concession and my offer to clear up possible uncertainties or misunderstandings in personal audience, I felt that I had reached the end of my resources for honourable settlement. But before committing myself to a definite report to Your Lordship I took the precaution of assuring myself, in a private interview with Qadhi Ragheb on the 28th June, that nothing further could usefully be attempted.

22. In the first place, Qadhi Ragheb resolved a faint doubt that still remained in my mind, from phrases that had been used both by him and by the Imam, that His Majesty the King's telegram to San'a of the 2nd June might have been mistranslated and misunderstood in a manner to give the Imam too optimistic a picture of the nature of His Majesty's intervention. That, I ascertained, had not occurred. Then the Qadhi, in reply to my direct question, satisfied me that the Imam's letter really represented his final word, and that no further approach by me either by letter or in person would be successful, or even desirable in the Imam's present state of mind. He made no mention of the Imam's telegraphic appeal to His Majesty the King of the 25th June, which had been made and despatched between the times of my last offer (Annexure " M ") and of the Imam's reply (Annexure " N ") ; and I knew nothing of the existence of that appeal until the 19th July, when I obtained the text of the reply of His Majesty. Finally, the Qadhi (as if to show his own personal disappointment and to hold out a straw for me to clutch), pretended still to have some hope that if I would agree to the restoration of the *status quo* in the tribal areas concerned and to the early appointment of the Boundary Commission to demarcate the limits of the area of that restoration, he would be able to persuade (or as I supposed, to hoodwink) his master into acceptance of the actual application of the agreement to a much smaller area than he had hitherto insisted upon. Qadhi Ragheb's pretence was, however, so obviously insincere, besides being for a variety of reasons untenable as a basis for further discussion (*cf.* paragraph 18, Sections (xi) and (xii), that I gave him no encouragement in it, nor did I even consider it worthy of mention in the telegraphic report that I sent to Your Lordship through the Governor of Aden on the 29th June.

23. Having despatched that report (Annexure " O "*), in which I recommended that I should be wasting my time in making any further attempts to persuade the Imam to relax his adamant attitude, I did not nevertheless exclude from my mind the possibility of finding an opportunity to bring more moderate advice to bear upon the Imam through the balanced medium of the Prime Minister, Qadhi 'Abdullah al 'Amri. That opportunity arose on the 11th July, when I had occasion to convey to the Prime Minister the favourable answer to an enquiry that he had recently asked me to make with the Governor of Aden as to the continuance of trade facilities between Aden and the Yemen. Since it would have been impolitic of me personally to have discussed with the Prime Minister matters connected with the negotiations, which had been entrusted specifically to his jealous rival, Qadhi Ragheb, I sent the message with my assistant, Mr. Saleh Ja'far, with orders to try and persuade Qadhi 'Abdullah to intervene with the Imam, using as a basis for argument a somewhat enlarged version of the contents of paragraph 2 of Sir Bernard Reilly's recommendations, contained in his telegram No. 312 of the 3rd July† to Your Lordship. I was pleased to hear that Qadhi 'Abdullah had readily agreed to approach the Imam, provided that I would also try again to win Qadhi Ragheb over. I learned subsequently that he had in fact done so, advising that neutralisation should be accepted in principle as a temporary arrangement, but that he had been unable to obtain the Imam's agreement, in the face of Qadhi Ragheb's contrary advice that it would be better to fall in with the latest suggestion by His Majesty the King that the negotiations should be suspended *sine die*.

24. Giving the Prime Minister a slight start (for he went back to Wadi Dhaher to resume attendance on the Imam on the same day of Mr. Saleh Ja'far's conversation with him), I invited Qadhi Ragheb to tea two days later, and by the device of a personal appeal as from Sir Bernard Reilly, for whom he has for long professed to have a high regard and strong personal affection, I succeeded in obtaining his promise also to try and move the Imam to change his mind.

25. I myself had an audience of the Imam on the 18th July upon another matter, and was so very cordially received, in an atmosphere of genial informality, that (although I was prevented by circumstances from mentioning the matter of the negotiations), I felt that both the Ministers had probably been able to fulfil their promises to me with some success. In the event, however, it proved that Qadhi Ragheb had not ; for when, having received Your Lordship's instructions to withdraw, I visited Qadhi Ragheb on the 21st July to sound him as to the effect on the Imam of the latest telegram from His Majesty the King and to make preliminary arrangements for my final audience, he admitted that he had not done so, and also confirmed that my audience would be the occasion of my taking my final leave of the Imam, implying that it was not to be expected that he would change his mind at the last minute.

26. I was received by the Imam in the somewhat informal atmosphere of his summer Diwan at Wadi Dhaher on the 27th July, and his first question to me—as to the route of my departure—dispelled my remaining doubt whether he might not at the very last moment relent. I offered to read to him the brief speech that I had prepared, embodying the formal communication from His Majesty's Government that I had been instructed by Your Lordship to make to him (Annexure " P "). He preferred, however, to read it to himself, and did so carefully and quietly. He then turned to me and expressed his keen disappointment that matters had reached this pass. He said that he maintained the justice of his position and would maintain it to the last ; and that he would never despair of obtaining his rights from His Majesty's Government. His attitude was so firm that no good purpose could possibly have then been served by my entering upon an argument with him, in especial consideration of the surprisingly mild and calm manner in which he received His Majesty's Government's

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* See No. 206. † See No. 207.

message. I had been prepared for a stormy interview, with some repetition of the reproaches that had been made so often and so warmly in his written communications; but in the event his manner was quiet, friendly and acquiescent—in the fact of the impasse—though not of course in the British acts that he believes to have produced it.

Our talk was short, and, on the subject of the negotiations, generalised. But when upon finally taking leave I asked the proper formal question of politeness whether there was anything I could do for him at my destination or elsewhere, he laughed gaily and, patting my hand, replied, "Nothing, God keep you, except to persuade your Government that my cause is just!"

My information is that after my departure the Imam had a short private consultation with the Prime Minister and the Chief Secretary, and expressed himself as very disappointed that no settlement had been reached; and he ended the discussion by saying, "God will help us, and—God help Ragheb."

IV. Observations.

27. I now turn to my conclusions of the reasons for the failure of the negotiations. At the outset it has seemed, both in Aden Political circles and I confess to myself, that there was little prospect of obtaining the Imam's agreement to the proposals comprised in the instructions conveyed to me in Colonial Office telegrams Nos. 90 and 91 of the 16th March (Annexures "Q"* and "R"†). Yet these terms must be offered and the arguments underlying them firmly pressed, because until I should myself be personally satisfied that they were in fact unwelcome to the Imam, I could not rely upon the unanimous advice given to me in Aden that they would be so.

28. I therefore advanced the preliminary arguments and proposals embodied in my instructions clearly, persuasively and patiently, being strengthened in my purpose by the sincere conviction, that grew daily as I proceeded, that the case I had to present was right and just. It was in the course of this presentation, and before I was yet satisfied that it must fail, that I was constrained to reject the Qadhis' vague proposals for neutralisation in principle, made so early in our discussions as during the second meeting (paragraph 12, section ix), and later at the third meeting (paragraph 13, section viii). Whether it might have been possible to have followed up those early suggestions to a solution acceptable to His Majesty's Government is a question that may validly be asked; but at that stage before my own case was complete I could not agree to consider them. However that may be, I am sure that even if at that time it had been proper for me to entertain the Qadhis' proposals, the discussion for definition of the limits of a neutralised zone must inevitably have led sooner or later to the crucial question and answer recorded in paragraph 15, section xiv, relating to future control over the Sei'ar and Karab tribes. From the time when I made the requirements of His Majesty's Government clear in that respect and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim conveyed the sense of them to the Imam, the hope of being able to agree upon neutralisation of *any* limited area, whether small or large, round Shabwa and Al 'Abr, but excluding the tribes, became remote.

29. It was a requirement of my instructions that the undertaking which would effect the purpose of neutralisation would be given unilaterally by His Majesty's Government, since no Yemeni guarantee could be accepted in respect of territory which was not acknowledged as being within the Yemen; and it was supposed that the Yemeni Government would, while not necessarily accepting the "1914 north-east line," be expected to observe it in practice as a matter of ordinary neighbourly behaviour. But it became clear very early in the negotiations that the Yemeni rejection of our claim to have acted at Shabwa and Al 'Abr as of right was so fundamental and so strong that no unilateral guarantee by us could possibly be accepted by them. As will be seen, Qadhi Ragheb's first specific proposal was that there should be a return by both parties to the *status quo* in the disputed region, a proposal that I could not at that time entertain, for reasons already explained. And when the question of the control of the tribal areas concerned arose, it was obvious that the possibility of a unilateral arrangement based on the premiss of our proper occupation of the territory, and on an expectation that the Imam would acquiesce in a neighbourly manner in our control of the tribal areas (other than Shabwa and Al 'Abr) south of the "1914 north-east line" had receded indefinitely.

30. In the meantime the effect upon the Imam's mind of the successful German occupation of Norway became progressively strengthened by later Allied reverses in the Low Countries and in France, by the difficulties caused by the entry of Italy into the war on Germany's side, by the spectacular fall of Paris and by the French capitulation. Britain was in trouble and could be squeezed:—admitted that Italy's position might very well be improved by Britain's embarrassments and that there was a real danger to the Yemen from an Italian success, nevertheless let the Imam not lose this unique opportunity of benefitting from Britain's momentary weakness, and Allah would look after the future.

31. It has been frequently suggested to me that the Italian Mission at San'a have continually been working on the Imam's feelings and pride to prevent a satisfactory compromise in these negotiations. I have no positive evidence that that has happened, however likely it might be; nor would it have been necessary, for the Imam's own implacable nursing of his grievances against the Aden Administration, constantly encouraged by Qadhi Ragheb, coupled with his blind conceit in what I have described as his Divine Right, and his clear impression of British embarrassments have been quite enough to cause his present stubbornness. Moreover I have latterly received intelligence, conveyed to me by a very important Yemeni personage (who is at present out of favour at the Palace and is bitterly opposed to the Crown Prince, and to the Italians who recently exposed his activities to the Imam), that earlier in the year the Imam approached the head of the German Government with suggestions for the establishment of friendly contacts, and received lately from Berlin a most cordial reply, assuring him that the whole of his kingdom would in due course be restored to him, including those parts of it now occupied by usurping foreign Powers. It may be imagined how such an encouragement would impose upon the Imam's credulity in his present mood and in present circumstances. Nor did an unfortunate frontier incident on the Subeihi border early in June, in

* No. 194. † No. 195.

which the Imam was firmly persuaded of British bad faith, do anything to ease the situation. In fine, I suppose that my negotiations, difficult enough in themselves in normal times, could hardly have fallen into so unfortunate a period as between April and July in this year.

32. Yet in spite of all these factors I believe that some less completely unsatisfactory result could have been achieved had the attitude of Qadhi Ragheb been more helpful towards compromise. In saying this I risk seeming to be ungenerous; but I cannot now in retrospect ignore the cumulative intelligence that I have since received from a number of independent and reliable sources that he had in fact been the very mainspring of the Imam's intransigeance. Qadhi Ragheb has the suave and charming manners of the Old Turk diplomat; but he is as lacking in sincerity as the most cunning of them, and I place no reliance whatever in his frequent protestations of friendship for Great Britain or of sympathy for British aims. Nor is there necessarily any inconsistency between this view and the Qadhi's expressions of regret described in paragraph 16, section (i), which are sufficiently explained by the supposition that he had realised that he had gone too far in the previous meeting in his efforts to make amends for earlier indiscretions, and wished to re-adjust himself to the Imam's less pliant mood, which had evidently been actuated by Qadhi 'Abdel Karim's report.

33. I believe that the Imam's acute sense of grievance against Aden, and particularly against the "young ambitious Political Officers" there has been directly due to the Qadhi's continual suggestion. No one, having heard Qadhi Ragheb's diatribes against Aden, could fail to be struck by the identity both of the matter and of the manner of his complaints with the phraseology of the Imam's letters (especially of his last to me) of his telegram of appeal to His Majesty the King. I am sure that these were mainly composed by Qadhi Ragheb, but no less willingly approved by the Imam on that account; for the influence of the Qadhi on his master, in spite of the curiously repressive and odious treatment he receives, is such that independent action on the part of the Imam in a matter like this is most unlikely. In fact I have ascertained on unimpeachable first-hand evidence that Qadhi Ragheb sent my letter of the 23rd June to the Imam with a first draft of a telegram which he advised his master to send to His Majesty the King, couched in very much stronger terms than were eventually used in the final form, after drastic sweetening by the Imam. Yet I do not suggest that the Qadhi has been actuated by ill-will: on the contrary I have no doubt that he believes that he has honestly served the Imam's best interests in advising him that this was the golden opportunity for getting by pressure what he might not obtain in less troubled times by free negotiation. In the event the Imam has of course failed; but he has no doubt the more readily agreed to a postponement of the negotiations *sine die* in the persuasion that he has something positive to lose by continuing them now on the basis offered by His Majesty's Government, and something potential to gain by waiting.

34. As to the chances of any better success with the Imam in the future I find it very difficult to prophecy with confidence. Of two things I am sure—that he will never acknowledge the justice of our contention that there has been nothing improper in our occupation of and assumption of control over the disputed area, and that any further argument on our part to persuade him on that score will be worse than a mere waste of time and effort, for it will serve only to rub salt into his wounded pride. Yet when this is said, the possibility still remains that with changed times and the restoration of British prestige by the defeat of Germany and Italy the Imam's positive attitude of diplomatic opposition to the continuance of British (Qu'aiti) control in the region may change to a more negative mood of acquiescence.

V. Conclusion.

35. After ten days spent in preparations for departure, including the requisite farewell calls, we left San'a on the 30th July. Qadhi Ragheb, with whom we had dined formally the night before in company with the members of the British Medical Mission, came to the guest house to see us off. With halts at Hodeidah, Zebid and Ta'iz for mechanical repairs to vehicles and rest to personnel, we reached Aden shortly after midnight on the 6th–7th August.

36. We were very cordially and hospitably treated on our journey, which like that into the Yemen, was continually interrupted by mechanical breakdowns and extremely bad road conditions. At Hodeidah I exchanged calls with the Acting Governor, Qadhi 'Ali al 'Amri (the brother of the Prime Minister), in the absence of Seif al Islam 'Abdullah. At Ta'iz I was well received by the Crown Prince, Seif al Islam Ahmed, who again seemed neither to know nor to care much about the facts and details of the controversy over Shabwa and Al 'Abr, though he expressed himself as most anxious that the Aden Government should have a good opinion of him personally. And generally he confirmed my impression that save for the Imam and his Foreign Minister, and a few sycophants (and the Italians) nobody in the Yemen treats the matter very seriously.

37. I wish to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation for the intelligence, advice and help that I received from my companion, Mr. Saleh Ja'far. He stands virtually in the position of "adopted son" in the household of Qadhi Ragheb and he has very close and cordial contacts with a large circle of Yemeni merchants and notables in the capital and in the provinces. His local knowledge and relations combined with a dignified and impressive manner made him a most valuable assistant. I commend him heartily to Your Lordship's attention.

38. Finally I beg to express my thanks to Sir Bernard Reilly and Mr. Ingrams, and to the Secretariat staff at Aden for much hospitality and sympathetic advice, and material help in the preparation and presentation of documents and in the framing and completion of my Report.

39. This Report I have requested His Excellency the Acting Governor to transmit to Your Lordship with such separate comments or criticism as he may desire to make; and I now await the first available opportunity of transport for my return to Palestine in accordance with your instructions.

I have, etc.,

R. S. CHAMPION.

ANNEXURE " C "

PRÉCIS

(*4th Meeting*)

I. The Treaty provides for a final settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen.

Lack of a final settlement causes uncertainty and dissension.

A final settlement is highly desirable, and there is no better time to effect it than now.

The Yemeni representatives have declined to consider it.

II. As an alternative I have suggested the definition of the *status quo* line along the whole frontier.

The Yemeni representatives have conditionally agreed, the condition being that satisfaction should be given to the Yemeni Government in regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr before any such definition is attempted. By making these terms they have put a most unreasonable obstacle in the way of pacification.

III. Why is it unreasonable? I explained :—

(*a*) The Treaty prescribed the maintenance of the *status quo* on the frontier.

It is not doubted that the *status quo* applied to all the frontier between Husn Murad and the eastern border of Beihan.

Did the *status quo* apply also to the further territory to the east and north, in which Shabwa and Al'Abr are situated?

(*b*) If the answer is " Yes," then the map that I handed to Qadhi Ragheb at the time of the Treaty negotiations is decisive, since it was presented to him at his own request, and it was marked, also at his own request, with the approximate line that, in the words of the Governor of Aden, written immediately after the conclusion of the negotiations, " must be established as the *status quo* before the signature of the Treaty."

It is not enough for Qadhi Ragheb to say that the map was unofficial and not an integral part of the Treaty : it provides a clear guide to the intentions of His Majesty's Government, and it was not questioned by Qadhi Ragheb at the time.

By the line marked upon that map, Shabwa and Al 'Abr are clearly in the Protectorate.

(*c*) If the answer is " No," then the Aden authorities were perfectly free to take any action they wished in any part of the territory that they in good faith deemed to be part of the Protectorate.

In this case Shabwa and Al 'Abr are definitely inside the line known as the " north-east line of 1914," which, in the absence of any subsequent revision or agreement to supersede it, is rightly held by His Majesty's Government to be the boundary of the Protectorate in that region.

It is not enough to say that His Majesty the Imam does not recognise that line : there is no other, and His Majesty's Government consider themselves legally bound by it.

(*d*) But consider what is the position if there were acknowledged to be *no line* bounding the Protectorate in that region :—

Article III of the Treaty mentions boundaries *four* times :—

(1) . . . there shall be postponed the settlement of the matter of the southern boundaries of the Yemen . . .

(2) . . . that the *status quo* regarding the boundaries shall remain . . .

(3) . . . any violation on the said boundaries . . .

(4) . . . any interference *from their side of* the said boundaries in the affairs of the people living *on the other side of* the said boundaries . . .

It is clear that a *line* was intended. Where *sides* exist there must be a dividing *line* between the *sides*.

If there was no dividing line north-east of Beihan, then there was no *status quo* there within the meaning of Article III of the Treaty.

(*e*) But even if we set aside all the above arguments as to the legal rights of His Majesty's Government, let us consider the practical issue :—

(1) Shabwa and Al 'Abr are naturally and geographically within the Hadhramaut system.

(2) Al 'Abr is definitely within the sphere of the Qu'aiti State by virtue of treaties between the Sei'ar tribes and the Qu'aiti Sultan dating back 90 years.

(3) The two places are important and useful points in the Hadhramaut administrative and security system, and their contacts are with the Hadhramaut towns.

(4) They are in practice useless to the Yemen.

(5) They are distant 120–140 miles, or 6–7 days' journey from the nearest Yemeni administrative post, across a barren, dead stretch of uninhabited sandy desert, while they are within the easiest touch with the Hadhramaut.

IV. All these arguments go to show that the places are legally, logically, and reasonably considered to be in the Aden Protectorate, and that no action taken by the Aden authorities in their respect has been other than proper and correct.

On the other hand the *only* arguments that the Yemeni representatives have adduced in support of their claims are merely :—

(1) that Shabwa and Al 'Abr are anciently part of the Yemen, and therefore subject to the present Imam, and

(2) that the present Imam's grandfather ordered the digging of the well at Al 'Abr. They have produced no evidence in support of that statement. On the other hand I have stated that the Sei'ar have given evidence that they themselves dug the well, which is indeed indisputably theirs.

V. I have tried to persuade the Yemeni representatives that whereas the device of the *status quo* was designed to permit the Imam to preserve what he claims as his rights in the Aden Protectorate, so the adoption of a *status quo* line that will stabilise the existing situation, whereby Shabwa and Al 'Abr are in the Protectorate, will equally not prejudice the Imam's claims to these two places also. In this sense there is no essential difference between Shabwa and Al 'Abr and, say, Jebel Jihaf and Dhala'.

VI. I have therefore repeatedly proposed to the Yemeni representatives that a *status quo* line of the above nature in the north-east should be adopted and agreed upon, to be applied during the term of the Treaty and to be treated exactly as any other part of the *status quo* line elsewhere.

They have refused, for no better reason than that the Aden authorities since the Treaty was signed are alleged to have improperly occupied Shabwa and Al 'Abr, and so to have infringed the *status quo* ; which *status quo* either :—

(*a*) did not exist there, or

(*b*) if it did exist there was defined by the very map upon which Qadhi Ragheb asked that it should be delineated.

VII. I made this final appeal to the Yemeni representatives to agree with me upon a reasonable settlement of the matter, and I asked that the foregoing points should be explained in detail to the Imam.

ANNEXURE " D "

TRANSLATION OF LETTER.

(*4th Meeting*) Official No. 1.

To the Honourable Mr. Champion,
Delegate of the British Government, at Sanā'a.

After due respects, we hasten to notify you by this official communication from us to Your Honour that the views which you have written from your own good self to your Ministry, and which you made us hear after we had expressed to you our excuses that we shall listen to them as if we did not hear them, and only in a personal and private manner—these views, we are bound to explain to you hereby in writing and repeatedly, we do not accept ; nor do we have any part in them nor admit that they are right. This especially in respect of the slander against the name of Qadhi Ragheb, that a map was given to him connected with the delineation (of the boundary).

We find ourselves bound to confirm, and assure you that this is not in accordance with the facts, and is contrary entirely to what happened, both fundamentally and generally. It is a clear and a great falsehood, improper in such a one as the delegate of the British Government, which is known for her great dignity and power and sincerity.

And in order to record this officially, we submit it to Your Honour.

Please accept our best respects.

Minister for Yemeni Foreign Affairs,
Muhammad Ragheb bin Rafiq.

Rais el Diwan,
'Abdel Karim el Mutahher.

ANNEXURE " E "

(*4th Meeting*)

To the honourable Representatives of the Yemeni Government, Qadhi Muhammad Ragheb bin Rafiq, and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim el Mutahhar.

After due respects, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed letter of yesterday's date, and I hasten to assure you of my great concern that any such misunderstanding could have occurred as resulted in the ending of our meeting yesterday, for it is clear to me from your letter that you have not fully understood my pure intentions.

Firstly, let me remind you that I had explained that the statement which I read to you was only a tentative draft which I might decide to include in my report to the Secretary of State. I have not written it in its final form, and it is subject to alteration.

Secondly, it was read to you as a clear and brief repetition of my own arguments, all of which I had put forward orally during the preceding meetings ; and my intention in reading it to you was solely in order that you should clearly understand my opinions, without any mistake.

Thirdly, you have every right to reject them if you feel it to be your duty to do so; but I very sincerely regret that you should have considered it necessary to do so in a letter of that nature, and while the excitement of discussion was still alive in us all.

Fourthly, I assure you with whole-hearted sincerity that neither in the words of my rough draft nor in the intentions of my heart have I slandered the Honourable Qadhi Ragheb, for whose honesty and ability I have the profoundest respect, and for whose person I cherish affection and admiration.

Fifthly, it is accepted by us all that a map was given to the Honourable Qadhi Ragheb at his request, and that on it was marked the approximate line of the *status quo*.

You will no doubt also agree that I have often assured you that the map was not official or absolutely binding, and also that I had only cited it, in the absence of other documentary evidence, as an indication of the clear and open intentions of His Majesty's Government; and I am confident that on reconsideration you will see that in none of this is any slander, or falsehood, or impropriety.

In conclusion I pray you to believe that my sincere wish and intention for a friendly and satisfactory settlement are much too strong to allow me to feel mental disturbance or discouragement at anything that happened yesterday. I was sincerely distressed to see that the honourable Quadhi Ragheb was suffering from pain during our talks, and if I had realised that it was so severe, I would have suggested a postponement of the meeting until he should have recovered. He will, I am sure, forgive me for that.

I look forward with pleasure to our next meeting, and am confident that we shall then resume our friendly talks without misunderstanding or embarassment.

Please accept, etc.,

R. S. CHAMPION.

San'a, 30*th April*, 1940.

ANNEXURE "F"

DRAFT: (TRANSLATION.)

(*6th Meeting*)

"In qualification of the Agreement that has been reached between us to-day concerning the definition of the *status quo* in respect of the southern frontier of the Yemen, nothing in the said Agreement shall be taken to affect or detract from the persistent claims of the Imamate of the Yemen to maintain its fundamental and natural rights in regard to Shabwa and Al 'Abr, nor to prejudice the complete and absolute reservation of the said claims."

ANNEXURE "G"

(TRANSLATION)

AN INSTRUCTION BY THE IMAM TO THE QADHIS MUHAMMAD RAGHEB AND 'ABDEL KARIM.

(*7th Meeting*)

We inform you that in accordance with all the correspondence and action and complaints that have lately occurred regarding the important encroachment by the Aden Government against the Sei'ar (having their headquarters at Al 'Abr), and against the Karab (having their headquarters at Shabwa), it is clear that that encroachment is an infringement of the clear undertakings set out in the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty, which is the sole basis and sanction for the relations and affairs, both general and special, connecting the respective British and Yemeni Governments.

And in accordance with the repeated official communications sent by His Majesty King George VI, Mr. Champion was deputed as a delegate to us for the purpose of the settlement of the said regretful incident, and to confirm and ensure the continuance of the good relations between the two Governments as provided by the Treaty, as concluded and executed.

Now, notwithstanding and in spite of all those communications and representations, the said delegate puts forward his last proposal, of which you have sent me a copy, namely the recognition of the right of the Yemen to set forth their case while acquiescing in the encroachment; yet the encroachment by the Aden Government to remain and be perpetuated, an encroachment into the territories of the Yemen in which lie the present and the future of the Yemeni Government and the essence of its protection.

This proposal does not accord with the nature of the case or of the situation, nor is it right or just at all; and besides it contravenes the terms of the Treaty, the fulfilment of which was entrusted to the honour and skill of the two contracting Governments.

We were astonished to see the special delegate of Great Britain, who had been deputed to settle the dispute, to put matters in order and to cement the friendship and interests between England and the Yemen, putting forward in the course of the discussions such a painful request as to ask us to consent and agree to release our land from the hand of our right and lawful possession, and to suggest that we should neglect and cancel our natural rights of ownership and rule in our property, which we have inherited from our forbears and ancestors from long ago.

In all these circumstances we instruct you to inform the honourable delegate that we are not willing to entertain such proposals as these which are not in accord with justice or propriety, and to request him with the greatest respect and honour to ensure the removal of the encroachment against our kingdom by the restoration of our country to us. And you must pursue the negotiations and discussions within the circle of logic and truth, and explain exactly to the delegate that our point of view and intention in this matter is to avoid any feeling or action which might oppose or run counter to the great and well-founded mutual friendship and happy relations between Great Britain and the Yemen; and we trust also in his kind care and endeavours in this respect. This is our object, and we pray God to lead us all to Grace.

5th Rabi 'Thani 1359.

(12*th May*, 1940.)

ANNEXURE "K"

(*9th Meeting*)

Translated note of the Qadhis' statement of the boundaries of the Sei'ar Karab and Bal 'Ubeid tribes.

Sei'ar.

North .. Budu' and the Rub' al Khali.
East .. The 'Awamir tribe and Um Shaqaf.
South .. The Karab and Nahd tribes, and the Hadhramaut—more precisely, Wadi Herez and the bottom of Wadi Makhia.
West .. The Dahm and 'Abida tribes—more precisely Jebel Ghuweirban.

Bal 'Ubeid or Karab (sic.)

North .. The Sei'ar tribe—more precisely 'Arq Ramad, 'Arq Himar and Zari' el Kelb.
East .. The Nahd tribe—more precisely the bottom of Wadi 'Amd and the bottom of Wadi Dhahar.
South .. Ba Nu'man and (Wadi ?) Jardan, and the tribes, Al Dhubal, Al Fesher, Al Sari'a and Nisiyin.
West .. The Dahm and 'Abida tribes—more precisely Jebel Thaniya.

Observation with the statement:—

The Bal 'Ubeid and Karab tribes include the following clans:—

Selmi.
Hayani.
Al 'Uweira.
Al Misfar.
Al 'Amru.
Al Mushai'a.
Al ba Dubhan.
Al Bureik and other small sections.

The Selmi clan are dwellers in Jebel Selm, and number 16 families or about 1,000 souls (sic.)

ANNEXURE "L"

(*10th Meeting.*)

TRANSLATION OF LETTER

From the Imam to Qadhi Muhammad Ragheb, and Qadhi 'Abdel Karim el Mutahhar.

Greetings.

I have understood what you have submitted to me in your oral report about the conclusions of the last meeting which took place between you and the delegate Mr. Champion.

After deep consideration thereof I express to you my great regret and surprise at your negotiations, which are quite beside the point as to Mr. Champion's explanations of his statement, which is illogical, unreasonable and unjust, besides being utterly contrary to the terms of the Treaty and to sound sense, I have never seen or heard such a proposal as that made by Mr. Champion, suggesting that I should abandon my country and not speak about it; and that the British Government should include it under their administration and control.

I therefore command you to inform the honourable delegate that I will not give up one inch, either of the Sei'ar or of the Karab, or of the Bal 'Ubeid tribes. That (namely, the delegate's proposal) would be against the terms of the Treaty, which is to be honoured and respected by both Governments. And if Great Britain wishes to continue to occupy these places by force, I shall not despair of negotiating with His Majesty's Government and His Majesty the King to obtain the restoration of my rights and for what is necessary to the good reputation of Great Britain.

In view of such action and of the explanations of the honourable delegate I order you to demand the surrender (of those places) finally and without any interference, to my territory; and that they should be entirely under my sole administration and rule, and that neither Aden nor any other party should have any right to interfere in them. This is clear justice, and there is no doubt or uncertainty in it. Greetings.

15 Jumad Awal 1359.

(21*st June*, 1940.)

ANNEXURE "M."

(*10th Meeting*)

From Mr. R. S. Champion, O.B.E., to His Majesty the King of the Yemen, The Imam Yehia, etc., etc.

After Compliments.

I have the honour to express to Your Majesty my very deep and sincere regret at the decision which you have been pleased to communicate to the honourable Qadhi Muhammad Ragheb and the honourable Qadhi 'Abdel Karim el Mutahhar and which they have read to me at our meeting yesterday, the 22nd June.

I am in great anxiety lest Your Majesty's decision may lead to a breakdown of our negotiations unless you can see your way graciously to modify it, in a spirit of conciliation; and therefore, before I telegraph its terms and meaning to my Government, I venture to appeal to Your Majesty as a last resource to be good enough to permit your honourable representatives to discuss with me one further possible solution which I have evolved on my personal responsibility, and which I wish to put forward, subject to the later confirmation of my Government.

I mentioned this solution to Your Majesty's representatives at our last meeting; but having so lately received your very clear commands they were unwilling to discuss it, and suggested that I might lay it before Your Majesty direct. And this I do, trusting in your patient wisdom.

The solution creates a zone for neutralisation, larger than that proposed in my last suggestion, and it has the advantage that the two places Shabwa and Al 'Abr are both included in that single zone. It is intended that the zone should remain neutral during the term of the Treaty, and its creation would therefore be without prejudice to the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen, which is prescribed in the Treaty. The solution would not constitute a permanent disposal of the territory within that zone, but only a temporary disposal during the term of the Treaty.

My solution may tentatively (and subject to the approval of my Government), be described as follows:—

> " Without prejudice to the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen which was deferred by Article III of the Treaty of Sana, the area hereinafter described and containing the village of Shabwa and the well of Al 'Abr shall not be brought within the administrative system nor occupied by the armed forces of either His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of Yemen, namely the area bounded—
>
> *On the south* by a straight line drawn due west from ABU SHADD (south-west of Shabwa), until it bisects a straight line drawn due north-east from BEIHAN AL QASAB.
>
> *On the south-east* by a straight line drawn approximately north-eastwards from ABU SHADD (aforesaid), to KHASHM MUSAIHIB (east of Shabwa) and thence in a straight line to BA'RURA (east of El 'Abr).
>
> *On the east* by a straight line drawn due north from BA'RURA (aforesaid) until it intersects a straight line drawn due north-east from BEIHAN EL QASAB (aforesaid).
>
> *On the north-west* by a straight line drawn due north-east from BEIHAN EL QASAB (aforesaid)."

I enclose a rough sketch map* which indicates the effect of the proposal.

In putting forward this proposal I have the honour to assure Your Majesty with complete frankness that I have been throughout these negotiations, and am still, actuated by the most sincere desire to reach a mutually satisfactory and just settlement. As I have several times explained to your representatives, where (as in the present case) there are two sides to a question, and two sets of mutually incompatible claims, it seems that no solution can be devised which will completely satisfy both sides. Therefore my Government have agreed, for the sake of goodwill and friendship, to relax their claims in such a degree as to forego the exercise of control by them in certain parts of the territory concerned. Will not Your Majesty, in illustration of the sincere friendship that I know you have for my King and my Government, and in the interests of good relations, also relax your own claims in that small degree sufficient to meet the proffered gesture of my Government?

Permit me, in conclusion, to assure Your Majesty that if there is any point in my present suggestion or otherwise in connection with the negotiations on which you desire enlightenment which I am able to afford, I am at all times completely at Your Majesty's command and disposal, to answer questions, to give explanations, or to clear up misunderstandings if they exist.

I have, etc.,

R. S. CHAMPION.

Sana'á,
23rd June, 1940

ANNEXURE " N."

(10th *Meeting*)

TRANSLATION.

From H.M. the King of the Yemen, the Imam to Mr. Champion, Delegate of His Majesty the King Emperor.

After compliments.

We have received your letter of the 17th Jumad Awwal, 1359 (23rd June, 1940†), regarding the question of the Karab and Sei'ar known by the names of their two headquarters as Shabwa and Al 'Abr, and we have considered its contents and the sketch map and your new latest proposals.

As you know, a Treaty of real friendship was concluded between the British and Yemeni Governments containing terms clearly guaranteeing that the two Governments would not encroach or penetrate into each other's territories; and until they should agree in the future upon a settlement, they would remain in the same positions in which they were at the date of the signing of the Treaty.

After the lapse of 5 years and more from the time of those guarantees, which were given upon the honour and respect of the two Governments, the Aden Government began to encroach and trespass, forcibly and mercilessly and by means of armed attacks, driving away and making prisoners of our Government's guards; and they frightened and threatened the people of the said places by every kind of menace, even by bombing aircraft and by (sending) men and officers of the British military forces. And they seized out aforesaid property and territory which has been inherited by us through the long centuries from our ancestors; and this they did by disturbance and barbarous force, as if there had been a state of war between the two Governments (God forbid) and as if the Treaty of friendship and good relations had been an agreement permitting Aden to obtain and extend (its sway) over the country of the Yemen *ad lib*: and without any consideration for any sanctify.

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* Not reproduced.

† Annexure " M ".

This contention and severe enmity and serious encroachment against us on the part of the Aden Government occurred by the will of certain youthful officers, who, anxious to enlarge their reputations, pursue a course of incitement between the two Governments, and are determined to cause bloodshed.

If we have not retorted in a completely similar hostile, and warlike way during these serious and notorious raids against out territory of Karab and Sei'ar, including Shabwa and Al 'Abr, it was, as all wise understanding and conscientious persons will realise, only because of our reliance on the honour and justice of the British Government, whom we respect and praise now as in the past and for ever.

With all our politeness, humility and regard we were content to submit our complaints, as in accordance with the proper procedure we deemed due to high rank, and we represented and explained the hostile and witless happenings to the British Government, and especially to the high Royal Throne.

Two years have passed; and in spite of the precise royal commands given by H.M. the King, and by His Government on many occasions, the Aden Government insisted on continuing their hostile, warlike acts with deliberate (evil) intentions against us. And they stood in the way, refusing to restore the rightful, proved Yemeni territories, and raising (or causing) various excuses, procrastinations, insistencies and wrongful acts, thus showing their conceit and pride against us. And this in every way and by every deed, to the degree that if anyone among the tribes, or the tribesmen, or the chiefs, or any of the youthful ambitious officers complained to them, they (the Aden Government) at once, and without making enquiry or getting proof, began to threaten us by sending war-planes over our territory and by dropping bombs on the people of the country and by killing innocent Yemeni souls.

They adopted a very strange practice, of attacking and accusing us whenever a crime occurred between the local people concerned, merely upon the statement of the plaintiff alone, without any consideration for our religious position (status) and for our Throne, which have existed for more than 1,300 years. We have been patient during all these many latter years, knowing and being sure that all these unpleasant matters caused by certain ill-intentioned persons, might open the door of strife between the two Governments. The exalted, powerful and civilized British Government would certainly not degrade herself by allowing such things to happen, in the case of Powers in friendly relations with her; and we have no least doubt about her on that score.

You, Sir, are certainly aware of all that has happened between us and the Aden Government since the conclusion of the firm and blessed Treaty between the two Governments; and you have been deputed to us from London by H.M. King George VI, whose kind and generous nature we recognize, whose pure character we acknowledge, and whose friendship and that of his Government we are proud to maintain. Not as a matter of mere imagination but of actual belief we are confident that His Majesty and his Government will not be content with what the Aden Government have done, by encroachment and determination to divide and distribute our land and property and rights between us and them; nor that we should be required to be silent about the trespass and forcible seizure that have been perpetrated against us publicly and by every means of hostile compulsion. We believe that your appointment as a delegate to us by the just British Government is for the purpose of settling and correcting the hostile, forcible, improper and contradictory acts, committed against the terms of the Treaty, of which your Government had undertaken the observance and fulfilment. There is no difficulty in the care, nor any necessity for examining into and considering it, nor hesitating about it. It is a most regrettable affair, which happened at the instance of the Aden Government, through enmity, and openly; and we have no doubt that their acts were contrary to the wishes and permission of the honourable British Government.

Therefore all we ask from you is the rectification of the regrettable occurrence and the assurance and hastening of the restoration and surrender of our seized territory to us, without any attempt to effect the separation or the handing over of any part of it to the Government of Aden. What we demand does not imply any liability and reparation or the handing over to us of any inch of the lands of others, so that the award, decision and settlement would cause difficulty or necessitate all the discussions conversations and negotiations that have lasted all this long time.

We ask you to complete the case in good faith, worthy of the honour and justice of your Government, and in accordance with the command communicated to us by H.M. the King, your liege.

21st Jumad el Awwal, 1359.

(*27th June*, 1940.)

ANNEXURE " P "

TRANSLATION OF MR. CHAMPION'S SPEECH TO THE IMAM.

Your Majesty,

In the telegram which you have received from His Majesty King George, and of which I have received a copy, it was stated that I was to be given instructions regarding the suspension of my negotiations with Your Majesty's representatives.

I have now received those instructions, which include the direction that I should make the following communication to Your Majesty from my Government; and this, with Your Majesty's permission, I accordingly have the honour to do.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have made what they considered and still consider to be a generous offer as a basis for negotiations, with a view to reaching a compromise on the question at issue; and they learn with deep regret that Your Majesty has not been able to regard this offer as a satisfactory basis for continued discussions.

His Majesty's Government regret too that they are unable to consider the cession to the Yemen of the territories which Your Majesty desires. They therefore feel sure that Your Majesty will agree that, since it has proved impossible to reach an agreement, it will be best to regard the whole question as standing on the basis oft he Treaty of Sana'á until such time as Your Majesty should wish to re-open negotiations as provided in the Treaty, for a final demarcation of the boundary. Mr. Champion has therefore been instructed to return to Aden.

His Majesty's Government will be willing to send another representative to Sana'á at any time, should Your Majesty desire to re-open discussion on the basis of the offer which His Majesty's Government have made.

This is the end of the communication of His Majesty's Government.

It is now with great regret that I must ask Your Majesty's permission to withdraw and return to Aden. It has been a sincere disappointment to me personally that our negotiations have not led to a successful conclusion.

I take this opportunity to express to Your Majesty my hearty thanks for the most hospitable and friendly manner in which I have been treated while your guest in Sana'á, and alsc my high appreciation of the patient courtesy that I have received at the hands of Your Majesty's Ministers and representatives during cur long and detailed and friendly discussions. I shall look back on my visit to your country with pleasure and gratitude : and by reason of my sincere affection for Arabia and its noble people and of my real interest ih the maintenance of good relations between Aden and Sana'á—so desirable always, but more especially now—I shall at all times, wherever I may be, pray for a happy solution of this present problem, and also for Your Majesty's continued prosperity, long life and good health.

78462/40 [No. 198]. No. 217.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE GOVERNOR

(Secret).

SIR, Downing Street, 3rd February, 1941.

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Ingram's despatch of 26th October, 1940*, forwarding copies of Mr. Champion's report on his mission to the Yemen, which has been read with much interest. The ability and patience with which Mr. Champion conducted the negotiations are highly appreciated, and great credit is due to him.

2. I shall be glad if Mr. Saleb Jafar may be informed that the services which he rendered in these negotiations have been most valuable and are fully recognised.

I have, etc.,

LLOYD.

78462/40 [No. 202]. No. 218.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

to

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, PALESTINE.

(Sent 4.0 p.m., 12th February, 1941.)

TELEGRAM.

No. 208. 12th February. Your telegram No. 158†. Champion's report has been received and has been acknowledge in despatch to Governor Aden of 3rd February‡, in which it was stated that it had been read with much interest, and that ability and patience shown by Champion were highly appreciated and great credit was due to him.

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* No. 216. † No. 7846/2/40 [No. 201]: not printed. ‡ No. 217.

17. POLICY IN THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

78481/40 [No. 1]. No. 219.

THE GOVERNOR

to

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Received 11th March, 1940.)

(Confidential (2).)

SIR, Governor's Office, Aden, 14th February, 1940.

I have the honour to refer to Sir Stewart Symes's secret despatch, No. 14, dated 30th January, 1929*, on the subject of policy in the Aden Protectorate, and to state that I think it may be of interest to place on record a summary of developments in the Protectorate since that time. These developments have not altogether followed the lines that my predecessor visualised, and in some respects they have diverged rather widely from them. Treaty revision within the Protectorate and the substitution of a single agreement with federalised tribes in place of the existing separate engagements, which Sir Stewart Symes advocated, have not been brought about. On the other hand His Majesty's Government have intervened more actively in the internal affairs of the Protectorate than they used to do, firstly by insisting on security on the main trade routes, and later by endeavouring to put an end to inter-tribal wars and to support Treaty Chiefs against insubordinate sections of their subjects and so check the tendency to continual disruption among the tribes. Lastly the Government have embarked on an attempt to police the more important parts of the Protectorate, and on this basis of greater security to institute reforms in the condition of the people.

2. These changes have followed on the establishment of air control, which in the first place brought about the ejection of the Zeidis (Yemeni tribesmen) from the Protectorate and facilitated the conclusion of the Treaty of San'a, whereby the process of Zeidi withdrawal was completed, and secondly, enabled a greater degree of contact and control to be established within the Protectorate.

3. I propose to summarise the development of these changes, and at the same time to endeavour to stress the diverse conditions that exist in different parts of the Protectorate territory, and to emphasise the caution that in my opinion is necessary in applying future plans of progress to the varied communities with which we have to deal.

4. Until comparatively recent years Aden itself was regarded as being primarily a fortress, and the Protectorate existed mainly as a No-Man's Land, designed to interpose a vacuum between the fortress and possible enemies on its land approaches. With regard to the tribes inhabiting this enclosure the Governments of India and Bombay contented themselves with concluding treaties with certain recognised Chiefs in order to secure friendly relations with them and to prevent foreign interference in their territories. No attempt was made to extend any benefits to them beyond security from aggression, and even this boon proved to be illusory when the Protecting Power failed to defend the Protectorate from the Turks from 1915 to 1918, and again when it allowed large parts of it to be overrun by the Zeidis of the Yemen from 1919 to 1928, and some portions of it until as late as 1934.

5. During these years nothing was done to improve the lot of the people of the Protectorate, even in the most elementary forms of medical, educational or agricultural development. Progress in these respects was indeed impossible in the anarchic conditions that prevailed among most of the tribes, conditions that were aggravated before the war of 1914–18 by the unchecked importation into the Protectorate of Le Gras arms and ammunition from Jibuti, and after the war by gifts and sales of munitions to the tribes by the British authorities in Aden. It was not until 1931 that it was announced to the principal tribes that Government would insist on the main trade routes radiating from Aden being kept safe for caravans and travellers, and it was only in 1937 that gifts of arms and ammunition were discontinued and their sale limited to responsible Treaty Chiefs.

6. From 1918 to 1934 the principal preoccupation of the Aden authorities, as far as the Protectorate was concerned, was resistance—at first ineffective, but, with the use of the air arm, successful—to Yemeni encroachments. With the Yemeni evacuation of 64 villages in the Audhali country and of eight in Amiri territory as a condition to the signature of the Treaty of San'a in February, 1934, the emancipation of the Protectorate from Zeidi intrusion was virtually complete, although Beidha, which was within the former Anglo-Turkish boundary but had no treaty with the British, and some outlying Yafa'i apanages whose status was doubtful, remained under Yemeni rule.

7. It was now possible to initiate measures for the amelioration of conditions in the Protectorate, but it had for so long been a prey to foreign invasion and internal anarchy that the task was not an easy one. The first requisites were obviously the establishment of some degree of internal security and the institution of closer contact between the Aden authorities and the tribes. A step towards the former had been taken in the declaration of the principle of the sanctity of the main trade routes in 1931, but for several years even this modest instalment of law and order could be enforced only by recurrent punishment of offenders by air action or the threat of it. With regard to contact, the Resident of Aden's Political Staff consisted of one Protectorate (from 1932 Political) Secretary and only one Political Officer, whose duties were defined in 1928 as political and intelligence. It was obviously impossible to maintain much personal intercourse with the people of the Protectorate under arrangements of this sort. Visits were paid to some parts of the country from time to time by the Resident and his small staff, but these were occasional, and the principal meeting place was Aden,

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* No. 346 in Middle East, No. 22.

where contact was limited to the periodic visits of the Treaty Chiefs and to interviews with their favoured dependents who clamoured round the Residency Office for Government largesse, and, above all, for arms and ammunition wherewith to uphold their prestige in their homes and to overawe or kill their neighbours, and so continue with zest the national pastime of fratricidal blood feuds. With the people at large, and especially with the subjects of the Chiefs and tribesmen, the representatives of the Protecting Power had hardly any contact except such as was possible for the single Political Officer to make when on tour.

8. The advent of the Royal Air Force and the institution of air control in 1928, followed by the ejection of the Zeidis, opened the way to a more active policy. Two further causes contributed to this change. In the first place it was possible for the Political Officer's pioneer work in exploring the remoter parts of the Protectorate to be extended, and the establishment of landing grounds brought outlying districts within much easier reach and incidentally indicated the great need for more Political Officers to help the Air Force activity and to supplement it on the Political side. Secondly, the consolidation of the Imam's rule in the Yemen produced an unedifying contrast between the absolute security that he enforced on the main trade routes of his independent Arab State and the disorder and brigandage that, in spite of the Government's declaration of 1931, still prevailed on some of the main trade routes in the adjacent British Protectorate. In 1932 the Imam closed the Yemeni-Protectorate frontier to trade on account of the dangers and depredations on the British side of the border, and when he eventually re-opened it in 1934 as a corollary to the signature of the Treaty of San'a drastic air action was needed from time to time before the main trade routes leading towards Aden within the Protectorate became reasonably safe.

9. In order to implement the new policy the staff of Political Officers in the Western part of the Protectorate has gradually been increased from one (until September, 1934) to five in 1939, and air control has been supplemented by the reorganisation under British guidance of the Sultan of Lahej's forces and by the creation of Tribal Guards and Government Guards, whose duty it is to assist in maintaining internal security. On this foundation of more peaceful conditions efforts are now being made to inaugurate plans for educational, medical and agricultural schemes, and to improve communications and trade by converting caravan routes into roads fit for motor traffic.

10. These attempts to achieve peace and progress are appreciated by many of the more intelligent elements in the Western Protectorate, but they are very seriously hampered by the apathy, selfishness or even open opposition of many of the Chiefs, and by the innate conservatism of the tribes and their distrust of any measures that may disturb their ancient customs or interfere with their freedom and independence. Above all, reforms that cost money are handicapped by the poverty of the country and the consequent dependence of nearly all improvements on the generosity of His Majesty's Government. The Sultan of Lahej, ruling over a large and fertile oasis, enjoys a regular revenue of about Rs.3 lakhs, and Chiefs, such as the Amir of Dhala' and the Fadhli Sultan, derive incomes from transit and other dues, while the Audhali Sultan possesses some productive lands, but for the most part the country has few resources from which to maintain any but a most primitive form of administration. There are no towns or commercial centres of any wealth or size in the Western Protectorate, for the largest and busiest is the small town of Lahej, and Aden cannot look for any direct reward for outlay on this area, except for some possible increase in its land trade and for a sense of that kind of virtue that is its own reward.

11. It cannot be said that British attempts at modern progress in these districts have been made in response to a demand on the part of either Chiefs or people. Rather they are due to a feeling on the part of the British that it is unjustifiable to retain a suzerainty over a wide belt of territory without making some endeavour to ameliorate its material fortunes, and that a European Power exercising protection over a backward Asiatic population is bound to offer it some of the advantages that Western civilisation believes itself able to give to the East. It can, however, be fairly claimed that in no part of the Aden Protectorate have either His Majesty's Government or the British authorities at Aden tried to impose an alien culture or to denationalise the people. On the contrary, they have constantly sought to respect all that is best in Arab character and tradition, and to build on Arab lines. They have been rewarded by much goodwill and genuine friendship, and by loyalty and appreciation among those in contact with them. They have thus been encouraged to persevere in the belief that the Aden Protectorate, in spite of rebuffs and disappointments, may eventually become an example of successful co-operation between two races which, although differing in certain fundamental respects, have much in common in their outlook on life, in their individualism, and in their love of freedom.

12. This summary of recent British policy in southern Arabia has dealt so far with what is now called the Western Aden Protectorate, that is with the territory in the neighbourhood of Aden which used to be known as, and is still sometimes termed, the Nine Cantons, although it includes areas beyond the country of the original nine protected tribes from which this designation was derived.

13. The story of the Eastern part of the Protectorate differs in many respects from that of the Western, and until recent years the Hadhramaut was regarded by many (including the British Foreign Office) as a separate entity, distinct from the Aden Protectorate, and it was so shown in many maps. The British treaties with the Eastern Chiefs are, however, identical in form with those concluded with most of the Western tribes, and they were made by the Government of India for much the same reasons. Just as Aden was looked upon as a necessary outpost of the Indian Empire, so the south Arabian coast, which faces India across the Arabian Sea, was considered to be an area from which all outside political influence, except that of the British, ought to be excluded. With this object treaties were made with the Sultan of Qishn and Socotra in 1886 and with the Qu'aiti Sultan of Mukulla in 1888, and with minor coastal Chiefs at about the same time. The purport of the treaties was similar to that in the Western part of the Aden Protectorate, for they provided for British

protection against external aggression in return for isolation from all foreign intrusion. With the coastline thus assured as a British sphere of influence, little or no interest was taken in the internal affairs of these Arab dependencies, and none at all in the comparatively remote valley of the Hadhramaut, which was regarded as being almost inaccessible and as being fanatically hostile to contact with foreigners.

14. The first signs of change appeared towards the close of the war of 1914–18, when fear of Turkish claims combined with dissatisfaction with the landlocked position of the Kathiri territory induced the Kathiri Sultans to enter into an agreement concluded in 1918 with their traditional enemy the Qu'aiti Sultan, through which they voluntarily placed themselves under British protection.

15. For a good many years this association with the British Government remained more nominal than real, for it was difficult to give any practical effect to it, and the Aden authorities, finding it impossible to honour their treaty obligations even to tribes in the near vicinity of Aden, were loath to involve themselves in more distant commitments. With the advent of the Royal Air Force contact with outlying districts became much easier, and the construction of the first landing ground in the Hadhramaut valley at Shibam in 1932 led to the first visit by a British Resident of Aden to this interesting country early in 1933*.

16. The condition of this remote but comparatively civilised valley was remarkable, for it presented an astonishing contrast between luxurious opulence of its wealthy merchants and Seiyids, who had enriched themselves in the East Indies, and the poverty and turbulence of the indigenous people who were devoid of foreign culture and continued to indulge in their ancient custom of internecine warfare. These opposite habits of life were intermingled to a point of absurdity, but the nominal rulers were impotent to suppress disorder, and the rich Seiyids could resort to nothing but bribery to solve their difficulties, a remedy which they found, as usual, to be in fact no solution at all. In these circumstances the well-to-do and more intelligent classes, who had seen the benefits of law and order abroad, despaired of any amelioration of their own country except through foreign intervention, and they appealed insistently to the Protecting Power to come to their help.

17. For a time the lack of Political staff at Aden and the disinclination of the British authorities to add to their responsibilities, which seemed at that time to be already more than they could meet, delayed any effective response to Hadhrami requests for aid; and these overtures were met only by occasional visitations and by expressions of goodwill. The gradual expansion of the Aden Political staff, however, made it possible to obtain closer contacts with this remote region, and to secure a valuable report on its condition and needs, which furnished a basis for a constructive policy of assistance. Imperial considerations were involved, and the Foreign Office particularly desired a more forward policy in this region. The prospects of finding oil also contributed to this active policy and closer touch with the country.

18. Internal peace was the first requisite, and in 1937 the misconduct of some notorious marauders afforded a timely opportunity for demonstrating the power of air control. This display of force, which was eagerly welcomed by the peaceable elements in the country, was followed by vigorous political action resulting in a great number of inter-tribal truces, which brought temporary tranquillity to a part of the world that had been distracted for centuries by murderous blood feuds. The next step was to endeavour to make the peace permanent, and this was met by the appointment of a British Resident Adviser to the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultanates in 1937. This measure has resulted in the initiation of a series of financial, military, educational, medical, agricultural and other reforms in the Hadhramaut States, which have received general approbation.

19. Peace must be founded on security, for which air control must, in both parts of the Aden Protectorate, be ultimately responsible, but, as in the Western Protectorate, so in the Eastern, air control has been supplemented by the creation of internal security ground forces. This has been achieved by the reorganisation of the Mukalla Army and by the institution of new units in the shape of the Kathiri Armed Constabulary, the Qu'aiti Gendarmerie and the Balhaf Tribal Guards, while a Hadhrami Bedouin Legion is being raised to control the desert areas. In a country addicted to chronic internal disturbance strong local forces for the maintenance of order are essential to any form of peaceful progress, and the readiness with which these security measures have so far been accepted is an indication of a general desire to be quit of the old evils of perpetual strife.

20. In this respect the Eastern Protectorate exhibits a marked contrast to the Western. In the former internal peace is ardently desired by the most influential classes, and they are willing to contribute to its organisation from their accumulated wealth. In the Western Protectorate there is no corresponding element of cultured and civilised people who appreciate the need for change. The Protectorate College for the sons of Chiefs, inaugurated at Aden in 1934, may eventually produce a new generation that will welcome more enlightened views, but for the present appreciation of modern western ideas on these subjects is limited in the Western Protectorate to a small minority among both Chiefs and people. The "raya," or subjects, stand to gain by British intervention and are therefore friendly to it, but the petty Chiefs and their tribesmen and others who have vested interests in old customs and old abuses resent the imposition of new ideas which may interfere with their privileges and profits. Although there appears to be a growing appreciation of the benefits of internal peace and other advantages that British intervention can confer, there is thus still a strong mass of opinion that is opposed to change, and that prefers the old system under which the Protecting Power limited itself to securing the tribes against external aggression, and, for the rest, left them to their own devices and to an uninterrupted enjoyment of their tribal traditions and vendettas. Moreover, as already stated, the Western Protectorate is poor, and has the most limited resources from which it can pay for reforms, which must therefore be not only initiated but also financed by His Majesty's Government.

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*For Sir Bernard Reilly's report of his visit to the Hadhramaut in 1933, *see* No. 93 in Middle East, No. 46.

21. For all these reasons it behoves the Protecting Power to proceed with great caution in these backward districts. The Arabs, here as elsewhere, are tenacious of their liberty and of what they consider to be their rights. Where they are unaccustomed to foreigners, as is the case in large parts of the Western Protectorate, they are extremely suspicious of them, and their resentment against outside interference is easily aroused. Above all, it is necessary for an alien Government, anxious in its benevolence to uproot old evils, to be on its guard against appeals to religious prejudice. Some attempts have already been made among the Western Protectorate tribes to arouse xenophobia on this pretext; and, although religious fanaticism is happily rare among the Arabs of the Protectorate it must be remembered that it exists in the neighbouring Yemen, and that its contagion may spread if it is provoked.

22. The objects of British policy are the same throughout the Aden Protectorate. In addition to the vital aims of security for the fortress of Aden and for British interests in an important part of the Empire, they seek the peaceful development of this large territory, which has an area approximately equal to that of the United Kingdom, on Arab lines under British guidance. Great Britain has little to gain from this Protectorate, except from its strategic value, and the benevolence of her intentions are proved by the money that she is willingly spending on it. The whole Protectorate is in a sense homogenous, inasmuch as it is almost exclusively inhabited by Arabs; but its people vary from the rich families of the Hadhramaut, who have added a modern foreign culture to their own, to very primitive tribesmen, and to others like the Yafa'is who, though they produce many men of remarkable intelligence and capacity, are obstinately tenacious of the isolation of their country from all foreign (including British) penetration.

23. These diversities must be taken into account, and although the intentions of British policy are the same throughout the Protectorate, the methods of achieving them and the time taken to attain them must vary according to the different conditions and temperaments of the various component tribes. Precipitancy may be fatal, and patience is essential. If this is remembered progress may be sure though in some cases it must be slow. If success is eventually achieved it will be due to those who have combined confidence and courage with caution, and enterprise with restraint. I have endeavoured especially to indicate the differences between the Western and Eastern Protectorates, which, in addition to geographical reasons, have necessitated their separate organisation. Unification of future policy in the two parts of the Protectorate must be conditioned on a realisation of their essential differences, and on the consequent divergence of methods that must be adopted if ultimate success is to be achieved.

24. The policy that has been initiated in recent years of gradual political, economic and social development in the Protectorate has been pursued under the aegis of air control supplemented by local ground security forces. This system relies on the ultimate sanction of air action, although it is hoped that the expansion and improvement of ground police forces and the effects of increased political penetration and contact will diminish the need for bombing to a point when this weapon will be very rarely, if ever, needed. Unfortunately this goal has not been reached, but another factor has arisen which makes it necessary to curtail air action in the Protectorate as much as possible. This is the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939. As long as there is any possibility of a serious attack on Aden itself or on the vital British sea communications in the Gulf of Aden and the southern part of the Red Sea, the Royal Air Force here must conserve its strength against this possibility and its commitments in the interior of the Protectorate must be kept to a minimum. Air control must be continued, for at this stage the fruits of work in the Protectorate in recent years would be largely lost if it were removed. Plans for further progress must, however, be conditioned by a realisation that the air arm can be used only very sparingly to subdue opposition. This limitation to the employment of force in support of our internal policy throws a greater responsibility on Political Officers who must more than ever endeavour to gain their ends through friendly contacts and peaceful persuasion.

I have, &c.,

B. R. REILLY, Governor.

(C46866) 20 9/43